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Abstract and Keywords
The loyalists of the American Revolution have never been explored from the
perspective of honour and masculinity. This dissertation offers a new reading of the
loyalist experience by drawing on the insights and methodologies of cultural history and
the anthropological study of honour, as well as the history of masculinity, to
contextualize the class and gender-based concerns embedded in patriot and loyalist
written records. American revolutionaries attacked loyalist men using deeply gendered
language and symbols, and succeeded in dishonouring loyalism in general, while also
driving individual loyalists from their communities. Male loyalists relied on the same
culture of honour to rationalize their experiences, justify their continued allegiance to the
Crown, and transform injuries intended as marks of shame into badges of honour.
This dissertation adds to the historiography of the loyalists, and to the wider study
of eighteenth century masculinity and honour, by revealing that while the American
Revolution was a deadly conflict, at the local level patriots often destroyed a loyalist’s
public existence and honour rather than kill him outright. Despite differences of political
ideology, loyalists and patriots shared a common culture of manhood which made insults
and humiliations exceedingly powerful. The combination of legal punishments and social
ostracism is referred to in this dissertation as political death, an original theory which
describes the process and consequences of the loss of citizenship, the negation of
patriarchal power and privileges, financial ruin, and the cultural dishonour of white
loyalist gentlemen and their families. Using the themes of household patriarchy, public
and printed insults, captivity, and vengeance, this study explains how the benchmarks of
manhood were systematically stripped from loyalists, and how the patriots formed their
own masculine ideals in contrast to the dishonoured loyalists. This dissertation also
reveals the importance of honour in the loyalists’ self-perception, their official claims on
the British government for compensation, and their political rebirth in Canada as they
attempted to restore their privileged status with Britain’s help. Loyalist honour has been
described by American historians as being submissive and deferential, but this
ii

dissertation argues that it was in fact as assertive and demanding as the patriot concepts
of manhood formed in the American Revolution.

Key Words: American Revolution, Loyalists, honour, dishonour, gender, gentility,
manhood, masculinity, culture, Revolutionary War, prisoners of war, insults, revenge,
Pre-Confederation Canada.
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1. Political Death
On August 10, 1776, a funeral procession filed through the streets of Savannah,
Georgia. According to one newspaper account “a greater number of people than ever
appeared on any occasion before in this province” participated in the gathering, not to
pay their respects to an esteemed local – but to mark the political death of their king.
“Forasmuch as George the Third, of Great Britain hath most flagrantly violated his
coronation oath, and trampled upon the constitution of our country, and the sacred rights
of mankind” went the eulogy, “we therefore commit his political existence to the ground,
corruption to corruption; tyranny to the grave…in sure and certain hope that he will never
obtain a resurrection to rule again over these United States of America.” The King was
dead, but not at the hands of the colonists. One year earlier a pseudonymous contributor
to the New York Journal, “Amicus Constitutionis,” had expounded on the same idea. He
explained: “When the King of Great Britain violates the constitution…he unkings
himself… The person remains, but the constitutional King of Great Britain no longer
exists in him. Nor can he be recovered from that degradation, that moral and political
death…”1 For the funeral attendees and Amicus Constitutionis alike, the colonists had
not committed symbolic regicide; rather the King had committed political suicide.
George III did not suffer his political death alone. In November 1774, with
Boston harbour closed and Massachusetts under martial law, the Essex Gazette described
the loyalist Supreme Court Justice William Browne as “politically deceased of a
persistent and mortal Disorder, and now buried in the ignominious Ruins at Boston.” In
1779, two much lower ranking Connecticut loyalists, Hiel Camp and Joel Stone, were
referred to by the probate court as “politically deceased, but now with the Enemies of this
and the rest of the United States of America.”2 Camp and Stone were both living in the
little parish of Judea in northwestern Connecticut when they fled their homes in January
1777. Little information remains of Hiel Camp. He was a small farmer who later settled
1
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in New Brunswick after the Revolution.3 Stone, on the other hand, was a rising young
merchant who penned a detailed, (if self-serving), account of his experiences. He presents
himself as a man of integrity surrounded by people possessed by an “invincible frenzy.”
Because of his principled stand he was “perplexed and harassed” and forcibly dragged
before the local Revolutionary committeemen for questioning, before being driven from
his home and family. The state confiscated his property and he became a social outcast
whose former friends “became the most implacable enemies.” To his neighbours, Stone
had committed one of the most dishonourable acts imaginable: betrayal. The probate
court treated him as if he was a deceased bankrupt, and invited creditors to claim what
they could from a ruined fortune before the remainder of his property was auctioned.
Though Stone recorded that he was pursued by men who considered him “unworthy to
live”, Revolutionary authorities rarely followed through with their threats to execute
loyalists.4 Instead, those men who made the active choice to support the King and his
government faced a concerted legal and social process of humiliation, emasculation,
ostracism, and dishonour. Just as George III had “unkinged” himself, in the eyes of
patriots, the loyalists had unmanned themselves and had killed the citizens within them
by remaining royal subjects. This was the loyalists’ political death.
In modern usage political death usually “refers to the effective ending of political
career possibilities,” because of resounding defeats or scandals.5 In this dissertation
“political death” is used in the ways eighteenth century commentators understood the
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term. Empires, countries, and individuals could all die politically because of their moral
defects. In May 1775, William Moore Smith, the provost of the College of Philadelphia,
delivered a convocation address entitled “The End of Empires.” Though ostensibly about
Rome, he was clearly speaking about the British Empire in America. “Empires carry in
them their own bane,” he remarked, “and proceed…from virtuous industry and valour, to
wealth and conquest; next to luxury, then to soul corruption and bloated morals; and last
of all, to sloth, anarchy, slavery, and political death.”6 Political death, according to Smith,
was the tragic but inevitable result of unchecked wealth, power, and pride.
Once Americans had secured their independence, they continued to watch for
signs of creeping immorality or apathy that could sink the infant republic. The postRevolutionary economic crisis and the former colonies’ continued dependence on British
goods led one writer, “The Spirit of ‘75”, to wish “to heaven I held the trumpet of an
arch-angel and could rouze [sic] you from the slumbers of political death!”7 This was a
clear warning that the inexorable economic pull of Britain would slowly and almost
clandestinely erode America’s hard-won liberty unless Americans were vigilant and
rejected foreign luxuries. A similar sentiment was expressed in 1783 by “Moses”, who
lamented America’s continued trade with Britain instead of France, and implored his
countrymen to “awake, lest the sleep of political death be upon you.”8 Like the loyalists,
the fledgling republic could cause its own political death through unmanly dependence on
Britain.
In a legal sense, political death was sometimes used as a synonym for “civil
death.” A dictionary definition from 1771 explains that “when a person is sentenced to
perpetual banishment, to work in the mines, or row in the gallies [sic], he is said to
undergo a civil or political death.” The eighteenth century Irish politician Charles Lucas
agreed, writing “As Liberty may be called political Life; so Confinement, or
6
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Imprisonment may be looked on, as political Death.”9 Patriot courts charged many
loyalists with high treason and sentenced them to fates which clearly fit this legal
definition. In the English legal tradition, traitors faced both execution and acts of
attainder which recognized a moral stain, a “corruption of blood,” wherein the lingering
heinousness of the offence destroyed the line of inheritance. Children of traitors would
receive nothing from their dishonoured fathers. States shied away from directly applying
“corruption of blood” to loyalist family members who remained behind, but confiscation
essentially produced the same effect. Attainder was the complete negation of a man as the
legal head of a household, and by extension the state’s relationship to a loyalist’s wife,
children, servants and slaves became frighteningly uncertain.10 Political death was a
family affair.
Political death was not just a legal punishment, but represented deep moral
corruption. A letter published in Spooner’s Vermont Journal in June 1785, shows a very
personal understanding of political death. The author, “Justice,” argues that certain
gentlemen in his community had dishonoured themselves through a duplicitous real
estate deal. In response he declares that “A Man’s honour is his political life; and the
moment he sacrifices it, he dies a political death – he is no longer a useful member of the
community, but is truly a burden to society.”11 This idea permeated the loyalist
experience. To patriots, the active choice to support the Crown in the American
Revolution displayed a level of moral bankruptcy that dishonoured the man and his
household. Unapologetic loyalists could not be permitted to remain a part of the
community, or else their presence might dishonour the whole.
The political death of the loyalists encompassed all of these definitions and was
manifested in a variety of ways. It could occur all at once with a sudden and violent
boiling-over of popular resentment towards a confirmed or rumoured loyalist. Or it could
happen incrementally as the crisis deepened and local grievances became entangled with
9
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the wider political conflict. The process leading to political death followed a common
pattern throughout the colonies. Crowds and individuals mocked and insulted known or
suspected loyalists. Tories could be shunned and their businesses boycotted. Depending
on local conditions and what was happening in the wider conflict, patriots usually
escalated their activities to vandalism and threats, and loyalists who remained in their
communities could be subjected to shaming rituals normally reserved for social pariahs.
Relatively few loyalists were subjected to the public dishonour of tarring and feathering,
carting, or riding the rail, but the prospect of such humiliation provided a terrifying
warning. These sorts of attacks and insults were normally directed at men, and the best
surviving information from both loyalist and patriot sources, describes the experiences of
public men of at least local significance. Political death was the total destruction of the
public life of a man within society. It was the popular rejection of his authority as a
householder, the rejection of his claims to personal honour through insults and shaming,
the stripping of his citizenship and property, and his final ostracism from the company of
his former peers. Added to this was the ignominy of being legally proscribed as a traitor.
These were dishonours the loyalist Joseph Galloway described as “penalties more severe
than death itself”, and this was what the patriots intended.12 By degrading their internal
enemy, the patriots elevated their own place in society. They created the archetype of a
villainous Tory which stood in opposition to the righteous patriot.
This dissertation explores the political death experienced by loyalist men who
considered themselves “gentlemen.” Colonial gentlemen comprised a loose collection of
men from a variety of social ranks and levels of wealth. Men such as William Bayard or
Oliver DeLancey were fabulously wealthy urban grandees, living off old money and
Atlantic trading networks, who sat at the pinnacle of colonial America. Other loyalist
gentlemen were like Amos Botsford, the son of middling sort of farmer, but who had
entered the world of gentility as a Yale-educated lawyer with a thriving practice and
government connections. Samuel Cornell was a South Carolina planter and slave owner.
Jonathan Boucher was an Anglican clergyman in Maryland, a prominent planter, and an
outspoken champion of the royalist cause. John Porteous was a Scottish merchant
12
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engaged in frontier trading, while the young merchant Joel Stone kept a shop at a remote
crossroads in Connecticut. Though separated by vast sums of money, education, regional
culture, and political connections, these men and their patriot counterparts were
connected by the pursuit of genteel respectability and adhered, as best they could, to the
expectations of eighteenth century patriarchy.
Loyalists made a different political choice than patriots, but they shared the same
culture. Indeed, it is this shared culture which made patriot attacks on loyalists so
powerful – both sides spoke in the same cultural language of symbols and meanings, and
attacks and insults to loyalist homes or bodies were charged with dishonour and
emasculation. The inability of loyalists to effectively respond to these insults left them
looking impotent and feeble. Nearly all of the loyalists explored in this dissertation fled
their homes rather than stand and face the overwhelming numbers. By attacking symbols
of the loyalists’ honour and patriarchal power, the patriots undermined the legitimacy of
loyalist men as householders and leaders. The language of honour fuelled and legitimized
the persecution of men who were considered a sinful and poisonous social threat. The
tactics used to drive them from their communities recognized that they were unworthy of
the privileges of white, land-owning men.
Loyalists expressed bitterness, anger, and grief at their treatment, but they rarely
mentioned feeling any shame for the consequences of their political choice. Instead they
regarded the whole experience as a terrible injustice perpetrated against a virtuous
minority by a deluded mob. Loyalists had few other options than to flee to the British
forces for safety. Exiled from their communities, loyalists were unable to support their
families without assistance, further undermining their role as independent providers.
Some loyalists sought vengeance while others tried to rebuild their lives as best they
could. For those loyalists who left America with the British in their final defeat, patriot
attacks intended as expressions of shame and ridicule soon became marks of honour in
the quest to prove the depth of their loyalty and willingness to suffer for the royal cause.
The loyalist experience is well known to historians, but that experience has not
been explored from the perspective of eighteenth century concepts of honour and
masculinity. Drawing on scholarship exploring manhood in colonial America and early
modern Britain, as well as both historical and anthropological examinations of honour,

7
this dissertation offers a new reading of the loyalist experience. Loyalists faced a
concerted campaign directed at destroying their honour and manhood. The patriot
reliance on these concepts in their attacks on loyalists speaks to the continued cultural
importance of masculine honour in the Atlantic world. “Tory” became the patriot
shorthand for a fallen man, while patriots became archetypes of masculine
accomplishment and virtue. Loyalists saw the situation in reverse, but despite their best
efforts suffered total defeat in the conflict. The bewildered and defeated loyalists either
reintegrated quietly into American society, or established new communities in the British
Empire. The loyalists’ political rebirth in these new lands was built on the same
traditional ideas of manhood and honour they had lost. This examination sheds light on
the anatomy of eighteenth century masculine honour and patriarchy, and how it could be
used to attack men as well as oppress women. The revolutionaries may have torn down
the power of monarchy and notions of aristocracy in the colonies, but, like their loyalist
counterparts, they were never radical enough to consider alternatives to these patriarchal
ideals. Whigs and Tories, loyalists and patriots, were united in their concerns about their
own masculinity and honour.

Loyalists were drawn from every strata of colonial society, and the vast majority
were simple farmers. Yet most of what we know about the loyalists comes from the
surviving records of the middling and upper ranks of society. Letters, diaries, government
documents, pamphlets and other printed material which form the basis of most historical
studies were produced by a comparatively privileged minority, and therefore histories
have had to rely on the experience of white, literate, often wealthy men to explain the
loyalist experience in general. Studies of loyalist women have been more exacting in their
conclusions, noting how elite women had a very different experience from the humbler
sort, but male loyalists have not yet had this same nuanced treatment. All men were
required to meet basic standards of masculinity, but gentlemen needed to meet higher,
more refined benchmarks of behaviour and conspicuous consumption in order to display
their virtues as successful men. The persecution and defeat loyalist gentlemen suffered
would have been interpreted and experienced differently from the lower sorts. This is not
to suggest that the higher ranking loyalists faced a harsher situation during the conflict.

8
Indeed, gentlemen loyalists, despite their greater monetary losses, likely faced less
material distress than the poorer loyalists in exile. British authorities were more willing to
sympathise with fellow gentlemen than they were with the common people. But it was
the middling or elite loyalists who were targeted by patriots in particular ways that will
be seen throughout this dissertation. Their pretences to authority and honour were
directly attacked by the patriots. In the American social memory that grew out of the
Revolution, it was the aristocratic Tory who remained the face of the loyalists. The rank
and file loyalists hardly left a trace on American history, while both the patriot
propaganda and the evidence of the wealthy loyalist minority remained.13 Similarly, the
Canadian loyalist myth remembered the loyalists as America’s most morally upstanding
and righteous men, and for generations this idea was accepted by historians.14
Ninety percent of the white refugees who settled in Upper Canada and a similar
number in the Canadian Maritimes were people of very modest means, mostly farmers
and labourers.15 Nonetheless, the tiny minority of loyalist gentlemen who settled in the
new provinces founded a colonial ruling class, and loom large in both the historiography
and in the popular memory. They were the most vocal, and had the ability to record their
thoughts at the time and for posterity. Towns, streets, and parks still bear their names.
Loyalist histories are often reliant on this privileged minority to build a picture of loyalist
thought in general, but do not engage with the important cultural aspects which separated
13

The idea of loyalist gentility is pervasive and has continued despite it being proven that the elite were
only a small minority. This fact can be seen in Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution
(New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 176. Wood argues that a “disproportionate number of [loyalists] were
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might be. To indulge in a counterfactual, it seems likely that had Britain won the Revolution, historians
might now be discussing how a disproportionate number of rebels were wealthy Virginia planters, Boston
merchants, and Pennsylvanian grandees.
14

As early as the 1930s, historians began revising this heroic loyalist narrative. In 1937, R.O. MacFarlane
rejected both American histories in which the “loyalists left because they were children of the devil…” and
Canadian historians who argued that “they left because they were following the Lord”. Though MacFarlane
was conscious that his ideas may “savour of heresy, if not sacrilege,” he was inspired by Progressive
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Migrations: A Social and Economic Movement,” In L.F.S. Upton, The United Empire Loyalists: Men and
Myths, (Toronto: The Copp Publishing Company, 1967), 158-161.
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the elite or the aspiring elite from the common people of the eighteenth century. This
dissertation, therefore, does not try to extrapolate from middling and upper class
experiences to explain the white loyalists as a whole.16 Rather, the experiences of this
elite loyalist minority provide a fascinating look at the ways honour and status were
constructed in the eighteenth century. The anatomy of patriarchy, honour, and
masculinity can often be seen most clearly in negative, and this is certainly true in the
case of the loyalists. The shared cultural values of honourable manhood became more
explicit in times of crisis, and were claimed and challenged by both loyalists and patriots
in the crucible of the American Revolution. The symbols and signs of respect which
marked certain men as genteel and privileged were denied to loyalists, who in turn
believed the whole moral order of their society was being overthrown. Whether or not
this idea was shared by the thousands of lower ranking white loyalists remains an open
question and is not directly explored in this study. The objective of this dissertation is to
uncover the cultural sources of male power in eighteenth century America, how that
power was conferred, claimed, and denied, and to explain the actions of elite loyalist men
from the perspective of their cultural world-view as gentlemen.
This study is a cultural history and as such it explores “ways of thinking”. In the
words of Robert Darnton, cultural history examines “not merely what people thought but
how they thought – how they constructed the world, invested it with meaning, and
infused it with emotion.”17 Eighteenth century people fit themselves into complex
hierarchies that were held together by symbols, rituals, and moral obligations. How
people reacted to challenges and disruptions to these already fluid constructs tells us a
great deal about what and how people thought. This dissertation is therefore an attempt to
grasp the mentalities of the loyalists and the patriots; the moral, even cosmological
justifications for their political positions and for their attacks on their adversaries. These
mentalities were expressed as binary positions of the manly and effeminate, and of the
16

Jerry Bannister and Liam Riordan, “Loyalism and the British Atlantic, 1660-1840” in The Loyal Atlantic:
Remaking the British Atlantic in the Revolutionary Era, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 5.
17

Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History, (New York:
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to the Eighteenth Century (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2003).
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honourable and dishonourable. They were articulated in the print culture of the period, in
personal writings, and can be read in the actions and behaviours of participants.
To flesh out these ways of thinking, this study draws from three areas of enquiry:
the historiography of the loyalists and the American Revolution, the study of masculinity
in the English Atlantic, and the historical and anthropological exploration of honour
cultures. Masculinity and honour overlap in many ways, but studies tend to treat them
separately, or consider one but neglect the other. Yet it is clear that masculine honour can
only be achieved if one meets the benchmarks of manhood. The two concepts have a
reciprocal relationship that cannot be separated, and both concepts are invested with ideas
of power. R.W. Connell, one of the most cited authorities on the concept of masculinity,
coined the term “hegemonic masculinity” to describe the culturally dominant form of
masculinity within a society “which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant
position of men and the subordination of women.” Furthermore, he later argued that there
are competing forms of masculinity within societies based on class, culture, ethnicity, or
race which lead to male hierarchies.18 In colonial America, the hegemonic form of
masculinity was the gentleman. That is not to say every man pursued this idea. Men on
the frontiers had little use for such ideas in their day-to-day struggles, and gentility likely
struck Native Americans as altogether pointless. Yet in settled regions, gentility and
power had an inextricable relationship. The loyalists in this dissertation, like their patriot
and British counterparts, were concerned with achieving and maintaining their position as
gentlemen.
The pursuit of gentility became an obsession during the eighteenth century among
the increasingly wealthy middling sorts and elite landholders in the colonies. Richard L.
Bushman’s The Refinement of America: Persons, Houses, Cities (1992) provides a
systematic examination of the aspirations of colonial Americans (both men and women)
to achieve levels of gentility – style, tastes, knowledge, and behaviour – that set them
apart from the lower orders. Beginning in the early eighteenth century, elite colonials
attempted to cultivate expressions of refinement that were meant to serve as both
18
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emblems of wealth and power, and as projected evidence of a “cultivated and refined
inward life.” Speech, dress, and architecture all changed as wealth increased and widened
the social chasm that separated the upper classes from the lower sorts. These aspiring
colonials were deeply conscious of their behaviour, and books on manners and decorum
were essential reading for their children. Most importantly, exhibitions of refined
material culture and manners “bestowed concrete social power” and “lifted properly
reared persons to a higher plane” while at the same time “gentility implicitly diminished
the rest”.19 Gentility was adapted slightly differently to the regional cultures: ostentatious
homes in the slave societies of the south, compared with the more modest genteel
expressions in New England. Variations aside, by the time of the American Revolution,
as T.H. Breen has demonstrated, following the fashions and consumer goods of Britain
was a common experience throughout the colonies.20 Though Bushman does not
explicitly use gender as a category of analysis, these ideas neatly complement Connell’s
hegemonic masculinity. Rhys Isaac also noted the ways in which genteel displays
distinguished the powerful from the low in colonial Virginia. In a slave society,
exhibitions of wealth and even pastimes like dances and horseraces marked the sharp
hierarchies and violence that underpinned the power relations between the different ranks
and races of men and women.21Gentility was a marker for masculine accomplishment and
prowess throughout the colonies.
As Michal J. Rozbicki explains, men could only attain power and be respected as
leaders if they achieved what Pierre Bourdieu calls “cultural legitimacy.” This idea posits
that adopting certain tastes and styles “reproduce power relations” within “the struggles
for social position…”22 As Rozbicki makes clear, the inherited notion of gentility had
19
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“potent social and political uses as a tool of constructing and authorizing order, identity,
and power.” There were simply no other cultural options open to colonial Americans.23
Rozbicki and Bushman agree that the idea of gentility was not monolithic, but was as
much a process as any aspect of culture, and “never existed in pure form.” The variations,
vernacular adaptations, and contradictions of genteel culture make it a slippery subject to
pin down, but the key idea is that these “culturally encoded concepts and
symbols…structure reality” because individuals accept them as powerful.24 The
American Revolution altered these symbols, challenging them, democratizing them, but
the pursuit of distinction and cultural power remained.25 For Americans in the
generations after the Revolution, it was the dimly remembered Tories, a privileged class
of vain and cruel patricians, who embodied the hollowness and corruption of Old World
gentility.
For more than a century after the events, the idea of the aristocratic Tory was one
of the essential stereotypes in the social memory of the American Revolution. In the
works of James Fenimore Cooper, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Catherine Sedgwick and others,
the loyalists, whether presented as villains or conflicted heroes, are wealthy and powerful
landholders with strong ties to the Old World.26 In Hawthorne’s tales the loyalists
cavalierly salute their king while indulging in drink, plays, and merriment and thus are
the polar opposite of austere New England Puritans. Along with their cosmopolitan
fashion sense and gaiety, Hawthorne’s loyalists lack prudence and wisdom, and are
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cruelly dismissive of the lower rungs of the social ladder. In the short story “Edward
Randolph’s Portrait” (1842), Massachusetts Governor Thomas Hutchinson exemplifies
the Tory stereotype. Ignoring the pleas of his aides and his niece, Hutchinson decides to
admit British soldiers into Boston, declaring that “upheld by [British] armed strength, I
set my foot upon the rabble...” He is also unmoved by the ghostly visitation of Edward
Randolph, the Crown official who advised Charles II to revoke Massachusetts’ Royal
Charter in 1684 and place the colonies under tighter imperial control. Randolph’s portrait,
covered in generations of black grime, is miraculously cleared to reveal the face “of a
wretch detected in some hideous guilt, and exposed to the bitter hatred, and laughter, and
withering scorn, of a vast surrounding multitude.” In spite of this “evil omen” and his
niece’s insistence that Hutchinson “Behold [Randolph’s] punishment!” the Tory governor
goes through with the betrayal and follows his predecessor into a cursed existence.27
The late nineteenth century author, Harold Frederic, depicts loyalists that share
many similarities with Hawthorne’s Tories. In his work In the Valley (1890), Frederic
describes the loyalists as men with “no restraining notion of public interest. Their sole
idea is to play the aristocrat, to surround themselves with menials, to make their
neighbours concede to them submission and reverence.” Frederic’s patriot narrator
reflects on the nature of his genteel, two-faced adversary, who was “affable, honorable,
generous, and likeable among his equals [and] cold, selfish, haughty, and harsh to his
inferiors.” Perhaps this style may have worked for the loyalists in Europe, but “the cursed
obligation to act like a ‘gentleman’” brought the Tory to his ruin in America.28
Not all loyalists are depicted as cruel aristocrats. James Fenimore Cooper,
probably influenced by his marriage into the De Lancey family and his father’s
Federalism, used loyalists as the main characters in several of his books. The Wharton
family in The Spy (1821), though led by a weak patriarch, is a sympathetic, well-bred
family torn between allegiances. A dashing though conflicted young loyalist is the title
character in Lionel Lincoln (1825). Cooper presents his loyalists as stalwart men of
27
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honour, bound to defend their king, even when confronted with sound and reasonable
moral arguments as to why they should not. They are men of action, not philosophers.29
Similarly, in Hawthorne’s Grandfather’s Chair (1840), the patriarch explains to his
grandchildren that even though loyalists were “men of talent” who defended the “king’s
tyrannical proceedings” as best they could, “their hearts were faint and feeble…”
Nonetheless, the wise old storyteller admits some grudging respect for these gentlemen
who gave up their “country, friends, fortune, everything, rather than be false to their
King.” 30 Though they may have possessed an effeminate love of luxury, and were
sometimes cruel, there was something alluring about the Old World charm of these
cavaliers.
Nineteenth century novelists were doubtlessly inspired by folk tales and local
lore, but they were also influenced by the early histories of the American Revolution.
Mercy Otis Warren’s History of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the American
Revolution (1805), was the first history to view Thomas Hutchinson as the archetypal
Tory. She writes that he “was dark, intriguing, insinuating, haughty and ambitious, while
the extreme of avarice marked his character.” Interestingly, Warren describes how
Hutchinson rose to power, not through his talents, which “were little elevated above the
line of mediocrity” but by his adherence to the strictures of genteel behaviour. He
cultivated an appearance of probity and piety, and “courted the public eclat [sic] with the
most profound dissimulation, while he engaged the affections of the lower classes by an
amiable civility and condescension, without departing from a certain gravity of
deportment mistaken by the vulgar for sanctity.”31 When it came to other loyalists,
Warren is more circumspect. She suggests that some patriots, who were “more zealous
than judicious”, pushed Americans just flirting with loyalism “under the banners of
royalty,” even though these lukewarm Tories were “without any fixed principles in
29
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religion or politics.” Nonetheless, once secure behind British lines in New York, the
loyalists “were continually urging [the British commander] to deeds of cruelty…”32 A
generation later George Bancroft continued the same line of argument, describing the
“malignant cruelty” of loyalists who belonged to “families of superior culture”.33 There
are few loyalists mentioned by name in Bancroft’s history, and their influence on events
is muted, with the exception of Thomas Hutchinson. Like Mercy Otis Warren’s portrait
of the Massachusetts governor, Bancroft describes how the great Tory corrupted America
and “infuse[d] into its veins the slow poison of tyranny.”34 The few loyalists mentioned
in Bancroft’s history are shameful anomalies and do not receive much attention.
Other nineteenth century historians were more sympathetic to the loyalists. New
Englanders such as Charles Francis Adams and Lorenzo Sabine, who were dismayed at
the vulgarities of Jacksonian democracy and antebellum party discord, admitted that
although the loyalists were mistaken in their political choices, their error was
understandable. 35 In his compendious Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American
Revolution (1847), Sabine collected hundreds of brief biographical outlines of loyalists to
create a far more nuanced and humanizing account of “outlaws, wanderers, and exiles”
than had appeared before. Sabine did not defend loyalism per se, noting, for example,
that loyalists and their descendants in their new homes continued to treat government
offices as their privileged sinecures.36 Such observations point to the fact that despite his
stated policy “to exclude no one, whether of exalted or humble station,” Sabine’s
loyalists remained firmly entrenched in the elite.37
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At the same time that some American historians were reconsidering their former
loyalist countrymen, writers and politicians in British North America were publishing the
first histories of their loyalist founders. The “Loyalist Tradition” that developed in what
later became Ontario, as well as the Atlantic provinces of New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia, held to the myth of the gentlemen exiles. Two of the earliest Canadian loyalist
historians, William Canniff and Egerton Ryerson, shared the idea that the loyalists were
the most industrious and morally upstanding people of American society.38 Both men
were evidently influenced by Sabine’s work and conclusions. Canniff, despairing of the
“over-weening [sic] vanity” of American histories, personally thanks Sabine for his
“redeeming words on behalf of the Loyalists”.39 Entire sections of Canniff’s work are
lifted directly from Sabine’s biographies, reflecting, again, the focus on the more famous
and well-to-do of the loyalist settlers of Upper Canada. Yet Canniff is careful to point out
that aristocratic gentlemen did not last in Upper Canada. Men who refused to believe that
“agriculture and gentility may go together” and were unwilling to work with their hands
did not prosper. These unnamed men dreamed of restoring their families to prominence,
but “alas,” writes Canniff, “how rarely was the dream realized!”40 Canniff’s loyalists are
closer to the Victorian ideal of men who know the taste of luxury, but are thrifty, moral,
and hard working. Ryerson, writing about a decade after Canniff, agreed that the loyalists
were “strangely misrepresented” by American historians, but more or less concurs that
the loyalists were “the most wealthy and intelligent…inhabitants of the colonies”41 For
Americans and Canadians alike, loyalists were Anglican in religion, conservative in
politics, and gentlemen by nature.
The trope of the aristocratic Tory continued into the twentieth century. Claude
Halstead Van Tyne’s The Loyalists in the American Revolution (1902) is, after Sabine’s
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work, the earliest American attempt to trace the loyalists in general, but in many ways
propagates the loyalist myth. Van Tyne argued that the “aristocracy of culture, of
dignified professions and callings, of official rank and hereditary wealth was in a large
measure found in the Tory party.” His loyalists were venal place men and grasping,
servile types, who were completely out of touch with America’s political genius. Van
Tyne confidently asserts that the loyalists, many of whom were not even born in the
colonies, simply could not think like Americans who even at that stage had become so
culturally distinct that “…neither Englishmen nor men recently immigrated [sic] from
England could understand American political ideals.”42 This is a nationalist and indeed
ironic statement considering Tom Paine himself was a recent arrival from England.
This image of the loyalists as elite and British-born remained mostly
unchallenged until the 1960s.43 William H. Nelson’s The American Tory (1961) was one
of the first to debunk the idea of the aristocratic loyalists. Nelson found that the average
loyalist was no more genteel than the average patriot, but he also convincingly discovered
that many loyalists were members of “conscious minorities.” As people from religious,
ethnic, and linguistic enclaves surrounded by a threatening majority, Germans, Scots, and
Dutch settlers often looked to the Crown as their defender.44 Nelson’s findings have been
cited in every major work on the loyalists since the publication of The American Tory.
Yet despite the clear evidence that the loyalists were not the aristocratic Tories of
popular imagination, loyalist studies continued to be dominated by examinations of the
elite to explain the entire body of the loyalists. Wallace Brown’s The King’s Friends: The
Composition and Motives of the American Loyalist Claimants (1965) attempts to
determine the identity and motivation of the loyalists through a quantitative analysis of
the loyalist claims submitted to the Royal Commission after the Revolutionary War. He
concludes that the loyalists were largely from urban seaports and were often not
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American born – findings that fit with the Van Tyne era of thought. His discussion of
loyalist motivations was not particularly illuminating either, considering his main sources
were the testimonies contained within the loyalist claims which were dominated by the
elite (see chapter 6). Brown used the claims as a statistical sampling of the loyalists as a
whole, as opposed to a record of the small portion of exiles with the connections and
means to submit claims at all. In Brown’s follow-up work, The Good Americans (1969),
he more explicitly states that there was “a distinct aristocratic veneer to Loyalism.”45 In
his review of Brown’s work, William H. Nelson scathingly referred to the book as a
restoration of “the old and foolish myths of Loyalist gentility…”46 Perhaps this was too
harsh, but Nelson’s criticism is a sharp reminder of the pitfalls of reading the experiences
of the majority into sources left by the privileged few.
When it comes to exploring loyalist ideology, as will be explored in more depth in
chapter three, there is no way around the fact that that the Crown’s American spokesmen
were drawn from genteel ranks. These men and their ideas were the focus of Robert
Calhoon’s The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781 (1965). In this
voluminous work, Calhoon divides the loyalist writers and leaders into three loose
categories. There were loyalists like Thomas Hutchinson, whom Calhoon calls
“enunciators of principle,” men who advocated for the British constitution, Parliamentary
supremacy, and the duty to obey. Others, such as the New York Chief Justice William
Smith Jr., searched for accommodation between the Crown and colonies and to find a
constitutional solution to the crisis. Finally there were the obstinate few, like the
Anglican clergyman Jonathan Boucher, who stubbornly appealed to doctrines of
submission and nonresistance to established imperial authority. Even with these
identifiable categories, however, Calhoon asserts that loyalist thought never formed a
“common, vital persuasion.”47 Other historians have seen more consistency in loyalist
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political ideology, and pointed out that it was actually quite receptive to the same
Lockean principles that undergirded Whig ideology. 48 Janice Potter contends that loyalist
ideology was comprised of a coherent set of conservative, though mainstream principles
which formed persuasive and motivating intellectual arguments. 49 These historians do
not dwell on the elite status of the loyalist spokesmen, nor do they consider how their
privileged perspective might affect how the common people would receive their message.
Potter points to the signatures of simple New York farmers on loyalist associations as
evidence of the effectiveness of loyalist arguments.50 Without more evidence this is a
tendentious argument considering the myriad pressures and fractured allegiances facing
the common people in Revolutionary New York.
Uncovering the motivations of loyalists, intellectual or otherwise, is a recurring
fixation that Potter shares with Calhoon, Wallace Brown, and Bernard Bailyn, but it is a
question that few American historians have directed at patriots. In Calhoon’s examination
of loyalist ideology he writes that he seeks to “understand the motivation – the
compelling reasons, influences, predispositions, and dictates of self-interest,
temperament, conscience, intellect, fear, and plain confusion – that impelled loyalists to
act as they did.”51 One way that Calhoon arrives at his conclusions is through examining
the “loyalist perception” a concept he continued to explore in his Loyalist Perception and
Other Essays (1989). This idea encompassed both how individual loyalists perceived the
world as well as their “self-image, emotional and intellectual dexterity and stamina…”
By examining the loyalists’ recorded political ideas, he argues, historians could gain
insight into their motivations.52 Wallace Brown sought clues to loyalist motivation in the
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official claims they made to the British government. This approach is fraught with perils
considering the way loyalists cited the purest motivations in their official claims for
financial remuneration. Few loyalists admitted desires to maintain trading connections
with British merchants or preserve their salaries from Crown offices as their primary
motivations for loyalism. Bernard Bailyn, in his attempt to uncover the motivation of the
greatly maligned Thomas Hutchinson, wrote incredulously that historians had not made it
“clear why any sensible, well-informed, right minded American with a modicum of
imagination and common sense could possibly have opposed the Revolution.”53 To
Bailyn, Hutchinson was not the tyrant described by Hawthorne or Bancroft, but was a
bland conservative without much capacity for original thought. Bailyn quotes the archTory himself who stated that he was “a quietist, being convinced that what is, is best”
perhaps proving that he had very little intellectual ammunition to fire back at his
opponents.54 In 2004 Bailyn reconsidered his conclusions, and added that Thomas
Hutchinson’s personality was dominated by “the Puritan virtues of self-restraint, personal
morality, worldly asceticism, and above all, stubborn insistence on pursuing the truth
however unpopular or dangerous it might be to do so.” In other words, it was the culture
inherited from his New England roots that led him to resist rebellion, while this same
culture inexplicably impelled others to embrace the Revolution.55 The fundamental
importance of culture in the political questions of the day has been explored more
recently by literary scholars Edward Larkin and Philip Gould. They reveal how loyalist
writers saw themselves as defenders of civilization against the forces of barbarity and
chaos. Loyalism for these men was an “affective sensibility” and was one side in a
culture war, which included issues of masculinity, as well as a political contest.56 In the
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end, discerning “the imperatives that govern him [a loyalist man] in moments of
conscious choice,” as Calhoon wrote, is a tall order indeed, and is likely impossible to
accomplish with any degree of certainty.57 Exploring loyalist ideology and motivation
through the lens of culture is more fruitful than political ideology on its own, but
historians must also take note of culturally constructed ideas of masculinity and honour to
enhance and qualify their understanding.
The attempt to understand the motivations and rationale of loyalists has spawned
scores of individual loyalist biographies.58 These have greatly illuminated individual
experiences, but as Jerry Bannister and Liam Riordan have recently pointed out, because
biographies far outnumber general studies, this has contributed to what they argue is “the
scattered and particularistic state of the field.”59 As expected, elite loyalists are the
subjects of nearly every biography. Taken together these studies highlight the experiences
of a small minority and present a fairly consistent pattern of loyalist experience. In
contrast, the equally numerous local and regional studies have provided impressive
insights into the very local nature of allegiance and politics in the American Revolution.60
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These social histories have revealed the broader appeal of loyalism among the wider
population and how local circumstances created a variety of loyalist experiences. Preexisting tensions and rivalries were routinely bound up in the revolutionary crisis, and the
experience of loyalists could be markedly different even between towns in the same
region.61 These findings support William Nelson’s contention that the Revolution
“exposed rather than created [loyalist] conflict with other Americans…”62
Indeed historians of the loyalist diaspora have focused a great deal of attention in
the last two decades on the polyglot, multi-cultural, and multi-racial nature of loyalism.
The loyalists as a whole were clearly made up of Americans from all religions, races, and
classes in America, though they are still largely regarded as a “one-dimensional” group in
much of the American Revolution’s historiography.63 Recent work on the experiences of
black loyalists in particular, has shown just how varied the exile experience could be.
While white loyalists endured their political death in the colonies, black loyalists
experienced a kind of political birth and for the first time many slaves had a direct
relationship with the state and were treated as people with the agency to choose their own
political allegiance. British strategy in freeing the slaves of rebels was hardly altruistic,
and the black loyalists were chronically mistreated by both British officials and white
loyalists, but their experiences underscore the vastly different backgrounds and
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experiences found within the loyalist ranks.64 Native American allies, too, formed a
crucial element in the British war effort. Whether or not they would consider themselves
loyalists in the same way that white refugees might, the fates of the Mohawks and other
groups became inextricably bound to British fortunes in North America. The American
Revolution divided Native communities as much as it did settler societies, resulting in a
concurrent outbreak of civil wars from the Great Lakes to the southern Mississippi. The
experiences, motivations, and goals of Britain’s Native allies form another important and
unique thread in the complex history of the American Revolution.65
There have been very few attempts to collect all of these different lines of inquiry
into a general account of the loyalists. Even after forty years, the works of Nelson,
Calhoon, and Brown remain the only broad academic surveys of the loyalists in the
American Revolution. The most recent comprehensive study of the loyalist diaspora after
the Revolution is Maya Jasanoff’s Liberty’s Exiles (2011), which synthesizes the
disparate loyalist experiences. Jasanoff argues that loyalists participated in the creation of
a reimagined British Empire which incorporated its many ethnicities while at the same
time tightened and centralized imperial authority.66 Yet even with the attempts to show
the diversity of the loyalist experiences, the literate middling and elite loyalists
effectively remain the spokesmen in these accounts. It is therefore essential to understand
this class of loyalist on their own terms to decipher how much of what they wrote can be
thought of as loyalist thought in general, or ideas that are contingent on their gender and
class. This dissertation seeks to flesh out the experience of this group of the loyalist
spokesmen by placing them and their experiences within the cultural context of manhood
and honour, a culture they shared with their patriot adversaries.
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To borrow Toby L. Ditz’s general observation on historical literature, loyalist
historiography has generally treated elite men as “representatives of their classes, their
callings or their nations, and even as spokesmen for universal human aspirations, but not
as gendered persons.”67 It was only with the examination of women in the American
Revolution that the concepts of gender and culture were first incorporated into the patriot
and loyalist experiences. Mary Beth Norton’s Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary
Experience of American Women, (1980) and Linda Kerber’s Women of the Republic:
Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (1980), presented a common picture of
the conditions faced by both loyalist and patriot women: the daily power men held over
women, coupled with clear evidence of profound female agency in colonial and
Revolutionary America. Indeed, it was the information gleaned from the several hundred
claims made by loyalist women that revealed the shared political activism of women, and
the often stultifying effects of patriarchy on their lives, regardless of political
allegiance.68 In the early 1990s, histories of women loyalists continued with Janice
Potter-MacKinnon’s examination of the agency of loyalist women in their migration from
northern New York to Upper Canada. According to Potter-MacKinnon, patriarchal
dominance resumed after their exile to Upper Canada and the sacrifices and contributions
of women loyalists were largely forgotten or even suppressed. Her work attempts to focus
on the common women, though the presence of the testimony of elite and middling
women is again unavoidable. Katherine McKenna makes good use of the records of a
gentlewoman in her exploration of elite concepts of womanhood. Her biography of Anne
Murray Powell, A Life of Propriety (1994) shows the power of women in replicating class
and gender roles – both male and female – in the household of a genteel family as North
America entered into the Victorian era. What these and other studies of loyalist women
point to is the essential importance of gender and class in understanding the behaviour of
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historical actors.69 To date, there has not been an examination of loyalist men that
explores the intertwined elements of masculinity and class with an understanding of the
cultural meanings of honour.
The study of masculinity is still relatively new and emerging, but has already
produced some fascinating work within early American historiography.70 Together these
studies show that early American men were deeply conscious of the cultural attitudes
towards masculinity and their own ability to live up to those standards. The construction
of manliness on the frontier, in coastal settlements, between different regions, religions,
and races created a confusing array of competing notions of the ideal man. This diversity
of gender norms in America and the competing notions of ideal manhood underscore the
usefulness of Connell’s conception of hegemonic and multiple masculinities. As Joanna
Burke pointed out in her study of early twentieth century British masculinity, this sort of
competition oppressed women, but it also created “power structures [which] also oppress
men.”71 This is now a widely accepted idea, but does have its pitfalls. Toby Ditz argues
that the insistence on the idea that masculinity was “generated primarily in relationship to
other masculinities” could cause “historians to downplay the deployment of gendered
power over women by the men they studied.” Ditz warns that this approach “is in danger
of restoring men – however particularised, differentiated and socially constructed – to the
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center of our historical narrative.” 72 Bryce Traister agrees, noting how an exploration of
masculinity that focusses on a “crisis theory” of unstable and conflicting masculine
identities “effectively crowds out women”.73 Effective discussions of masculinity must
therefore recognize that “the engendering of men involves power over women, whatever
else it might also concern.”74 As will be seen throughout this dissertation, when patriots
and loyalists attacked their enemy’s manhood, they did so with feminine tropes, what
Ditz calls the “symbolic woman,” but they also treated women as extensions of their foe.
As will be shown, the authority of patriarchs was rarely so injured as to lose power over
women. Most loyalist wives followed their husbands and fathers into exile and were
subjected to patriarchal authority even when the honour and manhood of their men was
rejected by others in their communities.
Focussing on how the loyalists were dishonoured and unmanned in the American
Revolution may at first glance seem to be falling into the “crisis theory” decried by Ditz
and Traister, but the loyalists present a unique opportunity in the study of manhood in
Revolutionary America. The dishonour and emasculation suffered by loyalists exhibits
the changing expectations of hegemonic masculinity in American culture and reveals, in
stark relief, what Toby Ditz refers to as “the ruses of masculine privilege.”75 Men in the
eighteenth century used the terms manhood and manly, and though “masculinity” was
first printed on paper in 1748, it was not in the general vocabulary of eighteenth century
men.76 Rather they used the broad but powerful term “honour.” The sacralisation of
manhood in the concept of honour was perhaps the most profound of the “ruses of
masculine privilege.”
Honour in this dissertation is defined as a man’s feeling of pride, his reputation,
and most importantly his “right to respect.” Honour was a demand placed on other men
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and women to treat the bearer with the respect and deference that recognized his rank.77
Eighteenth century men spoke of their honour so much, especially in times of conflict,
that it is difficult to overstate its importance.78 Yet honour was a surprisingly pliant
concept that could be used to shame and to empower as well as to justify cruelty or hide
malfeasance. Among the middling and upper ranks of society, honour was a particularly
prized ethic. As Caroline Cox explains in her study of the Continental army, “all men had
honour, even poor men, but a gentleman’s honour was of a more refined and delicate
nature.”79 This idea privileged a small group of men over others. While rank and file
prisoners rotted in unsanitary cells, for example, the officer class were lodged in private
homes and permitted freedom of movement on account of their honour. Judith Van
Buskirk has shown how this gentlemanly culture of honour and politeness dictated that
men, though differing in political ideas, were still worthy of being treated respectfully.80
The intensification of the honour system between loyalists and patriots, and the
intentional rejection of honour and privilege is a fascinating, but largely unexplored
aspect of the American Revolution.
Inspired by the extensive literature exploring the importance of masculinity and
honour to eighteenth century men, this dissertation set out with a few simple research
goals in mind that soon uncovered complex and previously unexamined aspects of the
loyalists in the American Revolution. The first was to explore how the loyalists
interpreted their experiences within this cultural framework of honour, manhood, and
patriarchy. How did they understand what was happening to them, and how did they
77

The idea of honour as a “right to respect” will be explored more in the following chapter, and relies
heavily on the theoretical framework presented in Frank Henderson Stewart, Honor, (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1994).
78

Douglas Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers, (Toronto: W.W. Norton & Co., 1974); Bertram WyattBrown, The Shaping of Southern Culture: Honor, Grace, and War, 1760s-1890s, (Chapel Hill [N.C.];
London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Caroline Cox, A Proper Sense of Honour: Service and
Sacrifice in George Washington's Army, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Joanne B.
Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic, (New Haven Conn.; London: Yale
University Press, 2001); Peter McNamara, The Noblest Minds: Fame, Honor, and the Founding Fathers,
(New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999).
79

80

Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor, 38.

Judith Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies: Patriots and Loyalists in Revolutionary New York
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002).

28
reconcile their overwhelming defeat with their concepts of honour and even their
cosmology? Though the loyalists displayed great moral certainty in their political
allegiance, did they feel unmanned by their inability to persuade more people to their
cause? Did they feel dishonoured by the insults hurled against them and emasculated by
their own powerlessness to defend themselves and their families? Were they humiliated
by the loss of independence and their reliance on British support? The partial answer to
all of these questions is that loyalist gentlemen relied on the fundamental pliancy of
honour to rationalize what had happened to them and justify their response. They took
refuge in Christian values and redefined their concepts of honour, transforming insults
and injuries intended as marks of shame into badges of honour. The loyalists did not
regard their dependence on Britain during and after the war as evidence of effeminate
weakness, rather the money and assistance they received was theirs by right. They had
performed honourable service for the King and sacrificed all, and now it was the King
who was duty bound to assist the loyalists. Though an honour system was built on strict
hierarchies, it functioned only if all parties met their obligations.
In hunting for these answers it became apparent that this study was also shedding
new light on the behaviour and thinking of the patriots. The written descriptions of both
the legal and extra-legal forms of punishment and persecution inflicted on the loyalists
contain deeply symbolic elements which provide insights into the revolutionary
mentalities. People in the eighteenth century thought and expressed ideas through objects,
through gestures, and folk rituals which are less apparent in the historical record than
they would have been for the actual participants, but when teased out can help us better
understand our subjects. Things like a wig plucked from a gentleman’s head; a
shoemaker driving a baronet’s carriage; a landowner wearing a slave’s hat; a tweaked
nose; a cropped horse’s tail; a hiss, a hoot, or an audible jibe, were revolutionary or
rebellious acts imbued with meaning. For loyalists they warned of a world turning upside
down. Gentlemen had a privileged right to respect by virtue of their unique moral
standing and manly competence and these acts denied loyalists this status and respect,
while conspicuously reinforcing or accentuating these rights for patriot gentlemen. The
more significant crowd and legal actions which followed, such as vandalism, home
invasions, imprisonment, and humiliating rituals like tarring and feathering were all
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violations of the code of honour, of genteel bodies, and of the sacred privileges of
gentlemen. These actions were made lawful, just, and necessary in the eyes of patriots by
the heinous crime of loyalty to the Crown which grew like a cancer in their communities.
The loyalist gentlemen explored in this study were transformed into a special kind of
reviled outlaw. They were ostracized from their communities, and stripped of all the
symbols of manhood and honour. They were unable to provide for their families, had
their property confiscated, and ceased to be independent men, householders, and citizens.
Even though they remained alive, and often maintained some social connections within
their former communities, they had no legal existence. They were politically dead. The
fact that patriots would go to such lengths to dishonour the loyalists rather than just kill
them like in other revolutions, tells us a great deal about the value placed on these
cultural conventions. In a world of slaves and citizens, or patriarchs and plebeians,
honour and manhood cut to the very heart of eighteenth century cosmology. For a
gentleman, to suffer a political death was worse than death itself.
This dissertation is organized around the key ideas and events of the loyalists’
political death. The following chapter, “Honour and Dishonour” provides an in depth
exploration of the concept of honour, its anthropological study, and how it was
understood and used by eighteenth century gentlemen. There are many facets to this
complex cultural virtue, but the most illuminating definition comes from Frank
Henderson Stewart’s theory of honour as a right to respect. An examination of some
aspects of eighteenth century honour culture clearly shows this idea at work. While
honour was a matter of public esteem as much as personal ethics, the construction of
honour was built on the foundations of patriarchal power within the household. Manhood
and gentility were projected as much by a man’s house as by his person. The second half
of the chapter turns to the concept of dishonour, and how the household became the site
of the most virulent attacks on loyalist honour and patriarchal authority.
Chapter three explores the insults and the rituals of dishonour which heralded the
loyalists’ political death. Though the exact nature of the insults hurled at the loyalists in
the street is unclear, the insults found in the patriot press are deeply gendered attacks on
loyalist masculinity. Ritualized humiliations were equally intended to showcase both the
shame and impotence of the loyalists and their political position. Yet an examination of
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the printed record does reveal that the loyalist and patriot spokesmen valued opposite
poles of the honour spectrum. Loyalists touted their masculine restraint, wisdom, fidelity,
and maturity, and accused the patriots of juvenile ingratitude, child-like petulance,
unrestrained passions, idle ambition, and an uncivilized and ungodly thirst for violent
rebellion. The patriots characterized the loyalists as impotent old men who lacked the
moral character to defend their honour, and as cowardly collaborators who had given up
their right to manhood.
The study then turns to the experiences of loyalist prisoners of war. Gentlemen
combatants expected to be treated well, but the legal and moral standing of loyalists
meant their fate could be frightfully uncertain. Notions of honour could mitigate the
severity of the prisoner experience, but dishonour often led patriots to deny loyalists the
privileges of gentlemen prisoners. Though both sides attempted to maintain the honour
system, competing claims of honour and legality complicated matters and nearly led to
the breakdown of the entire prisoner system. Loyalists sometimes denied the right of their
captors to hold them, and felt justified in breaking parole and attempting escape, an act
normally considered deeply dishonourable in the eighteenth century. In reprisal patriots
might mistreat their loyalist prisoners. This resulted in continual battles for the cultural
and moral high ground between jailers and prisoners, fought using the language and finer
points of honour.
Chapter five, “Vengeance,” explores the popular idea in American social memory
and history that loyalists were particularly cruel in seeking revenge against their former
countrymen. While some loyalist gentlemen were determined to retaliate against the
rebels for insults and injuries, just as many were concerned about the unchristian nature
of revenge and the stain such bloodletting would have on their honour as gentlemen.
Revenge was considered a passion that could transform a decent man into a savage.
Britain’s alliance with Native American warriors and escaped slaves added to the
bloodthirsty reputation of the loyalists in patriot propaganda, further dishonouring them
not only as traitors to their country, but also to their race.
Finally, chapter six explores how loyalist gentlemen worked toward political
rebirth. They struggled to reconcile their defeat and seeming abandonment by Britain
with their own sense of honour. In order to rebuild their positions as patriarchs, the
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loyalist exiles needed compensation for their losses from the same government that had
surrendered their property. Although loyalists felt betrayed by the Treaty of Paris, they
had no other choice than to persist in their loyalty to the Crown if they wanted any
compensation. Yet loyalist claimants sought more than monetary compensation from the
British government: they also sought the restitution of their honour. They accomplished
this through building personal and collective narratives that highlighted their virtues as
loyal, suffering martyrs who were willing to sacrifice their privileges and even subject
their families to the torments and privation of war on behalf of the King. They had done
all they could to preserve royal authority in the colonies, and any dishonour they may
have experienced had to be shared by the King and Parliament. Their loyalist claims
placed an obligation, a debt of honour, on the British state. Thousands of loyalists
received financial compensation from the British government (though far below what the
loyalists felt they were owed), as well as free land and government offices that placed the
loyalist gentlemen at the apex of their new communities. With British assistance, the
loyalists were politically reborn as household patriarchs and as civic leaders who could
claim their right to respect.
Loyalists and patriots lived and fought within a shared culture, and spoke in a
common language of symbols, rituals, and customs. The loyalist experience has long
been understood to have been traumatic, but by placing the events within the cultural
context of honour and manhood, the depth of the loyalist experience, for men and their
households, can be truly appreciated. In the eyes of their former communities, the
loyalists lost not just the war and their homes, but their manhood. The patriots pressed
their attacks and exiled the loyalists from American society using the gendered language
of honour. The loyalists resisted, fought, and eventually fled to find common cause with
others like them and reformulated their notions of honour to justify their allegiance, their
actions in the war, and to transform their political death into an emblem of undying
fidelity.

2. Honour and Dishonour
It is possible that the first shot in the American Revolution was fired inside a
Charleston tavern. According to South Carolinian lore, on the night of August 16, 1771, a
haughty Tory and a plucky Whig settled their political argument with a duel in a private
dining room at Mr. Halliday’s Tavern, a place of “genteel entertainments.”1 The duellists
were Dr. John Haley, an Irish-born physician living in Charleston, and Peter De Lancey
Jr., the son of one of the most well-connected gentlemen in the colonies.2 The most wellknown account of this duel appears in Joseph Johnson’s 1851 collection Traditions and
Reminiscences which romantically portrays the encounter as a microcosm of the
American Revolution. The author describes De Lancey as an “elegant and accomplished
royalist,” while Haley is an ardent patriot who “warmly espoused the popular cause in
opposition to royalty”. Though a recent immigrant, the Irish doctor embodies the true
revolutionary spirit against De Lancey’s old-money Toryism.3 When De Lancey is
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“foiled in an argument,” he intentionally provokes the doctor “by giving him the ‘lie.’”4
Calling a gentleman a liar in the eighteenth century was considered more than an insult; it
was an assault on the very core and worth of a man: his honour. Depending on the social
milieu, a gentleman’s failure to respond properly to such a public challenge could be
perceived as a gross sign of weakness.5 Haley instantly challenged the royal official to a
duel, right then and there, in a private room in the tavern, with no witnesses and no
seconds. Johnson writes that the two took their places at either end of a dinner table,
fired at the same moment, and De Lancey fell dead.6
The general outline of Johnson’s tale is confirmed in an anonymous newspaper
description published a month after the affair, but the duel is not presented as an early
blow for American honour. Like many seconds’ testimonies it was intended to combat “a
great number of contradictory and infamous reports,” but it leaves the cause of the duel a
mystery. The author explains that the “dispute between these gentlemen, was so sudden,
and so secret, that not one of the friends of either can pretend to give any certain account
of the cause.” Indeed, far from being enemies, the account describes how Haley and De
Lancey had spent the day together dining and drinking among a larger group of
gentlemen. Around seven in the evening, the report states, the two men went out to a
balcony and “were observed to converse rather gravely, & set their watches, but no high
words passed nor was there the least appearance of any difference.” Unlike Johnson’s
version of events, the duellists are restrained and engaged in sober reflection, calmly
setting their watches, perhaps after agreeing to a time and terms. The article continues
with De Lancey renting a private dining room at Halliday’s tavern where he acts the busy
host, ordering in candles and refreshments. After Haley arrives, they dismiss the waiter,
lock the door, “and presently the report of pistols was heard.” As in Johnson’s tale, Haley
4
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kills De Lancey, and flees the town stricken, apparently, by the gentlemanly paradox of a
killer’s dead aim and a poet’s feeling heart. “[W]ith visible concern in his countenance,”
Haley, “called at several of his friend’s houses, ‘begging a Doctor might be sent to poor
De Lancey,’ whom he believed he had hurt.” The article concludes by announcing that
that a jury of inquest investigated and delivered their verdict the next morning, after
which the Governor issued a proclamation for Haley’s arrest on the charge of murder.7
Johnson writes that Haley fled to “the Whigs” who “defended [him], and concealed him
until his trial came on.”8 The doctor assembled an impressive legal team for his defense,
though the contemporary sources are silent on whether or not the lawyers joined his cause
because of their political principles. His defence included some of the most respected
South Carolina lawyers, including “James Parsons, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,
Thomas Hayward and Alexander Harvey, Esquires.” Other sources include John
Rutledge among the defence.9
The chief difficulty for the defence was that the “duel” followed none of the
commonly accepted guidelines, and Haley would have known that without witnesses he
could be hanged as a murderer. Duels were not common in America prior to the
Revolution, but the general customs would have been known: duels were to be conducted
outside in the light of day, with “seconds” serving as partial witnesses for each
participant. For gentlemen of De Lancey’s standing, a surgeon would normally attend.
There would also have been time allotted, perhaps several days, for the parties to come to
an amicable resolution of the dispute.
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these conventions. Was this simply an irregular duel fought by two reckless young
gentlemen? Was it a hot-blooded argument propelled by alcohol into an impulsive
shooting? Considering the politics of the time, could De Lancey’s death have even been a
political assassination, disguised as an affair of honour? Doctor Haley’s Irish origins may
be significant. With its quarrelsome and jealous Protestant ruling class, eighteenth
century Ireland was known as “the land of [the] duel.”11 There are many examples of
Irish duels that “bear closer comparison with assassinations than with ritualized combat,”
and there is recorded evidence of at least one dining room duel.12 Haley may have
brought the Anglo-Irish gentry’s pugnacious culture with him to North America, as it
appears that his encounter with De Lancey was not his only visit to the field of honour.
David Ramsay, a member of the Continental Congress, wrote in 1776 that “Dr. Haley has
at certain times a willingness to settle medical controversies with the sword.”13
Late in 1771, colonial newspapers published the verdict. The jury convicted
Haley of the lesser charge of manslaughter, and he was pardoned by the governor – the
standard treatment of surviving duellists. Evidently the defence was able to frame the
shooting match as a legitimate duel between gentlemen, and convinced the jury “that
there was not the least Degree of Malice on [Haley’s] part.” De Lancey had consented to
the terms, which, between gentlemen, served to absolve Haley of any underhandedness in
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the eyes the colonial jury. Though irregular, this was considered an affair of honour.14
According to Johnson, Haley’s “acquittal was considered a great triumph by the Whigs
and popular party,” and his legal counsel “acquired no small Degree of Applause by their
Pleading upon this Occasion.”15
Though Johnson sees this personal quarrel in the larger context of the American
Revolution, it was honour that justified the killing of Peter De Lancey Jr. Without this
key element, the loyalist Governor William Bull would not have pardoned a man
responsible for killing a fellow royal office holder. In spite of the dubious form of the
duel, the court accepted the idea that the code of honour was not a static concept. In fact,
as will be argued throughout this dissertation, it was a pliant idea that could be moulded
to justify actions that under other circumstances would seem dishonourable, if not
murderous.
If this was indeed a duel between a loyalist and a patriot, it is the only one of its
kind known. That in itself is an important fact. A duel is ostensibly a contest between
equals, where each participant is accorded respect and fairness. The De Lancey – Haley
incident occurred in 1771, long before disagreements escalated into war. The loyalists
and patriots rarely offered each other such generous terms later during the conflict,
although the British and Continental forces sometimes did extend courtesies when it was
appropriate.16 Instead, the war between loyalists and patriots was a morally asymmetrical
contest from both perspectives. The loyalists regarded the patriots as rebels; the patriots
thought of the loyalists as traitors and collaborators.
The duel may be the most well-known and dramatic expression of honour in the
early modern period, but it only explains a fraction of what honour meant. The first part
14
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of this chapter sets out to explore the idea of honour from the perspectives of early
modern commentators, colonial Americans, and modern social science to form an
explanatory model for the experience of loyalist gentlemen. Honour, at its core, is a claim
or demand made on others for respect; the claim is either accepted or denied. How this
claim manifests itself and the criteria for honourable manhood differs between cultures
and over time. For people in the eighteenth century honour was as a very real, if
confusing, concept. Gentlemen inherited the traditional ideas of manly assertiveness,
independence, and mastery over self and household. Yet traditional, primal honour was
changing under pressure from newer cultural virtues like politeness and sensibility. As
will be shown, rather than supplant honour as a virtue, these competing ideas became part
of its construction. Polished manners, genteel homes, and fine clothing were badges of
manhood and symbols of honour. They were expressions of competence, prowess, and
mastery. Honour conferred power. Only by understanding what it meant to have honour
and to be a gentleman can the full impact of the loyalists’ political death be appreciated.
The second half of this chapter explores patriot attacks on these honourable
symbols through acts of vandalism, home invasions, and finally confiscation of loyalist
estates. Property confiscation served the practical purpose of denying a traitorous enemy
assets and resources, but it also stripped a gentleman of some of the most important
emblems of his status. Without a home and property, loyalist men lost their power over
their family and dependants, as well as respect and authority in their community.
Additionally, loyalist judges and lawyers were barred from practicing law, merchants
were boycotted, and even clergymen who spoke for the Crown were denied the civil and
ecclesiastic authority they enjoyed before the Revolution. The fundamental elements of
eighteenth century patriarchy were torn away, and the loyalist gentleman was
transformed into the antithesis of both the masculine and patriot ideal. Dependant on the
British, unable to look after his family, and cast out from his community, the loyalist was
dishonoured and unmanned. Many loyalists spent the rest of the war, and beyond, finding
ways to restore their lost honour.

Honour, like all aspects of culture, is an ever-evolving process. Yet, for those who
live in societies dominated by honour culture, called timocracies, the tenets seem firm
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and tested.17 If the “punctilios” or finer points of honour are sometimes confusing,
complex, or even contradictory, adherents accept their authority based on a belief in the
tenets’ ancient tradition, and more importantly, because the code is commonly accepted
among a population. The concept of honour exists in some form in every culture and can
be found at every point in recorded human history. Whether it is referred to as timé,
bushido, ird, pashtunwalli, face, or honour, it is a masculine need for public esteem, good
reputation, individual dignity, and acceptance in a peer group dominated by a system of
reciprocal respect and deference. Western philosophers have struggled to define and
articulate the meaning of this slippery idea from classical Greece to the post-industrial
world. Part of what makes honour such a difficult concept is that it can be incredibly
expansive. To borrow from a study of Mediterranean cultures: in honour “the whole man
is contemplated.” 18 Modern uses of the term such as “honour system” or “honour roll”
fall far short of what this word once meant in Western culture. According to the
anthropologist Julian Pitt-Rivers, western European attitudes toward the concept changed
radically in the early twentieth century. The “machine guns and artillery of the First
World War” writes Pitt-Rivers, “opened a mass grave for honour.”19 Yet it is clear from
the historical record that eighteenth century men in the Atlantic World were deeply
concerned with their personal and collective honour. The term appears regularly in the
sources, but historians often do not engage with it, perhaps assuming it is rhetoric or
bluster or a quirk of language. In reality men internalized this language and agonized
over their personal honour, along with the honour of their families, communities, and
nations. As a moral or ethical guiding principle, honour was a source of motivation that
worked alongside other factors such as economics or religion. As Julian Pitt-Rivers and
J.G. Peristiany write, honour cannot “be reduced and treated as an epiphenomenon of
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some other factor.” Bertram Wyatt-Brown calls honour the “the missing element in the
historian’s grasp of events” of the American Revolution. 20 If so, it is surprising that there
has never been an exploration of the loyalist experience from the perspective of honour.
Loyalists have often been treated as being somehow culturally different from
other British colonists in America, especially patriots. The loyalist mind, writes Bernard
Bailyn, was dominated by an “ancient, honorable, and moribund philosophy”. 21 In this
sense the loyalist idea of honour was an outmoded vestige of feudalism. In his work on
Southern honour, Wyatt-Brown concurs, defining the loyalist honour code as centred on
“submission to established authority.”22 Yet loyalists and patriots were products of the
same culture, and were actually animated by similar ideas of honour. Both the defence of
individual rights and the authority of the King were ancient tropes in the English
tradition, and, in the loyalist mind were not at odds. In fact the Crown was considered the
defender of individual rights and property in the face of rebel usurpation. In a recent
reappraisal of The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, Bernard Bailyn notes that many of the
character traits that led the deeply conservative governor down the path to exile –
clinging to unpopular beliefs, patient endurance of ridicule and spite – were ones that, in
a different situation, would have been considered Christian virtues in New England.23
The Puritan ethic was perhaps as strong in the loyalist camp as the patriot.
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Michael Kammen wrote in 1976 that loyalists often faced a “crise de conscience”
when brought before revolutionary committees and associations. Kammen does not use
honour as an explanatory model for this phenomenon, but rather argues the loyalist
conscience was influenced by “subtle and impalpable influences, for the most part
unconscious and emotional, which so largely determine motive and conduct.” William
Smith Jr., the chief justice for the Colony of New York and later Upper Canada, declared
he “refused the [rebel] oath as contrary to my conscience, my honor, & my love to the
country.”24 Smith’s statement appears sincere. Even if his actions and political choices
were consistent with his personal interests, or even hopes that his refusal might be
rewarded by the British as patriots may have suggested, that does not detract from his use
of honour to explain and defend his actions. As Douglas Adair explains in Fame and
Founding Fathers, honour and interest were inextricably linked in the minds of public
men of the eighteenth century. Members of the Continental Congress were motivated by
personal interest for fame, and the material benefits that accompanied renown, while at
the same time having the collective interests of the colonies in mind. They saw no
contradiction. Alexander Hamilton wrote that the “love of fame…is the ruling passion of
the noblest minds.” Adair argues that “[t]he pursuit of fame…was a way of transforming
egotism and self-aggrandizing impulses into public service.” “[P]ublic service nobly (and
selfishly) performed” continues Adair, “was the surest way to build ‘lasting monuments’
and earn the perpetual remembrance of posterity.”25 The loyalist gentlemen examined in
this study shared the same culture with their patriot brothers, and though they may have
hoped for government preferment and lucrative offices from the Crown, they also
believed they were acting in the best interests of the colonies as a whole. The archloyalist pamphleteer and Anglican minister Charles Inglis even included the sentiment
“Loyalty and Interest United” on the cover of his response to Paine’s Common Sense,
though it was dropped in the final printed version. This idea of self-interested service
may seem counterintuitive or hypocritical, but an honour code is built upon a “logic of its
24
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own which [can] dispel the paradoxes.” 26 The deep cultural traditions inherited by
colonial gentlemen provided added assurances that they were behaving honourably.
The gentleman’s honour culture of the eighteenth century had evolved from
aristocratic codes of medieval Europe and was preserved by early modern writers
obsessed with honour. One historian of Elizabethan literature even described the
playwrights and essayists of the period as being under a “fixed intoxication” with
explaining and extolling the idea. One need only glance at Shakespeare’s plays to verify
the Elizabethan preoccupation with aristocratic honour.27 Yet medieval and early modern
historians have noted the slow and uneven transformation of elite honour culture.
According to Mervyn James, the fifteenth century honour culture based in violence and
ferocity underwent a taming process which corresponded with the centralization of the
English state. By the age of Elizabeth, the independent and quarrelsome lords were being
civilized through education, Christianity, litigiousness, and a dedication to the Crown.28
The transition from medieval warriors to courtly retainers was a product of the rise in
civility, so that by the late seventeenth century a new and less violent elite culture had
taken root. Linda Pollock has argued that this transformation should not be viewed as
Christian virtue and civility winning out over medieval barbarity, but rather that English
traditions of honour became a source of stability. “Honor was ubiquitous” writes Pollock,
but it was not necessarily a violent ethic. Rather it was a day-to-day resource concerned
with “restraint and reconciliation” and the preservation of familial and kinship bonds.
English honour codes produced peacemakers more often than duellists.29 As seen in Dr.
Haley’s sorrow in killing De Lancey, men could have contradictory feeling towards
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violence, and the rise of civility, politeness, and sensibility during this period added to the
confusion.
The eighteenth century witnessed remarkable changes to the idea of honour.
Because wealth and literacy expanded into the growing ranks of the middling sort,
historians have argued that traditional honour built on household patriarchy gave way to
the idea of the “polite gentleman,” where honour shifted from a concern for reputation to
the cultivation of an inner life and morals.30 Helped along with the widely available
courtesy literature derived from the advice books for Renaissance nobility, the middling
sorts fused concepts of gentility, Christianity, and honour. Markku Peltonen argues,
however, that the rise of polite culture simply provided new ways to give offense which
then had to be answered in the older language and rituals of honour.31 Yet, as Robert
Shoemaker has shown, there was a notable decline in the incidents of public insult and
duels in eighteenth century London.32 As ever-increasing numbers of middling gentlemen
adopted cultural forms of aristocratic politeness, it became apparent in the late eighteenth
century that this code of conduct could be quite crass and shallow. Without a sound moral
education, gentility, politeness, and attention to taste might just create a fop: a man more
concerned with fashion and gaiety than with manly pursuits and integrity.33 The various
reactions to the publication of Lord Chesterfield’s Letters (1774) provide ample evidence
of the contentious debate over the meaning and use of genteel behaviour. Chesterfield’s
letters are full of advice to his illegitimate son on how to ingratiate himself with high
ranking people. “I owe much more of the success which I have had in this world”, wrote
Chesterfield, “to my manners, than to any superior degree of merit or knowledge.” “Half
the business is done,” he advised his son, “when one has gained the heart and affections
of those with whom one is to transact it.” Such instruction led Samuel Johnson to deliver
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his scathing rebuke that Lord Chesterfield’s letters “teach the morals of a whore and the
manners of a dancing master.”34 The emergence of sensibility in the late eighteenth
century challenged the culture represented by Lord Chesterfield’s Letters. Sensibility did
not dispense with the ideas of civility and politeness, but stressed a more honest
connection with the emotions and empathy. Public displays of sorrow for another’s pain,
for example, became marks of distinction in some circles. This deeper feeling was
considered the path to morality, and was, as David Hume wrote, the source of “true virtue
and honour.”35 If sensibility merged with and altered the standards of politeness, it would
seem reasonable that this new emotional ethic would curtail the more ancient demands of
honour. Within elite circles the preoccupation with older ideas of honour declined, but
Michèle Cohen argues that the rise of sensibility was actually accompanied with an
increased interest in chivalry and the cultivation of more traditional manly virtues. With
the ongoing struggles with France, the chattiness of polite society was considered
effeminizing, and the laconic Englishmen became a vaunted masculine trope against the
loquacious Frenchmen.36 The old ideas of honour waxed and waned with the tides of
fashionable behaviour, but distinction remained the goal of gentlemen.
The colonies imported England’s changing mores, but the settler experience in
America further transformed European concepts of masculinity and honour in ways that
are only now coming into focus. 37 Alexis de Tocqueville would agree that Americans
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altered and adapted European honour codes to their own needs. In his famous antebellum
study, Democracy in America (1835/1840), he notes that the old chivalric code of honour
lingered in America “like a religion which has some temples left standing, though men
have ceased to believe in it.” To Tocqueville, the non-slaveholding Americans of the
North honoured commerce and hard work over the martial bravery and genteel idleness
of the European elite. The American honour code even made room for the uneven
fortunes of market forces, and while bankruptcy was considered a moral stain in the
eighteenth century, Tocqueville observed that such stigma was largely absent in
antebellum America.38 Tocqueville’s appraisal of America may be coloured by the jarring
differences he perceived from his native France and he is likely exaggerating American
society’s blasé attitude towards bankruptcy, but he was picking up on a very real change
in social attitudes caused by the commercial revolution of the early nineteenth century
and the ruinous and baffling panics which followed.39 Tocqueville’s discussion of both
the “capricious” nature of honour and its variability are illuminating,40 and show how
much honour culture changed within two generations of the American Revolution. The
gentlemanly honour of colonial Americans, however, still followed the European lead.
Throughout the cultural changes of the sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries,
there were two key elements of honour which persisted: a deep concern for a reputation
of honesty and trustworthiness, and household patriarchy. A gentleman’s ability to keep
promises, which would assure others that they could have “faith” in his word, was a
consistent sign of character across the centuries. Gentlemen routinely used this quality as
a benchmark of honour in their assessments of others.41 Dishonesty was such an
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important subject that writers expounded on its “pernicious consequences in society”,
using language strikingly similar to that used in later attacks on loyalists. One colonial
writer advised that liars “ought especially to be banished from that social intercourse
among men, which the poison of this vice tends…to contaminate and destroy.”42 As the
revolutionary crisis intensified, loyalists and patriots often accused one another of lying
and hiding their true motives. The dominance of the patriot press, as will be shown in
chapter three, ensured that the idea of Tory predilections towards “deceit, flattery, [and]
falsehood” became a common refrain throughout the colonies.43
In addition to the broad generalization of loyalists as liars, individual loyalists
were branded as oath breakers and dissemblers. Thomas Brown of Georgia, a wealthy
young gentleman, was beaten by a mob, humiliated with tar and feathers, and dragged
before the townspeople of Augusta where he “repented of his past conduct” and pledged
himself to the patriot cause. At Brown’s first opportunity he fled to British protection.
The Georgia Gazette declared that Brown had “publicly forfeited his honor and violated
the oath voluntarily taken… [and] is therefore not to be considered for the future in the
light of a gentleman…”44 The loyalist likely believed that any oath he had given was
coerced and therefore non-binding, but the patriot authorities took this oath-breaking as
an example of the essential treachery of men like Brown. Consequently, patriots reasoned
that it was Brown’s own deceit, and not the crowd action, which caused his political
death.
A reputation for honesty was essential to the political life of a gentleman, but so
too was an ordered household. Historians have argued this period saw the emergence of
the separate spheres of men and women, as men engaged more in a market economy and
women turned their attention to cultivating virtue and orderliness within the home.45 Yet
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manhood was also inextricably linked with the home and family. Karen Harvey is
probably the most recent and assertive English historian to argue that the “house literally
and metaphorically generated masculine identities.”46 Honour, patriarchy, and
governance were deeply bound up in notions of family and household. This is not to say
that women did not have an important role and authority in the home, but the projection
of patriarchal dominance was essential for men. The spectre of being considered a
“henpeck’d husband” or worse, a cuckold, were monstrous threats to a man’s status. Men
could only claim authority in the community by keeping an orderly family.47 Robert
Cleaver, a seventeenth century essayist, argued that “it is impossible for a man to
understand how to govern the commonwealth, that doth not know how to rule his own
house.”48 Sir Robert Filmer would have agreed. In his Patriarcha, (posthumously
published in 1680), he famously argued that the male householder was the foundation for
all civil authority, and was the basis for the divine right of kings. Yet as Linda Kerber
argues, seventeenth century philosophers, as well as many people in the eighteenth
century, did not believe this constituted absolute male power. John Locke, for instance,
argued that the Fifth Commandment “to Honour thy Father and Mother” showed that
parental authority was shared and not purely vested in fathers. Marriage, like civil
society, was made up of voluntary associations.49 Nonetheless, men continued to see the
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linkages between the idea of the King as father and their own household governance.50
Honour was bound up in the concept of divinely sanctioned authority and the obedience
of the members of his little commonwealth. The philosopher Thomas Hobbes very
shrewdly noted that “to obey is to honour; because no man obeys them, whom they think
have no power to help or to hurt them.” Disobedience, consequently, is “to Dishonour.”51
As Rhys Isaac observes of colonial Virginia, the “wealth of the patriarch consists
primarily of the accumulated obligations of dependents”. 52 Nancy Rhoden, Carole
Shammas and others have noted that the American Revolution strained traditional
patriarchy, even in elite patriot households, but the concept remained a powerful source
of authority.53 The attacks on loyalist households, which will be explored later in this
chapter, present clear evidence of the importance colonial Americans placed on the
household and its function as extensions or representations of men. Undermining loyalist
patriarchy was a key factor leading to political death.

In the last few decades social scientists and humanists have directed considerable
effort to understanding the general concept of honour in a variety of ways that inform this
study of eighteenth century honour codes.54 Honour is often differentiated between
50
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internal moral imperatives (conscience) and external projections (reputation, face, or
status). Internal feelings of honour and the outward expression of social honour are not
independent of one another. As the anthropologist Julian Pitt-Rivers observed “honor felt
becomes honor claimed, and honor claimed becomes honour paid.”55 Furthermore, men
internalize the social response to their claim, feeling pride or satisfaction if honour is
indeed paid to them, and shame or anger if denied.
Another way of thinking about honour is in “horizontal” and “vertical” categories.
Horizontal honour is the sort of imperative felt as people strive to prove themselves
among their peers. Vertical honour is the desire to perform well for superiors and be
rewarded.56 In eighteenth century social relations, this concept played out in the vast and
complex system of patrons and clients. Whether a gentleman or a labourer, all men fit
somehow into these systems, wherein ritualized expressions of deference and gratitude
between the ranks were essential. A patron provided employment or prestige to his clients
by purchasing their services and making it public knowledge that the two men were
“friends.” In return the client performed services for his patron and publicly obeyed him.
Gentlemen sometimes even replicated the noblesse oblige of Europe, a concept displayed
in one of the memoirs of George Robert Twelves Hewes. After crafting a pair of shoes
for the wealthy John Hancock, Hewes was invited to a brief and awkward toast on New
Year’s Day at the gentleman’s manor. In a perfect example of the eighteenth century idea
of condescension, Hancock himself poured a glass of wine for Hewes, before giving him
a coin and sending the terrified young man on his way.57 Gentlemen were beholden to
even greater men for their advancement. Contemporaries described these connections in
friendly terms, but they represented a system of unequal obligations and loyalties, or
business relationships made solemn with the weight of honour and paternalism. The King
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sat atop this massive and often vague system, and dispensed the most lucrative and
honourable positions and sinecures.58 The connection between honour and material
wealth has been examined by scholars for centuries, and even in the eighteenth century
social commentators knew that there was more to the pursuit of a fortune than physical
comfort or luxury. According to Adam Smith, it was not “economic motivation that
prompts a man to work, but status, respect, esteem, moral mettle, qualities which would
allow him to be a man of worth and dignity.”59 By European standards, America was a
land rich in material but poor in structured hierarchy and this muddied the relationship
between wealth and honour. The relatively widespread prosperity of the colonies meant
that self-styled gentlemen sometimes found their pretences to authority questioned or
denied by their fellow colonists. It has even been argued that deference was perhaps more
of an abstract ideal in the minds of the elite than a reality in colonial America.60 Colonial
gentlemen could therefore be quite touchy when it came to matters of respect.
The interpretation which most informs this dissertation is the anthropologist Frank
Henderson Stewart’s conception of honour as a “right to respect.” Stewart’s comparative
study of European literature, nineteenth century German jurisprudence, and the concept
of ird among the Bedouin of Arabia, shows that the right to respect is a common trait
among honour-conscious societies. Honour is a man’s inner feeling of worth and a public
appraisal of the man based on his expression of culturally specific virtues. Most
importantly, as Stewart argues, honour operates as a claim-right, which in this case is a
duty placed on others to treat an individual with respect. “On the one side is the bearer [of
honour]” writes Stewart, “which gives him a right to respect; and on the other is the
world, which has a duty to treat the bearer with respect.”61 Whether or not anyone used
this sort of phrasing at the time, this was how honour functioned in the colonies and
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throughout the English Atlantic. In the case of the loyalists examined in this work, a
central element of their political death was the rejection of their claim-right to honour.
Building on the idea of honour as a claim-right, it becomes even more obvious
that personal honour derives from the acclaim of a group. As Bertram Wyatt-Brown
observes, “Kinlessness and solitude are the twin dangers to be avoided at all costs.”62
Family and community are sources of honour, but so too are what Stewart calls “honour
groups.”63 In Alexis de Tocqueville’s exploration of American honour, he clearly
describes this idea:
whenever men collect together as a distinct community,
the notion of honour instantly grows up amongst them;
that is to say, a system of opinions peculiar to themselves
as to what is blamable or commendable; and these
peculiar rules always originate in the special habits and
special interests of the community.64

It is important not to think of honour groups as too rigidly demarcated. Men can belong
to one or many honour groups, and they can overlap and conflict with one another.
Distinctions are blurry and only rarely formalized. R.W. Connell’s idea of hegemonic
masculinity is useful in helping to understand how honour groups operate. Connell posits
that societies encourage men to strive towards an idealized set of behaviours to dominate
women as well as other men who do not adhere to these standards. Not all men are
willing or physically, intellectually, or economically equipped to live up to these criteria.
Thus there are “multiple masculinities” which are in tension or competition with one
another.65 Honour groups operate in similar ways, but they are tied to specific locations,
institutions, professions, or even larger groups with a shared culture like castes or
religious confessions. Looking at the eighteenth century, a ship and its crew or a regiment
could be considered an honour group, but so too could the Royal Navy or army as a
whole. The officers thought of themselves as gentlemen who belonged to an
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international fraternity of gentlemen. In that sense, community leaders in the colonies
would feel themselves at the head of a local honour group, but also participate in a
regional fraternity of leaders, which was connected to the wider Atlantic elite. Depending
on the size of the honour group, each member shares in the triumphs and failures, and
accepts the honours and dishonours of the group as a whole. Individuals, then, are
conscious of their roles within the group, and how the behaviour of one member can
reflect back on others.66
There were national, regional, and professional concepts of honour which existed
side by side and overlapped throughout the Atlantic world. Soldiers had a code of honour,
as did physicians, clergy and even fur traders and labourers.67 Daniel Defoe, for example,
laid out the best practices for an honourable merchant in The Complete English
Tradesmen.68 The use of honour among merchants is interesting considering their
relationships were fraught with disputes. They regularly employed the language of
honour, and because of the vast distances and spotty communication, relied on a system
of trust and goodwill. Merchants had to be sure orders were filled and money was
transferred and thus paid close attention to their associates’ reputations for competence
and honesty. Trust was vital in the Atlantic trade networks, but an honourable reputation
was not always sufficient to quell the anxieties of merchants. Family networks could be
reliable, and as Nuala Zahedieh notes, minority subgroups such as Quakers, Jews, and
Huguenots were particularly strong in that they could command “loyalty, mutual support,
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and unconditional obedience” from their members, both from the fear of ostracism and
duty to God.

69

Negative reports of unsteady habits could sink the fortunes of any trader. Yet as
John Smail has shown, merchants could act in extraordinarily selfish or even duplicitous
ways, but continue to defend their actions using the vocabulary of honour. What was
actually quite underhanded and dishonest behaviour could be seen as honourable when
manipulated with significant doses of guile and casuistry. To modern eyes, the honour of
the eighteenth century was fraught with logical paradoxes, and was sometimes less about
doing “the right thing,” than to “be seen to be doing the right thing.”70 While all men
were expected to keep their word, pay their debts, and be loyal to their friends, gentlemen
considered themselves guided by a higher sense of morality dictated by their strict and
delicate code of personal honour. To accuse a gentleman of lying, as seen in the opening
vignette, was to imply that he had no honour. Yet this same idea of honour could and did
serve as a disguise or shield for all sorts of impropriety. Even if a gentleman was guilty of
an ethical violation, he could deny it and hide behind his honour.71
Military officers followed their own stern, martial code of honour, derived from
the romanticized notions of medieval knights, but this was also subject to the same
tensions and contradictions experienced in the wider British society. Duelling was
forbidden under military law and was generally on the decline among the upper social
ranks in England, but it was not uncommon for British officers to visit the field of
honour. Slights and insults were regularly settled with swords or pistols, and though there
were attempts to curb the custom, officers who refused a challenge were often ostracised
by their peers, or even in some rare cases, brought up on charges for dishonouring of the
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regiment.72 In the aristocratic European tradition, the gentleman who lived by the sword
was far superior to those who might have worn fine clothes, but lived chiefly by trade.
The comparative honour of warriors and merchants differed between regions and
ethnicities, and the differences so clearly visible in the early modern period persisted into
the eighteenth century. The French aristocracy, according to an Elizabethan observer,
thought the merchant’s “traffique ignoble”, while Italian nobles were more comfortable
with the idea of trade, though they left the chore of selling in the markets and “the gaine
of Retailing to the [common] people.”73 The English and the Dutch were perhaps the
most open to the rising power of merchants, though the old prejudices still lingered.
Daniel Defoe, for instance, believed that a true gentleman gave up “ravening after
money.”74 There are numerous examples during this period that show a vestigial echo of
these ideas among military men. Officers in every European army expressed their
exasperation at sutlers who bilked their poorly supplied soldiers or overcharged quarter
masters. One peculiar instance which illustrates the gentleman soldier’s disdain for
commerce occurred when a Connecticut jailer’s wife asked to purchase some wine from
an imprisoned British officer. The officer recorded in his journal that it was only “with
much difficulty [that] I could persuade her that British officers do not sell things.”75 If
some officers loathed traders, the merchants were in fact adopting some ways of the
sword. According to one elite observer, duelling had been transformed by the middling
sorts into the “spurious chivalry of the compting house and counter.”76
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Professional and class-based honour groups were complicated further by cultural
differences in the English Atlantic. Some rituals such as all-male drinking bouts were
found everywhere in the Atlantic. These were common ways to build group cohesion
among gentlemen, merchants, and military men, and involved friendly challenges,
quaffing wine, rowdiness, and long chains of witty toasts intended to prove individual
stamina and mettle among a peer group. Yet these same gatherings were just as
commonly denounced as wasteful and dishonourable.77 Other cultural understandings of
honour were more closely tied to specific regions which reveal the poles of English
honour cultures: the puritan and the cavalier. While the Southern planter, with his
cavalier sensibilities, sought to show off his skill and manhood with ostentatious displays
of prowess and wealth, his New England counterpart saw honour in the quiet, modest life
of thrift, service, and prayer. For the planter elite, blood sports, insults, and gambling
were common; among the New Englanders, these were rejected as ungodly.78
Part of these regional differences can be explained by religion, which also played
a powerful role in constructing honour. Anthropological studies have articulated a
“congenital relationship” between honour and a divine fount or source of honour
described as “grace.” The idea of honour, according to C.B. Watson, transformed from a
“secular morality” for medieval aristocrats, to a set of notions which “were inseparable
from virtue itself” during the Renaissance. In colonial America, Calvinist Puritan
societies in New England and the cavalier-influenced Anglican communities of the South

77

On colonial drinking see: Peter Thompson, “‘The Friendly Glass’: Drink and Gentility in Colonial
Philadelphia,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 113, No. 4 (Oct., 1989): 549573; Sarah Hand Meacham, Every Home a Distillery: Alcohol, Gender, and Technology in the Colonial
Chesapeake (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); Mark Lender and James Kirby Martin,
Drinking in America: A History (New York: Free Press, 1987).
78

For a thorough examination of the different folkways established in America see: See David Hackett
Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
Evarts B. Greene, “The Code of Honor in Colonial and Revolutionary Times with Special Reference to
New England,” Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Vo. 26, (1927): 367-388. The
entirety of Bertram Wyatt-Brown’s Southern Honor, and Honor and Grace: The Shaping of Southern
Culture, remain essential. Also see Richard E. Nesbitt and Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychology
of Violence in the South (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). Nesbitt and Cohen convincingly argue for
the strength and persistence of Southern honour codes into the present day. Their study of white
southerners in the 1990s shows the continued need for violent responses for “the protection of self, family,
and possessions, for responding to insult, and for socializing children” (82) and a variety of other points of
congruity that connect modern Southern culture with the Old South.

55
both developed different codes of honour which incorporated their Christian
denomination’s theology. Some Congregational preachers, for instance, saw it as a sign
of honour to extend their sermons on particularly cold days to induce character-building
suffering in their parishioners. Far from meek imitations of Christ, Puritan householders
could find Godly approbation in the pages of the Old Testament as they violently
defended their household honour and their position as divinely ordained patriarchs. The
outward expression of humility and asceticism could, paradoxically, become an avenue
for a sort of vanity.79 A true gentleman needed to avoid all the traps which led to vanity,
whether they were extreme indulgence or austerity. As the loyalist gentleman and
Connecticut lawyer Amos Botsford instructed his son in the years after the Revolution, “I
would not have a young Lad too close, nor yet too lavish, a Medium is always the best.”80
Restraint in all things was the way of the true gentleman.
The aristocratic code of honour found its most zealous adherents in the Southern
colonies, but even amid the degradations of a slave society religious belief played an
important part in fashioning honour.81 Youthful gentlemen might eschew open religious
piety in favour of displays of riding or dancing, but churchgoing was expected
nonetheless. Virginia churches were theatres for projecting rank and power, and even the
process of entering and leaving church was a ritual unto itself. The highest ranking gentry
would enter last and sit nearest the pulpit in reserved seating, and depart first, creating a
sort of procession for the lower ranks to observe.82 With no American bishop, the
governor and local vestrymen had the power to appoint clergy which fixed these men of
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the cloth in the dominant patron-client networks.83 The deeply entwined relationship
between ruling elite and church provided a kind of spiritual legitimacy to the social and
economic hierarchy. Though austere Northerners might cluck their tongues at the fast
horses, drinking, and dancing of the Virginia gentry, the Southern gentlemen were certain
of their divine favour. At the very least they could turn to pious religious observance in
their waning years, knowing that “a merciful God…would accept a few days or weeks of
sincere repenting.”84
Perhaps most importantly for Southern culture was the religious justification for
the enslavement of Africans. If God had cursed the sons of Ham to their fate as “servant
of servants,” He also elevated their white masters with grace. The domination of Africans
thus became a religious duty as well as one of the central pillars of their honour code.85
Slaves were without honour, but they were not damned. The Southern conception of
slavery evolved into a paternalistic ideology bound up in the mutual obligations between
masters and slaves. Like their New England cousins, Southern gentlemen saw themselves
as divinely ordained patriarchs.86 In the slaveholder’s world view, African slaves were
infantile and dependent creatures who relied on their masters to provide the necessities of
life and a useful purpose.87 Southern masters pointed to the biblical patriarch Abraham, a
slave holder, as the foundation of all Godly societies and “a model of manly virtues.”88
Masters could therefore feel confident that the honour they derived from their power over
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slaves was in keeping with Biblical precedent and was a sign of God’s favour. Southern
honour became inextricably linked with slavery. As Orlando Patterson so eloquently
writes: “Those who most dishonor and constrain others are in the best position to
appreciate what joy it is to possess what they deny.”89
The presence of dishonoured black slaves in North America provided a clear
antithesis to the honourable white man. According to Patterson, slaves were socially
deceased persons who had been “alienated from all ‘rights’ or claims of birth” and did
not belong to any legally recognized society of their own. Instead, they were perpetual
aliens, placed at the very lowest rank of society and regarded by the state as having no
existence except as the property of their masters. As Patterson argues, the “honor of the
master was enhanced by the subjection of the slave.”90 Slaves, along with fine clothes and
fast horses, became essential accoutrements to a gentleman’s kit. One observer noted that
when a wealthy Virginian’s son reached fifteen years of age, he received a “horse and a
negro” which were luxuries that displayed a young man’s power. The slave was
considered an extension of the master, just like other dependents and property. Runaways
could dishonour a master, just as a slave’s loyalty and obedience provided honour. How
that loyalty was acquired, whether through cruelty or some variety of twisted
benevolence, was a topic of debate throughout the history of slavery. A reputation for
cruelty brought little honour, and slave traders themselves were considered a
dishonourable lot. Nonetheless, in looking at the slave system of the South, whatever
honour was derived by the master from the slave, as Philip Morgan reminds us, “violence
was always part of their relationship.”91 That such a brutal system could exist
concurrently with notions of politeness and civility is another example of the paradoxes
inherent in honour cultures.
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Just as religious belief and slavery helped shape honour, so too did genteel
culture. Politeness and gentility were considered civilizing virtues, and in a land where
civilization seemed to cling to the seacoast, besieged by the forces of nature and
savagery, these ideas became a real source of power.92 Bertram Wyatt-Brown considered
gentility to be a separate kind of honour, derived from “the Stoic-Christian system”
which sat in juxtaposition to the “primal honour” of a violent Indo-European ancestry.93
Wyatt-Brown does not elaborate much on this dichotomy, but the notion that there were
two competing and contradictory standards of gentlemanly behaviour has been noted by
other historians.94 As already mentioned above, eighteenth century England witnessed a
shift in gentlemanly culture away from a fixation on traditional honour to ideas of
politeness and then to sensibility, and these trends crossed the Atlantic as well. The
friction and confusion between competing notions of proper behaviour can be glimpsed
in a letter from the Boston loyalist Rev. Mather Byles II to his daughter Rebecca. Writing
in response to news of some unnamed dispute, the Byles patriarch assures his daughter
that she behaved well and that she had his continued confidence. He then seemingly rolls
his eyes at his son’s attempts to gallantly defend his sister. “I suspect…” he writes, that
“his ideas of punchilio [sic] & of a Brother’s prerogative are rather too high…”
Traditional honour seemed rather outmoded to the aging Byles.95 Another wry
observation was printed in the Pennsylvania Packet in 1779 which shares a similar
exasperation at the conflicting tenets of honour and civility. The author writes that he
received a letter which delivered a “cavalier” challenge over a perceived insult. The
challenger threatens to beat the author with a cane, yet closes the message with a standard
expression of politeness. “[W]hat can be more truly ridiculous,” writes the author, “than,
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that a man has been venting on a sheet of paper every crudity imaginable, he should
politely conclude with assuring you that he is your very humble servant.”96 That men
were even worrying about such things in the middle of a war is testament to the value
they placed on sorting out these tangled customs.
Gentlemen could teach their sons the exacting standards of manners through
private tutors who taught fencing and dance, and through dozens of available “courtesy
books.” Some guide books were deeply spiritual in nature, such as Richard Allestree’s
The Whole Duty of Man. This was an accessible work, designed to cultivate a moral and
godly life for all men, rich and poor, but it was required reading for young gentlemen.
Counselling modesty, charity, and faith, Allestree’s work was taught in conjunction with
a variety of other instructional guide books. 97 Perhaps the best-known of the secular
courtesy books (though it was never printed in the colonies, only imported) was Youth’s
Behaviour, or Decency in Conversation among Men. George Washington famously
copied his “Rules of Civility” from its pages as a teenager, and it is a prime example of
the sort of education aspiring young boys would receive in politeness and behaviour. The
book instructs the young gentleman in proper manners, but each rule is actually designed
to bring honour to the reader or show honour to others. Some rules instruct on basic table
manners and social interaction, such as the eternal maxim of rule 96: “Drink not nor talk
with your mouth full…” Other rules explain the exacting etiquette which recognized rank
and station within a consciously hierarchical society. Rule 37 informs the young reader
that “In Speaking to men of Quality do not lean nor Look them full in the Face, nor
approach too near them…Keep a full Pace from them.” Another rule describes the ideal
interactions between different ranks and the mutual obligations required of all members
of the hierarchy: “Artificers & Persons of low Degree ought not to use many ceremonies
to Lords, or Others of high Degree but Respect and high[ly] Honour them, and those of
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high Degree ought to treat them with affibility & Courtesie, without Arrogancy.”

98

These

were basic instructions on rituals of deference and condescension.
Behaviour distinguished gentlemen, but fine possessions displayed economic
power and refinement. Genteel homes, clothes, dinner ware, and the knowledge to
recognize style and fashion served as marks of honour for the elite.99 One can best read
the importance of genteel accoutrements in the concerns of men who felt their
possessions were somehow deficient. The seventeenth century Member of Parliament
Samuel Pepys wrote that he considered himself “a little dishonoured” because he hired a
carriage, rather than owned one.100 It was less stylish, but he was also projecting the idea,
perhaps, that he did not have the means to purchase and maintain his own carriage and
driver, thereby revealing some defect in his abilities or power. When the loyalist exile
Jacob Bailey and his family arrived in Halifax, his first impulse was to ask those who met
them to “excuse the meaness [sic] and singularity of our dress” and account for his
shameful appearance.101 Through displays of wealth, manners, and refined tastes, men set
themselves apart from common people and laid claim to authority within and beyond the
household.
Gentility was inseparably linked with honour in the minds of eighteenth century
gentlemen and so too was a liberal education. If they had the means, fathers sent their
sons to one of colonial America’s premiere centers of higher learning such as Harvard or
The College of William and Mary in Williamsburg. The wealthier still paid for their sons
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to cross the Atlantic for a more illustrious education in Britain, and to pick up the finer
manners and tastes of the Old World, but these men represented a small fraction of
colonial society.102 Most people had to content themselves with less formal education.
Gentlemen of the Enlightenment were required to exhibit knowledge of science,
philosophy, and the law. There was honour in expressing knowledge of the classics,
literature, the Bible, and the wider world. It served almost as a kind of exclusive language
for the initiated. Individual gentlemen might disagree on the comparative value of
different educational pursuits, but they all understood the power a liberal education could
provide. The loyalist Reverend Charles Inglis explained the importance of a proper
education to students at King’s College in New York prior to the Revolution, warning
that “there are so many Branches of science which demand your Attention…that you
have no time to lose.” Inglis explained to the young gentlemen that knowledge was an
elevating virtue, which allowed men “to rise above the common Herd on whom fair
Science never shed its Influence [and] above those sordid minds, who never think
anything Worthy of Pursuit but what pampers their appetites.”103 According to Rev.
Inglis, faith, grace, and learning went hand-in-hand. Men from humbler backgrounds
therefore smarted at their lack of education. The loyalist Joel Stone was a successful
merchant and magistrate by the end of his life, yet he knew that his “want of a liberal
education has obstructed that communicative knowledge” which provided other
gentlemen the authority to speak on matters of religion and politics. Not to be cowed into
silence, however, Stone justified his forays into these subjects on the basis of his
“temporal experience, recollection and belief of Eighty-one Years past… [which had]
obliged him to hear Politics discoursed frequently…”104 Life experience surely gained
one respect, but it could never replace the advantages of formal learning. John Harrower,
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for example, was a penniless, though well-educated, Scottish merchant who came to
Virginia as an indentured servant in the early 1770s. Because of his “abilities
and…behaviour” he soon found himself dining with his master and serving as a tutor for
the children of other nearby planters. By virtue of his knowledge, he was placed at a
social level far above his station as an unfree servant. His education and manners alone
provided him with honour.105 That education was supposed to set men apart was a fact
bitterly noted by the loyalist James Moody in his description of the execution of the
“honest soldier and martyr, Robert Maxwell…” According to Moody, vengeful patriots
refused to believe the man was innocent of plundering a local home, even though “he had
a good education.”106 This was yet one more sign for loyalists that the revolutionaries had
abandoned civilization, and ignored the personal marks of honour and decency.
American gentlemen, both patriot and loyalist, were engaged in cultivating a set
of virtues and achievements which earned them a privileged status. Only by meeting the
benchmarks of genteel manners, education, mastery over the household, and accumulated
wealth could men enter into the ranks of the colonial power brokers and leaders. As the
New Hampshire loyalist Benjamin Thompson, (later Count Rumford), put it: “Men
cannot bear to be commanded by others that are their superiors in nothing.”107 Ideally, a
man’s genteel status obliged others to respect or defer to him. The term “gentleman” was
somewhat ambiguous, however, covering a whole spectrum of wealth and achievement,
and the requirements for gentlemanly status differed considerably between professions
and regions. Southern gentlemen found the New England elite inferior, prudish, and dull,
while New Englanders found the Southern planter class vain, debauched, and lacking the
morals of true gentlemen. The English gentry found all colonial gentlemen rustic and
quaint. Yet men who claimed genteel status sought to belong to a defined group that
commanded respect. In a gentleman’s ideal world, when he passed by lesser men, they
would show signs of respect, doffing hats or stepping aside. The gentleman would be free
from public insult, his dignified body would never be subject to corporal punishment, he
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would be taken at his word, and his home would be an inviolable castle. He would
command his household, and have a say in governing his town or region or even the
empire depending on his rank. This status relied on the consent of others to accept him as
the gentleman he claimed to be. If he failed to live up to the cultural standards, his honour
would be impugned. One of the most important traits of honour that makes it so prized in
any culture is that it can be lost.108
Men could lose their honourable reputations through their own vices, such as
foolishness, incompetence, criminality, drunkenness, cowardice, or servility. The many
shaming rituals found in various parts of colonial America in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries – affixing specific letters to clothing, shunning, the pillory, begging
public forgiveness, ducking and so on – were employed to punish sexual transgressions,
thievery, spousal cruelty or other dishonours.109 A man could also be dishonoured by
others through insults, slander, or some other trespass unless he responded appropriately
with a challenge, lawsuit, or returned insult. All acts of dishonour were emasculating, but
to be publicly “unmanned” by the disobedience of one’s wife or other dependent was a
dreadful fate for a householder, regardless of his rank.110 Eighteenth century Americans
were fascinated by gossipy tales of unmanning, and extreme examples circulated through
American newspapers. In 1768, a man from Shrewsbury, New Jersey, was “plied with
strong Liquor by three Females,” which included his wife and mother-in-law. The women
then “proceeded very deliberately to deprive him of his Manhood by C[astration]n” in
revenge for his infidelity. A similar tale of physical “unmanning” was imported from
England which recounted a feud between two suitors of a “buxom country wench.” After
the young lady had made her choice and married one of the men, the spurned suitor
attacked the drunken groom and performed “the same operation on him, that the Italians
do on their male singers.”111
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Emasculation in colonial America did not need to be so literal. Court records in
both the New and Old World testify to common accusations of dishonourable conduct
and the lengths men and women would go to defend their reputations. Though
Tocqueville noted the absence of any social stigma against bankrupts in the early
republic, Toby Ditz has shown that merchants in colonial America often used gendered
language, even the term “cuckold”, to describe financial failure and bankruptcy.
Incompetence in business was linked with all manner of male deficiencies, and the
eighteenth century mind made a clear association between business reversals and
disorderly household governance.112 Men were equally concerned about imputations of
cowardice. Ambrose Serle, General Howe’s personal secretary from 1776 to 1778, took
a tour of Upper Bay between New York and New Jersey, “not far from [rebel] Batteries;
too near in my Opinion, though I made no objection, lest it should be imputed to
Cowardice, with which, I thank God, I am not much troubled…”113 Serle chose to risk his
life and the ship rather than wisely suggest a different course. Indeed, such ideas were
quite common during the late eighteenth century. Hannah Lawrence Schieffelin
considered the primary motive for Montgomery’s suicidal assault on Quebec in 1775 to
be “the delicate sense of honour, and fear of reproach that influence the minds of the truly
brave.”114 Regardless of the changing fashions in manners, cowards remained objects of
scorn in times of war.
Cowards, rakes, pirates, and other criminals provided popular contrasts for
honourable men, but the most obvious foil for man was woman.115 In the eighteenth
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century, men and women were thought to have different vices which brought them
dishonour. Men could be violent and prone to idleness and drink, whereas women were
ever tempted towards luxury and lust. Honourable men and women restrained these
passions. Men who appeared to exhibit feminine vices could be labelled unmanly, just as
women who were too assertive or wrathful were denounced as harpies or viragos.116
In many cultures, women’s honour is often centred on their sexual purity or
chastity and this was a common idea in colonial America. A short poem in the Boston
Post-Boy from 1774, entitled “Female Honor,” clearly articulates this popular attitude. It
begins by accepting the fact that the male libertine “may rove, Free and unquestion’d
thro’ the wilds of love,” but a woman faces a much different fate,
If strongly charm’d, she leave the thorny way,
And in the softer paths of pleasure stray;
Ruin ensues, reproach and endless shame,
And one false step entirely damns her fame:
In vain with tears the loss she may deplore,
In vain look back to what she was before,
She sets, like stars that fall, to rise no more.117

This concern for women’s sexual purity was very powerful at the time, but historians
have shown that a woman’s honour in the Old and New Worlds consisted of more than
just her sexuality. Women gained honour and good reputation through their work and
comportment, just as men did.118 Although women, like children, servants, and slaves had
little relationship to the state other than through the male householder, usually their
husband or father, a woman’s situation was more negotiated than contemporary men
were often willing to admit in public. As historian Elizabeth Foyster observed of
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seventeenth century English householders, they “were all too aware that their honour
depended on the actions and words of their wives,” and the same was true for their
eighteenth century descendants. In fact, Foyster argues that the “language of ‘honour’
was how men and women talked about their gender roles” and that an honourable
reputation was the reward for men and women who lived up to the expectations of a
patriarchal society.119 The same was true in colonial America, where women certainly
had a “right to respect,” albeit one that differed from men. Yet as with so many of these
cultural traits, the honour and dishonour men and women gleaned from their relationships
was negotiated, and depended greatly on their social and economic status.
Hannah Lawrence was a woman who found herself torn between various honour
groups in the American Revolution in ways that reveal how honour was subjective and
negotiated. The daughter of a wealthy New York Quaker, she defied her religious
community and was an outspoken supporter of the Revolution, while her father,
ostensibly neutral, seemed to favour the Crown and remained in New York during the
occupation. Lawrence penned scathing poems that she posted on a promenade popular
with elite redcoats, lambasting British officers for their apparent debaucheries. And yet
this stalwart Whig chose to marry a loyalist soldier, Jacob Schieffelin, a man of different
political principles and a stranger to the Quaker family. Disowned by her congregation,
Hannah Lawrence Schieffelin travelled with her husband to the remote outpost of Detroit
where he served as a secretary of the Indian Department.120
Though rejected by her congregation, Hannah Schieffelin was quite welcome with
the genteel sort at Detroit. The ladies and gentlemen at the outpost attempted to make the
best of their isolation, holding dinners and parties, furnished with the best of what they
could acquire in the wilderness. At one of these dinners sat an officer “rather past the
bloom of youth,” Hannah recorded, “whose reserved air, and unaccommodating manners
rendered him remarkable in an atmosphere where every other person wore the aspect of
implicit subservience to unlimited power.” He was alone at the table, though his wife was
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present in camp. The officer, whom she referred to as Captain B., had been spurned by
another woman years past, and met his present wife when she was a captive among a
group of Native warriors. The Captain managed to free the young woman, and,
Schieffelin records “gratitude, if not a more lively emotion, induced her to remain with
her deliverer.” Mrs. Schieffelin, raised amidst genteel manners and mores, could not help
but express her feelings on the matter. “I remonstrated with him on [the] injustice of
taking advantage of those sentiments, and her unprotected situation, to destroy her honour
and peace of mind,” she records. The other ladies in the British outpost obviously thought
the same, as the frontier woman was not welcome at the table. Captain B. looked at the
gentlewoman “with the smile of conscious integrity” and replied that he preferred to keep
his wife from the company of such women anyway, and in a wry retort, adapted a line
from Joseph Addison’s Cato: “the post of honour is sometimes a private station.”121
The loyalist officer’s allusion to a line from Addison’s Cato certainly made an
impression on the young poetess. She, like most other literate people involved in the
American Revolution, knew the play well.122 What this little vignette reveals, aside from
the multiple claims on the meaning of Cato, is the collision of mores between metropolis
and hinterland and the malleability of the concept of honour. Captain B., in his mind, was
a gentleman soldier who saved a maiden in distress and she had returned his gallantry by
giving him her hand in marriage. Mrs. Schieffelin, on the other hand, saw a man on the
frontier, rejected by another woman, who satisfied his desires with a helpless girl, and
because of her frontier manners or perhaps the stain of living among savages, she was
never accepted into the company of the officers’ wives. In keeping with their elitist and
patriarchal behaviour, neither Shieffelin nor Captain B. thought to share his wife’s
opinion on the matter, but the match brought the young officer no honour in the camp.
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Part of Capatin B’s problem may have been the perception that he had acted
rashly, impetuously following his youthful passions by marrying a woman far below his
station. Boyish qualities were perhaps even more widely used as a contrast to manhood
than womanhood. Honour and dishonour did not weigh as heavily on boys, as
indiscretion and error were part of the learning process. Defects in character and bad
habits could be corrected in youth, and produce an honourable man. The hallmarks of
boyhood were dependence, frivolity, unrestrained passions, and foolishness, but if these
vices lingered into manhood they were cited as proof of emasculation.123 An honourable
man would recognize and restrain such proclivities. The popular enthusiasm and the
outpouring of emotion that occurred during the lead-up to the American Revolution was
used by several loyalist writers to show that Americans, like young boys, were rebellious
and unprepared or unable to lead independent colonies.124 In response to such attacks,
Thomas Paine embraced the youthful analogy, declaring that the colonies were indeed
young, but that “Youth is the seed time of good habits…in nations as in individuals” and
therefore the colonies needed to throw off oppression and join together, or each colony
would grow too large and too proud on their own to ever unite.125 Indeed, in the
American Revolution and the early years of the republic, the attitude towards young
unmarried men became more ambiguous. Young bachelors played a celebrated role in the
expanding new country, but they were still regarded warily by many.126
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Loyalist were collectively labelled effeminate cowards, corrupt and servile lovers
of luxury, and likened to any number of shameful archetypes. Yet of all the ways
loyalists were dishonoured, the most cutting were the attacks on their positions as
patriarchs and householders. Their homes were attacked and their families abused with
impunity, but patriots saw this as the result of loyalist immorality and not revolutionary
malice. Patriot propaganda most famously pointed to Joshua Loring Jr. as the archetype
of depraved loyalist manhood. Loring was a Boston loyalist transplanted to New York
who acquired the lucrative, but infamous, position as the commissary for American
prisoners of war. Historians more or less attribute his rise through the ranks to his wife
Elizabeth, who allegedly had an extended sexual relationship with General William
Howe.127 The tale, spread far and wide, was made all the worse by the idea that Loring
was a willing cuckold who eagerly traded his family honour for government preferment.
The Pennsylvania Evening Post carried a satiric poem which described a British
leadership more interested in banqueting than fighting the war. The poem took a
particularly gleeful jab at the debauched arrangement between loyalist lady and royal
General:
Sir William he, snug as a flea,
Lay all this time a snoring;
Nor dreamt of harm, as he lay warm
128
In bed with Mrs. Loring.

The story even made it to England where it was included in a published letter
condemning the British army’s failure to destroy the rag-tag remnants of the American
army in late 1776. According to the anonymous author, the fault belonged to William
Howe who “was at New York in the lap of Ease” it read “or, rather amusing himself in
the lap of a Mrs. L_____, who is the very Cleopatra to this Antony of ours." Such an
arrangement would not be unknown to an elite British audience. Faramerz Dabhoiwala
has shown that high ranking ladies with a promiscuous reputation did not always suffer
potential for virtue, see Rodney Hessinger, Seduced, Abandoned, and Reborn: Visions of Youth in MiddleClass America, 1780-1850 (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2005).
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unduly in early modern England. The late seventeenth century author John Dunton noted
that elite men and women engaged in illicit affairs out of “temptations of honour” – the
idea that a carnal relationship with a superior might meet with financial or social rewards,
and such arrangements were not unknown in the eighteenth century.129 Nonetheless, the
tale of the Lorings and Howe was printed as a hand bill and distributed in Parliament, no
doubt to raise awareness that a loyalist cuckold, an American Jezebel, and a high-ranking
letch were sinking the honour of the British Empire in America.130 The scandalous tale of
Joshua and Elizabeth Loring was sensational, and perhaps unique, but patriots used this
as one of many examples to prove that loyalists would sacrifice their personal and family
honour for government rewards.131
Most men in colonial America, patriot or loyalist, would have been aghast at the
thought of trading their wives’ virtue for a government office. Instead, men of all ranks
jealously guarded their households which included dependents, their property and
possessions, and the physical structure itself. The house was the most visible emblem of a
gentleman’s status. As Henry Glassie explained in his study of American vernacular
architecture, the style and location of a home “told you exactly where you stood in the
social order.” The house projected power in a particular location, and, especially amid the
privations of frontier life and the upheavals of the American Revolution, “the house
beamed a message of control.” The emotional connection to a home cannot be overstated
in the eighteenth century, especially for gentlemen who went to great expense to design
and build them, and the women who were expected to maintain the domestic interior. In
some respects the idea of the house as a living thing, as an analog to the human body with
the hearth, window, and doors mirroring heart, eyes, and orifices, persisted into the
eighteenth century: it was the expression of a family’s soul. An ordered, genteel house
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brought honour to a gentleman and his family.132 The home was, to repeat the clichéd
adage, a man’s castle, and as Amanda Vickery writes, the “external perimeter of the
house was a frontier in custom and law.” The fences and walls of a home protected not
only the physical well-being of a man and his family, but their privacy as well, which was
a key component of respectability and status.133
The attacks on loyalist homes are covered extensively in the historiography, and a
few examples should suffice to connect the theory described above with the actions of the
patriots. In the early years of the crisis, Mathew Robinson of Newport, Rhode Island had
his fences torn down, evidently as a symbolic gesture to inform him that he no longer had
the power to claim boundaries or separate himself from the rest of the town. Edward
Stow of Massachusetts discovered the exterior of his house frequently “bedaubed by
Excrement and Feathers…and repeated again with Blubber Oil and Feathers…”134 Peter
Oliver recorded how Jonathan Sewell, Daniel Leonard and other loyalist grandees of
Massachusetts had their homes vandalized by mobs. Sewell’s home, for instance, “was
attacked by the Mob, his windows broke & other Damage done…”135 These crowd
actions bear many similarities with the folk practises of the “charivari” or
“skimmington,” which were common in both England and the colonies, and were
normally intended to ostracize or punish community members for adultery, spousal
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abuse, or some other transgression not immediately punished by law.136 When directed
against loyalists, however, these crowd actions often took a decidedly more violent turn,
exploding into direct attacks on the private space of the gentlemen and their families. The
mob that harassed Leonard’s home “fired Bullets into the House & obliged him to fly
from it to save his Life.” Another mob invaded John Peters’ home while the local
committee “searched my House for Letters of secret correspondence with General
Carleton, with whom in fact I never had corresponded, they took away all papers found in
my House, insulted me & required me to sign Deeds of some Lands I had bought;
confined me to the Limits of the Town.” The Anglican minister Samuel Peters of Hebron,
Connecticut, (John Peters’ uncle), “was stript of his Canonicals & carried to one of their
Liberty Poles & afterwards drove from his Parish…” an act of ostracism from the
community, but also a rejection of Peters’ civil and ecclesiastical authority.137 The most
famous (or infamous) home invasion occurred during the Stamp Act crisis of 1765, when
the stately manor of Lt. Governor Thomas Hutchinson was ransacked for hours. The mob
destroyed every vestige of domestic gentility from trees and garden fences to the cupola
on the roof. The destruction was so thorough that the mob even tore the wainscoting from
the walls. No one was ever arrested or tried for any of these acts of vandalism or trespass
as they were largely approved of by the vocal majority of the population.138
Committees of Inspection, Correspondence, or Safety as they were variously
called, often led the mobs, and felt justified in violating the homes of suspected loyalists
as they searched for banned items or proof of conspiracies. Yet loyalists noted the
impertinent pride and venom with which the committeemen carried out their tasks.
Loyalists regarded these violations of the household and the basic liberties of English
subjects as evidence of the revolutionaries’ hypocrisy and their true, power-hungry
136
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intentions. James Allen, a professed supporter of colonial resistance but an opponent of
independence, saw the spectre of societal collapse in rebel action. “[T]he most
insignificant now lord it with impunity & without discretion over the most respectable
characters,” he wrote. Incensed at the confiscation of his friends’ estates, he bitterly
noted that “Men who could scarcely maintain their families, now live in splendor. In
short this Country is agitated to its foundations, & will probably soon be overturned.”139
Loyalists often scoffed at the patriot’s claims of defending liberty, seeing instead a
calculated plan to steal from the better sort.
The apparent disregard for rank and dignity even found its way into loyalist bed
chambers. Edward Brimley of Massachusetts told the Claims Commissioners after the
war that the rebels occupied his house in his absence, and kept a detachment of soldiers
with his family, intruding even into his wife’s dressing room. To add to the misery, the
rebels opened the loyalist’s home “exposing [his wife] to the view of the banditti; as a
sight ‘See a Tory Woman.’”140 James Allen noted that such outrages were “justified by
the Whigs as necessary for the security of all Government…” but he felt this was a
shallow excuse, and was leading to social collapse. “If necessity is a plea, who created it,
or where will it stop?” he asked in his diary. “Massacres, proscriptions & every species of
iniquity may be justified by necessity.”141 Since men like Allen understood the home to
be the basic building block of civilization, undermining household authority was the first
step on the road to total anarchy.
One of the loyalists’ most prominent spokesmen, Reverend Samuel Seabury, who
wrote under the pseudonym of “A Westchester Farmer,” denounced the committees’
violations. In 1774 he declared that any committeeman who might “condescend to go
pimping, and peeping, into tea-canisters and molasses jugs,” would learn “better
manners” with a “good hickory cudgel.” Seabury repeated this threat in two different
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pamphlets and was mocked by the teenaged patriot Alexander Hamilton in his pamphlet
A Full Vindication of the Measures of Congress. Hamilton responded to Seabury’s
argument with profoundly masculine language, declaring that all loyalist ideas displayed
“impotence” and a “defect in vigour,” while the patriot cause was a “manly and virtuous
struggle.”142 The image of an old man impotently waving a cane in the air could not
compete with the romantic and youthful call to revolution.
A man unable to defend his home was publicly humiliated. Consequently, loyalist
householders often fled on their own hoping that their dependents would be left in peace
and in possession of their estates. Joel Stone, a young unmarried shopkeeper living in
Judea, (now Washington), Connecticut shared his home with his sister, Rene. After
assisting in the escape of a prominent loyalist prisoner in the area (see chapter 4) he fled
an approaching mob in January, 1777. Though he “happily eluded” the patriot crowd, his
sister “met the resentment of the mob who from language the most approbrious [sic]
proceeded to actual violence breaking open every lock in the house and seizing all the
property they could discover…” With the estate confiscated she was forced out of the
house and had to return to her aged father’s overcrowded home, where she and much of
her family contracted smallpox.143 Stone was powerless to protect his sister, and in exile
it was impossible for him to help his suffering family. His political choices destroyed his
patriarchal role in his family.
Banishment and property confiscation were the most profound and far reaching
elements of loyalists’ political death. Property rights were the foundation of citizenship
and without land and possessions a man was hardly a man at all, and became a dependent
wanderer. All loyalists considered the confiscation of their estates as the worst violation
they experienced in that it removed them from society and destroyed any prospects for
their families’ future wealth. In 1777 the Continental Congress advised all states to
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confiscate the property of loyalists who had fled to the British or had otherwise assisted
the enemy, but many states had already enacted such measures.144 Patriots felt fully
justified in the various confiscation acts, and published defences of their legal and moral
position. According to a Virginia publication of 1782, the laws were not only “founded
upon legal principles,” but the “common justice” of not allowing “vicious citizens” to
partake in the victories earned by “virtuous citizens.”145 These thoughts were shared by
New Jersey governor Robert Livingston, who explained to Benjamin Franklin that there
could “be little doubt, that every society may rightfully banish…those, who aim at
subversion, and forfeit the property, which they can only be entitled to by the laws, and
under the protection of the society, which they attempt to destroy.”146 The justice and
necessity of confiscation seemed obvious to the patriot leadership, although the
application of the laws differed from state to state. In general, states which held more
active and numerous loyalists tended to have harsher laws against them. The legal
persecution of loyalists certainly stemmed from the practical concerns of state authorities
who feared being undermined by their Tories, but it may also have been a reflection of
revolutionary governments incensed or embarrassed because of the dishonourable
presence of so many Crown supporters in their midst. They had to act swiftly and harshly
or the state’s honour might have been impugned within the confederation. In Georgia and
New Hampshire, for example, the few loyalists there were given time to sell off their
property and depart. In Virginia, a state which also produced comparatively few Tories,
the loyalist planter Jacob Ellegood testified that Tory property was not confiscated but
went “immediately to the Wife & Children… upon the Spot & was vested in them one
third to the Wife &c as if the father was dead…” New York, which saw the most loyalist
activity of the war, eagerly confiscated loyalist estates. According to a nineteenth century
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estimate, the seized property of the New York loyalists amounted to $3.6 million, an
incredible sum even factoring for war-time inflation.147
The legal attack on loyalists followed the precepts of attainder, which along with
execution was the punishment for high treason, and had been a part of English Common
Law since at least 1352. Attainder stripped a traitor of all property rights, and included a
unique provision known as the “corruption of blood” which prevented the transgressor
from passing on any property to his or her heirs. According to the historian J.R. Lander,
attainder meant “the legal death of the family.”148 The New Jersey legislature, which
enacted some of the most virulent anti-Tory laws, including execution “without benefit of
clergy,” specifically stated that acts of attainder would not include the corruption of
blood, perhaps feeling that an attack on innocent members of the family was not in
keeping with the ideals of the Revolution.149 Yet loyalists believed confiscation had the
same effect. The New York loyalist Peter Van Schaak argued that banishment should be
enough to satisfy the patriots. “By removing the man,” he wrote, “the measure of public
justice is full; by adding to that punishment [confiscation], it runs over.” Confiscation
was not a necessary punishment, but an act of “vindictive justice”. Quoting from the
Marquis di Beccaria, Van Schaak asked if there could be “a more melancholy
spectacle…than a whole family overwhelmed with misery from the crime of their chief?”
The true intention of the law, according to Van Schaak, was to perpetuate the loyalists’
“punishment down to innocent posterity” that the family “may forever be accompanied
by the infamy of their father…”150
147

Brown, The King’s Friends, 115, 7. Maya Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the
Revolutionary World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011), 68. Hugh Edward Egerton, ed. Daniel Parker
Coke, The Royal Commission on the Losses and Services of the American Loyalists, 1783-1785 (Oxford,
1915), 71.
148

J. R. Lander, “Attainder and Forfeiture, 1453-1509” The Historical Journal , Vol. 4, No. 2 (1961): 119.

149

Pennsylvania Packett Oct 22, 1776 “An Act to Punish Traitors and disaffected persons.” All loyalists
“provably attained of open deed by people of his or her condition, shall be adjudged guilty of high treason,
and be punished accordingly, saving the corruption of blood.” A later proclamation, also published in the
Pennsylvania Packett, Oct, 19, 1782 declared that any loyalist “found within this state, shall be and is
hereby declared to be guilty of high treason against this state, and being thereof legally convicted, shall
suffer death (saving the corruption of blood).”
150

Henry Cruger Van Schaak, The Life of Peter Van Schaack, LL.D.: Embracing selections from his
correspondence and other writings during the American Revolution, and his exile in England (New York:
D. Appleton & Co., 1842), 114-115. Parts of this section are also quoted in Van Tyne, The Loyalists, 281.

77
Revolutionary authorities faced the quandary of whether loyalist wives were
guilty of treason, or were blamelessly following their husband’s commandments. Under
the English law of coverture, a married woman’s legal identity was subordinate and
inseparable from her husband’s. Normally a woman’s property and legal relationship to
the state was turned over to the husband upon marriage. In matters of political allegiance,
women were expected to abide by the decisions of husbands. “The fictive volition of the
pair” as Linda Kerber describes it, “was always taken to be the same as the real will of
the husband.” Even though women could be guilty of treason against the state, wives who
crossed enemy lines to be with their husbands were not considered traitors. Both British
and Continental authorities were pleased to allow women to join their men as it freed up
resources and left property abandoned which could be confiscated and put to use.151
Loyalist wives who stayed behind could pose serious problems to this plan. In most states
women could claim dower rights of a third of their husband’s property at death, but how
this would apply to political death was not at all clear. The Massachusetts confiscation
laws passed in 1777 specifically held out the option for wives to effectively separate from
their loyalist husbands to retain their dower rights as if their husbands had physically
died.152 This may have marked a brief recognition of women’s political agency, but it
also functioned as a direct attack on loyalist patriarchy.153 Elsewhere, the treatment of
loyalist women who remained on their lands depended greatly on local conditions.
Women might be objects of sympathy and regarded as victims of their traitor husbands
who abandoned their families as they did their country. Other women were suspected to
be dangerous spies, passing intelligence and supplies to the enemy and were turned out
and sent across the British lines.154
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Reports of loyalist women suffering privation and indignities are quite common in
the loyalist records, but ultimately the patriot authorities perhaps regarded such events as
collateral damage brought on by the wickedness of their Tory husbands and fathers. Just
as a dependant’s behaviour reflected on the honour of the patriarch, so too could the
actions of loyalist patriarchs dictate and justify how patriots treated their families. If the
loyalist himself could not be taken, then the family and estate could serve as a powerful
substitute.155 For example, the suspected loyalist John Peters accompanied the
Continental Army in its invasion of Quebec, only to desert to the British at his first
opportunity. Peters boasted in his narrative that he provided a British officer intelligence
that “enabled him to form an Ambuscade whereby he took and killed near 150 Rebels.”
In retaliation for his desertion, the patriots confiscated his estate in Moorestown, New
York (now Vermont) and evicted his wife, whom Peters described as “a small and
delicate Woman”, and their several children in January 1777. Stripped of their servants,
they were left with “three Weeks provisions in a deserted House near fifty Miles from
any Inhabitants between them and Canada.” They were not reunited with John Peters
until May 6, 1777.156
Loyalists also considered the devastating attack on the stately home of Brigadier
General Oliver De Lancey as an act of reprisal. According to fellow loyalist officers, the
De Lancey household was “a new House & very large” in which the family “kept a very
good table & lived with great splendor.” The furnishings alone were thought to be worth
as much as £2000. On November 26, 1777, while De Lancey was absent, a raiding party
“robbed and plundered his house of the most valuable furniture and money” before
setting the house on fire. Few doubted that De Lancey’s home was deliberately selected,
and the British General James Robertson testified that he believed “the burning of his
House was a mark of [rebel] Enmity.”157 The loyalist newspaper in occupied Philadelphia
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reported that in addition to the physical destruction of the house, “Mrs. De Lancey, her
two daughters, and two other young ladies” had to escape “through the flames in only
their bed-dresses; when they were most cruelly insulted, beat, and abused…[and] an
infant grandchild in a most barbarous manner thrown on the ground.” The De Lancey
women and children scattered into the woods where they were found the next day. The
report blamed the outrage on “Continental Troops” who completed their foray into
British territory by robbing “a poor man’s house…of all the family cloathing, blankets
&c.”158 The loyalist paper’s insistence that the assailants were uniformed Continental
soldiers, and not irregulars or raiders, was intended to show the true mercenary colours of
the patriot rank and file. The attack against the women of the house was a further sign of
rebel depravity and dishonour. Because women were often considered innocents, with
little political will of their own, the attack on the domestic sphere was viewed as
extraordinarily savage by the loyalist press.
Loyalist families were sometimes taken hostage to check the actions of their
absent patriarchs. The capture of Lieutenant Governor Philip Skene’s family is a case in
point. A former Jacobite, Skene had atoned for his prior rebellion in the Seven Years’
War and was rewarded with the command of the forts surrounding Lake Champlain, and
founded a large manorial settlement he called Skenesborough. It was a well-known fact
that Skene was loathed by his tenants.159 The loyalist was en route to England when the
violence erupted in 1775, and in his absence, his family was arrested and forced out of
their home. Like other important prisoners, (see chapter 4), the Skenes were sent to
Connecticut. After the war, Lt. Gov. Skene testified that his family “suffered exceeding
hardships from their Mode of travelling…and exposed to every insult and mortification
from a licentious people by whom they were surrounded and threatened repeatedly.” The
loyalist landlord was arrested upon his return to America, at which point his family was
released, only to face another strenuous journey to Quebec, where they were besieged
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with the rest of the city in late 1775.160 Though certainly not a genteel practice, holding
families hostage was a pragmatic way to compel enemies to surrender themselves as
prisoners, or at the very least place a check on their freedom of action. Later in the war,
for example, the family of John Butler was taken hostage after a string of outrages on the
frontier allegedly perpetrated by Native warriors under his command.
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Families could also be punished for breaches of the honour code between genteel
prisoners and their captors. When Sir John Johnson, the wealthy and powerful baronet of
the Mohawk Valley, broke his parole and fled to Canada, his wife and children were
taken prisoner. By breaking his parole, his word of honour, Johnson had committed a
serious breach of gentlemanly conduct. In response, Johnson’s regal home was pillaged
and “robbed of his cattle, his negroes, his horses, hogs, sheep, and utensils of
husbandry…” More despicable, according to a later sympathetic historian, was that
“Lady Johnson,” seven-months pregnant, was forced to share her carriage with a patriot
lieutenant who prior to the war had been a lowly shoemaker. In an added insult, the rebel
upstart dressed himself in Sir John Johnson’s clothes “stolen at the Hall,” and sat beside
Mrs. Johnson in the carriage. Though this was perhaps a cruel joke at the expense of Sir
John and Mary Johnson, donning the baronet’s attire had a deeper significance in the
eighteenth century. It is likely that the clothing in question was imported from England
and would have been far beyond the means of the shoemaker-turned-officer. As Ann
Little argues, attire “marked colonial bodies as bound or free, English or…Indian…as
child or adult…and [was] a handy indicator of class rank.” Clothes were badges of
identity, and in the eighteenth century, spoke also to legal and social rights. Therefore to
cross boundaries by donning the clothing of another race, gender, or class, was
considered a violation of the social order.162 Johnson’s clothing would have projected
power and status, but with the loyalist gentleman gone, the patriot officer transformed the
meaning of the suit. Sitting next to the loyalist’s wife in his carriage, the mockingly
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attired shoemaker gained honour by displaying Johnson’s impotence and disgrace. To
Lady Johnson it must have been a dreadful humiliation.
Mary Johnson and her family were held in Albany under the command of General
Philip Schuyler. While there she complained bitterly about the indignities she suffered on
her forced journey and in her captivity. The general’s written reply blamed her
circumstances on “the Pain Sir John’s Conduct has occasioned me, and how I have been
distressed at the sad necessity which obliges me to secure his Person.” In his polite but
cold letter, he reminds Lady Johnson that by breaking parole, her husband “has forgot the
obligations he lays under to me” and as long Mrs. Johnson remains in the General’s
power she should “make [herself] perfectly easy” with her situation unless she wished to
make the long overland journey to Canada on her own. Eventually some of Johnson’s
faithful tenants helped the family escape. Disguised as peasant women and children, the
Johnsons slipped away with their servants and rejoined Sir John Johnson in New York
City.163 What significance the Johnsons placed on their disguises is not recorded, but it
must have been noted among the indignities they suffered on account of the revolutionary
upheavals, and would have served as a symbol of how far the Johnsons had fallen in the
colonial hierarchy.
General Schuyler may not have cared much for Lady Johnson, who even went
over his head at one point, writing directly to George Washington with her complaints,
but she was not being held on her account, but because of Sir John Johnson’s
dishonourable conduct. This was a dispute between two men, Johnson and Schuyler, and
holding the loyalist’s family hostage was no doubt intended, at least partially, as an
insult. Schuyler, not Johnson, had power over the loyalist’s wife and children. It was a
profound challenge to Johnson’s patriarchy. In his letter to Mary Johnson, Schuyler
presents the dispute in the language of a debt – Johnson had failed in his “obligations” to
Schuyler, personally. Furthermore, Schuyler was “distressed” by Johnson’s conduct,
which had perhaps made the patriot general look foolish for not securing his prisoner
properly, thus placing him under the “sad necessity” of holding women and children
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hostage to collect what he was owed. To Schuyler, Lady Johnson and the children
suffered because of Sir John Johnson’s perfidy, not patriot malice.
The vulnerable place of loyalist families in the contest between patriots and
loyalists can also be seen in an attack on the family of James Allen of Philadelphia in
January 1776. Allen’s wife and children were travelling in their carriage when the driver
attempted to get around a group of patriot militiamen. In the ensuing traffic snarl, the
militiamen attacked the Allens’ chauffeur, Samson, who lashed out with his horsewhip.
Incensed by the insult, the militiamen attacked the “Chariot, broke the glass & pierced
[it]…in 3 places” and attempted to overturn it with the family inside. Eventually cooler
heads prevailed, but when James Allen attempted to bring the matter to the local patriot
commander, he received a much different response than the apology he expected. Perhaps
realizing that Allen was a wealthy and influential opponent to independence, Major
Boehm “a violent man, countenanced the attack,” and even “attempted to draw his sword
on me.”164 Although Allen feared this debacle would lead to further insults and attacks,
he was later able to smooth things over with Boehm and “we buried the affair in
Oblivion.”165 The Allen family was certainly not the first to fall afoul of a rowdy,
possibly drunken band of militiamen, and it is not clear if the militia knew that the
carriage belonged to the Allen family. Nor is the full identity or race of Allen’s driver
recorded. The militiamen were likely outraged at the prospect of being whipped by a
servant or slave, and it only retroactively became a “countenanced” attack on a loyalist
family once the father’s identity became known. What started out as an unfortunate
chance encounter transformed, after the fact, into a conflict between a wealthy Tory
family and their republican adversaries, and further reveals how families and property
were regarded as extensions of loyalist gentlemen.
These vignettes provide some consistent, important evidence of the loyalists as
dishonoured householders. By seizing, vandalizing, or destroying a loyalist’s home, or
even appropriating a loyalist’s fine clothing and carriage, patriots elevated their standing
and dishonoured the loyalists. When loyalists fled, this was taken as a further sign of their
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immorality and cowardice, among other dishonourable traits. To the patriots, loyalists
had abandoned their families like they had abandoned their country and the blame for
their suffering dependents was charged solely to the exiled patriarchs. Loyalists, in turn,
denounced the mistreatment of their families as savage acts of cruelty which unveiled the
true depravity of the patriot cause. Most importantly these episodes reveal the loyalists’
powerlessness to defend their property and families, and the total loss of any respect they
once held in their communities. If a man’s true wealth and power was measured in the
number of people who obeyed and respected him, and that obedience was predicated on
his ability to protect and provide, then loyalist manhood had suffered a fatal wound.
There was a pragmatic reason for loyalist persecution, but there was also a clear intent to
deny the loyalists’ positions as men and householder. The concerted attacks on loyalist
manhood indicate the importance patriots themselves placed on honour, manhood, and
patriarchy. Revolutionaries created a powerful image of the emasculated Tory which was
an inverted reflection of their own idealized image of virtuous manhood.
Some loyalist families buckled under the stress of persecution, and there are
examples of dependents who chose a path separate from their patriarchs. Grace
Galloway, the wife of the prominent Pennsylvania loyalist Joseph Galloway, lost much of
her own inheritance and family wealth because of her husband’s political choices.
Already locked in an unhappy marriage before the Revolution, she recorded in her diary
in 1779 that she was “truly set against him” for causing so much pain and loss to their
family.166 Even though she remained in Philadelphia and refused to follow her husband or
abide by his political allegiance, patriot authorities still evicted her from her home and
confiscated the property that she had inherited from her father. Patriots authorities were
not about to overturn centuries of patriarchal tradition while they dismantled monarchical
power in the colonies.167 Galloway poured out her disdain for her absent husband in her
diary, sharply noting that his absence “Makes even poverty more agreeable than any time
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I ever spent since I married.” Mr. Galloway’s exile marked a permanent separation, and
the two never saw each other again.168
Rifts could also form between father and son. John Peters wrote that his “Father
Colonel Peters of Hebron, wrote against me, and urged on the Mobbs…” The elder Peters
seemed to be engaged in a sort of revolutionary tough-love, explaining to the patriots that
his son “would soon become a Friend to America if severity was used.” From the lack of
further correspondence, it appears that father and son never spoke again. More famously,
Benjamin Franklin and his loyalist son William, the former governor of New Jersey, also
became bitterly estranged.169 James Allen’s family all shared loyalist sympathies, but
they were still divided on how far to follow their political leanings. Allen’s brothers had
been attained and exiled, while he remained in Philadelphia under suspicion, but still
politically alive. He wrote in his diary that even though his family was “linked together
by the purest & most disinterred [sic] affection,” because of the war they had become
“totally unhinged.” Not only did his family seem to be disintegrating, but his wider
authority was challenged. He recorded that “My tenants set me at defiance & I who am
not the most patient man, am forced to bear all…” Unable to compel obedience and
deference, Allen was dishonoured by the disrespect shown by his former subordinates. It
seemed to Allen that “This convulsion has indeed brought all the dregs to the top.”170
To loyalist gentlemen, the rise of the “dregs” was accompanied by the painful fall
of the better sort. In 1776 William Bayard, one of the wealthiest men in New York City,
was forced out of his home and became a fugitive “Contending Fourteen weeks with
unspeakable hardships in a dubious concealment, And often in Barns, Lofts, Hovels,
Swamps and Forests…” The ignominy of a public man hiding in filth and skulking
through the wilderness was dishonourable enough, but the nadir of Bayard’s humiliation
occurred when he “entered [British occupied New York] in the Disguise and Habbit [sic]
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of one of my own Slaves.”

171

For William Bayard, the transformation from honoured to

dishonoured was as stark as it could be. Crossing the frontier in disguise was a necessity,
but crossing the sartorial line from gentleman to dishonoured slave was a powerful
symbol of just how far the loyalist gentleman had fallen. Yet we know of it through both
Bayard’s private correspondence and his official claim prepared for the loyalist
commission. While the experience was certainly humiliating at the time, Bayard recast
the experience as a badge of martyrdom. Bayard so loved the British constitution that he
defiled himself in its cause. Though the dregs might gain material wealth, the loyalists
retained their moral superiority.
Willingly suffering deprivation and humiliation for the royal cause with a clean
conscience became a hallmark of loyalist self-perception, and they refused to be ashamed
of the patriot attempts to dishonour them. A.D. Spalding wrote that though he had been
driven from his home and family, and was threatened with death, he was “determined to
suffer any thing rather than Comply” with the rebels. “I do from my Soul abhor the
thought of Rebelling against my Prince” wrote Spalding. Yet he also deeply resented the
fact that the British government had “strangely disappointed” the loyalists, offering no
support or protection. Like other loyalists, Spalding lamented that being “absent from my
Family & Business is Cruel, ‘tis hard…” but he felt no shame. He was bitterly sad and
bewildered, but still remarked on the “sensations of a Good Conscience.”172
Gentlemen loyalists may not have felt ashamed of their predicament, but they
consistently expressed grief over their losses. The exiled Jacob Bailey wrote how he
could not contain his “bitter emotions of grief.” Joel Stone, reflecting on his flight from
his Connecticut home, wrote that he “could not help considering my fate a peculiarly
hard one thus being hunted as a common criminal and proscribed without cause…”173
The wealthy New York loyalist Sylvester Gardiner wrote to a friend from his refuge in
Halifax that he had been driven to a “miserable place…from a state of Affluence…”
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“God knows what I will do,” he concludes.174 Some loyalist gentlemen could not cope
with the traumatic loss of status and lifestyle. The prominent Connecticut loyalist, Filer
Diblee, recorded that his brother-in-law, despairing at his ruined life “took a Razor from
the Closet, threw himself on the bed, drew the Curtains, and cut his own throat.” Another
loyalist, Millington Lockwood, reportedly drowned himself rather than continue in his
state of indigence and exile.175 These loyalist suicides are striking, but they were rare.
Christian gentlemen were expected to embrace a sensitive, yet stoic perspective on loss.
In 1783, William Bayard wrote to his daughter from exile in England that he was ill,
alone and “Gloomy Indeed…” But his “Greatest Affliction…will be these thoughts of
being Separated from you…” Nevertheless, Bayard obeyed the genteel strictures of stoic
forbearance: “However bitter as the cup may be I must swallow.” Nicole Eustace
describes the complex culture of genteel grief over the death of loved ones in the
eighteenth century, and the process elites undertook to “reweave the rent social web”
caused by death. 176 In many ways loyalists adopted the same attitude towards their
political death as gentlemen might towards the death of a loved one.
While some loyalists reacted with grief to the threats and persecutions they
underwent, others embraced their sense of righteous indignation. Elite loyalists regarded
the entire contest as a battle between a genteel, professional, and moral minority and the
uncouth and disordered majority. Loyalist narratives are full of descriptions of injured,
yet persevering gentlemen, and the coarseness of their patriot adversaries. Perhaps one of
the most telling examples is found in the memoir of the Reverend Jonathan Boucher, an
English-born Maryland planter and Anglican rector of Queen Anne’s Parish. He was a
hard-line Tory who preached non-resistance to his parishioners, and was hounded for his
loyalism at every turn in the years leading up to the American Revolution. Both a man of
the cloth and gentleman, Boucher was not the sort to back away from the demands of
aristocratic honour. In one instance, he recorded that he found himself at a dinner with a
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“large company of men of different parties and opinions.” Boucher was verbally
assaulted when he refused to partake in a toast damning General Gage and the troops in
Boston. Osborne Sprigg, a “very great patriot” who had quarrelled with Boucher over
some corn purchases earlier in the year, began to advance toward the minister, but was
stopped in his tracks by Boucher’s suggestion that he would prefer to settle the matter the
following day “as a gentleman,” and not fight at the table. Boucher took it as a particular
satisfaction that Sprigg never answered his challenge, and he noted in his memoirs that it
did not surprise him because he had never known “any instance” where Sprigg had acted
“as a gentleman.” Boucher could rest in the knowledge that whatever the outcome of the
larger conflict, by not agreeing to the duel, Sprigg had lost in this personal test of honour
and manhood. And yet, like many gentlemen of his age, Boucher himself seems
conflicted on the use of violence to defend his honour. Even though he later relished the
tale of laying-out his uncouth neighbour for firing “swan shot” at his horse, and though
he did indeed challenge Sprigg to a duel, Boucher remarked that “there is nothing I so
much dread and detest” as fighting.177 Just as with Dr. Haley, here again is one of the
paradoxes of the gentleman – the eagerness to prove one’s mettle in combat combined
with the sensibility to deplore the act.
Boucher and Sprigg encountered one another again on July 20, 1775, a fast day
proclaimed by the Second Continental Congress. Boucher planned to deliver a sermon
denouncing the rebellion and encouraging his parish to reject Congress. When he arrived
he found “200 armed men, under the command of Mr. Osborne Sprigg, who soon let me
know I was not to preach.” His honour was challenged. It was Boucher’s pulpit. He had
the education, the wisdom, and the spiritual and intellectual authority to lead and teach,
and he would not be cowed by barely literate men in hunting shirts.
His friends begged him not to ascend to his pulpit. They had been informed that
some of the armed men present had been ordered to open fire the moment Boucher began
to speak. Boucher recorded in his memoir that he replied with the argument “that once to
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flinch was ever to invite danger” and insisted that he would preach “with my sermon in
one hand and a loaded pistol in the other.” Boucher never made it to his pulpit, however,
and found himself surrounded by Sprigg and his men. Thinking quickly, he grabbed
“Sprigg…by the collar, and with my cocked pistol in the other hand, assur[ed] him that if
any violence was offered to me I would instantly blow his brains out.” Such a robust
response from the minister must have come as something of a surprise to the patriot
militiamen, who let Boucher use their commander as a human shield until he was safely
on his mount. Boucher’s description of events, seemingly intended to show his own pluck
and courage, lets an important and unedifying observation slip through. As he walked his
prisoner towards his horse the crowd did not stare after him in stunned silence, cowed by
a manly expression of supreme authority. Instead they jeered and were ordered “to play
on their drums the Rogues March all the way we went, which they did.” Far from being
impressed by the clergyman’s dash, it was yet another opportunity for the crowd to insult
and dishonour him, perhaps seeing in the gesture a last feeble expression of Boucher’s
impotence. Jonathan Boucher returned to preach the following Sunday, but his life in the
colonies was over. He was saved from the ignominy of an act of attainder or banishment
by being allowed to sell his property, and he left the colonies later in 1775, never to
return.178
Boucher viewed this encounter as a matter of honour, or as a duel between the
uneducated and unprincipled crowd and himself as a representative of refinement, moral
decency, and fidelity. Just like the patriots, Boucher believed he was fighting a morally
asymmetrical battle and was animated by a firm belief in his own merit and the authority
of the Crown. The Anglican minister was not just defending his right to preach, but his
personal honour, the status of his honour group – the Church of England – and the
rightful status of loyal gentlemen like himself. He could have walked to the pulpit
unarmed, as an imitation of Christ, but he did not. The same masculine honour that
supposedly drove Peter De Lancey and John Haley to shoot at one another in a
Charleston tavern compelled Boucher to defend his divinely and royally ordained rights
with the threat of armed force. Boucher’s honour depended on deference from his
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parishioners, and if that meant holding a loaded gun to another man’s head and using him
as a human shield, so be it. He would claim respect, one way or another. That he failed
so utterly is a testament to the power of the majority to decide, in the words of
Tocqueville, “what is blamable or commendable.” Boucher, and many like him, had
fallen decidedly into the category of the dishonoured.

This chapter has explained the importance of concepts of honour and dishonour in
the eighteenth century and provided a theoretical framework for considering the political
death of the loyalists in the American Revolution. Honour was felt as an internal feeling
of conscience and self-worth, but more importantly honour functioned as a gentleman’s
right to be respected. The degree to which he was respected indicated his position and
power within his society. Gentlemen acquired honour by achieving patriarchal
benchmarks such as marriage, household mastery, and prosperity, which are common
traits in many cultures, but they also had to cultivate refined tastes, manners, fashions,
and behaviours that served as badges of their honour and rank. The richest loyalist
sources come from the elite and middling sorts who embraced these ideas, though this
element of their experience has been largely overlooked by historians.
Scholars have explored the loyalists’ statements of principle and the facets of their
ideology; they have examined the local and regional variations of the loyalist condition;
and they have documented loyalist persecution, legal status, confiscation, and exile.
When these experiences are placed within their cultural context and the mentalities of the
eighteenth century, a deeper and richer image of how the loyalists and patriots made
sense of their reality and their conflict emerges. Drawing on the methods employed by
historians such as Bertram Wyatt-Brown, the theories of anthropologist Frank Henderson
Stewart, and by harnessing the insights found in the rich literature on gender in colonial
and Revolutionary America, the meaning infused in patriot attacks on gentlemen loyalists
is revealed. Patriots stripped loyalist gentlemen of the fundamental elements of manhood
– property, honour, and patriarchy – when they targeted loyalist households, family
members, possessions, and other symbols of authority. To do this to fellow white men
required powerful justifications. The patriots thus attempted to first dominate and then
eliminate the loyalists and their political arguments by dishonouring them. Like colonial
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Americans who carried out traditional shaming rituals against adulterers and thieves,
patriots believed the attacks on loyalist households and families were the just
punishments for a kind of moral perversion. In a deeply symbolic culture, with stark
gradations of freedom and power, the patriots created a new category of the ‘Tory’ – an
effeminate, corrupted, and culturally divergent non-person. As will be explored in more
detail in the following chapter, the archetype of the dishonoured loyalist, constructed in
the print media and in the ritualized public humiliations of loyalist bodies, property, and
effigies, served as a dark inversion of the patriot. The loyalist man became a negative
trope which highlighted the bravery and honour of the revolutionary man.
Loyalists who once expected respect and deference were treated with insults and
defiance. Bodies, clothing, possessions, and houses which once beamed power and
authority, became objects of humiliation. To the loyalist gentlemen, this was evidence of
a world turned upside-down, of the uncultivated mob seizing power from the rightful
leaders. Yet patriots never intended their actions as generalized attacks on wealth or
patriarchy. Instead they believed that men who espoused the cause of loyalism revealed a
fatal corruption that had to be removed from their society. The shaming, ostracism, and
exile separated the loyalists from other men and marked them as politically dead. All the
cultural virtues that placed a gentleman at the apex of society – honour, gentility, virtue,
competence – were systematically denied to loyalists. Cultural dishonour and legal
punishment combined in the loyalists’ political death.

Most loyalist gentlemen regarded the American Revolution as a catastrophe
which overturned not just a government, but the natural order. Men like James Allen,
Jonathan Boucher, and Oliver De Lancey saw the American Revolution as an attack on
decency and stability. To them it was a morally unequal contest between a minority of
virtuous gentlemen and a crowd of grasping usurpers. Only rarely was it a battle between
equals. The popular nature of revolutionary anger precluded more genteel forms of
combat between individuals, such as the duel between the loyalist Peter De Lancey and
the patriot John Haley. As the crisis progressed, both sides jockeyed for the moral and
cultural high ground, and the conflict between loyalists and patriots became deeply
personal. Unable to effectively respond to the threats, insults, and humiliations, and with
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no lands or property, the loyalists became dependent on the British government.
Politically dead in America, the loyalists would never find satisfaction with their patriot
cousins in gentlemanly duels. Instead loyalist gentlemen had to hope for British victory in
the protracted Revolutionary War. And war, according to the famous military strategist
Carl Von Clausewitz, “is nothing but a duel on a larger scale.”179
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3. Insult
James Murray was a prosperous son of the British Empire. In 1735, the
enterprising merchant left his genteel Scottish family and established a rice plantation in
North Carolina, where he became deeply connected with the colony’s governor and
ruling clique. Thirty-four years later Murray was a Boston magistrate and a respected and
influential member of the Massachusetts elite. He was the quintessential colonial
gentleman: well-traveled, well-connected, well-dressed, and wealthy. The new taxes
levied on the American colonies likely hurt his business interests, but he remained
steadfastly loyal to the Crown and to its official representatives in Boston. Whether in
South Carolina or in Massachusetts, Murray loathed the rebelliousness of the lower ranks
of colonial society. The street protests, disturbances, and the open disdain for lawful
authority he witnessed in Boston confirmed his prejudices. As a public figure and a
magistrate, Murray felt honour-bound to stand up for his ideas of order and stability. This
sense of duty brought him to Faneuil Hall on the evening of September 6, 1769 to attend
the preliminary hearing for William Burnet Brown who was charged with assaulting John
Gridley during a fight the previous evening. Normally, such a trifling affair would not
have concerned Murray nor brought such a large crowd to witness the event, but Brown
and Gridley had been involved in a sensational coffee-house brawl between the
opposition firebrand James Otis Jr. and the royal official John Robinson.1
The affair began when Otis and Robinson encountered one another at the “British
Coffee House” on September 5, 1769. Otis was furious with Robinson and other
members of the Board of Customs for allegedly calling him a “rebel and a traitor” in their
1
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correspondence.2 He took this to be a personal insult, used to damage his reputation and
eliminate him as a competitor for government offices. Yet Robinson also felt aggrieved.
The day before this encounter, Otis had published a tirade against Robinson and the
Board of Customs in the Boston Gazette, in which he called Robinson a “blockhead,” and
stated that “I have a natural right if I can get no other satisfaction to break his head.”3
Robinson was incensed at the breach of honour, the insult, and the implied challenge.
Had Otis and Robinson followed the code duello this encounter could have been
remembered as another opening shot of the American Revolution. Instead, it devolved
into a lowly row when Robinson, by his own admission, “attempted to take [Otis] by the
nose.” Few things were more insulting and provoking to an eighteenth-century gentleman
than nose tweaking: the fight was on. Some reports say that Robinson’s friends attacked
Otis as a group, though Robinson avowed “that no man besides myself struck Mr. Otis
nor even offered him the least unfair play.”4
John Gridley saw the outnumbered Otis catching the worst of the affray and ran to
his aid. In the ensuing fight, William Brown, a Robinson ally, allegedly beat Gridley with
a cane, gashing the would-be defender’s head and breaking his wrist. Otis suffered some
bloody wounds as well. James Murray recorded that Robinson’s jacket was badly torn,
which seemed to Murray equally worthy of record as Gridley’s bleeding forehead. In the
days that followed, the Boston presses printed and reprinted various witness accounts and
versions of events, including Gridley’s testimony which painted the royalists as cowardly
bullies. Both sides spat on the honour of their opponents while touting their own.5
Needless to say, a charged atmosphere greeted Murray at Faneuil Hall. A large
group of Otis’ supporters barred his entry, and it was only a selectman’s admonishment
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“For Shame, gentlemen, do not behave so rudely,” that convinced the men to allow
Murray entry. Once inside, Murray reported that “I was hiss’d.” Always on stage, the
gentleman responded with an ironic bow. “I was hiss’d again, and bowed around a
second time. A small clap ensued.” James Murray was holding his own against the crowd
for the moment. Once the hearing was over, “the justices thought fit to bind over Mr.
Brown. He lookt about for bail. No one offered but I.” Murray was careful at this point
to make clear to the justices that “I did not mean by this offer to vindicate what Mr.
Brown had done, but only to stand by him now the torrent was against him.”6 The torrent
was in no mood to accept Murray’s statement of principle, and the angered crowd refused
to disperse.
At this moment someone snatched Murray’s wig from his head “and a pate, clean
shaved by time and the barber, was left exposed.” The sartorial insult was meant to leave
more than his scalp exposed. The wig was a symbol of gentlemanly status, and when the
crowd stole it directly from Murray’s head they dishonoured him. In an instant Murray
was humiliated in front of a crowd of inferiors who, theoretically, owed him deference.
If he lunged and snatched at the wig thief he would look even more like an impotent fool,
so he tried to make his way through the crowd to escape further insult. His few friends
formed an ineffective barrier while, Murray reported, “somebody behind kept nibbling at
my sides, and endeavoring to trip me.” When the crowd emerged from the hall someone
stuck Murray’s wig on a pole for all to see and followed him to his house. Later the
Boston Evening-Post jeered the magistrate further, reporting that he and his men had been
conveyed to their homes without “suffering a hair of their exposed pates to be touched.”7
James Murray was humiliated by the crowd. They had barred his entrance to a
court hearing, even though he was a magistrate, and verbally insulted him with hisses,
before escalating the ridicule and snatching away his wig. His inability to respond, or
even call on enough friends and allies to assist him, exacerbated the image of
helplessness and emasculation in front of the crowd. When the Evening-Post printed the
details of the event, it broadcasted Murray’s humiliation while adding a few fresh insults.
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According to Murray bloodshed was only prevented by a prudent member of the throng
who cried “No violence or you shall hurt the cause.” 8 Yet, in the symbolic theatre of
eighteenth century social relations, this insult was as much an assault on Murray’s
position as actual violence.
Eighteenth century gentlemen envisioned an ideal world of hierarchies in which
those at the top had a distinctive right to respect: honour. The common people owed
Murray deference, and Murray owed the common people leadership and direction. Along
with his role as a magistrate he was meant to serve as a moral example. In this instance
the crowd decided that Murray had abrogated his responsibilities as a gentleman and as a
leader and therefore lost his elevated right to respect. In some regards this was a clash of
competing notions of honour and the public good. Murray represented the chivalric code
of honour, deference, and stability while the crowds of Boston displayed a zeal for
corporatism and a popular notion of the collective good.9 Though he remained in Boston
until 1776, Murray was never free from insults on the street and he even resorted to
maintaining an escort of British regulars, which no doubt confirmed and deepened public
antipathy towards him. If the public life of a gentleman was measured in the number of
people who paid him deference and owed him service or allegiance, the events of 1769
show that Murray was rapidly approaching political death. In 1778 he and hundreds of
others were included in the Massachusetts Banishment Act, barred from ever returning. It
was the public dishonour of insult that initiated this process.10
The Boston disputes entangled imperial politics, personal insults, and crowd
action. Trying to parse through the layers to differentiate between the problems caused by
British policy and the fuses lit by personal insults is nearly impossible. In colonial
America, everything was personal. This chapter explores how loyalists were dishonoured
in their communities by what Rev. Mather Byles Sr. described as the “public storm.”11
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Loyalists were buffeted in the streets, in their homes, and in the press by public insult,
intimidation, and shaming rituals. One single plebeian on the street could not offer a
meaningful insult to a gentleman like Murray. Men of his station were free to ignore
affronts from the lower orders and were only honour-bound to respond to offences
committed against them by other gentlemen. But when the insults came from a large
crowd they were impossible to ignore. Murray attempted to defend his dignity with a
bodyguard of redcoats, but force could not compel respect from the people of Boston, and
without their consent, he could not claim any kind of leadership over them. Sociological
and anthropological studies have shown that all insults enact a sort of culturally specific
ritual with a few key elements: the insult, the response of the insulted, and the evaluation
of other concerned parties and witnesses. Loyalists found that the insults they received
from crowds were impossible to counter. If a gentleman in the English Atlantic was
insulted and did nothing about it, his honour, his “face” or reputation, was diminished.
For this to happen at the hands of a rabble was particularly galling. A gentleman who
could not defend his personal reputation could not claim deference or respect from others,
not even from men who were supposed to be his inferiors.12
Nearly every work of loyalist history refers at some point to the insults royal
supporters suffered in the American Revolution, but there have only been a few
examinations of the deeper cultural significance of those insults.13 Of those, the gendered
nature of the insults is not directly explored, though studies of public insults in England
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do note the significant connection between gender, sexuality, and insults.14 This chapter
will therefore explore this overlooked facet of the loyalist experience and examine how
the mockery, affronts, and indignities directed at loyalists were interpreted through the
lens of manhood and honour. Dissecting epithets or indignities may not at first glance
seem a significant pursuit when set among the upheavals of the wider conflict. Yet in the
deeply symbolic world of colonial America, these insults provide a glimpse into the
shared culture of loyalists and patriots. The campaign of insults experienced by loyalists
illustrates “the systematic breaking of established rules of conduct” to degrade men
holding specific political positions and opinions. 15 By ostracising formerly respected
members of the community and subjecting even a few distinguished gentlemen to
shaming rituals, patriots elevated their own status while also deepening their rejection of
British power in the colonies. The ineffective loyalist response to verbal or physical
insults, and their reliance on the British for protection and redress, served to exacerbate
patriot contempt for Tories and their cause. The crushing psychological impact of these
insults on honour-conscious gentlemen was enough to cause loyalists to flee their
communities or recant, which was precisely the patriots’ intent.
Insults followed the loyalists from the streets into the print media of the
Revolution. As seen in the case of James Murray, the crowds and the press often worked
in tandem, sharing the insults with a much larger audience and preserving loyalist
humiliation for posterity. Though the loyalists left us few clues as to the specific nature of
the verbal insults hurled at them in the streets, the invectives we find in the patriot press
likely reflect a more articulate version of the same themes. Loyalists were reviled as
Judases and parricides, as corrupted and sneaking cowards, and as villains who
prostituted their manhood for the sake of luxury and preferment. Loyalist publications

14

Laura Gowing, “Gender and the Language of Insult in Early Modern London,” History Workshop, No.
35 (Spring, 1993): 1-21. Robert B. Shoemaker, “The Decline of Public Insult in London, 1660-1800.” Past
& Present, No. 169 (Nov. 2000): 97-131.
15

Flynn, Insult, 6. Flynn adopts an ethnomethodological approach to the study of insults which posits,
essentially, that all insults, in whatever culture, “consist largely of violations of…unspoken but very
significant norms” that regulate society and maintain hierarchies. The situation of elite loyalists fits neatly
with this theory. The vast amount of sociological work that examines social interaction cannot be included
here, but the theory used by Flynn and others was introduced by Harold Garfinkel, Studies in
Ethnomethodology (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

98
compared the revolutionaries to brutes or rebellious children who could not control their
passions. These were not just jibes and slights; these were powerful attacks on their
enemies’ manhood and honour. Both sides tried to emasculate and degrade the other, but
the patriots were far more effective. The loyalists had access to very few friendly printing
presses and, just as importantly, loyalist writers refused to adopt a more populist and
aggressive style. The loyalist message was neither circulated widely enough nor was
persuasive enough to take root. Whether on the street or on the page, the patriots waged a
successful campaign of insult against loyalists. It was not just the fact that loyalists were
insulted, but the manner in which they were insulted that drove so many loyalist
gentlemen from their homes. The invectives and shaming rituals relied on symbols of
dishonour and emasculation, which were intended to exhibit loyalist effeminacy,
cowardice, treachery, and servility, and deny their cultural legitimacy. Gendered insults
were a crucial part of a process to remove the politically dead from society.

In times of peace and war, a gentleman was expected to take personal insults very
seriously. How he responded depended greatly on his rank within the complex hierarchy
he inhabited. Plebeian insolence might be ignored or might be physically punished with
the strike of a cane or a horsewhip. A slight from an equal could result in a challenge or
linger as a long simmering vendetta carried out through gossip or intrigue. An insult from
a superior often had to be endured.
The power of public insult and its relationship to the demands of honour groups
and patron-client networks can be glimpsed in a “memorandum” recorded by the
Scottish-born loyalist John Porteous. Porteous was one of the wealthiest merchants in
Detroit and served as the unofficial spokesman for the other traders. In 1774 he had a
very public dispute with Major Henry Basset, commandant of the British garrison, which
in many ways represented not only a personal quarrel, but a conflict between the honour
of the merchant and the solider.16
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On the morning of January 27, 1774, Major Basset assembled all of the merchants
and officers, with the notable and intentional exception of Porteous. According to
information passed to the spurned merchant, Bassett “then began a very unbecoming &
ungramatical [sic] discourse…wch was intended to vilify & ridicule Mr. Porteous, which
he compared to a Mushroom the production of a night & to a Cat that was always
growling but could not mouse…” Porteous recorded a transcript of what happened later
when he and the other merchants met again with Major Basset. In Porteous’ written
record of the encounter, he presents himself as cool and measured, while the obstinate
British officer is caustically abusive. “I despise you Sir & all you can do,” declared
Basset, “I tell you so before all your Brother Merchants.” While another officer might
have drawn his sword and challenged the Major at such an insult, Porteous had to tread
carefully. Basset, in many respects, acted as the fort’s chief patron since no merchant
could trade at Detroit without his consent. Porteous was also only one man in a larger
partnership that relied on him. To respond warmly might allow him to save face in the
immediate argument, but he would jeopardize his business and therefore his reputation as
a competent merchant. Therefore, Porteous swallowed his pride and responded: “Sir, I
am very much obliged to you. Adieu.” This was a pragmatic reply, but also one intended
to maintain Porteous’ reputation among his fellow merchants. The Scottish trader knew
to keep his mouth shut and restrain his emotions in the face of the Major’s intemperate
and brutish emotional display, especially when profits were at stake.17 What happened
next is not recorded, but Porteous remained a steadfast loyalist throughout the American
Revolution and continued to trade with the British military.
Yet Porteous’ “memorandum” may be rather selective. Many surviving letters to
the merchant show him to be no shrinking violet. Robert Bartlet, writing to Porteous in
November 1778, declares his “surprize” to have received “such treatment from Mr.
Porteous” over some debts. John Stoughton wrote a year later chiding Porteous for
displaying “so little appearance of friendship” and that his “Conjecture” over some
irregularities in accounts “might have been couched in a more friendly manner…”18 It is
17
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very likely that Porteous had managed to offend the commandant. Though Porteous
obviously chafed at his treatment at Detroit, there was little he could do to redress the
insult directly and still maintain his honour among his partner merchants.
Public insults directed at loyalists in the American Revolution were equally tied
up in concepts of rank. Most often, loyalist insults bore similarities to traditional
communal responses meant to restore stability and social order. Publicly calling someone
out for illicit sexual conduct or unethical business practices was a long-standing practice
in the English Atlantic, and though the rise of politeness and gentility had seen a decline
in public defamation litigation in England during the eighteenth century, honourable
reputations could still be jeopardized by gossip and slander.19 Adulterers and rakes could
face social ostracism and “rough music” from assembled crowds, the names of debtors
could be published, and petty criminals could find themselves in the pillory. Whether
officially sanctioned punishments or a crowd’s vernacular expression of disapproval,
shame was the common goal. Patriots drew on these traditions to force loyalists to recant
their political position and declare their support for the revolutionary cause, but it is also
clear that patriots sought to punish and humiliate their intended converts and simply
terrorize unbending loyalists. Revolutionary fervour intensified traditional insults. Ann
Hulton, the sister of a prominent customs official in Boston, Henry Hulton, could see that
“the Mobs here are very different than in O[ld] England where a few lights put into the
Windows will pacify, or the interposition of a Magistrate restrain them, but here they act
from principle & under Countenance, no person daring or willing to suppress their
Outrages…” 20 “A Son of Liberty” advised the “Committees of Inspection in the several
Towns on the Continent” to give the loyalists “no Quarter…convince, convert, or
confound them. However dignified and environed with conceptions of their Importance,
cause them to bow before you, and lick the Dust.” 21 Public humiliations were thought to
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right a moral imbalance and serve as examples to others. From the Stamp Act of 1765
through to the conclusion of the American Revolution, insults and shaming rituals were
used against political non-conformists who, like James Murray, argued for restraint and
continued loyalty to the Crown.
Loyalist gentlemen were dismayed by the abuse they received from the lower
orders, but they were equally conscious of their rejection by their former peers. When a
mob forced the resignation of the Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts, Thomas Oliver,
in September of 1774, the loyalist Boston Weekly News-Letter noted that “The mob was
not mixed with tag, rag & Bobtail only. Persons of Distinction in the Country were in the
Mass…”22 The Revolution ended the privilege of the few royal office holders in America,
but it was not necessarily a class-based struggle. The riots and mobs of the Revolution
reflected a popular consensus of the public good which united people from all ranks,
though an anti-aristocratic sentiment was often loud and clear.23 Loyalists also smarted at
their ostracism from the company of their fellow gentlemen. James Allen, a Philadelphia
loyalist, wrote in his diary while isolated in Philadelphia that “I never knew… how
painful it is to be secluded from the free conversation of one’s friends, the loss of which
cannot be made up by any other expedients.” Ashbel Humphrey, a Connecticut loyalist,
wrote how his rejection “almost brought him to the borders of despair.” George Watson
certainly felt the loneliness brought on by his loyalism. When he attended church one day
in Plymouth, Massachusetts, “a great number of the principal inhabitants left” as he
entered. Nathaniel Whitworth Jr., writing to his father in December of 1775, described
how he declined certain positions to avoid being “stigmatized with the names of
Ministerial Friends, Enemies to their Country & which I have hitherto escap’d tho they
are Titles which no honest man will regard yet they are such as every prudent one would
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wish to avoid…”24 Indeed, the hope of eluding public ridicule compelled some loyalists
to flee their homes. William Bayard, the prominent New York loyalist and landholder
fled the city in 1775 “to avoid being insulted.” Doctor John Caleff left his home in Maine
“after having rec’d many insults.”25 Others tried to show their tenacity in the face of
abuse. Mather Byles dismissed his dishonours as “nothing more than insults in the Street”
while Alexander Thompson of Savannah, Georgia testified that he did not “leave the
province for these insults but from ill health.” 26
Insults and social ostracism were common aspects of the loyalist experience, but
that did not make them any less painful. The loyalist claims are filled with examples of
gentlemen being subjected to “great insult,” “outrageous insults,” “shameful and
degrading language” and there are numerous references to being pelted with stones,
receiving “incendiary letters” and threats. 27 Yet, it is not at all clear what constituted an
insult. The vagueness of the loyalists’ descriptions may be a result of the polite
eighteenth century culture, wherein repeating vulgar insults was beneath a gentleman’s
dignity. The opaque descriptions might also be due to the fact that any man who was
publicly mocked or abused and could not respond lost something of his manhood.
Anthropological studies have shown that the division between external honour
(reputation) and internal honour (self-esteem) can erode under concerted disrespect.28 It is
impossible to tell whether the loyalists’ silence on the precise nature of their insults was
due to their sense of decorum, or stemmed from the emotional stress of public
emasculation and dishonour.
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Loyalist gentlemen saw the collapse of social hierarchy and felt the sting of insult
in simply being questioned by lesser ranks. When Benjamin Marston was brought before
a committee, he regarded the whole experience as one extended insult. He recorded that
one of the chief committeemen was a Captain Weston, who “owes his whole existence to
the very people he is now insulting.” The contempt Marston felt towards his captors is
evident in the way he connects their bodily appearance to their lack of virtue or even
humanity, a typical mentality of the higher ranks in the eighteenth century. He refers to
committeemen as “creatures” and provides individual descriptions like a “pious-looking
whining body” or “a Simpering…kind of body.” Marston’s description of his
interrogators as “bodies” fits with the wider elite conceptions of the poor and the genteel.
In the eighteenth century those at the bottom were thought to be controlled by their
bodily appetites. Their coarse manners and loafing ham-fistedness was considered
evidence of moral weakness and intellectual torpidity. The bodies of people in the higher
social ranks were thought to represent a more vaunted state of grace and were therefore
sacrosanct. When Marston observed that Mr. Drew was wearing a “ragged Jackett & I
think a leather apron” and another in the group “Can do dirty work” he was not simply
casting aspersions on their fashion sense or their toleration of muck, but was making a
pointed moral statement. The loyalist gentleman found it extremely galling to be at the
mercy of such men and took their every attempt to restrict his movement as an egregious
insult.29 Those who were challenging the authority of Britain were not only insolent and
petulant, but they were as a whole, according to the Reverend Thomas Bradbury
Chandler, “ignorant men, bred to the lowest occupations, who have no knowledge of the
general principles upon which civil society should be always established.” Question
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seventy-five of Chandler’s American Querist, neatly sums up his opinion of the matter by
asking: “whether the old rule, Ne sutor ultra crepidam [The shoemaker should not go
beyond his last], be not a good rule and proper for this day?”30 The classical allusion
might very well have gone over the heads of most colonists, but the sentiment is clear:
government was the business of a privileged few, who from breeding and character were
set apart to lead. Chandler later referred to the patriot leadership as the “beer-house
gentry” and mused about the “extraordinary tavern expenses” which accrued at their
meetings.31 Loyalist elites believed that the royal cause was the only logical choice any
sober, thoughtful gentleman could make.
Verbal insults and the household violations described in the previous chapter were
intolerable for gentlemen loyalists, but the most infamous insults meted out against the
loyalists were targeted at their bodies. There are few better ways to gauge a society’s
cultural mindset than in the way it treats the human body, and the stark contrast between
the treatment of plebeian and patrician bodies is evidence of the chasm of rights and
respect which separated people in colonial America. Slaves, vagrants, and the poor could
be flogged, branded with hot irons, or otherwise disfigured, whereas a gentleman would
never face such physical torments and permanent marking.32 Murray’s description of
Robinson’s torn coat is an example of a transgression against a genteel body, but the
popular uprising employed far more severe insults. A man named Jesse Dunbar, who
purchased an ox from a Tory councillor, was punished for violating the boycott by being
shoved inside its hollowed carcass and carted through the streets of Plymouth,
Massachusetts. He was then tied to a horse and dragged from the town. Peter Oliver
recorded this and other outrages as an appendix to his Origin and Progress of the
American Rebellion (1781). He reported how public officials were threatened by mobs
and how prominent judges were forced to run gauntlets before being coerced into asking
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forgiveness for their errors.33 Other loyalists reported similar abuses. The loyalist
gentleman Cadwallader Colden Jr. was chained to a slave while a captive in New York.
The Connecticut loyalist Peter Guire was reportedly branded with a “G.R.”, (George
Rex), a punishment reserved for slaves, criminals, and cattle. In both of these examples,
the symbolic connection with slaves or cattle was clearly a mark of dishonour and
perhaps meant as a punishment for loyalists’ perceived servility to the Crown.34 A list of
reported bodily insults could go on for pages, but the most iconic form of shaming
punishment was tarring and feathering.
Like effigy burning or other folk customs, tarring and feathering had a long
history in the English world. Originally a maritime custom with roots going back to the
medieval period, the ritual of tarring and feathering was painful and humiliating.
Throughout the early modern period the punishment was used in England against
drunkards, rapists, and thieves. The first recorded instance of it in the colonies was not
until the mid-1760s, yet it quickly became familiar to the residents of seaside towns.
Tarring and feathering was mostly directed at customs officials or other government
agents, but it was also used on occasion to punish sexual transgressions. In 1769, a man
was tarred and feathered for luring a woman into the clutches of the hated soldiers in the
Boston garrison. The Boston Evening-Post described how the man was then “carried
about the town for two or three Hours, as a Spectacle of Contempt and a Warning to
others…” Tarring and feathering was normally reserved for low-born bodies, but with
the intensification of the political crisis, some gentlemen found themselves at the end of
the tarring brush. Crowds could sometimes satisfy themselves with stand-ins if the
gentleman could not be found or the crowd lost their nerve. When a mob could not get
their hands on Timothy Ruggles, they instead “cut his Horses Tail off & painted him all
over. The mob found that Paint was cheaper than Tar and Feathers.” One of Samuel
Seabury’s pamphlets was tarred and feathered as were the homes and stores of numerous
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merchants. Though tarring and feathering a house might seem little more than a
sophomoric prank, it was intended as a very threatening act.35
One of the most brutal episodes of tarring and feathering took place outside of
Augusta, Georgia in the summer of 1775. Thomas Brown was a young gentleman from a
prosperous and wealthy English family, who established a plantation in 1771. When he
flatly refused to sign an association supporting colonial resistance, a group of armed
patriots attacked his home and after a brief melee Brown was knocked unconscious.
When he awoke he was tarred and feathered, scalped, and then had his legs briefly set on
fire, before being carted through the streets of Augusta. The burns to his feet were so
extreme that he eventually lost two toes. Though he finally signed the patriot’s
association, he fled shortly after. The Georgia Gazette included a sarcastic note from the
local committee, which like the insult done to James Murray’s wig in Boston some years
earlier, highlights the affront done to a gentleman’s head, considered to be the part of the
body most infused with honour.36 In reference to Brown being scalped, the article
reported that the loyalist “wears his hair very short and a handkerchief around his head in
order that his intellect…may not be affected.” Once again a patriot newspaper added
insult to injury.37
The respected Connecticut doctor, Abner Beebe also experienced the terror of the
tarring ritual after he cursed the local patriots in East Haddam for abusing his uncle. In
response, the local committee posted advertisements in the Connecticut Gazette declaring
him “inimical to the liberties of the people of America…” A short time later a mob
“stripped [him] naked & hot Pitch was poured upon him, which blistered his Skin.” The
patriot mob then rolled him in a pig sty and forced him to eat dung. To complete the
emasculation he was then “exposed to a Company of Women.” Patriots attacked Beebe’s
house and destroyed his grist mill, financially ruining the man. Beebe was unmanned, but
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he was also dehumanized. Rolled in filth and blackened by pitch, he ceased to look like a
man, but was transformed into a lesser creature, a thing. As will be seen, the comparison
of loyalists to crawling vermin or frightened worthless animals was a recurring trope in
the writings of Tom Paine and others. In response these indignities, all Dr. Beebe could
do was insert a note in the paper pleading his innocence and begging to be either granted
a trial or left alone.38
Perhaps the most well-known image of tarring and feathering is a 1774 English
print showing a man covered in tar and feathers being forced to drink tea from a kettle at
the hands of a group of five grinning ruffians.39 The image depicts the experience of John
Malcolm, a customs official and former sea captain and army officer. He is unique in
being one of the only loyalists to be tarred and feathered twice. The first time occurred in
November, 1773, when he was “genteely tarr’d and feather’d”. Thomas Hutchinson
noted that in this instance Malcolm “was not stripped and the chief damage he sustained
was in his clothes…” Nonetheless, the humiliation followed Malcolm through the streets
where he was “hooted at…for having been tarred and feathered.” On January 25, 1774, a
young shoemaker named George Robert Twelves Hewes got into an altercation with
Malcolm on the street and brought up the Captain’s humiliation. In response, Malcolm
lashed out with his cane and badly wounded Hewes. An incensed crowd then invaded
Malcolm’s house, stripped him, tarred and feathered his body, and paraded him about the
streets in the dead of winter. Ann Hulton recorded that they whipped him, beat him with
clubs, and threatened to hang him if he did not renounce the King and Parliament. “This
Spectacle of horror & sportive cruelty was exhibited for about five hours,” she wrote.
Hulton added in her letter that the doctors did not expect him to live and that “his flesh
comes off his back in Stakes.” An advertisement appeared in the Boston Post-Boy shortly
after from the “Committee for tarring and feathering” in which they disavowed their role
in the treatment of Malcolm. Not that they disapproved of the action, but, they mockingly
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declared, “We reserve that Method for…Villains of greater Consequence.”40 The exact
nature of this committee is unclear, and it is possible that there was no “committee” at all,
but rather this was a name borrowed at will by anyone seeking to legitimize their actions
with an official-sounding title. The same name was used in newspapers throughout the
colonies in printed threats against violators of the non-importation agreements.41 This
was yet another example of the press working with the crowds to continue to insult
loyalists.
Though these assaults on genteel loyalist bodies are quite infamous, they were not
the norm. In spite of the widely documented cases of tarring and feathering and other
shaming rituals, comparatively few gentlemen loyalists were ever subjected to this fate.
The fact that most victims of patriot mobs were from the lower orders is perhaps a
testament to the abiding cultural respect for genteel bodies, or it could have just been due
to the loyalists’ skill in eluding the mobs. Nevertheless, it only took a few examples to
make the patriots’ point. The act of stripping a genteel body, of marking it with tar,
feathers, or dung was a powerful attempt to take away the power of a loyalist gentleman.
This was not an attack on gentility and the privileges it conveyed in general, but was
specifically directed at loyalist gentlemen who were thought to have abused their
positions for their own gain and were no longer worthy. In the same way that the stripes
on a slave’s back showed the coercive power of the master class, these violent shaming
rituals displayed the power of the crowd and transformed and degraded the loyalist body
into an object of loathing and mockery. Even if very few loyalist gentlemen were tarred
and feathered, those examples still terrified others of their rank. William Aitchison, a
Norfolk merchant wrote that “A large tar mop was erected near the Capital wt a Bag of
feathers to it and a Barl. of Tar underneath” in order to intimidate men into signing the
40
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patriot association. Such intimidation often had the desired effect. Aitchison complied
with the committee, because, as he wrote “[t]here is no contending against such
Numbers.”42 Gentlemen were always in the minority, and loyalist gentlemen were
particularly vulnerable to crowds politicized against royal or aristocratic symbols. The
poor wore their rags and disease, slaves and criminals bore the marks of the lash, and the
wealthy displayed their finery. All of these announced the individual’s place in a
spectrum of distinction and degradation.43 The cultural importance of clothing and
appearance for eighteenth century people cannot be overstated. How a man or a woman
presented themselves announced their place in society, their social and political rank, and
their virtue. Therefore the prospect of a violent transformation at the hands of a mob was
terrifying and loyalists went to great lengths to avoid such dishonour.44
Even if loyalists could escape direct insults and attacks, the patriot press
continued to print screeds and diatribes against them. Just as loyalists often found
themselves outnumbered in their communities, the print war was a lopsided contest since
royal supporters could rely on very few friendly presses. Before the intensification of the
colonial crisis, printers welcomed opinion columns from multiple points of view. This
made their papers livelier and exhibited the sort of non-partiality expected of a free
press.45 By 1774 things had changed. Printers were under more pressure to refuse
publication of loyalist arguments. Rather than see this as censorship, patriot thinkers
invoked the idea of the “public good” and the press as a “bulwark” of American liberty.
What was considered the public good, of course, was subjective, and during the
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revolutionary crisis loyalist arguments were considered antithetical to that public good.
Daniel Leonard, writing as “Massachusettensis,” noted how the Whigs of Boston had
“become the licensers of the press…by playing off the resentment of the populace against
printers and authors” and had turned the press into “an engine of oppression.”46 The most
prominent loyalist printer, James Rivington of New York, faced a campaign of direct
intimidation. He was hanged in effigy in Rhode Island, and had his print shop vandalized,
before his press was finally destroyed in November, 1775. Rivington fled to England, but
returned as the King’s printer after the British captured New York City in the summer of
1776.47 Patriots defended the assault on Rivington’s press by arguing that he had not
simply printed for the British, but had “prostituted” himself and his print shop. The
mercenary printer as prostitute was not a new idea. In 1753, William Smith Jr. (a loyalist
during the Revolution), argued that any printer who “prostituted his art” should be
censored and was effectively guilty of high treason since he was working against the
society as a whole.48 The comparison of a printer to a prostitute was intended not only to
show the professional transgression of the printer, but it was also a deeply gendered insult
which highlighted Rivington’s moral depravity and emasculation, and the dishonour he
had brought upon the press as an institution.
In spite of the patriot dominated press and the intimidation, loyalist spokesmen
were still able to publish some pamphlets, but never in the numbers enjoyed by their
revolutionary adversaries. Prior to the outbreak of open hostilities, loyalists controlled
approximately one-fifth of the colonial presses, but during the War of Independence
loyalists could only print in British occupied areas. In all, there were approximately 15
loyalist newspaper titles printed between 1774 and 1783, though some, like the Georgia
Gazette, lasted only a few brief months. The number of newspapers printed in the
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rebelling colonies at any given time during the war ranged from 25 to 42 titles. Of that,
the loyalists could claim only five to eight newspapers depending on the vagaries of the
conflict, and the effective circulation of these papers was restricted to British held
territory. In terms of pamphlet production the loyalists faced a similar disadvantage. In
1775, of the 46 political pamphlets published in the Thirteen Colonies, twelve were
penned by supporters of the royal cause. The following year that number had dropped to
only two of twenty six pamphlets, and both of those – James Chalmers’ Plain Truth and
Charles Inglis’ True Interests of America, were reactions to Paine.49
The dominance of the patriot press throughout the colonies allowed patriot writers
to create a consistent and disparaging image of the loyalists. Patriot newspapers,
pamphlets, and broadsides were filled with depictions of loyalists as skulking spies, as
dependent and effete courtiers, and as traitors to their race, country, and even civilized
society. The patriot press portrayed the loyalists as everything from spineless cowards
and lap dogs to sub-human amphibians. Although prominent loyalists were singled out,
more often than not the printed attacks on the loyalists were generalized. Whig
polemicists created the spectre of unified, organized cabals and gangs of archetypal
Tories. This characterization of the loyalists accomplished several important things for
the patriot cause. By linking all Tories in a great conspiracy against the liberties of
America, the patriots justified any actions they took against individual loyalists. Just as
importantly, by arguing that all loyalists were also depraved and immoral men, they
transformed the political issues into a Manichaean struggle, in which the loyalists of
whatever rank became the antithesis of the patriot ideals. A Tory gentleman was a corrupt
leader who abused his power; a Tory merchant was a selfish cheat; a Tory farmer was a
dependant weakling, and so on. Patriots could therefore make a claim to morality and
worthy manhood simply on the basis of their allegiance to the revolutionary cause.
A fairly routine article from The Connecticut Courant in 1775 is filled with the
typical patriot charges of loyalist betrayal and degeneracy. It reported that the “Judases,”
who formed the Loyal Fencible Americans in Worcester, Massachusetts may have
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contained some “head Tories” but the majority were “a few negroes, and some Scotch
rebels and convicts,” a none-to-subtle implication of racial upheaval, criminality, and
Catholic Jacobite connections.50 Another report of a loyalist force described them as
consisting of “200 (Boys, Negros etc.)” who were poorly armed and awaited the King’s
fleet to protect them and “make them Masters of our estates.” The Tory leaders of this
group were described as feeble, dependent cowards whose “reigning Principle is
Lying.”51 The reams of attacks printed during the opening stages of the armed conflict
were intended not only to show the intellectual, political, and moral bankruptcy of the
loyalists and their cause, but to also show their degeneracy and failure as men. In this
early stage of the conflict, as will be explored in more detail in chapter 5, armed loyalism
was hardly considered a threat. The loyalists were unmanned by their dependence on
royal power, by their willingness to abandon manly resistance for the languid acceptance
of arbitrary power, and their attempts to enrich themselves at the expense of their
countrymen.
The patriot press endeavoured to uncover the direct conspiracy that linked these
Tories to the authorities in Whitehall. The years leading up to the American Revolution
were, in the words of Thomas C. Leonard, “an era of exposés” when the patriot press
attempted to ferret out all the pernicious schemes of the British Parliament.52 The belief
in secret British plots to undo the liberties of the colonists, plots which relied on the selfserving nature of the American Tories, was a common and recurring subject in the press.
There was hardly any question as to the identity of the “snakes” which, one newspaper
asserted, the North administration was “cherishing in their bosom.”53 Royal Governors
like Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts or William Franklin of New Jersey were
American-born, yet they were believed to have conspired with the British government to
undermine colonial rights and resistance. The publication of letters from Governor
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Hutchinson and other high ranking officials to Thomas Whately, a British Member of
Parliament and member of the Board of Trade, provided fuel for patriot propaganda. To
some patriots this was proof that there was indeed a conspiracy at the highest level of
political power in the colonies and Parliament. The letters were written in 1768, when
Hutchinson was Chief Justice of Massachusetts, and were published in 1773 as a
pamphlet along with letters from Governor Francis Bernard, Andrew Oliver (a former
stamp-distributor and Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts), Charles Paxton (a high
ranking customs official), and Hutchinson’s nephew Nathaniel Rogers. How they came
into hands of the Massachusetts Assembly is a long and still uncertain tale of intrigue, but
at the centre was Benjamin Franklin, who confessed his part in late 1773.54 Intrigue to
expose intrigue was a tricky matter for gentlemen, ever concerned about their honour,
reputations, and political careers. Though Americans applauded Franklin for his efforts to
expose the machinations of the Tory Governor and his conspirators, he was publicly
rebuked and called a thief in England – a slight that helped push Franklin ever deeper into
the patriot camp.55 Nevertheless, the letters provided proof for those already convinced
that an alliance of Tories and British ministerial agents were plotting the enslavement of
freeborn colonists.
There were very few sentiments within the letters that Hutchinson had not
publicly stated before their publication, and when compared with other loyalist writers,
Bernard Bailyn argues that they were “restrained and discreet.”56 Nonetheless, it was the
apparent clandestine nature of the correspondence that incensed the Whigs. In the letters,
Hutchinson heaps the blame for the riots and other public disruptions on John Hancock,
accuses the Sons of Liberty, “our incendiaries,” of misleading the people, and laments the
general gullibility of the populace. Yet Hutchinson’s letter of January 20, 1769 was
perhaps the most damning. In it he suggests that to restore order “[t]here must be an
abridgement of what are called English liberties.” Hutchinson then questions whether it
was even possible that “a colony 3000 miles distant shall enjoy all the liberty of the
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parent state.”57 The Sons of Liberty pounced on the letters and, as is often the case with
conspiracy theorists, twisted the evidence to fit their pre-existing world-view. Patriots,
loyalists, and their British contemporaries all shared a penchant for political conspiracy
theories, a trait no doubt gleaned from almost two centuries of regicides, dissenters,
Popish plots, and Jacobite insurgencies.
An author, who borrowed the name of Oliver Cromwell’s “press agent,”
“Marchmont Nedham,” commented in early 1774 that the content of the letters proved
that the officials “wrote in concert” and that “the conspiracy was joint.” Furthermore, the
letters displayed an unparalleled level of “unfairness, disingenuity, malice, and
cowardice.” In his next installment, Nedham asks if the real “Betrayer of Government”
was the patriot who “openly assembles with his brethren to consider of public affairs,
who speaks his sentiments freely, and determines his conduct in the face of all men?” Or,
he asks, is the colonial traitor one “who writes secret and confidential letters to the
enemies of his country, blasts its reputation with calumny, and points the way to its
overthrow and ruin?” Nedham notes that an “open invader” is a more honest foe since the
country can be “in some measure prepared, by the knowledge of our enemy and danger”
adding even that “there is something of generosity in the attack. But against the secret
destroyer…who hides his dagger under the veil of friendship…innocence is no
protection---valour is no adequate defence.” “The thrust of a duelist may be parried;” he
writes, “but who can repel the stab of an assassin?”58 The cowardly, dishonourable, and
sneaky Tory mould was set.
Along with government officials, merchants also bore the brunt of suspicion from
revolutionary committees, mainly due to their connections to the imperial trading
networks. Distrust of the “Art & Mystery of a Merchant” was common enough in the
eighteenth century, but was exacerbated in the American political crisis. As T.H. Breen
has shown, British consumer products became charged with political meaning in the
years leading to the Revolution. Colonists engaged in “rituals of non-consumption,” and
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newspapers published the names of transgressors to the non-consumption and nonimportation associations, all in an effort to end their dependence on British manufactured
goods. A merchant’s personal morality was carefully judged by revolutionary
committees, who might suspect that a merchant’s patriotism lasted only as long as his
inventory held out. Many shopkeepers and importers refused access to their account
books as a point of honour, which only increased suspicions.59
Loyalists saw things quite differently. Thomas Bradbury Chandler likened nonimportations to “a remedy…ten thousand times worse than the disease. It is, for the
wisdom of it, like cutting off an arm, in order to get rid of a small sore in one of the
fingers.”60 Samuel Seabury’s sardonic comparison of non-importation to a gun is a good
summation of his scepticism of the committee-enforced boycotts. “If a man puts a pistol
to his breast and draws the trigger,” he writes, “the pistol will fire as vigorously as if he
turned the muzzle the other way, but the consequence will be very different.” In an
earlier pamphlet, Seabury warned his readers that “[w]hen a trading people carelessly
neglect, or wilfully give up any branch of their trade, it is seldom in their power to
recover it.” 61 Seabury argued that the non-importation agreements would leave the
colonies economically ruined, which would in turn lead to anarchy. Marauding bands of
the starving poor would ravage the countryside while the unscrupulous merchant would
not quibble to “prostitute his honour” and fleece the colonists by engineering artificial
scarcity. Seabury, in the persona of the supposedly straight-talking “Westchester
Farmer,” reminded his readers that they were “Englishmen…and will eat, and drink, and
wear, whatever the public laws of your country permit, without asking leave of any
illegal, tyrannical Congress or Committee on Earth.”62 To loyalists like Seabury, nonimportation was an infringement on liberty, not a defense.
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In response to loyalist arguments, Thomas Paine attacked those who “would sell
their Birthright for a little salt” asking “[w]hat are salt, sugar, and finery to the
inestimable blessings of ‘Liberty and Safety’?”63 The connection between conspiracy and
luxury was easy to make, especially in the northern colonies where the Puritan ethic was
still very much alive. Imported goods smacked of the sin of luxury and were touted as
“the handmaid to Bribery and Corruption.” The individual quest for luxury gave birth to
“Corruption, that secret and certain destroyer of virtue, that engine of despotism…”64 An
excellent example of this thinking in action can be seen in a resolution published in July
1776. The Committee of Inspection for Simsbury, Connecticut banned the sale of
“indigo, feathers, wooden dishes, teas, and many other goods, and wares of various
kinds,” by “strolling petit chapman” for whom there were “great grounds of suspicion”
that such men were forming “inimical combinations and correspondence…and carrying
on with the enemies of the United American States.”65 Though merchants were found in
the ranks of both sides in the Revolution, the degenerate Tory merchant remained a
stereotype throughout the conflict and long after.
The image of the miserly or decadent Tory merchant was just one of many
gendered anti-loyalist tropes found in the patriot press, but it was Thomas Paine who
delivered the most concerted and bitter attacks on loyalist manhood. In Common Sense,
Paine’s most famous and incendiary pamphlet, he writes that the wealthy Tories who
allied themselves with the Crown “are in general slaves to fear, and submit to courtly
power with the trembling duplicity of a spaniel.” The denigration of loyalists does not
end with the lapdog analogy, as Paine continues by claiming that any adherent to Tory
ideology has “forfeited his claim to rationality” and is an “apostate from the order of
manhood…one who hath not only given up the proper dignity of a man, but sunk himself
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beneath the rank of animals, and contemptibly crawl through the world like a worm.”66
As seen in the physical attacks on Dr. Abner Beebe and other loyalists, these were
literary attempts to transform gentlemen into things. Popular attitudes towards animals
were beginning to change in the eighteenth century, as the rising notion of sensibility
extended to the idea that animals could suffer and feel just like people. In a world in
which humans were enslaved, however, there was a very clear hierarchy of organisms in
which animals fared poorly. Some animals were considered nobler than others, and the
loyalists were always compared with the lowest orders. The lapdog analogy employed by
Paine is a particularly good case in point. In the words of Markman Ellis, the lapdog of
the eighteenth century was “a misogynist trope of female venereal concupiscence” as
well as a symbol of useless luxury. A spaniel was merely a “trifle,” fussed over by
pampered women, which provided no practical contributions to a household or farm.67
The worm was universally considered the lowest of all organisms, crawling through dirt
and feasting on corpses.68 Paine could not have chosen two more powerful images than
the spaniel and the worm.
Paine’s attacks on loyalists’ manly virtues are strewn throughout his writings.
Perhaps the most stinging indictment of loyalist manhood during the entire conflict is
delivered in Common Sense. After listing the agonies and outrages caused by the British
government, Paine addresses the Tories directly. “[I]f you…can still shake hands with the
murderers [the British]” he writes, “then are ye unworthy [of] the name of husband,
father, friend, or lover, and whatever may be your rank or title in life, you have the heart
of a coward, and the spirit of a sycophant.” Such condemnations of loyalist masculinity
continue into The Crisis where he answers his own question “what is a Tory” by
describing a loyalist as “a coward, for a servile, slavish, self-interested fear is the
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foundation of Toryism; and a man under such influence, though he may be cruel, never
can be brave.”69
The loyalist writers never found an effective response to such virulent attacks. In
Plain Truth, the Maryland loyalist James Chalmers attempts to answer Paine by repeating
the biting passage quoted above from Common Sense. Chalmers then feebly asks “Are
these words dictated by peace, or base foul revenge, the constant attendant on
COWARDS and sycophants [?]”70 The effect of his response falls flat, since the reader
surely knows that the sentiments are not meant to be peaceful, and by quoting the entire
passage, Chalmers has granted his revolutionary opponent far too much space to restate
his attack. It was an error common to many loyalist writers during the American
Revolution and one which the Anglican minister Jonathan Boucher lamented in hindsight
as “foolish good-nature and improvidence…which [lead] them [loyalist writers] often to
hurt their own interests by promoting those of their adversaries.”71
While Chalmers provided a more precise reading of history and the great
Enlightenment thinkers in Plain Truth, his eighty-five page tract does little to counter the
blow that Common Sense gave to the royal cause and loyalist manhood. Paine’s work,
when read aloud, was accessible to an artisan or labourer, whereas Plain Truth is full of
sarcastic allusions that could only be grasped and appreciated by the learned. In the end,
that might be exactly what Chalmers intended. As Douglas Adair observed, it was not
enough for an eighteenth century gentleman to be famous, but to be famous with the right
people and for the right reasons. A thousand cheering plebeians were not equal to the
approval of a single man of culture and learning. Jonathan Boucher dismissed the idea of
appealing to the people. “I am persuaded,” he wrote in 1787, “whenever it happens that a
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really sensible man becomes the idol of the people, it must be owing to his possessing a
talent of letting himself down to their level.”72
The tone and style of loyalist writers did not help their cause. Prior to 1774,
loyalists responded to printed attacks with “serene, patient rationalism,” though their tone
stiffened with the intensification of colonial resistance.73 There were many loyalist
contributors to the print war in the lead-up to the conflict, but the most notable
spokesmen came from two distinct groups of men. Royal and government office holders
such as Joseph Galloway of Pennsylvania and Daniel Leonard and Jonathan Sewall of
Massachusetts, made carefully considered arguments built on their understanding of the
British constitution, but they could neither convince their fellow colonists of the folly of
rebellion nor convert them (or the British, for that matter) to the wisdom of finding some
sort of amicable compromise, such as Galloway’s proposed Plan of Union.74 Sewall and
Leonard contributed their anonymous arguments to Massachusetts newspapers while
Galloway published two pamphlets in Philadelphia in 1775, though none of these
publications found the wide circulation enjoyed by their patriot rivals. These loyalist
writers often used vivid language and were technically proficient, but were usually
cerebral, scholarly, and they actively rejected any appeal to the passions. Indeed, as
Robert Calhoun writes, their publications “reflected a concern with law and the details of
imperial administration…or the subtleties of colonial politics”.75 This resulted in less
emotional, less persuasive language than the polemical exhortations found in patriot
newspapers and pamphlets.
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The other group of writers were Anglican clergymen such as Thomas Bradbury
Chandler, Samuel Seabury, and Charles Inglis who struck out passionately against what
they saw as the childish, immoral, and the sinfully rebellious attitude of colonial
resistance.76 By invoking the image of the rebellious, petulant child, they were playing on
the passions of the reader as much as the patriot writer who invoked the image of the
coward. Yet these authors seem to be writing for others who already thought as they did,
and they did more to insult than persuade the undecided. In the small corpus of writings
produced by Chandler, Inglis, and Seabury, two competing versions of men are
presented. The revolutionaries are misguided by their passions and the designs of wicked
men, and though they are brave, they have lost one of the key requirements for an adult
male: emotional restraint. This argument drew both on the idea that a true gentleman
carefully governed his emotions, and the teachings of High-Church Anglicanism, to
which these three writers belonged, that rejected the emotional outpouring of evangelical
Protestantism and instead sought an emotionally restrained and contemplative form of
worship. In addition to the threat posed by the uninhibited passions of the rebels, these
loyalist writers saw the levelling, republican influence of New England Dissenters at
work, who sought to establish a “Presbyterian yoke of bondage” over their fellow
colonists.77 In other words, the passions were whipped-up as part of larger New England
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conspiracy to end religious freedom, not defend liberty. The loyal subject, on the other
hand, bore all the hallmarks of prudence, caution, aged wisdom, and respect for
established authority and religious conscience – attributes which might make an excellent
vicar, but not a particularly good counterrevolutionary fighter.
Perhaps the most hard-line conservative of the loyalist writers was Thomas
Bradbury Chandler, the Connecticut-born rector of Elizabethtown, New Jersey. Chandler
had stoked controversy in 1766 with his publication of “An Appeal on Behalf of the
Church of England in America” which espoused the establishment of an American
bishopric in the face of increasing religious pluralism in the colonies, a cause which John
Adams later credited with being one of the earliest and most important factors leading to
the Revolution. “We firmly believe,” Chandler candidly explained in a letter, “that
[Government’s] best security in the colonies does and must always arise from the
principles of submission and loyalty taught by the Church. The Clergy…are constantly
instilling these great principles into the people.” A strong church would help build a
strong empire. William Smith Jr., another prominent loyalist and Chief Justice of the
Province of New York, noted how misguided those beliefs were, and more accurately
wrote that “the body of the people are for an equal, universal toleration of all Protestants
and are utterly averse to any kind of ecclesiastical establishment.”78 Smith seemed to
know that a strong imperial union could be based on religious toleration.
Chandler’s conservatism and elitism can be best seen in The American Querist
(1774). This collection of one hundred self-answering and often sneering questions
directed at the American colonists ranges from body metaphors to constitutional history.
In question 10, Chandler asks whether the political turmoil in the colonies was not unlike
a disease, “of the feverish kind, as is attended with an irregular pulse, and discovers, in
some parts, a dangerous swelling and inflammation” and asks whether the root cause was
the colonists “own imprudence and intemperance?”79 The cures put forward by the
patriots are likened by Chandler to those prescribed by “notorious quacks” rather than
78
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professional doctors, a sentiment that echoes Chandler’s thoughts on the impropriety of
the common people getting involved in political discussions at all. Chandler suggests a
cure to these political ailments by asking “[w]hether some degree of respect be not
always due from inferiors to superiors, and especially from children to parents; and
whether the refusal of this on any occasion, be not violation of the general laws of
society, to say nothing here of the obligations of religion and morality?”80 This was a
sentiment shared by other loyalist writers at the time. Samuel Seabury, also distressed at
the disrespect shown by his fellow colonists, chided them that “the people are under the
strongest obligations to treat them [their representatives and governors] with honour and
respect; and to look to them for redress of all those grievances that they can justly
complain of.”81 Fundamentally, Chandler’s deeply unpopular message of passive
obedience and non-resistance is summarized in question 96: “Whether [God] has given
any dispensation to the body of the people, under any government, to refuse honor, or
custom, or tribute, to whom they are due; to contract habits of thinking and speaking evil
of dignities, and to weaken the natural principle of respect for those in authority.” And he
answers his question with yet another leading question: “Whether, on the contrary, he
does not command us to submit to every ordinance of man for the Lord’s sake; and
require us, on pain of damnation, to be duly subject to the higher powers, and not to
resist their lawful authority?”82 Jonathan Boucher agreed, advising his parishioners to “sit
still” and “stand fast” rather than take any actions against lawful authority.83 For
Anglican clergymen like Chandler and Boucher, unlawful armed resistance was one of
the darkest sins, a fact attested by I Samuel 15:23, which declared that “rebellion is as the
sin of witchcraft.”84
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Most loyalist clergy spokesmen rejected the rule of “passive obedience and nonresistance,” because the doctrine could call into question the Glorious Revolution of 1688
which dethroned the Catholic James II in favour of a Protestant King and a more
religiously tolerant constitution. To advocate acceptance of established authority too
strenuously would, ironically, seem to question the legitimacy of the ruling House of
Hanover. Samuel Seabury declared that he could not “swallow [the doctrine of passive
obedience and non-resistance], and if I could, I am sure my stomach would never digest
it.” Charles Inglis avowed that “I am none of your passive obedience and non-resistance
men.” Anglican writers needed to tread a careful line. If the King and Parliament were
indeed acting in an unjust or ungodly manner, then good Christians were not obliged to
obey, but open rebellion was still unchristian. Anglican clergymen believed that
Englishmen should work within the system laid down by the Glorious Revolution
through a “golden mean” that rejected servile Catholic obedience as well the rebellious
tendencies of Puritanism.85 The Anglican loyalist writers were in agreement that the
political disagreements leading to the American Revolution were far too petty to justify
the colonists’ outrage. Colonial resistance in this case represented a sinful, unjustifiable,
and unnatural rebellion.
Two main tropes characterized the loyalist argument to prevent a permanent
schism within the empire. The first was likening the imperial relationship of colonies to
Britain as a tree or body, whose limbs could not be severed without causing the death of
the whole. The other more powerful metaphor was of the empire as a family.86 In the
words of Clifford Geertz, the family symbol functioned as a matrix “for the creation of
collective conscience.”87 By wrapping the political constitution of the British Empire in
the rhetoric of family, the loyalist writers were invoking the duties of children to parents
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as established in the Fifth Commandment. Samuel Seabury describes the upstart rebels as
“peevish and petulant” and filled with “sulky obstinacy” and “preposterous pride” and
“fiery intemperate zeal” which prevents them from honestly considering their position
and accepting their errors.88 The characterization of patriots as petulant children is found
throughout the loyalist writings. Seabury refers to the Suffolk Resolves adopted by the
first Continental Congress in 1774 as “this adopted brat of the congress,” while James
Chalmers, the Maryland author of Plain Truth, describes the colonies as a wayward
apprentice seeking patronage from another master before his term has properly expired.
Perhaps the most striking example is Inglis’ comparison of the patriot sentiments of
Thomas Paine to “a rash, froward stripling, who should call his mother a d-mn-d b—ch,
swear he had no relation to her, and attempt to knock her down.”89 Seabury opines in his
last letter from A Westchester Farmer that perhaps a vanquished rebellion is the only way
the revolutionaries can see the error of their ways since, “like children, they seem
incapable of learning from any experience but their own.”90
Thomas Paine turned the parent-child metaphor back on the loyalist writers,
declaring that a man could not be beholden to his parents forever, and noted in Common
Sense that it was absurd to think that “because a child has thrived on milk…it is never to
have meat.” Inglis repeats the charge of child-like insolence again in his True Interests of
America, dismissing Paine’s hijacked simile as “absurd, and a violation of the propriety
of language” and reminds his readers that the parent-child relationship between Great
Britain and the colonies was only figurative. Even so, he goes on to assert that the
continued relationship between parent and matured child is “still necessary to the
happiness of both.”91 Both arguments would have made sense to colonial readers, but in
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the end the patriot argument won by rejecting the analogy altogether and replacing a
government built on bonds of affection with voluntary ideas of association and consent.92
Perhaps the loyalists’ most effective insult, and one which patriot writers actually
took notice of and worked to refute, was the epithet “rebel.” Chief in the minds of the
loyalist writers was the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, 1639-1649, which resulted in the
execution of King Charles I, the desolation of the English countryside, and the
establishment of Oliver Cromwell’s Protectorate. The Restoration of the monarchy in
1660 ended the Dissenter-led experiment and with the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the
Church of England became firmly entrenched above other Protestant denominations in
the British constitution. For the loyalist writers in North America these violent
convulsions had produced an effective constitutional arrangement which invalidated any
need for further insurrection. Seabury’s brief discussion of the events of 1688 is
representative of the body of loyalist pamphlets on the subject. He writes that however
“necessary that revolution may have been to secure the rights and liberties of the English
nation, no man, I am persuaded…would wish to see it again torn by such violent
convulsions.” To Seabury, anyone who would cite the Glorious Revolution as a
legitimate precedent for colonial rebellion was “too fond of revolutions to be good
subjects of any government on earth.”93 Since 1688, the most vividly remembered
rebellion in the British world was the Jacobite uprising that was defeated at the Battle of
Culloden in 1746. The image of the wild and savage Scottish highlanders had become
associated with the idea of rebellion in English thought, and Seabury invokes the notion
of savagery when he lambasts the Continental Congress for their intemperate passions.
Using a rather far-flung analogy, Seabury likens Congress to the “inhabitants of NewZealand, [who] before they attack their enemies…found it necessary to animate
themselves by singing their war song…that they might work themselves up into…a state
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of frenzy.”94 Charles Inglis noted these qualities in Thomas Paine, observing that the
patriot writer’s intemperance “knows no limits, and hurries him along, like an impetuous
torrent.”95 Once again, the passions have made the patriots less than men, though this
time they are not youths, but wild and uncivilized savages. The loyalist writers no doubt
saw insurrection as a predictable consequence of the combination of enthusiastic religion,
youth, and the uncivilized nature of colonials.
Rebellion and criminality were nearly synonymous in the eighteenth-century
mind. Patriot writers had to establish the justice of their rebellion and many worked to
redefine the word itself. Thomas Paine recognized that the colonies could never expect
any assistance from foreign powers as long as they were considered rebels by the
international community. Such a precedent could be disastrous for their potential allies’
imperial possessions. Garnering international support was therefore another powerful
reason cited by Paine to support a complete break from Great Britain. As Paine writes,
establishing an independent country would “solve the paradox.”96 He also elaborated on
the criminality of rebellion in the second volume of The Crisis, but like the parent-child
metaphor, he turned the concept back on the British. In a clear nod to the principles of
the Enlightenment, Paine argues that “The Republic of Letters is more ancient than
monarchy…” he writes, and “he that rebels against reason is a real rebel, but he that in
defence of reason, rebels against tyranny, has a better title to ‘DEFENDER OF THE
FAITH’ than George the Third.”97 The Congregational minister Nathaniel Whitaker went
further, declaring that the American Revolution was not a rebellion at all. Following the
traditional Dissenter idea that there was a contract between God, ruler, and ruled,
Whitaker argued that he “who transgresses this compact…is a rebel. In this, it matters not
whether the person be a king or a subject.”98 The Whig writers were also able to call upon
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the historical precedent of the Cavaliers who supported the Stuarts in the War of Three
Kingdoms, and the few adherents to James II when he was deposed in 1688. A column
written by “Cato” in 1775 argued that a Tory is a Jacobite in the sense that he is a
“maintainer of the infernal doctrine of arbitrary power…and of passive obedience and
non-resistance on the part of the subject.” Another New England newspaper asks
whether the King’s ministers have “all turned Tories, and become Jacobites?” In 1774,
“A Friend to Liberty” wrote to the Newport Mercury of a fictional loyalist named Francis
Puffgut, who was a “flaming Jacobite with more guts than brains” who came into
Connecticut to escape winds which were “unconstitutional to weak men.” The Quebec
Act of 1774, which formally permitted the Catholic Church in Quebec, only added to
suspicions of the creeping influence of the “popery” that characterized the popular
memory of the Stuarts.99 Combined with biblical justification and precedents from
English history, the American Revolutionaries reconciled rebellion and just resistance for
themselves, and turned the charges of criminality and treason against the loyalists.
In addition to the debate over whether armed colonial resistance was justified, the
loyalist pamphleteers stressed what they saw as the practical reality that any uprising was
doomed to fail. Yet in their attempts to dissuade the colonists from armed resistance, the
loyalists made another fatal blunder by insulting the manhood and prowess of the
colonists thereby leaving themselves open to charges of cowardice. The weakness of the
colonies, Chandler argued, had been revealed in the Seven Years’ War, when they were
“unable to withstand the militia of Canada, supported by a few regiments of regular
troops from France.” Furthermore, Chandler intentionally insults the martial spirit of the
colonists, declaring “I am too well acquainted with their character to expect that they
would prove thus definite in the day of trial.”100 It is hard to see how such statements
could be taken as anything other than a challenge to supporters of the patriot cause. To
explain how the Whigs deluded themselves into thinking that they could win, loyalist
authors pointed to the immoral pride of the revolutionaries. It seemed obvious to
Chandler that “there is too much reason to believe, that our minds are unprincipled, and
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our hearts disposed for rebellion. Ever since the reduction of Canada, we have been
bloated with a vain opinion of our own power and importance. Our ease has produced
pride and wantonness.”101 Colonial hubris would lead to destruction, but the loyalists
were still hopeful that cooler heads would prevail.
The loyalist writers differed slightly among themselves on how to prevent the
final plunge into open rebellion. Samuel Seabury, as the Westchester Farmer, addressed
the New York assembly bluntly: “We, Gentlemen, have no alternative left, but either to
join the other colonies in a war against Great-Britain, or to make the best terms we can,
for ourselves. The former may have the most old Oliverian glory in it, but the latter is
certainly the most prudent course. It will save this province, and probably the whole
continent, from desolation and destruction.”102 He could acknowledge the martial allure
of the call to arms, but, like the wise and knowledgeable man he regarded himself to be,
he advocated caution. Thomas Bradbury Chandler agreed, but neither writer openly
encouraged the colonists to resist Congress. One of Chandler’s only calls to arms falls
quite flat. “I will only observe farther on this subject,” he writes, “that all who have the
courage now to declare themselves friends to Government, will undoubtedly think
themselves bound in honour, interest and conscience, to resort to the King’s Standard,
when it comes to be erected in our different Colonies…”103 Chandler is not
recommending that colonists take it upon themselves to fight the rebels; rather he is
merely advising that they wait for the redcoats and follow their lead. The call to do
nothing appears quite feeble when compared with the bellicose rhetoric of the patriots.
Even if the rebellion was successful, the loyalist writers believed it would lead to
a dystopian world akin to Hobbes’ state of nature. “This will be productive of eternal
quarrels, and riots, and disturbances, and acts of violence among ourselves;” wrote
Chandler, “and then our misery will be compleat [sic].”104 Seabury agreed, and once
again raised the spectre of the Protectorate. “There would be no peace in the colonies, till
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we all submitted to the republican zealots and bigots of New-England” he warned,
“whose tender mercies, when they had power in their hands, have been ever cruel,
towards all that presumed to differ from them in matters either of religion or
government.” Seabury believed, too, that the unnatural rebellion would lead to the end of
trade and prosperity, the end of honour, and the collapse of civilization in the colonies.
His dystopian predictions include bands of men wandering the countryside, invading
farms to steal food, a bitter war between New England and the middle colonies, and the
end of courts and justice.105 To ardent patriots, this must have seemed like the fretful
hand-wringing of grey old men, who were so afraid of change that they would surrender
their rights as free-born Englishmen. The final question in the American Querist lends
credence to such an idea, as Chandler asks “[w]hether it be not a matter both of worldly
wisdom, and of indispensable Christian duty, in every American, to fear the Lord and the
King, and to meddle not with them that are GIVEN TO CHANGE?”106
Taken as a whole, the body of loyalist pamphlets written by these doctrinaire
Tories, or their more cerebral, secular counterparts between 1774 and 1776 failed to
answer the vigorous insults of the patriot propaganda campaign for a variety of reasons.
The loyalist pamphlets present a negative, almost sneering reactionary tone, and lack the
populism that made Thomas Paine and other Whig pamphleteers so successful. The
vociferous outrage and call to arms that fuelled the patriot argument is absent from
loyalist writings, and is instead replaced by a call to reason and prudence, and an appeal
to respect the established authority. Such a message obviously did not resonate with a
youthful and frontier audience. As Philip Gould has shown, this style of pamphleteering
evolved into more satirical and lampooning attacks on the patriots later in the war, but
they simply did not resonate with the wider American public.107 In the end, the loyalist
attempts at countering the patriot argument failed because they were, in a word, unmanly.
Patriot insults were always more visceral than anything the loyalists conjured. The
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loyalist pamphleteers explored in this chapter appealed to reason, not passion, and their
arguments got lost in pedantry and patronizing instruction. Indeed, many of the
arguments employed by the loyalist writers, such as fretful predictions of defeat in the
face of British might, or their insistence on showing respect to established authority,
actually reinforced the stereotypes of loyalists as dependent, obsequious cowards. It is
therefore quite possible that these doctrinaire loyalists did more damage to their cause
than if they had written nothing at all.

Insults were a central part of the loyalist experience. From verbal taunts on the
street, to shaming rituals, to the printed word, loyalists were dogged by a concerted
campaign to discredit and intimidate them. This fact has long been recognized by
historians, and the ubiquitous references to insults in the writings of both loyalists and
patriots have been recognized in most studies of the Tories in American Revolution. Yet
the fact that these insults were infused with the symbolic language of honour and
manhood has not been examined in any detail. This chapter has therefore drawn on the
social science of insult and methods of cultural and social history to provide a cultural
examination of these insults to more fully grasp how they would have been perceived and
understood within the shared culture of loyalists and patriots. Although the content of the
invectives shouted at loyalists on the street is mostly lost to history, the epithets found in
the revolutionary press show the consistent use of deeply gendered language to excoriate
the loyalists and their political allegiance. In the words of the patriot propagandists the
loyalists became “apostates to manhood” and had “prostituted” themselves to the British
at the expense of their fellow colonists. They were described as effeminate, luxury-loving
cowards, as subhuman animals, Judases, and Papists. The loyalists’ written responses to
such devastating attacks on their masculinity and honour were ineffectual. They
castigated the patriots as unruly, unrestrained, and ungrateful children, who were being
led by their passions into ruin, but this in turn made the loyalist pamphleteers seem feeble
and cowardly in face of youthful revolutionary zeal. The relatively few, but widely
publicized, physical acts of shaming such as stealing wigs or tarring and feathering,
indicate how this same revolutionary ideology and fervour shattered the established
customs of respect for genteel bodies so that patriots could mark Tories as fallen men, as
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colonists might have done to deviants or thieves. The psychological impact of these
insults within a profoundly honour-conscious society cannot be overestimated.
Whether by design or as an unintended consequence, insults could effectively
eliminate gentlemen loyalists from communities without bloodshed. The insults explored
in this chapter such as verbal epithets, physical gestures and shaming rituals, and the
campaign or printed insult in the press, were all made openly and with impunity. The
potency of patriot insults was increased by the loyalists’ inability to effectively respond
and restore their maligned reputations and appearance of honour. Loyalists could not seek
legal redress where patriots were in the majority, and since loyalists were often
outnumbered in their communities, they could usually not seek any satisfaction through
physical retaliation or challenges. Even the efforts of loyalist writers fell flat and failed to
present a vigorous or persuasive response to patriot arguments and insults. Instead,
loyalist authors, already hampered by the lack of friendly printers, adopted a genteel and
instructive, even paternalistic, tone which was drowned out by the more vigorous patriot
written assaults. This sense of impotence in the face of indignity was enough to compel
many loyalists to flee before ever being subjected to physical shaming or violence
directed at their bodies. This is a testament to the power of insult in eighteenth century
honour culture, where the loss of public esteem effectively meant the loss of status and
power. The inability to meaningfully respond and retaliate against insults, especially
coming from the lower ranks of society, was simply intolerable. In a culture built on
entrenched hierarchies, the degradation of the loyalists served to elevate the honour of the
patriots. Insults were therefore a vital tool of patriot ascendency and a crucial step in the
political death of American loyalists.
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4. Captivity
On the night of October 14, 1777, British General John Burgoyne prepared to
concede defeat. His composite army of British and Hessian regulars, Native allies,
Canadians irregulars, and loyalist volunteers had struggled through the forests of northern
New York and suffered heavy casualties in a series of engagements before being
completely outmanoeuvered at the Battle of Bemis Heights. Surrounded by a much larger
American army, with no hope of reinforcements and with dwindling supplies, Burgoyne
and his officers decided that there was no dishonour in negotiating terms with the
American commander, Major General Horatio Gates. The stipulations of the “Convention
of Saratoga” (Burgoyne would not refer to it as a surrender or a capitulation), were
consistent with the customs of the time. Burgoyne’s army was to march for Boston with
the “honours of war” – their colours flying and bands playing – where they would be
evacuated back to England on their promise not to return to North America. Article eight
of the convention stated that “All corps whatever...of whatever country...shall be included
in the fullest sense, and utmost extent of the [the privileges of the convention]; and
comprehended in every respect as British subjects.”1 This clause of the convention
seemed to include the loyalist corps, yet by 1777 loyalists were aware that if they fell into
rebel hands they faced a very uncertain fate.
Among Burgoyne’s forces was the loyalist Colonel John Peters of the Queen’s
Loyal Rangers. He had accompanied the rebel army to Quebec in 1775 only to flee to the
British with valuable intelligence. In retaliation, patriots confiscated his lands in New
York State and expelled his wife and children from their home. Because of his previous
actions, Peters’ rank would provide very little protection if he was captured. In August,
Peters learned firsthand what could happen to captured loyalists. After his unit was badly
mauled at the Battle of Bennington, reports came in that his surrendering soldiers “were
refused quarter, after having asked it,” while other loyalist soldiers were taken prisoner
and abused. In protest, Burgoyne sent a letter to Horatio Gates to remind the general of
1
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the “horrors of retaliation” if the Continental forces did not adhere to “those maxims
upon which all men of honor think alike.”2 To Burgoyne this was a fairly straightforward
matter: Gates needed to restrain his backwoods fighters and enforce the standards
expected of European officers. Yet for Americans fighting a civil war, where both sides
viewed the other as traitors and criminals, the question of who was worthy of honour and
deserving of proper respect was far from clear. Indeed, Peters recorded in his narrative
that “I was in great anxiety and distress of mind knowing how impossible it was that any
Capitulation could provide for my Security.” Even with this threat looming, Peters noted
that he would not flee on his own volition. Loyalist units had already been accused of
abandoning their posts during the campaign, and Peters wrote that he “would not go
without orders in writing, for that no one should be able to say, that I had deserted them
in the hour of distress…”3 So, on the night of October 14, before Burgoyne had signed
the Convention, Major General William Philips provided Peters with written permission
“to Escape through the Woods to Canada.” Nearly six thousand British and Hessian
prisoners marched off to Boston a few days later. Peters and his small band of loyalists,
however, made it back to Quebec with their skin and, it seemed, their honour intact.4
John Peters’ fear of being mistreated if captured by the patriots was not
unfounded. Most states had enacted strict treason laws, and regardless of the uniforms
loyalists wore or British commissions they carried, captured Tories could be sent back to
their provincial homelands to face local justice or revenge.5 Ambrose Serle, the secretary
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to General Howe, recorded the rumours that “[t]hose [loyalists] who fall into [rebel]
Hands are either killed upon the Spot, or dragged to their Copper Mines...surrounded
with Terrors equal to Death itself.”6 Rank and file loyalists could be treated harshly, and
some were indeed sent to the copper mines at Simsbury, Connecticut. Private soldiers of
any eighteenth century army could expect to face daily privations, whether they were in
their own camps or held as prisoners. The loyalists’ uncertain legal status while in patriot
custody complicated their plight, but their treatment was rarely worse than the thousands
of patriot prisoners who languished in British prison ships and warehouses in New York.
Gentlemen prisoners, be they military officers, public office holders, or just
private gentlemen, expected to be treated very differently from common men. In
eighteenth century European warfare, gentlemen prisoners brought their status and
reputation with them into captivity, and as with other areas of their life, demanded their
right to be treated with respect and dignity. Unless there was some exceptional
circumstance, gentlemen would be granted very generous paroles based solely on their
word of honour not to escape or continue to participate in the war in any way until
released. Low-ranking private soldiers were rarely, if ever, offered paroles, but were held
under close supervision. They could not be trusted to abide by their word. In contrast,
gentlemen were normally treated with civility and made as comfortable as possible while
they waited to be exchanged for an enemy prisoner. These rules were not so much
codified laws, like the Geneva Conventions of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
but were instead customs known and accepted by European nations and their empires.7
Civil wars and insurrections complicated these conventions. Initially the British refused
to accept the legitimacy of patriot soldiers and militia because they were rebels and
subject to criminal law. As the war progressed and British officers fell into rebel hands,
Crown forces were obliged to extend gentlemanly privileges to patriot officers to prevent
retaliation against their own men. Yet prisoner exchanges remained ad hoc and were
predicated on necessity and the authority of individual British commanders rather than a
6
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formal agreement between warring nations. This nuance was taken as a deep insult by
Congress, but it was not until 1782 that a formal cartel was arranged between the British
and Continental armies. This confusing situation was made even more so by the civil war
between Whigs and Tories. To the patriots, the loyalists were guilty of high treasons; to
the loyalists, the patriots were rebels and usurpers. Therefore, both sides viewed the other
as criminally dishonoured which threw the whole idea of captivity as an agreement
between gentlemen into disarray.
This chapter explores the experiences of white gentlemen loyalists who were
captured or arrested by the revolutionaries. Women and entire loyalist families were also
held prisoner on occasion (explored in chapter 2) but they were often treated as
extensions of their loyalist patriarchs and held as hostages to compel fugitive Tories to
surrender. Once in patriot custody, the treatment loyalists experienced was surprisingly
inconsistent considering that they had been collectively dishonoured and criminalized
through campaigns of insults, harassment, and in punitive laws passed by state
assemblies. Loyalists were not accorded the automatic honours of war expected by
officers in a conventional European conflict, yet they were not universally mistreated.
Some were granted generous paroles, while others were placed under house arrest.
Loyalists could be dealt with harshly, transported hundreds of miles from their homes,
held in common jails, or, on occasion, shackled to floors, or even executed. Few
historians have looked for general reasons for this varied treatment, and attempts to
classify or categorize loyalists and their corresponding treatments have fallen short.8
There were no consistent instructions for the treatment of loyalist prisoners from the
Continental Congress or Army. Rather, this chapter argues that revolutionary authorities
evaluated and judged the personal honour or dishonour of loyalists on a case-by-case
basis to determine appropriate treatment regardless of the wider patriot consensus that all
Tories were dishonourable traitors. This personalized captivity helps explain some
strange inconsistencies. One would expect that a loyalist implicated in a plot to kidnap
George Washington would face a harsher captivity than one who merely refused to take
an oath to Congress, but this was not always the case. In practice, the severity of their
8
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captivity experience could be mitigated because of the loyalists’ pre-war reputations, or
through their genteel and obliging manners which paid respect to their captors. This again
reveals the real power men derived from these cultural virtues. Captive loyalists who
displayed culturally legitimate expressions of rank and virtue continued to be respected
and were afforded privileges that other gentlemen were reluctant to deny. Honour was
subjective and malleable, but it was also persistent and powerful enough to alter a
captives’ material situation, for better or worse.
In examining the loyalist prisoner experience there does not appear to have been a
concerted attack on gentlemanly privilege in favour of republican or egalitarian ideology.
While there are examples of low-ranking rebels lording-over or intentionally insulting
high-ranking loyalists, patriot gentlemen sitting on committees or in councils seemed
reticent to inflict too much discomfort on fellow gentlemen, even Tories, if it could be
prevented. Patriots and loyalists shared the same aspirations to gentility and honour, and
both denying and extending gentlemanly privileges to individual loyalist prisoners
empowered patriot captors. Signs of respect helped legitimize patriots and their cause,
and could be rewarded. Committees and guards also eagerly capitalized on perceived
signs of disrespect or duplicity as evidence of the loyalists’ moral corruption, and these
were used to justify stripping loyalist prisoners of their right to respect.
Official records, personal diaries and narratives of loyalist prisoners, as well as
public announcements of captured or fugitive Tories, are filled with discussions and
appraisals of the honour and dishonour of individuals. Patriot committees and their
prisoners regularly engaged in charged debates and tests of will over who was the truly
honourable party, and who was deluded by a false sense of righteousness. The
interactions between loyalist prisoners and their captors also reveal the complexities and
malleability of eighteenth century honour. Loyalists sometimes employed honour to
disguise escape attempts or parole violations; patriots used the apparent dishonour of
loyalists to justify humiliating punishments; and both sides watched for any breach or
punctilio that could be construed as deceit or bad faith. In essence, loyalist and patriot
gentlemen always found ways to justify their actions and ensure that honour was on their
side. Even with all of this confusion and competing claims on the moral high ground, as
well as the concerted campaign to unman and collectively dishonour the loyalists, patriots
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treated Tory prisoners based on individual evaluations of their personal honour. This
could work for or against the loyalists. A few of the prisoners examined in this chapter
stoically endured their captivity and were even restored to political life after their release,
while the dishonours experienced by many others marked the penultimate stage of their
political death before their final exile.
This chapter begins with an exploration of the historiography of prisoners of war
in the American Revolution, before shifting to the thorny issues of legality and honour
which hampered official negotiations and prisoner exchange between the British military
and the Continental Congress. Patriot authorities suspected scheming duplicity on the part
of their enemies, and routinely noted the disrespect they received from elite British and
loyalist prisoners, yet the revolutionaries never abandoned the European model. Rather
they diligently attempted to abide by its customs and prove that they were the truly
honourable party. The chapter then turns to the variety of loyalist prisoner experiences,
from parole negotiations to summary executions. While a captured British officer could
normally depend on being paroled and treated with customary civility, a loyalist officer
or gentleman civilian could not. Because of the generalized idea of Tory dishonour and
criminality, patriots denied loyalist prisoners automatic privileges. Instead, individual
evaluations of honour and dishonour were essential in determining the severity of loyalist
captivity experiences. Appraisals of personal honour could dictate whether a prisoner
spent the summer on a private yacht moored on the Hudson River, or was degraded in
close confinement among criminals. More broadly, these findings underscore the
consistent power of honour over the behaviour of eighteenth century gentlemen, and
reveal the very personalized nature of the American Revolution. As subjective and
malleable as honour was, it nevertheless functioned as a right to power and respect
between men, and was therefore crucial in such matters as combat, captivity, and prisoner
negotiations. This concern for honour might seem petty or even absurd to modern eyes,
but it was powerful enough in the minds of some men to supersede even the demands of
political ideology or practical military necessity. In this sense, personal honour had the
potential to hamper the war effort of either side as men languished in prisons, died of
disease, and drained coffers, often on account of points of honour between the gentlemen
negotiators and their governments. The individual prisoner experiences explored in this
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chapter are microcosms of the wider cultural conflict that erupted in the American
Revolution between loyalists and patriots.

The history of prisoners of war in the American Revolution has been dominated
by examinations of the patriot experience. First written down and spread by the Whig
press during the conflict, scores of publications and newspaper accounts detailed the
misery of American prisoners floating in prison ships or confined in warehouses in New
York City and in England. Ethan Allen’s captivity narrative and Philip Freneau’s 1781
poem “The British Prison-Ship” are two of the most famous publications which detailed
the horrors patriots experienced at the hands of the British. Allen described his guards in
New York as “slavish Hessians” and “merciless Britons”, yet even their cruelty was “less
malignant than the tories.” Indeed, of all the characters Allen met, none were quite as
gloating and sadistic as the loyalists, who “exult[ed] over the dead [patriot prisoners],
saying there goes another load of damned rebels.”9 Allen’s narrative recounts sacred
churches transformed into hideous prisons, where captives writhed “in the agonies of
death” afflicted with hunger, disease, and cold. He graphically sketches floors “covered
with excrement” “in consequence of the fluxe [sic]” while the suffering patriots bravely
resist British temptations to renounce the cause and be released from their torments.10
The most feared places of captivity for rebel prisoners were the rotting hulks in
Wallabout Bay off Brooklyn. Freneau’s poem tells of the “damps, disease and varied
shapes of woe” suffered on these decommissioned and dilapidated ships. Every day men
died and their bodies were dragged from below deck for a shallow burial on shore or
simply tossed overboard. According to Freneau, the helpless men lay dying “Some struck
with madness, some with scurvy pain’d, But still of putrid fevers most complain’d.”11
Congressional and state authorities collected equally graphic reports of patriot suffering
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which were spread through the revolutionary press. One official account described
wretched food, illness, merciless guards, and the indignity of white patriots being
“huddled together between decks…with Indians, Mallatoes [sic], Negroes etc.”12
Between 8 500 and 11 000 rebel prisoners died in British custody. Patriot leadership and
propagandists decried these deaths as intentional war-crimes and seized on the alarming
mortality rates in British prisons as evidence of the Crown’s savagery and dishonour. The
horrific tales of death and suffering also provided another opportunity for patriots to
contrast their own incorruptible decency with the perfidy of their enemies, and led New
Jersey Governor William Livingston to declare that the patriots would “triumph over
[the] Enemy not only by force of arms but by the virtues of humanity.”13 Former loyalist
prisoners thought differently and scoffed at the reams of patriot propaganda. “Were the
loyalists to take the pains...to collect and publish relations of this nature,” wrote William
Franklin after his own captivity experience in Connecticut, “I am very certain that they
would be able to furnish well-attested accounts of far more barbarities actually practised
by the rebels against their prisoners than is even contained in all their exaggerated
charges against the Britons.”14 Loyalist captivity narratives will be explored later in this
chapter, and while they do provide vital insights into loyalist experiences, they were only
circulated in occupied areas of North America during the conflict and never in great
numbers. Like the pamphlets explored in the previous chapter, loyalist narratives were
drowned out by the torrent of patriot publication.
Professional twentieth century historians were not entirely convinced by patriot
claims of British cruelty and were less willing to condemn the Crown forces’ treatment of
their prisoners. Philip Davidson viewed patriot claims of prisoner abuse as sensationalist
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exaggerations intended to whip up support for the Revolutionary cause.15 Charles
Metzger was also suspicious of the propagandistic nature of the reports, though he did not
dispute the wretched conditions. Rather he points out that the British were more or less
following the standard practices of eighteenth century counterinsurgency in the early
phases of the conflict, and conditions markedly improved after thousands of British
prisoners were taken at Saratoga. Despite their reservations, British authorities had to
treat men they regarded as criminals with more lenience to prevent acts of retaliation
against their own imprisoned comrades.16 Larry G. Bowman agrees that conditions were
often dreadful, but argues that American prisoners of war suffered more as a result of
scarce resources and British ineptitude than “a lack of human compassion”.17 Philip
Ranlet contends that British commanders, and to a lesser extent the Congress, bear the
blame for allowing political intransigence and confusion to lead to deadly overcrowding
and the inevitable spread of disease on the prison ships.18 More recently Edwin Burrows
maintains that while British policy was never directed toward deliberately killing
American prisoners, “a lethal convergence, as it were, of obstinacy, condescension,
corruption, mendacity, and indifference” essentially achieved the same result, though he
does concede the point that conditions in army camps, where Continental soldiers died in
similar numbers, were not much better.19 Regardless of intent, the thousands of dead
patriot prisoners gave the Revolution a massive public relations victory and provided a
valuable pretext or justification for the abuse of loyalist prisoners.
The few published studies of British prisoners tend to focus on the Convention
Army captured at Saratoga, which was mainly comprised of redcoats, Hessians and
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Canadians.20 Since Burgoyne and Gates had agreed to a “convention” and not, strictly
speaking, a surrender or capitulation, the Continental Congress denied the Convention
Army the status of prisoners of war. Both sides used this semantic confusion to their
advantage. Unlike the captives in New York, British Convention prisoners escaped in
large numbers from prison camps as the army was marched from Cambridge,
Massachusetts, to Albemarle, Virginia, and finally to Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Escape
was considered a form of desertion in the eighteenth century, but because of the dubious
status of the Convention Army, enlisted men fled with the tacit consent of their officers.
Burgoyne even invented a new category of “honourable deserters” to describe the
escapees who returned to British service.21 Likewise, Congress refused to exchange the
Convention prisoners until the British government officially consented to the Convention
terms rather than leaving it as an agreement between commanders. This would have
effectively forced Britain’s acknowledgment of an independent America and was thus
rejected by Parliament.22 Indeed, all studies of prisoners in the American Revolution
point to the confusion created by competing notions of legality and pragmatism, and the
obligations arising from the military honour culture of the eighteenth century. Yet they
rarely, if ever, explore how the loyalists further complicated this situation.
There has never been a dedicated study of loyalist prisoners in the American
Revolution. This may be due to the confusing status of the loyalists, or perhaps
nationalist historians were reluctant to engage with evidence that John Ferling calls a
“black stain on America’s record” in the Revolution.23 Claude Van Tyne explains loyalist
20
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captivity with the patriot’s metaphor of a “political quarantine” to prevent the spread of a
Tory disease.24 As for charges of loyalist mistreatment, he concludes “that the truth lies
somewhere between the best that the Patriots can claim and the worst that the Loyalists
could charge.” Van Tyne’s loyalist prisoners reflect the prevailing early twentiethcentury archetype of the aristocratic Tory, and he divided them into three categories. The
most dangerous class of Tory was made up of men who committed “some overt act in
support of the British, and…were treated as criminals”, and were therefore not accorded
gentlemanly honours. The other two categories are described as political prisoners, which
included “influential and active” loyalists who were kept under paroles of varying
severity, and loyalists “who had little influence, but who talked too freely about the
mistakes of Congress, or the virtues of the British government…” The second group
could be transported away from their homes, but were normally allowed a generous
parole.25 Though Van Tyne does not elaborate on his use of the term “influence,” it does
suggest that he is referring to the loyalists’ status. Those of higher rank, therefore, were
often transported out of their communities. Charles Metzger, writing seven decades after
Van Tyne, also groups loyalist prisoners into three categories, consisting of loyalists who
actively served in provincial units of the British military, royal officeholders, and
civilians. Metzger suggests that each of these groups were treated somewhat differently,
but even loyalist civilians were kept under tight security for the threat they posed as
informants and spies.26
Though Van Tyne and Metzger attempted to classify loyalist prisoners into neat
categories, a careful look at loyalist captivity experiences reveals that the competing
demands of gentlemanly honour and military security caused deep inconsistencies and
confusion in the patriots’ treatment and attitudes towards Crown supporters. Captured
loyalists faced a particularized and capricious situation that often depended on the
personal inclinations of patriot officers. When George Washington sent Connecticut
Governor Jonathan Trumbull prisoners from Long Island, he made it clear that “they are
24
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apprehended merely on suspicion” and he had given them assurances they would be
treated kindly and humanely. He asked the Governor that the prisoners “might have every
accommodation and Indulgence, having a respect for their rank and Education which may
be deemed Consistent with Safety…”27 Washington was anxious to extend all courtesies
to fellow gentlemen, but his attitude towards confirmed loyalists could be severe. While
besieging Boston in the summer of 1775 he reminded the British General that “Not only
your [captured] Officers and Soldiers have been treated with a Tenderness, due to
Fellow-Citizens, and Brethren, but even those execrable Parricides, whose Counsels and
Aid have deluged their Country with Blood, have been protected from the Fury of a
justly-enraged People.”28 While Washington considered British soldiers his countrymen
at this early stage in the conflict, Tories, though protected, were set apart. Washington
referred to them as “abominable pests of Society” and later advised summary executions
for “some of the most notorious offenders whenever they can be found in flagrante
delicto…” in order to terrify other loyalists.29 It is clear, however, that the treatment of
gentlemen loyalists during captivity was largely determined on a case by case basis
which caused a great deal of uncertainty. The status of the loyalist Captain Albert Cole of
Long Island, captured in 1779, testifies to the sort of confusion these men faced even at
this advanced period in the war. Washington was seemingly stuck in indecision, writing
to Major General William Heath that he did “not yet know in what light Captain Cole
will be considered, whether as a Prisoner of War, or a Citizen.”30 While Washington may
have suggested shooting Tory banditti on site, he was much more reticent to even
mistreat captured loyalist gentlemen.
The numerous biographies of gentlemen loyalists lend support to the personalized
nature of their captivity. Sheila Skemp’s exploration of Governor William Franklin’s
imprisonment shows that while patriots respected the rank and status of their prisoner,
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this quickly eroded when Franklin violated the terms of his parole. Patriots felt fully
justified in treating Franklin as a common criminal, since from their perspective he had
acted like one. The indulgent captivity of Cadwallader Colden II is explored by Eugene
Fingerhut who shows the surprisingly generous terms a gentleman could receive based on
his pre-war reputation, his cordial friendships with patriot officials, and his persistent
adherence to notions of personal honour and civility. Susan Shenstone’s biography of
James Moody, on the other hand, reveals the complexities and confusion active loyalists
experienced if taken prisoner. When first captured Moody was treated as an officer and
granted a parole. As a well-known partisan fighter, Moody’s capture came to the
attention of the more zealous revolutionary leaders who annulled his parole and had him
shackled and placed in a cell.31 These cases demonstrate how different loyalist captivity
experiences could be, and yet when taken as a whole, the one determining factor in their
treatment was the patriots’ appraisal of loyalists’ personal honour.
In many respects, the individual experiences of loyalist captivity match the
findings of Judith Van Buskirk and Caroline Cox. Van Buskirk shows how civility could
override political enmity to ensure honourable treatment of gentlemen and officers.
Indeed, though the British were initially skeptical of patriot officers’ claim to status, they
soon granted captured American officers very liberal paroles. American commanders
worked hard to maintain these favourable conditions, and even sent their own escaped
officers back to the British if they had violated their paroles. A captive’s right to
gentlemanly respect could be lost if he was perceived to have dishonoured himself. The
most infamous example was British Major John André, who was caught out of uniform
after carrying out an act of espionage, a crime held in particularly low regard in the
eighteenth century. Even though André was celebrated as the epitome of gentility and
grace he was hanged as a common spy.32 Cox’s examination of Continental prisoners of
war explores some of the same ideas as Van Buskirk, and she also points out instances
where harsh conditions or failing health forced prisoners to weigh the punctilios of
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honour to determine whether abiding by a parole was worth more than life itself. What
exactly constituted the honourable course of action was not always clear. Nevertheless,
Cox argues that when “imprisoned, a man’s honor and his sense of his place in his
community guided his conduct.” Officers’ willingness to cooperate with their captors was
contingent on being “treated in a way that honoured and recognized their rank…”33 The
same sort of deliberations described by Cox can be seen in the experiences of the loyalist
gentlemen examined in this chapter. High ranking loyalists, who had enjoyed the
privilege and respect of community leaders, felt the sting of insult at the very idea of
being in rebel custody. Loyalist gentlemen sometimes attempted to use their status and
notions of honour to shame their patriot captors into lightening restrictions and improving
conditions with varying degrees of success. For their part, patriots used the same ideas to
enforce compliance or to punish loyalists who had seemingly violated their paroles by
rolling back privileges and by placing loyalists in “close confinement.” Being shackled,
shut away in a cell, and denied communication with the outside world, separated a man
from all the things that provided him with gentlemanly distinction. Like other attacks on
the genteel body, physical restraints were not only painful, but symbolic of a significant
fall from grace. As the captive loyalist John Ferdinand Smyth wrote bluntly,
“Confinement is death and torture to me”.34 While this treatment might not have been
considered out of place for a common soldier, it was intolerable for a gentleman.
The treatment of prisoners is a reflection of society’s wider values, and the
“civilizing” process which introduced politeness and civility to society carried over into
warfare. The casual mistreatment and ransom of prisoners seen in the Wars of Religion
was replaced with the common practice of prisoner exchange and the extension of
courtesies to captive gentlemen by the mid-seventeenth century.35 The gentility, courage,

33

Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor, 203.

34

John Ferdinand Smyth to unnamed recipient, November 24, 1775. Peter Force, ed. American Archives:
Fourth series, containing a documentary history of the English colonies in North America from the King's
message to Parliament of March 7, 1774 to the Declaration of Independence of the United States
(Washington: M. St. Claire and Peter Force, 1846), 615-616.
35

Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor, 204-205.

146
and magnanimity displayed by a gentleman officer served as a badge of professionalism,
and provided him with the assurance that his opponent, too, would be honourable and
generous. Gentlemen were believed to be morally superior to the common soldier and
were thus accorded great respect, and consequently their terms of captivity could be very
generous. After giving his parole, either written or verbal, an officer was permitted to
find his own lodgings and was granted freedom to travel miles from his residence as long
as he returned by an agreed time. He was allowed to entertain guests, attend dinners, talk
with whomever he pleased, and send letters. As a gentleman, he had given his word of
honour to refrain from any military involvement, including taking note of defences or
sending information to his own forces. Officers of European armies were permitted to
return home to attend to ill or distressed family members if they promised to surrender
themselves when their tasks were complete or they were recalled. Captured officers could
also return to their army to negotiate their own and fellow officers’ exchange on behalf of
the enemy.36
The question of who was honour-worthy was at the heart of the confusion
surrounding the status of prisoners of war in the American Revolution. Gentlemanly
courtesies were often denied to American officers in the early stages of the conflict
because they were officially considered rebels. As more and more British officers fell
into rebel hands, basic necessity demanded the system of mutual respect be extended,
even if this did not include official British recognition of the Continental Army as a
legitimate entity. Permitting rebel officers the rights of gentlemen, one British observer
noted, gave “great disgust to all the Loyalists.”37 As well as creating tensions between
British officers and loyalists, debate and confusion over points of honour slowed down
the prisoner exchange negotiations between British and Continental authorities. George
Germaine instructed General Howe that while exchanges were needed “to procure the
release of such of His Majesty’s officers and loyal subjects as are in the disgraceful
situation of being prisoners to Rebels” there should be no “regular cartel”. Because the
American forces were rebels, King and Congress could not share in general agreements
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as warring European states would. The necessary prisoner exchanges were left to the
general’s discretion, though Germaine made it clear that negotiations were to be
conducted “without the King’s dignity and honour being committed, or His Majesty’s
name used in any regulations for the purpose”.38 Any agreement would be an expedient
arrangement between British generals and their counterparts, and not a covenant between
sovereign nations. This meant, in effect, that all negotiations were carried out without the
moral support of the Crown. Congress took this as a slight, and a series of conferences
intended to iron out a regular system for prisoner exchange never got past this basic
point. The fact that the highest authorities of both sides would jeopardize the lives of their
men and even weaken their own forces by leaving their soldiers and officers prisoner is a
testament to the obstinacy of both sides and to how seriously they took matters of honour.
The Crown finally recognized American captives as bona fide prisoners of war
after the British defeat at Yorktown in 1781. After a Parliamentary act in the spring of
1782 made the acknowledgement official, British and Congressional representatives
negotiated a general exchange of prisoners on the European model.39 The agreement laid
out a table of exchange for the general cartel. A Lieutenant General, for example, was
worth 1044 private soldiers or an equivalent number of other ranks whose combined
value equalled 1044.40 Although a practical solution, this fair exchange was exactly what
the British had earlier wanted to avoid because it placed American officers on an equal
footing with British gentlemen. Upon first meeting American officers in 1776, a surprised
Hessian observer wrote that they were “nothing but mechanics, tailors, shoemakers,
wigmakers, barbers etc. Some of them were soundly beaten by our people, who would by
no means let such persons pass for officers.”41 American officers smarted at such
dismissive insults, and in the words of Judith Van Buskirk, often attempted to “out-
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gentleman” the British by forcefully asserting their honour.42 As rebels and provincials,
the Americans needed to prove themselves, and Washington took it upon himself to
educate his men and enforce strict adherence to the European standards of parole and
exchange. When several of his officers broke their paroles and escaped from Long Island
in 1777, Washington sent them back. The officers claimed that they were short of money
and supplies, and though Washington did not doubt that they were suffering, the honour
of the army was more important.43 This same concern can be seen in Washington’s
rejection of a plan to mount a rescue operation to liberate Continental officers held on
Long Island. Washington pointed out that those officers left behind would face reprisals,
and “No future prisoners, in the hands of the Enemy, would receive the same favourable
indulgence”. Washington stressed that a rescue attempt would be considered “a breach of
Honor [and] would certainly be objected against by the Officers released; for it would be
said, right or wrong, they, at least, had consented to the measure, if not planned it.”44
Even clerical mix-ups did not excuse officers from their parole. A Continental officer,
Isaac Grant, who had been paroled home, then exchanged and restored to active duty,
discovered that his exchange had actually been a bureaucratic error. Rather than risk any
sort of dishonour, he quickly returned home to resume his parole.45 This sort of careful
observance was just one of many ways the Continental officers attempted to show their
honourable character so that they and their fellow officers would continue to receive
generous paroles.
Continental authorities were deeply annoyed early in the conflict when it became
clear that many British and loyalist prisoners were unwilling to abide by the same code of
honour that the patriots were so diligently cultivating in their own ranks. In December
1775, General Philip Schuyler wrote to Connecticut Governor Jonathan Trumbull that he
was sending a particularly obstinate group of officers to Connecticut. One loyalist in
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particular, Captain Samuel McKay, was stripped of his parole for a pattern of insulting
behaviour towards the Albany Committee and was essentially ejected from the
community under guard. Schuyler also lamented that Lt. Gov. Philip Skene and his son
Andrew had broken their paroles and fled custody, as had a number of other officers in
the area. This was an insulting pattern of disregard for oaths given to Continental
authorities. “I fear,” wrote Schuyler, “they do not consider their parole of honour as
binding.”46 Many loyalist and British officers perhaps felt, especially in the early phases
of the war, that abiding by their paroles would be an insult to the King since he did not
recognize the rebel captors as legitimate foes.
Even those British and loyalist officers who adhered to their paroles often
interpreted their limits rather loosely. In late 1777, Elias Boudinot, commissary general
for prisoners of war, wrote to his counterpart in Connecticut, Ezekiel Williams to inform
him that while transferring a group of prisoners from New Jersey to Connecticut, a
British Captain “to his great dishonour broke his parole” and slipped away into the
countryside. A few days later he voluntarily rejoined his captors and proceeded with
them to Connecticut. Boudinot instructed Williams to “Confine the Captain in
Gaol…unless by his late Behaviour he has wiped away the stain” of his dishonour. For
both sides, the captivity experience was a way to evaluate and gauge the personal honour
of gentlemen to determine the depth of their personal corruption and the dishonour of
their cause. The fact that the Captain returned at all is a testament to the value gentlemen
and officers placed on their honour in the Revolutionary period, and would have been
regarded favourably. Why the officer left is not discussed in the document, but Boudinot
mentions that the officer “went Sixty Miles into the Country among his friends…”47
Whether the officer simply wanted to see his friends one more time and cavalierly took
his own leave, or he had intentionally broken parole and was then talked into returning by
his colleagues, is not known. It is unclear exactly how many British and loyalist officers
broke their parole and escaped, and the evidence is mostly anecdotal. As will be
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discussed later in this chapter, loyalist and British rank and file prisoners escaped from
patriot custody in their hundreds, but that would have been of less consequence than the
escape of gentlemen prisoners. Nonetheless, there is evidence that parole violations and
escapes committed by elite loyalist prisoners compelled patriot authorities to treat their
remaining gentleman captives more severely. When the respected gentleman Cadwallader
Colden II was held on suspicion of loyalism in the summer of 1777, his captors initially
denied him a generous parole suited to his rank and reputation. Though Colden had not
violated the conditions of his parole, the committeemen informed him that “there was
to[o] Many Instances of gentn of [Colden’s] Disposition who had Broke their Promise
and Paroles and…that there was no Confidence to be had in any one any more…” The
patriot authorities were convinced that loyalists and British officers believed “No faith or
Promise was to be kept with Rebels…”48 Continental authorities took every breach of
parole as an insult and as proof that their prisoners did not deserve the respect that
underwrote paroles.
Attention to the legalities of paroles, the subtle nuances and loopholes, had a
tendency to exacerbate distrust and suspicions of dishonour between captives and captors.
Witness the contest between General John Burgoyne and the Continental Congress.
Congress had never sanctioned the “Convention” terms between Horatio Gates and John
Burgoyne, and it did not feel obliged to live up to the extraordinarily generous limits
promised to the defeated British. The Convention Army, as Burgoyne’s forces came to be
known, were to be evacuated to England through the port of Boston, but when they were
finally camped at Cambridge, the British General, Congressional representatives, and the
Continental Army entered into a drawn-out dispute over points of honour and
interpretation of the Convention. Burgoyne accused Congress of violating the terms by
failing to provide adequate shelter for his men and officers and for not allowing a
significant alteration to the Convention which would have allowed his army to march to
Rhode Island instead of Boston. Burgoyne argued that this alteration would better
facilitate the evacuation, but Congress suspected this was a ploy to get the men into the
Long Island Sound in British transports and then simply land the troops in New York.
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Burgoyne declared that the refusal to allow the amendment to the Convention represented
“a breach of public faith” – a charge which incensed the Continental Congress. The
captive general, at the head of nearly 6000 prisoners, posed a serious danger if he decided
that his men were no longer bound by the Convention. Congress fumed that General
Burgoyne was the offending party who, in addition to his scheme, lied about the
whereabouts of his regimental colours, refused to provide lists of officers and men to the
revolutionary authorities, and did not order his men to surrender small items like
ammunition pouches which, Congress argued, adhered to “the technical definition of the
word ‘arms’”. Congress resolved that Burgoyne was attempting to “avail himself of…
pretended breaches…to disengage himself, and the army under him, of the obligation
they are under to these United States…” Burgoyne’s invocation of honour, Congress
insisted, was nothing more than a ploy. Congress therefore announced that “the security,
which these states have had in [John Burgoyne’s] personal honor, is hereby destroyed.”49
As a final rebuke, when Burgoyne asked to be paroled back to England, Congress replied
that it would only consent if the general first settled all accounts, in specie, for the cost of
maintaining his imprisoned army. Burgoyne had no honour – and therefore no credit –
with the Continental Congress.50
In many ways paroles were legal expressions of the trust gentlemen placed in one
another. Congress issued a standard printed parole for captured officers to sign that
articulated some basic requirements and privileges,51 but individual gentlemen and their
captors often worked out their own terms. When Lt. Gov. Philip Skene, the manorial
landlord of Skenesborough, was sent to Hartford as a prisoner, the authorities pointedly
instructed his guards to “take care that he is treated with that politeness & civility which
is due a Gentleman of his Rank.”52 If at all possible, the Continental leadership wanted
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high-ranking British and loyalist prisoners to return with stories of respectful treatment
that might help ensure patriot prisoners receive the same generous terms. John Hancock
wrote directly to the Commissioner of Prisoners in Connecticut, Ezekiel Williams, that
Skene was to be held on a “Parole within such Limits as your Honor shall point out to
them.”53 In other words, his parole was left to the discretion of the local authorities, but it
could also be a matter of negotiation.
Parole conditions depended greatly on the local mood and the popular appraisal of
the guilt and dishonour of individual loyalists. The Connecticut interior was considered a
safe place to hold valuable loyalist prisoners, and the state was particularly burdened with
prisoners sent in from other regions. Such imported loyalists, even notorious privateers,
were usually permitted to “go at large” on parole, while homegrown Tories were denied
parole, jailed, and at least one loyalist was executed for aiding the British.54 Prominent
loyalists like Philip Skene, Governor William Franklin of New Jersey, and New York
Mayor David Mathews, who fell under the jurisdiction of the Continental Congress and
held in Connecticut, were granted generous paroles, even though local Tories were not.
Popular outrage at local betrayers determined the fate of many Connecticut loyalists,
while the directions and orders from the Continental Congress ensured that high ranking
Tories and British military officers would be treated according to their rank.
Local Tory prisoners were usually held under the auspices of Committees of
Safety or individual town assemblies, and these authorities imposed tight restrictions on
prominent gentlemen loyalists to limit their potential influence within communities.55
Van Tyne’s notion of a “political quarantine” is an apt metaphor for this form of
treatment. Gentlemen loyalists might not always be held in a jail, but they would be
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forced to remain in their homes, much like people afflicted with smallpox.56 Loyalists
posed a threat of contagion to the republican body politic. In late 1776, rebel privateers
captured Gideon White, a young loyalist merchant, and brought him to his home
community of Plymouth, Massachusetts. The Committee of Correspondence refused to
give White a parole and instead placed the prodigal loyalist under house arrest “within
the limits of his father’s house & garden… (except on Sabbath to Attend Publick
Worship)”. White’s compliance was ensured by a bond secured by friendly neighbours,
who would stand to lose £200 if the young loyalist fled. White stubbornly refused to
recant or reform, and was banished from the community a few months later.57
Israel Williams of Hatfield, Massachusetts, one of the prominent “river gods” of
the Connecticut Valley, was similarly treated. Known as the “Monarch of Hampshire
County” the wealthy grandee was suspected of loyalist sympathies, and was a known
associate of the reviled former governor Thomas Hutchinson.58 The local revolutionary
authorities believed that Williams had been communicating with Hutchinson and the
British, and was undermining American resistance, though how Williams accomplished
this was never made clear. Hatfield Committee of Safety assured the Massachusetts
House of Representatives that “it would be fruitless for us…to Attempt to inform you of
all the ways… [Williams] has taken to discourage & intimidate the People… [but] we are
fully convinced he has spared no pains to frustrate and defeate [sic] the measures” of
Congress.59 They could not explain what, exactly, but they knew he was up to something.
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This was enough for the House of Representatives to determine that Williams and his
son, Israel Jr., had committed a “Violation of Natural Law” and ordered that father and
son be arrested and placed in the town jail.60 The elder Williams complained bitterly of
being “injuriously treated and entertained [while a prisoner] the whole night with the
most obscene conversation…and Blasphemies that I have ever heard.” At no point did
either Williams resist. They simply questioned the meagre evidence against them, and
endured. Both men were held under house arrest for several years and were required to
put up an extraordinary £3000 security bond for the privilege.61 In June 1779, a few
friends of the Williams family interceded on their behalf lamenting that father and son
were “still restrained of their Liberty…owing to the People of Hatfield.” In other words,
it was the people’s judgment of the Williams’ suspected loyalism that kept them under
arrest, and not any proven crime or act of treason.62 The house arrest continued into the
following year, when the elder Williams wrote another plea for release, arguing that he
had been made a “Prisoner for Life” based on of the popular resentment of “the People of
Hatfield.” Williams invoked the principles of honour in his appeal, likening his unnamed
accusers, with their mysterious evidence, to assassins. He demanded that all allegations
be brought to trial, “For there is no fencing against Daggers or Darts thrown in the
Dark.”63 The controversy and Williams’ captivity ended with the war. He was never
banished or attained, and his family continued to be community leaders for generations
afterwards. The patriots of Hatfield rejected Israel Williams’ honour and ignored genteel
conventions because of his personal relationship with Thomas Hutchinson and the
swirling rumours about his Toryism. Williams was likely opposed to the rebellion, but he
were equally vague. A letter from Samuel Dexter to the House of Representatives claims to have a foggy
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was not an active loyalist, nor was guilt by association enough to condemn him to
political death. Yet suspicion was enough for the local people to dishonour him and at
least temporarily deny him the rights of a gentleman.
As seen in the case of Israel Williams, patriot friends sometimes attempted to
intercede on behalf of captured loyalists or suspected loyalist gentlemen. Jacob
Shieffelin, a loyalist who had already once escaped from close confinement in Virginia,
travelled with his wife Hannah Lawrence to Detroit in 1780. He carried a letter written by
his patriot friend William Roberts in case the couple was captured and taken to
Philadelphia. Roberts addressed his letter to his friend, the influential politician Thomas
Mifflin, and genteelly suggested to the prominent revolutionary that “the Affection you
have always professed for me [Roberts], cannot in any manner be better applied than by
assisting [the Schieffelins] as much as is in Your Power.”64 Luckily for the Schieffelins
they never had to use their protection letter, but other loyalists did rely on the intercession
of their patriot connections. A suspected loyalist named Ralph Phillips, held by the New
York Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies in December 1776, had two
respectable character witnesses come to his assistance. Joshua Draper, a Massachusetts
Committeeman, wrote to the committee on his behalf, and a “Rev. Mr. Rysdorp” testified
in person that that the prisoner should be treated humanely for he “was a Person of good
Moral Character and very useful to the Community.” Rysdorp, like many Americans who
had friends and family on both sides of the conflict, compartmentalized the situation,
admitting that “with Respect to his Political Character he does not pretend to
Determine.”65
A man might face political death, but that was not the same as a social death.
Friends and family could and did continue to assist loyalists despite political differences
and the prevailing idea of loyalist dishonour in the press. Indeed, this phenomenon was
noted by frustrated revolutionaries at the time, and as Judith Van Buskirk has
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convincingly argued, ties of family and friendship often overrode political or military
considerations.66 The continued social connections among friends and family may also
help explain why loyalist persecution was often more symbolic than deadly. The
internecine nature of the conflict meant that revolutionary authorities had to tread
carefully lest their actions create new enemies or harm their cause. Patriots and loyalists
were often locally defined and seen through the lens of past friendships and animosities.
Consequently, the revolutionary persecution of a well-liked man for loyalism could
threaten to fracture sometimes tentative support for the revolutionary cause. G. Selleck
Silliman, a general in the Continental Army, worried about the deep connections that
linked Whig and Tory. The people, he said, “have every kind of relationship that you can
mention among the enemy…when they see vigorous measures pursued…of taking or
slaying a father, a son etc. the tender sensations that they feel…run them into modes of
behaviour that are altogether inconsistent with the Character of a Patriot.” A nineteenth
century Connecticut historian admitted that the execution of a local loyalist “did not
advance the cause of independence” in his town.67 Loyalist prisoners could often rely on
the assistance of friends and family for food, money, and even help in their escapes.

The captivity of Cadwallader Colden II of Ulster County, New York highlights
the complexities of holding esteemed gentlemen prisoners for suspected loyalism.
Honour and virtue were bound up in genteel customs and civility, and these cultural
conventions came into conflict with revolutionary fervour and the practical necessities of
the war effort. Colden’s father was a wealthy and accomplished gentleman who had twice
served as New York governor. The younger Colden inherited his father’s estate, his
famous name, and the privileges of offices and appointments. He was regarded as one of
the most refined gentlemen in New York. Colden recorded his extended, though usually
genteel captivity in a lengthy journal which displays how adherence to gentlemanly
customs and conduct could aid elite loyalist prisoners by disarming patriot gentlemen.
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Yet he often remained subject to the machinations of lower ranking patriots who resented
the haughtiness and gentility of the dishonoured Tory.68 Like other loyalists, Colden’s
treatment was dependant on his captors’ evaluation of his personal honour, and though
his experiences show the extensive freedoms a respected loyalist might receive on the
basis of their personal honour or wealth, they also reveal the limits of the security civility
could provide. Colden’s loyalism could not be ignored, regardless of how friendly the
patriot leadership may have been with him. Despite his protests and appeals to his
gentlemanly privileges and freedom of conscience, he was eventually exiled into Britishoccupied New York.
Colden was taken from his home under guard in June 1776 and brought before the
Committee for Detecting Conspiracies in Fishkill, New York. Though he was not charged
with any specific crime, he had refused to take an oath of allegiance to the state of New
York and was ordered to be sent to Massachusetts as a prisoner. In a respectful and
humble petition, Colden requested the “Committee to Soften their Sentence” and grant
him a parole at his home which was refused, and he was “Shutt up five weeks in the
Common jail” replete with its “Common Nastyness.”69 Colden, who was never officially
charged with any crimes throughout his whole ordeal, wrote repeatedly to the
committeemen and councillors that the allegations against him were false. He was
accused of aiding and communicating with the British but no firm evidence was produced
and the only testimony against him, according to Colden, came from a witness whom he
described as a “man of a vile infamous character”.70 Indeed, Colden prevailed on the
patriot authorities using the language of gentlemanly deliberation, personal
independence, and sensibility. First he appealed to the “Rights of Private judgement” and
argued that his political principles were based in the “freedom of Disquisition and Debate
on Topics which affected the Public Weal… [which were] the Birth Right of English
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Men…” The council at Fishkill was unconvinced, though Colden was permitted the
opportunity to address them in person, and read a long prepared statement in which the
key issue, he argued, was the fact that he refused to abjure his previous oaths to the King
as a royal official and lawyer. “How gentn am I to get over this matter of Conscience?” he
asked. Though he was terrified that his unprotected family might be subject to “the
Insults& Raviges [sic] of a Soldiery” this could not “Induce me to take an Oath against
my Conscience… I should undoubtedly conclude that the Sin was in [the] takeing [sic] of
the Oath & not in Breaking of it…” This was a fairly common position employed by
loyalist gentlemen in the hopes that they could appeal to patriot leaders’ ideals of
personal freedom and honesty. In essence, this was a claim to neutrality: the gentleman
simply wanted to retire in peace to his farm and stay out of these worldly affairs. Colden
was either naïve or desperate enough to imagine that the patriots would accept the
neutrality of a public man of his wealth and influence. Though Colden might characterize
his political position as principled and impartial, the patriot leadership would see it as a
clear rejection of the Revolution.
The Committee for Detecting Conspiracies encompassed several counties within
its jurisdiction, and was led by some of the most prominent gentlemen in New York,
including John Jay, William Duer, and Gouverneur Morris.71 These and other members
would have known Colden and his family, so the suspected Tory was being judged by his
peers, and he seemingly endeavoured to make things as awkward as possible. Colden
concluded his gentlemanly address by thanking the committee and apologizing for having
“discover’d so Much weakness in Delivering my Deffence (for I had let fall a few Tears)
But if there was any more punishments in Store for me they would find I had Resolution
to bare them.”72 Colden was displaying the ideal qualities of a gentleman – showing deep
feeling, but also stoicism. This bit of theatre, though perhaps genuine, was calculated to
engender the requisite feelings of empathy from his fellow gentlemen. If individual
committeemen were moved by this show of genteel oration and feelings, they
conveniently relegated the issue of Colden’s captivity into a bureaucratic morass. Indeed,
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the committee members were often at odds with each other over the treatment of Colden,
with the elite members being quite sympathetic to the captive gentleman, while
committeemen from more humble backgrounds chafed at the indulgence shown to
Colden because of his wealth and gentility.73 As the months passed, individual members
of the council, such as Robert R. Livingston, who was once Colden’s lawyer, would
openly sympathize with Colden, but throw up their hands at the complexity and delay of
it all.74
Colden seems to have maintained control over his emotions, save for the instances
when a genteel tear could help his cause, and he never intentionally antagonized the
gentlemen of the committee. By January 1777, Colden had tired of waiting for the
authorities to make a decision on his fate, so he wrote to the prominent New York patriot
James Livingston that since he had been held in Fishkill for seven weeks without parole,
and because his home was only a short distance away, he would depart and stay there
until called for.75 Colden’s simple yet audacious plan worked, and he lived quietly at his
estate until March 2, 1777 when he was again taken by an armed company. Luckily for
Colden, and again showing how personal honour and sociability worked to the benefit of
a suspected gentleman, the state representative William Denning was a guest at his house
when the company came for him “or I might have Expected to have been Insulted and
very Ruffly handled…” wrote Colden.76 Once more under the power of the Committee,
Colden was paroled to a private residence, and experienced a tedious period of petitions
and hearings, but also evenings spent “in a Sociable manner with the Commissioners
without Entering on Politics.”77 That a suspected Tory would have such cordial relations
with high-ranking patriots seemed unremarkable to Colden and consistent with genteel
customs, but it must have been a source of consternation for the humbler sort.
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These friendly relations did not prevent Colden from being thrown into the
common jail in Kingston, New York in May, 1777, for allegedly aiding or harbouring
members of a Tory raiding party some time earlier. Colden vociferously denied the
allegation, and the patriot authorities had little evidence to back up their claims. The very
raiders Colden was alleged to have aided were held in the cell next to his and were “so
Lousey as not to be fit to Lodge with the Meanest of their fellow Creatures.” After the
local authorities executed the leader of the raiding party, Jacobus Rose, Colden and some
of his fellow gentlemen were informed that they would be transferred to the state’s own
prison ships. In a display of Colden’s wealth and influence, he and a few other
imprisoned gentlemen petitioned to purchase their own ship rather than be held with
common prisoners. What was intended by patriot authorities as an act of retaliation for
British mistreatment of Continental prisoners on the prison ships in New York, ended
with Colden and his friends living through the early summer of 1777 “very Comfortably
& very merry” on their own private sloop without a guard. He was even permitted to
bring a “servant,” most likely his own slave on board with him, and at one point was
granted a five day holiday to visit his family.78 Though Colden paid for all this himself,
he was permitted these extravagances because the committee had faith in him that he
would abide by his word not to escape nor communicate with the enemy. Patriot
gentlemen continued to recognize Colden’s right to respect, and he was dedicated to
staying in their good graces, while still refusing to renounce the king.
Yet this indulgence provided some of Colden’s fellow genteel prisoners the
opportunity to take advantage of the lack of a guard and escape. In their deliberations,
Colden attempted to persuade the men not to run off. “Tho’ we were under no kind of
Parole,” wrote Colden, “yet by there being no guard put on bord [sic] our vessel it
imply’d a confidence put in us by the Captn of the gard [sic] ship which for my part I had
a kind of Reluctance in forfeiting…” His fellow gentlemen respectfully disagreed and
planned their escape, though Colden asked that they conceal any further plans from him
so he would not be complicit. When Colden finally discovered that his friends had
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escaped, he waited until daybreak before informing the captain of the guard, thus giving
his friends a chance to gain some distance, while also appearing to be a model prisoner.79
There were no real consequences for Colden because of this escape. In fact, he
was actually paroled on land, though he was only granted a two mile limit around his
private lodgings. His gentle captivity was disrupted when an armed troop arrived to take
him back to the Kingston jail because of reports of advancing British forces. Even with
the state of emergency, the troops were obliged to let Colden finish his dinner and gather
his belongings. Once at Kingston, prisoners of all ranks were lined up in front of the jail
and chained together. To Colden’s horror, the guards “put me into the Ranks with the
other Prisoners” and he insisted on seeing whoever was in charge. At some perceived
slight from Colden, the guards decided to intentionally insult the gentleman and “just
before me was Placed an Indian & behind me a Negro…” As a slave owner himself,
Colden was infuriated by the insult. The lowly rebels had placed him, as a Tory, literally
in the ranks of slaves and Indians. To be physically attached to men considered racially
inferior, and to be seemingly valued on the same level as chattel slaves or uncivilized
savages must have stung the proud white gentlemen to the core.
Colden’s physical trial was short-lived. He records in his journal that “I saw Mr.
Robert R. Livingston Standing in the Barbers Shop, I beconed [sic] to him as he came up
to me, & upon Desireing him to observe the indignity with which I was used, he said he
was Intirely Ignorant of it [and] that he was Sorry to see it…” A few minutes later he was
released and allowed to find his own way back to his place of lodging.80 Livingston could
not let such an indignity stand, even if it was inflicted on a suspected enemy.
Colden’s constant petitions and complaints about his limits finally ended in June
1778 when the New York Assembly passed “An Act More Effectively to Prevent the
Mischiefs ariseing from the influence and Example of Persons of Equivocal and
Suspected Character.” This new law criminalized neutrality, and no amount of evasion or
delay could keep Colden from either taking or refusing his oath, once and for all. The
wording of the act was particularly harsh and directed at men like Colden who attempted
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to stay out of the conflict. The act declared that such men acted from “an undue
attachment to Property” and concealed information and beliefs “Contrary to their faith
Pledged by their Paroles…and perfidiously from time to time, by active
misrepresentations…”81 Neutrals were at best greedy sneaks who might play both sides,
or at worst crypto-loyalists who were actively undermining the war effort. After he was
presented with the ultimatum, Colden deliberated overnight, but could still not bring
himself to take an oath abjuring the King. The committee therefore had no choice but to
send him across the lines into British New York as a bona fide Tory.
In a revealing post-script, the newly exiled and penniless loyalist wrote to General
Henry Clinton, “That in April 1777 an Officer or Messenger Charged with dispatches
from the Commander in Chief at Canada to Sir William How [sic],” was “being pursued,
[and] fled to the house of Your Memorialist for protection, which he not only Rec’d but
your Memorialist hired guides who conducted him” back to New York.82 Colden had
pledged his word of honour to the New York Committee that he was neutral and had not
assisted the British in any way. He had either been lying the entire time to the patriot
authorities, or was lying to General Clinton. Either way, Colden does not seem to have
been overly troubled by his apparent dishonesty. Colden used honour as a tool to ensure
the continuation of his wealth and privileges, regardless of which side prevailed in the
conflict. As Eugene Fingerhut argued in his biography of Colden, the country gentleman
did his utmost to preserve the appearance of passivity and neutrality to the patriots, and
steadfast loyalty to the British.83
Colden was concerned about maintaining a credible appearance to both sides in
the conflict, but other loyalists were less bothered if they appeared dishonourable to
rebels. David Mathews, the loyalist mayor of New York City, was arrested for his
involvement in the nefarious ‘Hickey plot” to possibly assassinate or kidnap George
Washington and cause general havoc in New York when British forces attempted their
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landing in the summer of 1776.84 Initially, Mathews’ role in the treacherous plot was
thought sufficient for patriot authorities to deny him the privileges of a gentleman. Sent
to Hartford, Connecticut, he was refused a parole and held under close guard.
Connecticut Governor Jonathan Trumbull took a personal interest in the case and
instructed the commissary, Ezekiel Williams, that the mayor’s guards “should be
frequently changed and that no person should be long about him.” 85 The reason for this
peculiar order became clear over the course of the next few months. Through his genteel
and obliging behaviour, Mathews apparently convinced Williams and others that he was
not a threat. Connecticut authorities granted him a generous parole, and he was
transferred to Litchfield, Connecticut where he was a guest of Captain Moses Seymour. It
seems he had convinced at least some of the locals of his honourable character, and
perhaps that his involvement in the whole Hickey affair was nothing more than a
misunderstanding.86 Mathews ingratiated himself with the elite members of the
community and even imported a fine carriage for Mrs. Seymour to thank her for her
hospitality. With his captors put at ease, Mathews began corresponding with the British
and planning his escape. With the help of the local shopkeeper Joel Stone, Mathews
slipped away in late November 1776. Captain Seymour realized that he had been duped
by a master of genteel disguise and posted an advertisement in the Connecticut Journal
offering a fifty dollar reward for the capture of the fugitive mayor. The strongly worded
notice declared that Mathews had “most basely and perfidiously deserted” his parole, and
readers were further warned that he had “a very plausible way of deceiving people” a
phrase designed to both explain Seymour’s own failure and further impugn the mayor’s
character.87 It is likely that Mathews either saw no dishonour in breaking his word to
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rebels, or believed that his initial close confinement was so insulting that it absolved him
from any obligations. However Mathews rationalized his escape, this was a serious mark
of dishonour to the patriots, but did little to harm the mayor in the eyes of the British, and
he resumed his office upon his return to New York.88
Parole breaking was also central to the controversies surrounding the captivity of
New Jersey Governor William Franklin, the loyalist son of Benjamin Franklin. The
stubborn governor was the last sitting royal official in New Jersey when patriot
representatives arrived at his mansion to offer him a parole in June 1776. Franklin
refused to recognize their authority and was placed under house arrest before being
transferred to Middleton, Connecticut. By refusing to sign a parole, however, Franklin
was not honour-bound to remain a prisoner, and an intercepted letter to his wife seemed
to indicate that Franklin intended to take advantage of that situation. Writing to the
Committee of Safety in Essex, New Jersey, George Washington reported that Franklin
told his wife that he feared “something may turn up to make his removal improper”, (i.e.
a parole), which Washington interpreted as “full evidence, that he means to escape if
possible.”89 Despite this suspicion, the patriot authorities endeavoured to secure their
gentleman prisoner through a parole, and allowed him to negotiate directly with the
governor of Connecticut. When those negotiations proved fruitless, Franklin was given a
stark ultimatum: sign a parole or be thrown in jail with common criminals. This threat
tapped into a recurring fear shared by gentlemen loyalists, and as seen in the cases of
Israel Williams and Cadwallader Colden, was taken as a profound insult. Common
criminals had no honour, their word was worthless, their bodies were subject to painful
marking and punishments, they were diseased, and were often from racially subjugated
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groups like Natives, African Americans, or Irish immigrants. For a gentleman to be
thrown among such loathsome people, to be humiliated and exposed to violence and
disease was a terrifying prospect. Franklin signed the parole, but it is clear that the former
governor felt unfairly coerced into signing.90
Perhaps because of Franklin’s reticence to sign a parole, along with the recent
example of David Mathews’ escape, Connecticut authorities closely monitored their
valuable prisoner. The new revolutionary governor of New Jersey, William Livingston,
believed Franklin was hiding sensitive documents and ordered Franklin’s room searched.
Franklin took this an insult since he had given his word that there were no letters, and
none were found. In April 1777, the Continental Congress learned that Franklin had
indeed committed serious parole violations by corresponding with the British and
handing out “protections” to the locals in the name of General Howe. In early May he
was sent to Litchfield, Connecticut, the same place where David Mathews had broken
parole a few months earlier, and Franklin was confined in a cell above a tavern.91 Though
the former Governor denied the charges and demanded a hearing or trial, his requests
were soundly rebuffed. “I was closely confined for about eight months,” Franklin wrote
to Lord Germaine after his release in 1778. “Overrun and molested with many kinds of
vermin, debarred pen, ink, and paper and all conversation with every person”, Franklin
described his experience as being “buried alive.”92 The former governor claimed that he
was poorly fed, that his clothes were filthy, and he was covered with lice. The great man
had taken on the appearance of a condemned criminal. For months Franklin waited to be
exchanged, but Continental authorities continued to view Franklin as far too dangerous
an enemy to release. While other loyalists were sometimes allowed to return to New
York to tend to ill and distressed relatives, Franklin was not. Though the former
governor’s wife was on the verge of death, and even with George Washington’s humane
intercession on his behalf, the Continental Congress reasoned that Franklin could not be
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allowed any freedoms after a “violation of so sacred a tie as that of honor.”93 Yet some
Connecticut residents thought that Franklin’s abuse had gone too far. One letter to the
Connecticut Gazette demanded to know “the true reason of Mr. William Franklin...being
confined to a loathsome gaol” and wondered why the “Son of the Great Doctor Franklin
is treated...like a thief or murderer.” The anonymous writer went on to declare that “If he
has broke his parole of Honor, publish it in all the News Papers on the Continent, and (if
he’s not lost to all the finest feelings of the mind) to be exposed will be worse than
death.” Just as William Franklin had requested, the writer concludes by demanding a trial
for Franklin lest “the vile Tories...boast that the patriotic Doctor Franklin’s son is used
with a Rigour, seldom known but in a Portuguese Inquisition.”94 Despite the writer’s
hyperbole, the patriot authorities had followed the accepted customs of the time in
treating a parole violator. Initially they recognized the potential danger posed by an
influential loyalist like Franklin, but the patriots still accorded him the respect and dignity
of his rank, and hoped that a parole would guarantee his compliance. Franklin would not
acknowledge his adversaries’ authority or their right to respect, and this led him to violate
his parole. As Sheila Skemp has shown, despite Franklin’s protestations of innocence, he
was very much guilty of the illicit communications charged against him, and the patriots
were within their rights to confine such a cunning and duplicitous man. His actions were
both a breach of security and an insult that the patriots were honour-bound to answer, yet
Franklin certainly felt no dishonour in breaching a rebel parole he was forced to sign.95
Franklin’s experience shows that the patriots did attempt to treat the former governor
with respect for his rank and dignity, but the honour system quickly unravelled because
the former governor did not truly recognize the patriot’s right to respect. In the end, both
captive and captor viewed one another as criminally dishonoured. After nearly two years
as a prisoner, Franklin was exchanged in October, 1778.96
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Franklin’s difficulties arose from his unwillingness to accept the validity of a
rebel parole, but in the case of Major Christopher French, one of the first British officers
captured in the war, the intensification of the gentlemanly honour system resulted from
dozens of smaller slights and insults. French recorded his experiences in a detailed and
lively journal which provides some clear insights into how ideas of honour were used in
the moral contest between captive and captor. An officer of the 22nd Regiment of Foot,
French was captured on board a British supply ship in August, 1775. French, like
William Franklin and others, initially refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of his
capture, but eventually relented and gave his parole which, interestingly, was not an
indefinite parole, but one which was only to last up to twelve months.97 It is not clear
why the patriot authorities would agree to a time-limit, as most paroles were worded so
that they would apply for as long as the conflict lasted or until the parolee was
exchanged. This was likely the result of patriot inexperience at this early stage in the
conflict.
Though not a loyalist, French muses extensively about honour and the loyalists
who became his fellow prisoners, including such notables as Lt. Gov. Philip Skene and
Gov. Montfort Browne of the Bahamas. French was from an Irish Protestant landowning
family, and seems to have understood the American Revolution in terms of an ongoing
Atlantic struggle between rebellious forces and the Crown, whether in Ireland or
America. In this sense he felt common cause with the American Tories. At times in his
journal he refers to himself as a loyalist and, noting the Calvinist roots of his New
England hosts, borrows terminology from the English Civil War, labelling his captors
“Roundheads,” and his fellow loyalists “Cavaliers”.98 Like so many other prisoners,
French was paroled in Connecticut, where he was free to roam around Hartford and
interact with the locals. In 1775-76, patriots feared the possibility of a Tory insurgency in
western Connecticut, and French and his fellow parolees and prisoners felt the tension in
numerous disputes with community members. Since many loyalist gentlemen brought
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their slaves with them into captivity, matters were not improved when the local AfricanAmerican population elected Philip Skene’s servant as their governor “according to
annual custom,” which added the terrifying prospect of servile insurrection to the fears
of a Tory fifth column.99 The turning point for the loyalist and British prisoners at
Hartford was the escape of Captain Samuel McKay, the same loyalist who had caused the
Albany Committee to doubt whether British and loyalist officers could be trusted to abide
by their paroles. Once recaptured, French recorded that McKay was tied and “beat &
abus’d…in the grossest manner” before being “sent to the common [jail]
indiscriminately.” McKay’s mistreatment seemed a far worse crime to his fellow
gentleman prisoners than his breach of parole. Perhaps in solidarity, Philip Skene refused
to sign a parole and was confined in the common jail.100 Following this affair the local
committee tightened the restrictions on the prisoners, and French’s intransigence towards
the local authorities increased.
Any semblance of mutual respect between the committee and the Major
evaporated when French issued an order forbidding British prisoners in Hartford from
attending Congregationalist services, since the clergy “abuse and revile [His Majesty] by
the epithets of Bloody Tyrant etc....and call his Navies and Armies murderers Pirates &
Butchers.” When French refused to rescind the order, he and his officers were removed to
the common jail with “no distinction made between us & Felons”, “contrary,” he later
wrote, to “all laws, Civil or Military, of all nations…”101 For French, the committee had
used his order as a pretext to violate the conditions of parole and wound the pride of the
British officers. The rebels had shown their true colours, and now it was his business to
torment his jailers, to mock them, and plot his own escape.102
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French carefully recorded the apparent indignities he and the other loyalists
suffered, including charges of high treason, threats of execution, imprisonment, attacks
from locals, and an episode where Governor Montfort Browne performed the degrading
task of rolling a sugar barrel.103 Though this act may seem trivial, French was outraged
that a man of Browne’s status and rank should perform manual labour. The British Major
often scolded his captors for such ignoble treatment of their genteel prisoners, and
bombarded his jailors with letters and petitions.104 French described the locals and the
committeemen as little more than country bumpkins bereft of any sense of proper
deference to a man of his learning and rank. This was to be expected, he wrote, because
the people were “accustom’d to a Life of equality, where Birth, Riches, nay merit are
mostly undistinguish’d” and therefore the New Englanders could “scarcely be found fault
with for this method of acting, which arises from Simplicity and Ignorance.”105 In the
opinion of French and other gentlemen, a country without any semblance of proper
hierarchy produced defective people. At times French seems to regard his jailors and the
local populace as bratty children in need of correction and instruction, an attitude that
enraged the independent-minded New Englanders.
In response to French’s constant complaints and challenges, the Hartford
committee, led by the Princeton-educated gentleman Jesse Root, entered into a battle of
wits and insults with their prisoner. French bristled when local farmers were admitted to
the jail to gawk at him through the bars and demand he play his flute for them. Rather
than rail at the common people and call them “rascals,” as he so often did to his jailors,
he politely excused himself from performing on account of sore fingers. The jailers also
kept him in the company of arsonists and counterfeiters, and lodged a “raving lunatic” in
the cell beside him, whose shrieks and cries kept him up at night. When French
demanded that his right to exercise in the yard be acknowledged, Root offered him the
use of the yard as a personal favour, which French flatly refused, as he “never accept[ed]
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favors from any but those I think upon as friends.”106 The Major seemed to delight in
talking down to his jailers and admonishing Continental officials, especially Jesse Root,
for their failings as gentlemen and their ignorance of the finer points of honour.107
The feud between French and his jailers veered at times towards the absurd,108 but
the crux of the insults and arguments was a dispute over who was the truly honourable
party. This led Jesse Root to submit an editorial on the dangers of “False Honor” to the
Connecticut Courant. Though French is not mentioned by name, he recorded in his
journal that he had little doubt the piece referred to him. Root described the bearers of
false honour as “impertinent, saucy, [and] vain” whose ideals are “a war
[upon]…conscience, upon heaven... [False honour] substitutes brutal ferocity [for]
fortitude, and breaks through all restraints…” Those men who embraced such principles,
the article continues, were like a vector that could “give the country the plague” and
“ought to be cooped in the caverns of the earth” – a thinly veiled reference to Newgate
prison built into the Simsbury copper mines north of Hartford.109 In response to what
French saw as “an Attack upon me,” he penned his own discussion of honour entitled
“True Honor” under the name, “Cosmopolitus,” though the printer evidently refused to
publish it. French describes true honour as “mild and gentle in Prosperity, yet bold &
manly in Adversity...” Using Root’s own words against him, French writes that his
honour is “Not Vain, not saucy, nor impertinent, but steady and unshaken - & fears not
tho’ many threaten.” “In short,” he writes, “true honor is as a precious Gem which (tho’
buried in the...Caverns of the Earth...) will retain...its indelible Stamp of Sterling Merit, &
will shine forth, to the terror of False Honor…”110 French and his captors were not only
engaged in a political conflict, but were also waging a cultural war as well.
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The Hartford committee’s irritation at their bothersome prisoner exploded into
rage when a local girl eloped with a soldier under French’s command, and the Major was
blamed. French feared that a local mob was coming for him, or that he would indeed be
sent to toil in the Simsbury copper mines. On the night of November 15, 1776, he and
four other prisoners made their escape through a hole they had chipped through the wall.
For five days the group of fugitives attempted to make their way to British lines. French
even disguised himself as “a Woman with Cloak & Bonnett” but seemingly saw no
dishonour in it, as he was both desperate to escape and presumably thought little of what
his captors might think of him. He and his fellow fugitives were captured and returned to
their patched-up jail, but they escaped again on December 27th and successfully made
their way to New York.111
The inexperienced Whigs seemed helpless to stop the constant escape of both
rank and file loyalist and British prisoners who were not granted paroles by virtue of their
lower status, or gentlemen who refused to abide by their oaths. Burgoyne’s Convention
Army prisoners fled in droves and by the time it arrived in Virginia in January 1779,
around 1 900 had escaped. Even the fearsome, converted copper mine of Newgate prison
was subject to mass escapes.112 Yet it was the desertions of gentlemen prisoners that most
infuriated the revolutionary leadership. Evidence for this can be seen in the numerous
printed insults directed towards specific fugitives, distributed in newspapers and
handbills. About two months after he escaped, the Connecticut Gazette carried two
scathing rebukes of Major French and his behaviour. A letter to the editor explained that
French had initially been “used with the greatest Lenity…till he violated (like a
Scoundrel) his Parole…” The article describes him as “peevish, ill-natured, churlish,
bigotted [sic],” and of a “bloodthirsty Disposition.” He is accused of responding to
kindness with “fresh insults and Instances of uncommon Insolence and Scurrility…” The
paper also included an acrostic poem describing French’s character, in which the author
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again takes aim at the Major’s egotism. “F” is for “Fixed in Opinion always in the
wrong” while “H is [for] Honor to maintain in spite of Man and God.” The article
concludes by attacking French’s manhood, calling him a “Hermaphrodite” and explaining
that he was dependent on his brother for “Two Hundred a Year towards the Support of
his needy Family, and yet the Major is such an Ingrate and Churl that he has not spoke to
his Brother and Benefactor for several Years.”113 The patriot press also targeted other
fugitives or escapees. A hand bill described Isaac Wilkins, a New York loyalist, as a
“wolf in sheep’s clothing” for his deception and escape.114 Connecticut authorities
insulted Philip Skene in the newspapers by officially offering to exchange him for a
corporal.115
Escaped loyalists rarely responded to printed insults. This may have owed to the
lack of loyalist printers, but gentlemen loyalists likely felt it would be vulgar to exchange
insults in the press. One of the few printed answers to patriot accusations of dishonour
and oath-breaking came from Andrew Skene, a loyalist officer and the son of Philip
Skene. He admitted that he had indeed escaped, but he claimed to be innocent of any
dishonour and called upon his former jailers to admit their violations of gentlemanly
conduct which voided the parole and forced him to flee. He politely restrained himself
from providing any particulars.116 Major Christopher French never responded publicly to
any of the printed attacks against him, but he likely would have seen such crude attacks
as further evidence of the rustic and plebeian character of New Englanders, and may have
even taken a touch of pleasure knowing how badly he had riled his captors. Judging from
the sentiments expressed his journal, French saw his prisoner experience, and indeed the
American Revolution in general, as a cultural conflict between a proper, ordered
hierarchy, built on respect, merit, and honour, and the ignorant, levelling rebel upstarts of
Connecticut. French assumed moral superiority over his captors throughout his
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imprisonment, and though he begrudgingly accepted the parole offered to him when he
was first taken prisoner, he refused to respect the honour of his captors. French’s
rejection of the patriot claim-right of honour sparked a bitter feud in which both sides
attempted to reveal the illusion or shallowness of their opponents’ concept of honour. It
was a conflict that spilled out of the jails and into the newspapers and gossip of the
community. Even in jail, a gentleman was on a stage.
The patriots had initially treated French according to the customs of civilized
warfare, and assumed his honour as a gentleman and a British officer. Showing this sort
of respect was vital for the American revolutionaries to prove that they were honourable,
legitimate soldiers, and not rebellious criminals. Abiding by civilized customs was also a
way to ensure that their own captured officers would be treated with dignity. With only a
few exceptions, the Continental Congress and Army tried their best to treat captured
British and Hessian officers and soldiers with the requisite honours. In contrast, the
treatment of loyalists such as Gideon White, Israel Williams, Cadwallader Colden II,
William Franklin, and David Mathews varied considerably depending on the patriots’
estimation of their captives’ personal honour. Gideon White and Israel Williams were
denied parole by the local committees and quarantined in their homes to prevent the
spread of their political infection. David Mathews and Cadwallder Colden II were both
confined to jail cells despite their status as gentlemen, before their captors lightened their
restrictions because of the prisoners’ genteel behaviour and polite arguments. The patriots
initially sought to treat Governor William Franklin with respect owing to both his rank
and his illustrious father, but were compelled to place Franklin in close confinement
because of his allegedly duplicitous conduct. Though loyalism was considered a
dishonourable political principle, the treatment of loyalist gentlemen was contingent on
the patriots’ appraisal of their personal honour. Loyalist prisoners were under a sort of
evaluation to discover whether their treasonous political allegiance was born out of
foolishness and misplaced affection for the King, or whether it represented a deeper
moral defect.
Of particular interest to patriot assemblies were the quiet sorts who did not openly
declare their support for either side. Patriot committees would often give such men the
benefit of the doubt, and could even attempt to separate a man and his honour from his
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political delusions. According to Robert Calhoon, when local patriots interrogated their
neighbours they sometimes tried to expose “the evil of Toryisn without destroying the
self-respect of the suspect, peeling away the thin layers of misguided belief in an effort to
isolate and excise specific tendencies.” A revolutionary committee of New Englanders
residing just across the frontier in Sunbury County, Nova Scotia, questioned a group of
men whose seeming neutrality had caused “uneasiness to many”. The committee
demanded the men make their political sentiments clear, and warned them that claiming
neutrality “will not be a satisfactory answer.” Only one suspected neutral in this case
refused to declare for the Revolution, and was officially ostracized by the committee.117
The idea of neutrality was considered politically indefensible since it effectively
amounted to a rejection of the revolutionary cause, but it was also regarded as a deeply
unmanly position. Whatever allegiance truly lay in his heart, the committee declared that
a neutral “must be a slothful man who…desires a thing may come to pass and yet shall
use no measures, direct or indirect, to accomplish his desires.” By this logic it would
seem that being an open loyalist was manlier than being a neutral. Indeed, the contempt
for neutrals was a recurring idea in patriot thought. The Congregationalist preacher
Nathaniel Whitaker railed against “neuters” because, he argued, there “are but two sides
to any case, a right and wrong; and they who neglect to take the right side…must stand
chargeable with all the ill consequences that follow…” A neutral was just as culpable as a
Tory villain, but lacked the courage to choose a side. Even with this stark binary of
honourable patriots and dishonourable loyalists created by revolutionary committees and
the patriot press, authorities were adamant that support for the cause needed to be
voluntary and not go against individual conscience. 118 Religious justifications for
neutrality or pacifism posed a serious challenge to the sort of coercion practiced by
committees. The imprisonment and relocations of prominent members of Philadelphia’s
Quaker community raised perplexing questions as to the justice of persecuting gentlemen
merely on grounds of neutrality or suspicions of loyalism.
117

Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 303-304. For an in depth look at the politics of
communities along the Maine/Nova Scotia border, see: Elizabeth Manke, The Fault Lines of Empire:
Political Differentiation in Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, ca. 1760-1830 (New York: Routledge, 2005).
118

Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 304. Nathaniel Whitaker, The Reward of Toryism
(Newbury-Port, MA: John McCall, 1783), 16-17.

175
In early 1777, a group of nearly two dozen Philadelphia Quaker merchants
protested their innocence in the press, and made principled complaints against the local
committee for roughly searching their homes and imprisoning them in the Freemason
hall.119 Quaker prisoners wrote and published several “remonstrances” directed at the
Pennsylvania council and the general public. “[W]e have been kept in close confinement,
under strong Military Guard,” reads one remonstrance, “but have remained here
unaccused and unheard.” The Quaker gentlemen attempted to point out the essential
hypocrisy of being held without charge by men who claimed to be protecting liberty, and
appealed to the “Declaration of Rights, which form a fundamental...Part of the
Constitution from which you derive your power.”120 Continental commanders and patriot
civil authorities were deeply suspicious of the Quakers, and there were numerous
rumours and tales of their collusion with the British, though there was little firm evidence
to prove the allegations. John Hancock, for one, believed the Society of Friends was
acting against American interests under the “Hypocritical Cloak of Religion.”121 Most of
the suspected Quaker loyalists were pacifists who wanted to stay out of the conflict,
which was enough to bring them to the attention of the revolutionary authorities. The
instructions of the Philadelphia Meeting of Friends were decidedly anti-revolutionary and
seemed to confirm the patriot suspicions.122 The Society of Friends, like other churches in
Revolutionary America, was divided on the political crisis, and some Quakers abandoned
their pacifist roots, while others clung to them.123 According to a pamphlet published by
the imprisoned Quakers, a key point of contention was the patriot demand that they take
an oath affirming they would do nothing “injurious to the United Free States of North
America, by speaking, writing, or otherwise, and from giving intelligence to the
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Commander of the British forces.”124 Quaker theology, then as today, teaches that oaths
create two standards of honesty, whereas the Society of Friends teach that one should
always unfailingly tell the truth. More importantly, Quakers believe a secular oath
interferes with their spiritual obligations to God. Therefore the Quakers had never taken
an oath to the British Crown, and neither would they take one to the new United States.125
The local committee offered the imprisoned Quakers the choice of taking the oath or
submitting to voluntary house arrest. The Friends refused the ultimatum as a point of
honour, “disdaining to be considered in so odious a light, as men who by crimes had
forfeited our common and inherent rights…”126 The Quaker merchants argued that they
had done nothing wrong, and had not given offence or preference to either side in the
conflict. They were not denying the authority of Congress, but neither were they willing
to lay aside their principles and submit to restrictions on their freedom. With the British
army closing in on Philadelphia in the late summer of 1777, the exasperated patriot
authorities sent the intransigent Quaker gentlemen to Winchester, Virginia as prisoners.
The wealthy merchant Thomas Gilpin Sr. kept a diary of his prisoner experience
that details a fairly peaceful captivity spent at church meetings and simply putting in time
with colleagues. Yet their status as suspected loyalists meant that Gilpin and his fellow
Quakers were subjected to the indignities and dishonours experienced by other Tory
prisoners. The Friends chafed at the insults and abuse hurled by the common people as
they travelled and it “Rather appeared”, wrote Gilpin “that [the country people] had been
encouraged by some Violent People to do so.”127 One point that continually irked the
Quakers was the armed guard posted at their door. This seemed a particularly insulting
and overbearing gesture to Gilpin, who noted that even mercenary Hessians captured at
Saratoga were granted the freedom to work for local farmers without supervision. The
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rustic captain of the guard attempted to intimidate the peaceful Quakers with threats of
hanging, and bragged with “familiar centiments [sic] & expressions ab[ou]t thumming
people’s eyes, biting, pinching their Privates.”128 Most of the Quaker prisoners at
Winchester stoically endured the constant nuisances and indignities.
The Virginia legislature eventually offered the Quakers a parole, but it required
them to leave Winchester and go to British occupied New York. This may have been a
clever ploy by the Virginia authorities to rid themselves of the costly prisoners, and by
accepting the parole the Quakers would essentially admit that they were indeed Tories.
Although some did take the offer, the scrupulous Gilpin thought this was an unwise move
which would “be construed to a Consciousness of guilt.”129 Having refused to leave
Winchester on principle, Gilpin died in the early spring of 1778, along with another
Quaker named John Hunt. The deaths of these gentlemen angered their patriot friends
who pointed out the inhumanity of causing death on the basis of mere suspicion. The
Pennsylvania Council was obliged to agree, and permitted the return of the remaining
Quaker prisoners at Wilmington.130
Thomas Gilpin may not have been an active loyalist, and his personal opinions on
the justice of the Revolution remain unclear. Yet to patriots he belonged to a class of
deceptive or weak-willed gentlemen like Cadwallader Colden II, who conscientiously
refused to support the revolution, but did not openly support the British either. Gilpin
took his captivity much more gracefully than other gentlemen loyalists examined in this
chapter, perhaps owing to his strong religious faith. Though he offered no resistance, he
believed that the indignities he experienced in captivity were designed to force him into
declaring for the loyalists, or to taking the oath against his convictions. The Quaker
intransigence on this matter continued throughout the war.
Patriot authorities deliberated over the proper ways to treat loyalist prisoners
depending on their status, honour, or religious convictions, but they were far less willing
to extend privileges to captured loyalist fighters. Like their civilian counterparts, the
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treatment of armed loyalists depended on patriot evaluations of their honour, though
loyalist gentlemen captured in battle, or who participated in partisan warfare, were
generally not accorded gentlemanly honours, and many faced the possibility of execution.
Patriots argued that these men were traitors and bandits, and therefore deserved the
harshest treatment possible regardless of their rank or status. It was commonly accepted
that armed Tories had not only committed the unpardonable dishonour of treason, but
they had also violently turned on their own families, communities, and even their race.
revolutionary authorities therefore felt fully justified in mistreating loyalists captured in
arms.
The narrative of the New Jersey loyalist James Moody displays how a self-styled
gentleman-at-arms, with an officer’s commission and clear and direct orders, could end
up being held as an ignominious spy. A middling landowner, Moody tended five hundred
acres in Sussex County, New Jersey before being driven from his home for his open
loyalism.131 Moody received a lieutenant’s commission in the New Jersey Volunteers and
achieved a degree of fame (or infamy) during the war for his daring exploits freeing
prisoners and capturing rebel dispatches. He was even immortalized in 1785 by the
British engraver Robert Pollard, who depicted Moody rescuing a shackled British officer
from a gothic dungeon.132 A patriot force captured Moody in July 1780, and he was
transferred to Westpoint where the genteel commandant Robert Howe granted him a
gentleman’s parole with a three mile limit around the fortress. The patriot press jubilantly
announced Moody’s capture, and printed the orders he carried directing him to capture
New Jersey governor William Livingston. Even though these documents were intended
“to prevent his being treated as a spy”, the newspaper informed readers that because he
travelled with a very small party of men behind enemy lines “with weapons concealed,”
his actions were “characteristic of a spy” according to the rules “of all the nations of
Europe”.133 It was an important distinction. According to eighteenth century custom,
gentlemen fought bravely and openly; they did not skulk in shadows. Spies were
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therefore not considered gentlemen and were not normally protected by the genteel
conventions of war, as seen in the execution of Nathanial Hale, John André and others.134
Indeed, Livingston and George Washington interceded by voiding Moody’s parole and
ordering that the loyalist partisan be held under close guard.135
The new commandant of Westpoint, Benedict Arnold, took no chances with his
wily prisoner. He ordered Moody shackled, which, the loyalist later recalled, “caused his
wrists to be much cut and scarified”. To add to the security, and the torment, Moody
recorded that he was held in a roofless pit dug out of natural rock which often filled with
ankle-deep water.136 Even with this treatment, Moody believed his life would be spared
since he was more valuable for prisoner exchange than for patriot vengeance. The
Continental authorities dashed his expectations when they informed him that he was to be
tried for the “assassination” of a pair of officers who were killed fighting Moody and his
men. The loyalist officer wrote that this charge could be easily countered since the
officers died fairly in battle, but he was then told that he was “so obnoxious” and was
“likely to be…so mischievous” if exchanged, that the revolutionary authorities planned to
use whatever excuse they could to justify executing Moody. Even if the assassination
charge failed, an officer explained to Moody that “you have enlisted men…for the King’s
service, and this, by our laws, is death.” 137 Moody, like so many other loyalist prisoners,
escaped before he could be put on trial.
Moody presented his treatment as exceedingly harsh and unjust, but his
experiences were consistent with other captured partisans and raiders. The shackles,
however, were an injury and an indignity spared most captives in the American
Revolution. Such instruments were normally reserved for slaves or the worst sort of
criminals. News of starvation and disease aboard the prison ships incensed the
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revolutionary leadership, but it was rumours that Continental officers been shackled and
chained to the floor that provoked an immediate response. After hearing these reports in
1779, Governor Livingston retaliated directly on British Colonel Christopher Billop.
Elisha Boudinot apologized to Billop in writing, but lamented that such harsh treatment
was the only way “to teach Britons to act like men of humanity.”138 To constrain a
genteel body was the height of insult and indignity, but according to Boudinot it was the
enemy who had provoked such treatment. Boudinot was arguing that in times of war the
truly dishonourable act was the one which started the cycle of violence, not the one
provoked out of retaliation. In eighteenth century custom, when one side violated the
rules of warfare it absolved their enemies from the same obligations. George Washington,
a fastidious observer of honour’s punctilios, wrote General Thomas Gage on the matter of
prisoner abuse in 1775 warning that the “Obligation arising from the Rights of Humanity,
and claims of Rank are universally binding, and extensive, (except in case of
Retaliation).”139 For Boudinot and Washington, when their enemies refused to act like
gentlemen, retaliation was the only effective way to prevent further cruelties.
Patriots employed this principle of retaliation against British and loyalist officers
who fought alongside Native warriors on the frontier. The Lieutenant Governor of
Detroit, Henry Hamilton, was one of the most loathed royal officials in the conflict
because of his central role in establishing the alliance between Britain and the western
tribes. Whig frontiersmen derisively labelled Hamilton the “Hair Buyer” for allegedly
paying Native warriors for patriot scalps. Thus he and his officers were among the most
valuable prizes for the frontier Whigs. To patriots Hamilton was the epitome of false
honor: an accomplished gentleman born to privilege and influence, yet in league Native
Americans who were assumed by white patriots to be the very antithesis of civilization.140
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In February 1779, Colonel George Rogers Clark surprised Hamilton’s garrison at Fort
Vincennes, and demanded its surrender. Both loyalist and patriot sources agree that
before the negotiations were complete, Clark’s men captured a small party of Native and
French Canadian fighters and brought them into town. After separating the white men
from the party, the remaining four Natives were publicly murdered and their bodies
tossed into the river. The patriot Major Joseph Bowman recorded that Hamilton and
Clark were meeting while this occurred, but his mater-of-fact description perhaps
highlights the routine nature of such killings.141 The loyalist Lieutenant Jacob Schieffelin,
who claimed to be an eye-witness, provided a more graphic description for the Royal
Gazette, claiming that “Colonel Clark…took a tomahawk, and in cool blood knocked
their brains out, dipping his hands in their blood, rubbing it several times on his cheeks,
yelping as a savage…”142 The American Revolution enflamed generations of racial
hatred on the frontier, where tales of murder and torture were all too common. These
particular murders were not given any coverage in the patriot press, though news of the
capture of Henry Hamilton and his officers was widely reported. 143
The actions taken against Henry Hamilton, his men, and his Native allies was part
of the ongoing battle for moral superiority, and patriot officials circulated accounts of
enemy cruelty to justify their acts of reprisal. The Virginia legislature published a
broadside detailing the Indian raids supposedly ordered by Hamilton, and the governor’s
own inhumane treatment of prisoners. In particular, several paragraphs were devoted to
the sufferings of the unfortunate John Dodge, who was shackled in a stone cell without
blankets, fire, or proper food in the dead of winter. On the verge of death, Hamilton
ordered him brought out until “somewhat mended, and then again, before he had
recovered the abilities to walk, was returned to the dungeon.” Other prisoners were said
to be placed “into the hands of savages.” The last few paragraphs of the broadside
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contrast the loathsome conditions suffered by patriot prisoners with the indulgent
treatment accorded to British captives. Although, the pamphlet reads, “we had long and
vainly endeavoured to introduce an emulation in kindness [in the enemy]”, Hamilton and
his fellow prisoners “are free subjects to begin on the work of retaliation.” The
publication concludes that Henry Hamilton, along with the Detroit Justice of the Peace
Philip Dejean and Captain William Lamothe, were ordered to be “put in irons, confined
in the dungeon of the public jail, debarred the use of pen, ink, and paper, and excluded all
converse except with the keeper.”144 To patriots, the alliance with Native warriors and
their alleged inhumanity against patriot prisoners stripped the royal officers of any
honour, and transformed these gentlemen into the most loathsome criminals.
The loyalist Jacob Schieffelin, who was also taken prisoner and transported to
Virginia, recorded that when he and his fellow officers watched helplessly as Hamilton,
Dejean and Lamothe were clasped in irons, they “shed tears of indignation that their
worthy Chief should be so treated”. The patriots marched their prisoners through the
streets of Williamsburg “with great pomp” in the rain, before being “committed to the
dungeon with felons, murderers, and condemned criminals, not so much as a blanket
allowed them…and heavy chains put on their legs before great numbers of people.”
Schieffelin was not simply offended at the insult of seeing his commander in chains, but
the public nature of the dishonour. The young officer believed the charges against his
commander were “infamous falsehoods”, and could not bear that so many rough people
could feel morally superior to the Governor based on rebel lies.145
Washington initially supported the harsh measures against Hamilton and his
fellow prisoners, agreeing with Virginia Governor Thomas Jefferson that “Their cruelties
to our unhappy people who have fallen into their hands and the measures they have
pursued to excite the savages…discriminate them from common prisoners…”146 Yet
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British General William Phillips reminded Washington that since Fort Vincennes had
surrendered on the basis of a negotiated settlement, retaliation was a violation of the
patriot’s word of honour. Ever conscious of such intricacies, Washington was forced to
concede the point and wrote to Jefferson that “on more mature consideration, [the issue
of retaliation] appears to be involved in greater difficulty than I apprehended.”
Washington admitted that Hamilton deserved to be punished, and that his crimes should
be widely published “that the World…may feel and approve the justice of his fate”.
Nonetheless, the offender could not “be subjected to any uncommon severity” since his
“capitulation placed him upon a different footing from a mere prisoner at discretion.”
Washington suggested that “altho’ the practice of War” did “not justify the measures that
have been taken against him,” Hamilton could still be kept under close confinement.147
This potential breach of faith troubled Washington’s sense of honour, but it would also
have had larger military ramifications. If British garrisons felt they could not trust patriot
surrender terms, they might choose to prolong sieges through obstinate resistance, and
force bloody assaults that would work to no one’s advantage. In the end, Hamilton’s
fellow prisoners were either paroled, or in the case of Schieffelin, escaped, but Hamilton
was not exchanged until November 1780. 148 Despite the intense public rancour against
Hamilton and his loyalist officers, practical military necessity prevented them from
experiencing the full brunt of patriot vengeance.
Less well-known loyalists without friends among the British were not as fortunate
as the officers from Detroit, and as the civil war intensified, atrocities and reprisals
became more common. In an attempt to prevent extrajudicial killings of captured Tories
in South Carolina, the legislature instituted £80 bounties for loyalists taken alive.149 Even
if captured, the patriot authorities were rarely willing to acknowledge that loyalists in
arms were lawful combatants.150 After the Battle of Kettle Creek in Georgia on February
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14, 1779, dozens of loyalists were denied prisoner of war status and instead tried under
the state’s Sedition Act.151 Fifty loyalists were convicted of treason, though most were
released on grounds that they had been “seduced and terrified” into joining the British
cause.152 Eventually five of the loyalists were hanged. The British condemned these
executions and threatened retaliation, but the Continental General Andrew Williamson
defended the killings, arguing that the deceased were in fact brigands who carried no
commissions. It was only when several committeemen fell into British hands that the
patriots agreed to exchange loyalist prisoners in Georgia. British authorities were furious
that loyalists were abused and sometimes executed, but they were reluctant to retaliate on
Continental prisoners out of fears for the safety of their regulars and officers. Sir Henry
Clinton himself ordered that no action be taken against the Whig prisoners despite the
fact that the loyalist executions had been sanctioned by the Georgian government.153
Similar situations faced the loyalists elsewhere, and little was done by the British to
protect loyalist prisoners. In fact, the British sometimes rejected patriot offers to
exchange loyalist prisoners, and demanded their regulars first.154 Such actions must have
been deeply insulting to loyalists.
In some cases, being an influential loyalist officer could be a death sentence. Not
only had they raised arms against their country, but they had also encouraged and lead
others to do the same, thus compounding their treason. This was fate of Lt. Colonel
Ambrose Mills and two of his captains on October 7, 1780, when one thousand provincial
soldiers and loyalist militia under British Major Patrick Ferguson were surrounded and
defeated at the Battle of King’s Mountain in South Carolina. Ferguson and nearly three
hundred loyalists and provincials were killed, and the rest were taken prisoner. Anthony
Allaire, a loyalist lieutenant in the provincial light infantry, recorded that the militia
officers were singled-out for mistreatment since they had “the most Influence in the
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country.” 155 First the officers’ baggage was ransacked, and their clothes, money and arms
were all stolen. The patriots convened an impromptu court martial, and condemned thirty
loyalist militiamen to hang. Lt. Colonel Mills, two unnamed captains, and six privates
were executed while the rest of the prisoners were sent on a forced march where more
died.156
The brutality witnessed at the Battle of King’s Mountain was typical of the
ferocious civil war in the southern theatre, which will be explored in more detail in the
following chapter. The loyalists’ mistreatment may have also stemmed from the culture
of the “over-mountain men” who filled the ranks of the patriots at this engagement. These
were Scotch-Irish frontiersmen who had little time for the niceties of genteel behaviour
and were determined to punish the loyalists for the threats and insults made by Major
Ferguson in a circular letter spread in the lead-up to the battle. The British officer had
called the patriot militiamen “Barbarians”, “the dregs of mankind” “Backwater men” and
“a set of Mongrels” and even mentioned their leaders by name. 157 The brutal treatment
eventually compelled nearly six hundred loyalists to escape and spread the demoralizing
news of their defeat and suffering. Since loyalist soldiers could depend on neither the
conventions of honourable warfare nor the protection of the British, loyalist support
began to whither in the South. 158
The ill-treatment of loyalist prisoners taken at King’s Mountain came to the
attention of patriot militia Colonel William Campbell. Concerned about how such brutal
actions would reflect on his character, he issued a general order on October 11th
instructing “the officers of all ranks in the army to endeavour to restrain the disorderly
manner of slaughtering and disturbing the prisoners. If it cannot be prevented by
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moderate measures, such effectual punishments shall be executed upon delinquents as
will put a stop to it.”159 Yet few patriot officers shared Campbell’s concerns. The British
protests at the executions and abuses were equally ineffective. “The hanging of Poor old
Col. Mills,” wrote Lord Charles Cornwallis to Continental General William Smallwood,
“who was always a fair and open enemy to your Cause, was an act of the most Savage
Barbarity.” Mills was neither a spy nor a bandit, but a military commander with a British
commission. “From the Character which I have heard of you, Sir,” continued Cornwallis,
“I cannot suppose that you can approve of these most cruel Murders: but I hope you will
see the necessity of interposing your Authority to stop this bloody Scene; which must
oblige me in justice to the suffering Loyalists, to retaliate on the unfortunate persons now
in my power.”160 Continental authorities thought little of Cornwallis’ protests or his
threat. There was no investigation of the complaints nor was there any attempt to
discipline the troops. The patriot generals were confident that the British had no right to
complain of harsh treatment when they had committed so many outrages themselves.161
Any act committed against the loyalists seemed perfectly justified.
Perhaps the most infamous example of patriot severity towards captured loyalists
occurred at the Newgate jail in northern Connecticut. Called the “Black Hole of
Connecticut”, a nineteenth century historian recorded that this converted copper mine
was employed specifically for “the purpose of retaliation.” 162 Newgate was a dreaded
and well-known spectre to the loyalists: Ambrose Serle mused about its horrors in his
journal; it appeared regularly in loyal newspapers; and the Hartford committee used it as
a threat to compel Major French to behave. Yet, despite its infamy, Newgate never
housed a large number of prisoners, nor were any elite loyalists held in its depths. Rather
it harboured dishonoured members of the rank and file whom Washington described as
“atrocious villains.” Nonetheless, the patriot leadership were fully aware of how effective
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the threat of imprisonment in a mineshaft could be against patrician or plebeian loyalists
alike. The Newgate prisoners were comprised of marauders, counterfeiters, deserters, and
those caught in arms with Native warriors. After the failed invasion of Canada in the
winter of 1775-76, General Philip Schuyler’s command in northern New York was “daily
tormented by parties of Indians from all quarters” and he believed “some Tories” were
inciting them. He swore that if he captured any of these offenders he would “provide
them with a lodging in Simsbury mines.”163 The mines were also used as a form of
punishment in lieu of the death penalty for Continental soldiers in the early phases of the
conflict. Several army deserters from Massachusetts, who allegedly fled with the
intention of joining the British, were flogged and sentenced to six months to two years in
the prison.164 Loyalists were well aware of the jail and its terrible reputation both from
rumour and from published reports. The Royal Gazette printed the narrative of two
loyalist privateers who escaped from Newgate in 1781. They described their descent
through a trap door “which they called hell” seventy feet below ground, where the
prisoners were kept in a communal room ventilated by an “auger hole.” The men
remained captive for twenty days until they and the rest of the prisoners overpowered
their guards and escaped.165 The loyalist press celebrated such escapes, but news of
mistreatment served to both demoralize loyalists and enflame their vengeful passions.166
Though the Simsbury mines were often used to threaten gentlemen captives, few
if any high-status loyalist prisoners were held captive there. Revolutionary authorities
were pleased to send deserters, counterfeiters, and pirates down the mine shaft, but were
obviously reticent to do the same to loyalist officers and gentlemen. This was perhaps
due to the fear of reprisal, but such concerns did not prevent executions and close
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confinement in other situations. Newgate is often invoked as a prime example of rebel
cruelty, yet it might also reveal the patriots’ abiding respect for individual rank and
gentility. The sources are silent on this question, but either no loyalist gentlemen were
thought deserving of imprisonment in the mines, (which is unlikely), or there may have
been some unspoken, immutable quality to a gentlemen which the loyalists’ former peers
could not bring themselves to entirely disregard. To seal a gentleman in “the bowels of
the earth” was a fate far worse than death, even for a parricidal Tory, and the patriots may
have feared that such an act would bring as much dishonour to the captor as the captive.

Honour, manhood, and gentility were cultural virtues shared by British, patriot,
and loyalist gentlemen alike, yet the tangled legal and moral issues of rebellion and
treason confused matters, and complicated any easy importation of European standards of
prisoner treatment to North America. Initially the British refused to consider patriots
lawful combatants or treat their officers as gentlemen. Yet as the conflict intensified and
both sides took prisoners, practical necessity required the British and Continental armies
to come to terms with one another. Even while the British refused to invoke the King’s
honour in prisoner exchanges, the limited cartels established between the armies
essentially functioned in the same manner as the more formal arrangements that existed
between warring states in Europe. As Charles Metzger, Caroline Cox, and Judith Van
Buskirk have shown, despite the difficulties of the early phases of the conflict and the
recurring outrages that threatened to sink the war into unrestrained chaos, by 1777
captured patriot and British officers in uniform could expect to be treated with basic
standards of gentlemanly honour and dignity.
The historiography has not paid the same attention to the experience of loyalist
prisoners, yet this aspect of the Revolutionary War provides some valuable insights into
both eighteenth century culture and the personalized nature of the American Revolution.
Unlike British or Continental officers or officials, elite loyalist captives were not
automatically extended the honours of war, but faced a number of possible fates. Some
twentieth century historians attempted to classify loyalist prisoners into different legal or
perceived moral categories to explain the variety of treatment, but these theories have too
many exceptions and inconsistencies to be useful. Rather, this chapter has shown that the
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key determinant for the treatment of loyalist gentlemen prisoners, whether they were
civilian or military, was the patriot evaluation of their captives’ personal honour. The
loyalists as a group were dishonoured, and carried the weight and stain of the insults and
infamy of a generalized dishonour, yet that shared opprobrium could be mitigated, or
exacerbated, in the face-to-face realities of captivity. The cultural forces of personal
honour or dishonour were so strong that they could override political animosities and
indulge captured loyalists in spite of potential security risks, or punish loyalists without
concerns for potential retaliation.
Patriot jailors and committees stood in judgement of captured loyalists’ honour
and their evaluations determined what sort of treatment the prisoner would receive. From
genteel parole, to house arrest, to confinement in a loathsome cell, or even execution, the
nature of loyalist captivity depended on a combination of the individual loyalist’s alleged
crimes, his pre-war reputation, the intercession of his friends, his displays of manners and
respect, and the cultural sensibilities of his captors. As in the case of Governor William
Franklin, this could turn into a contest for moral superiority. Because Franklin was
unwilling to recognize the honour and legitimacy of his captors, he violated his parole
and was imprisoned like a common criminal. To the patriots, he had revealed his true
corruption and dishonour by breaking his word, and was therefore undeserving of the
privileges accorded to true gentlemen. The power of gentlemanly privilege and right to
respect among patriots was reinforced by its denial to dishonoured loyalists. From
Franklin’s perspective, his captors were rebel criminals and were therefore unworthy of a
gentleman’s word. There was no dishonour in breaking promises made under duress to
villains.
Other loyalists, like Cadwallader Colden II, who refused to take an oath of
allegiance to the Congress, received very generous treatment. Yet, Thomas Gilpin Jr. died
while under armed guard hundreds of miles from his home for the same crime. David
Mathews, a man alleged to have plotted the kidnap of George Washington, was
eventually lodged as a guest in a genteel home, while a uniformed loyalist officer was
hanged on the field as traitor. Patriot treatment of elite, male loyalist prisoners may on
first glance seem to be so particularized and ad hoc to defy any systematic explanation.
Because the loyalist political position had been so thoroughly dishonoured in the patriot
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press and made illegal by the individual states, loyalists could not expect to be treated
with the honours of war like their British and patriot counterparts. Instead, their treatment
depended on individual reputations and personal notions of honour. For loyalist
gentlemen, captivity was an experience which could determine their political life or
death. Some suspected loyalists, like Israel Williams or the Philadelphia Quakers, bore
their captivity and eventually rejoined their communities with the support of their friends
and family. Others, like David Mathews, only ensured the permanence of their political
death by rejecting the patriots’ right to respect. Patriots justified their mistreatment of
loyalists on the grounds of retaliation against the Tories’ betrayal of their country or, as in
the case of Henry Hamilton, of their race. So while the loyalist cause was dishonoured in
a general way, evaluations of individual honour or dishonour ultimately determined the
treatment of elite loyalist prisoners. As will be explored in the next chapter, it was
precisely the personalized nature of their mistreatment that encouraged Crown
supporters, led by William Franklin and other aggrieved gentlemen, to seek satisfaction
and the restoration of their honour through vengeance.
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5. Vengeance
In July 1779, a group of loyalist refugees in British-occupied Newport, Rhode
Island, inserted a notice in New York’s Royal Gazette. It described “The imprisonment
and captivity of our persons – the forcibly separating us from our families and tenderest
[sic] connections – The destruction of our possessions, and the confiscating of our
estates.” After outlining the crimes suffered by loyal subjects, the refugees came to their
main point: that this “long train of evils” had “laid a foundation for the most justifiable
revenge”. To achieve their goal, the association was taking up arms “as the ultimate and
only possible means of procuring happiness for ourselves or for America.” “The sword is
drawn”, declared the loyalists, “we will never resign our claims but with our latest
breath.” Pure revenge was considered savage and unchristian, so the association assured
readers that their vengeance would be “devoid of passion and resentment, and free from
every unworthy or vindictive motive…”1 Led by the Harvard educated loyalist Edward
Winslow, this band of loyalists gathered a small fleet of sloops and schooners, and began
preying on coastal communities, plundering and burning rebel farms and warehouses, and
all with the consent of British commanders. George Leonard, captain of the Tory flagship
Restoration, enticed loyalist recruits with promises of “profit and honour”.2 These
predatory raids would restore pride and manhood by aiding the British, chastising the
rebels, and providing the impoverished loyalists with the wealth needed to restore their
status and independence as gentlemen. For the loyalists of Restoration and scores of other
similar ships, they would reclaim their honour through vengeance.
Yet, in the end, the loyalists failed to achieve their longed-for revenge. Rather
than restore their place in American society, the actions of armed loyalists provided the
Whig press with endless propaganda material. By the conclusion of the war, the loyalists
had gained the reputation as the worst of America’s enemies. In 1783, “Civis,” an
anonymous contributor to the Boston Evening-Post, wrote that the greatest share of blame
1
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for the destructive war belonged to the “the malignant tories, who were among
ourselves.” It was the Tories, argued “Civis” who provided the bad council to the King
and encouraged the British to punish the colonies. “How obstinate, how spiteful, how
murderous, have these domestic incendiaries been!” The Tories burned “single homes,
churches, publick buildings, and even whole villages…” and committed “innumerable
murders.”3 While the loyalists prepared for their final evacuation from New York, a
handbill circulated through the streets railing against their “delusive prospects of
conquest, plunder, and revenge”.4 Other publications mocked the defanged Tories as they
departed. An article in the Boston Gazette lampooned the loyalists’ impotent thirst for
vengeance by presenting the minutes of a fictitious meeting between nineteen of New
York’s well-known Tories. There were banal suggestions to “crop”, “club” or “enslave”
the patriots, along with more personalized and creative forms of retributions that reflected
loyalists’ particular sins. New York Mayor David Mathews, who had been implicated in
the notorious Hickey Plot, planned “to poison and murder them.” “Joseph Allecock”
wanted “to Negrofy them”; a loyalist named Reylander sought “to make Indians of
them”; the merchants Watson and McAdams were eager “to vendue [sell] them.”5 These
inventive acts of fictional vengeance contain all the notions the patriot press held about
the loyalists by the end of the war. They were cowardly assassins; they were savage
murderers; and they were greedy, unscrupulous merchants willing to sell their souls for
money. Perhaps worst of all to the patriots, the loyalists were willing to transgress racial
barriers and employ Native Americans and African American slaves against their white
countrymen. A postscript explained that Reylander’s chosen revenge was a reference to
his “being of Indian breed”. Patriots explained that the political choices of some
loyalists, and their desire for vengeance, were products of racial corruption.6
Whereas the indignation that fuelled patriot retaliation against the loyalists was
characterized by Washington as the “Fury of a justly-enraged People”, the rage which
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animated the loyalists was described as something feral and twisted.7 Patriots regarded
their loyalist adversaries differently from their other enemies. While the British and
Hessians were considered ruthless and cruel, and the Native warriors on the frontier were
as terrifying as they had always been to settlers, the loyalists were a new breed of enemy.
They were hidden in plain sight among friends and neighbours, often indistinguishable
from patriots. To the revolutionaries, the loyalists were betrayers, apostates,
collaborators, and traitors. As David Ramsay explained in 1789, loyalists “were
considered by the whig Americans as being cowards, who not only wanted [i.e. lacked]
spirit to defend their constitutional rights, but who unnaturally co-operated with strangers
in fixing the chains of foreign domination on themselves and on their countrymen.”8 The
politically dead loyalists were the unnatural corruptions of Americans. If the patriots
were honourable, manly heroes in battle, the loyalists were dishonourable, unmanly
assassins. The patriots fought for a glorious cause, while the loyalists fought for plunder
and for revenge.
This chapter explores the differing perspectives on the honour and morality of
revenge in the conflict between loyalists and patriots, and provides a cultural explanation
for how the patriots so successfully discredited the loyalists’ attempts at armed resistance.
Loyalist and patriot combatants brought their cultural ideas with them onto the
battlefield, therefore understanding their mentalities can bring us closer to an appreciation
of why these historical actors behaved as they did. The gentlemen loyalists examined in
this dissertation were caught between two competing notions of honour: genteel and
primal. Eighteenth century genteel culture held a dim view of vengeance and regarded it
as a savage, unchristian, and unmanning passion, yet responding to insults and abuse was
also considered essential to maintaining honour and manhood. This tension between what
Bertram Wyatt-Brown called “primal honour” and “genteel honour” can be seen
throughout the loyalist experience. Primal honour was the ancient set of principles
predicated on strength, martial glory, and what Frank Henderson Stewart terms “reflexive
7

George Washington to Thomas Gage, August 20, 1775. George Washington Papers, Library of Congress.
“To all Adherents to the British Government…” (New York: Morton & Horner, August 15, 1783).
8

David Ramsay, The History of the American Revolution Vo. 2 (Philadelphia: R. Aitken & Son, 1789),
240.

194
honor” which demanded that a man respond to insults or trespasses to himself or his
family.9 As shown in chapter two, these ancient precepts were in tension with both
Christian teachings and the culture of politeness and gentility. While some loyalists
thinkers like the Anglican Reverends Samuel Seabury and Charles Inglis preached
against the dangers of unrestrained vengeance, others saw armed retaliation as the only
way to restore the loyalists’ manhood and their rightful place in the colonies.
Approximately 19 000 colonists served in organized loyalist units, while an estimated
10 000 loyalists engaged in raiding parties, privateering and other armed activities only
loosely under British command.10 This chapter argues that while thousands of loyalists
took up arms to restore both the British Empire and their personal honour in America, the
Whig press was able to use loyalist actions in their continued campaign to dishonour and
unman the Tories. The resoundingly successful propaganda image of vengeful Tory
monsters persisted throughout the Revolution and for generations after. Tories were
presented as villains who burned old women in their homes, led Native warriors to attack
settlers, and provoked slaves to turn on their masters. Once proud and haughty, the Tory
had become a bandit and a pirate, lured by plunder and revenge to ravage the coasts and
pillage peaceful farms. Even uniformed loyalists were depicted as little better than
marauders, and as men who, in spite of their fine polished uniforms, rejected the civilized
ways of war in favour of brutal vengeance. The British redcoats, Hessian regulars, and
the Native American warriors were all accused of cruelty and atrocities, but it was the
American Tories who were considered the most morally reprehensible. They were
politically dead and dishonoured Americans, transformed by their savage and unjust
passions for revenge into the antithesis of the patriot and the honourable man. Regardless
of whether or not they were truly guilty of the crimes charged against them in the patriot
newspapers, the loyalists’ attempts to regain their honour through arms left them even
more deeply dishonoured in the eyes of their fellow Americans.
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This chapter begins by exploring the vengeful loyalist trope in American history
and literature, before turning to an examination of eighteenth century discussions of
vengeance and the loyalists’ own debate over how best to respond to the insults and
abuses they had suffered. As will be shown, attitudes had hardened by 1778 and refugees
like the associated loyalists described in the opening vignette called openly for revenge.
The chapter will then examine how notions of vengeance influenced the actual fighting
between loyalists and patriots, and the cycle of violence, reprisals, and massacres which
ensued in the Neutral Ground in New York, in the heated civil war of the Southern
theatre, in the coastal waters, and on the frontier. Both sides believed their vengeance was
justified and both blamed the other for initiating a deadly cycle of attacks on people and
property. Yet, because of the preponderance of the patriot media, the specific events
explored in this chapter led to a devastating and lasting public relations defeat for the
loyalists. Already politically dead, formerly respected gentlemen now became pirates,
savages, murderers, and bandits. Despite their attempts to counter patriot claims of
loyalist brutality, gentlemen like James DeLancey, John Butler, William Franklin, and
indeed the loyalists in general, became intensely despised enemies of the American
Revolution.

Nineteenth century American novelists did not waste a great deal of ink dealing
with American loyalists. A few writers like James Fenimore Cooper and Catherine
Sedgwick crafted nuanced, human portraits of loyalists, but others chose to present Tories
as the one-dimensional archenemies of American liberty.11 John Pendleton Kennedy’s
Horse-Shoe Robinson: A Tale of the Tory Ascendency (1835) provides perhaps the
broadest fictional treatment of the loyalists in South, showing how the conflict split
families and set fathers and children against one another. Though there are stern,
conservative, yet good-natured old Tories and their beautiful daughters, most loyalists are
depicted as mercenary cutthroats “always dodging about in gangs” involved in “house-
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burning and thieving”.12 Lawrence Labree’s Rebels and Tories, Or, The Blood of the
Mohawk (1851) recounts that “our worst foes were not the English, nor their savage
allies…” but rather it was the “tories [who] were equally cruel and bloodthirsty, and often
added to their other atrocities, the most unpardonable treachery.” The main antagonist, a
fictional loyalist named Nahum Leffers, betrayed his people and had a mind “incapable
of the conception of liberal feeling.” Through a combination of revenge and lucre,
Leffers engaged in a “class of duties [i.e. pillage and murder] that the honest and highminded soldier would shrink from.”13 Harold Frederic’s In the Valley (1891) shares
similar ideas, and describes “the wanton baseness and beast-like bloodthirstiness
[of]…native-born Tories…” “Beside them”, the narrator continues, “the lowest painted
heathen in their train was a Christian, the most ignorant Hessian peasant was a
nobleman.” Frederic’s portrait of Walter Butler of Butler’s Rangers depicts a former
gentleman whose passions were “inflamed…by dissipation and by the evil spell which
seemed to hang over everything in the [Mohawk] Valley, into a sinister and sombre rage
at the Whigs, difficult to distinguish from madness.”14 These home-grown enemies are a
sort of patriot in negative, displaying cruelty and rage instead of heroism and righteous
indignation. This image of the transformed and maddened loyalist continued into the
literature of the twentieth century. Walter Butler appears again in Walter D. Edmunds’
Drums Along the Mohawk, (1936), and is described as having a “whittled attorney’s face”
marked “with a passion of contempt.”15 Butler, the vengeful country gentleman, is altered
by his experiences which had “given him a bitter power” and made him drive against
both reason and nature to attempt the impossible task of besieging the fort at Cherry
Valley. Rather than take the military objective, Butler’s monomania causes the deaths of
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innocents as his Native warriors massacre women and children outside the fort’s walls.16
These works of historical fiction published over the span of more than a century reveal a
persistent image of the vengeful Tory, and are perhaps an indication of the persistent fear
of a disguised enemy lurking in American society.
Fictional Tories in American literature bear striking resemblance to the loyalists
in early American histories. Historical descriptions of two of the most infamous loyalist
partisans, Thomas Brown and David Fanning, are particularly revealing examples of the
belief in the transforming power of Tory vengeance. The “black legend” of Lt. Colonel
Thomas Brown of the East Florida Rangers began almost immediately after the
conclusion of the War of Independence. Because of his intractable loyalism, Brown was
transformed from an English gentleman, newly arrived in the colonies, into a physically
and morally disfigured enemy to liberty. Later historians record that a patriot force
confronted Brown at his home and after a violent altercation, beat the young planter
unconscious, tied him to a tree, scalped and tarred him, and set his legs on fire.17 Early
historians of the American Revolution omitted this violent origin story, blaming Brown’s
zeal for the Tory cause and his thirst for vengeance on his defective character. David
Ramsay’s 1785 history of South Carolina in the Revolution depicts Brown as a principle
villain of the Southern theatre and describes how he tormented civilians, hanged
“beardless youth,” and handed his prisoners off to be tortured by his Indian allies. Hugh
McCall, writing in 1811, presented a similar picture of cruelty. To McCall, Brown’s
“feelings had long been banished from his remorseless bosom, and their place inhabited
by a fiend of darkness.” Like the evil spell which possessed a fictional Walter Butler in
Frederic’s novel, Brown’s vengeance was imbued with a supernatural quality. Nineteenth
century American novelists and historians were unable to find a rational cause for Tories
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like Brown who “gloated in revenge.”18 Just like witches, the internal enemy of the
seventeenth century, the loyalists of the American Revolution were seemingly imbued
with an evil that could only have come from the devil.
Colonel David Fanning received equally harsh treatment from historians. Though
by no means a gentleman, Fanning is a repugnant Tory insurgent in the annals of
American history. From “obscure parentage”, Fanning was described by a nineteenth
century historian as an orphan, runaway, and wanderer who lived at times with the
Catawbas or was fostered by compassionate settlers. He suffered from “the scald head”
and “was so offensive that he never ate at the table with the family or slept in a bed.”
Both his experience with Native Americans and his exclusion from civil society helped
the nineteenth century writer Thomas Wynn explain that Fanning’s support for the
loyalist cause derived not from his allegiance to the King, but from his desire for
personal revenge, unchecked by a civilized soul. At the beginning of the Revolution
Fanning was a Whig supporter, but after being robbed by supposed patriots he “availed
himself of every opportunity to wreak his vengeance on his former friends.” From the
British perspective Fanning was an effective partisan fighter, who even captured the
Governor of North Carolina and hundreds of other important prisoners, but to his patriot
contemporaries he was guilty of “rapine, and cruelty.”19 Indeed, there is no other loyalist
with such a loathsome reputation as Fanning. As late as 1988, Don Higginbotham
described him as both physically and morally “grotesque”, who in addition to his skin
disease “reeked of an unusually strong body odor, [and] had a penchant for teenage
girls”. Perhaps some of these allegations were true, for even in exile Fanning was reviled
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by his fellow loyalists, and was banished from New Brunswick for a rape conviction in
1801.20
Few loyalists had such odious reputations as Fanning and Brown, but men like
William Franklin, Colonel John Butler (Walter Butler’s father), and Joseph Brant
garnered reputations for ruthlessness and treachery, and these attributes were applied to
the loyalists as a group in American histories. Even the normally sympathetic Lorenzo
Sabine described the “horrid warfare” of men like “that incarnate devil John Butler” and
other “predatory bands” which “speak of Tory guilt, and of the horrors of civil war, in
tones, which will ring in the ears of men for centuries to come.”21 Ernest Cruikshank, a
Canadian historian, admitted that Butler and his men “were hard, fierce, and revengeful
men, but it should be remembered that they lived in stormy times, in a hard, fierce, and
revengeful world.”22 Interestingly, Cruickshank does not absolve Butler of his dark
reputation, but merely suggests that he was a product of his time, and was no worse than
his patriot enemies.
Despite some Canadian works defending the loyalists, Sabine’s predictions of
lasting infamy proved correct. The early twentieth century historian Claude Halstead Van
Tyne, while trying to be even-handed, admitted he could “understand why a Tory was ‘a
devil in human shape’ in the eyes of the patriots.” Van Tyne argued that the loyalists
engaged in “acts of war which especially aroused the hatred of the patriots.” While the
British and those involved in “great campaigns…were regarded as honorable
enemies…the men who harassed and worried the country by petty attacks came to be
hated in the most virulent way.” “Tory aggression” and the “horror of massacre” left an
indelible mark on the land, he wrote, and was “fearfully suggestive of the work they
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might have done” had more loyalists not left “their fate to the success of British arms.”23
That some loyalists were ruthless antagonists while most others were sidelined cowards is
a recurring theme in the historiography, but it was obvious to Van Tyne that revenge
motivated the more violent loyalists. This idea was shared by Sydney George Fisher in
The Struggle for American Independence (1908). Fisher condemns the Tory elite, who,
motivated by revenge, “called for the most relentless severity, slaughter, hanging, exile,
and confiscation,” and had they been victorious, America would have faced “the severity
that had been inflicted upon Ireland – no mercy to men, women, or children.” Fisher
justified his counterfactual by citing similar calls from “literary men of England” for “the
extermination of the Boer republics.”24 Such muddled comparisons did little to shed light
on the Revolutionary War, but show the continued image in the American histories of
perfidious Albion and her ruthless Tory allies.
With more immediate examples of insurgencies and asymmetrical wars in the
latter-half of the twentieth century, historians began to see the armed loyalists in more
nuanced shades. William H. Nelson dismissed the idea of the savage Tory outlaw, as he
did the genteel loyalist, as a product of “folk tales of nineteenth century America” and
argued instead for the importance of pre-existing ethnic and religious tensions to explain
the ferocity of the internecine conflict.25 Robert Calhoon also distances himself from the
antiquated tropes of Tory villains and regarded the loyalists as “the most immediate
victims of the war” who took up arms from a variety of overlapping motivations. The
ranks of armed loyalists represented everyone from localized “agrarian radicals” who
fought against patriot landlords, to those who took up arms to preserve their vision of law
and order, and, indeed, to those loyalists who sought to “unleash terrible vengeance on
the rebels”. The guerilla wars of the twentieth century showed Calhoon that partisan
conflict “involves terror inflicted by informal bands of insurgents” and neither loyalists
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nor patriots could be singled-out as more or less ruthless when both were caught up in the
violence.26 Charles Royster followed the same line of thinking when he characterized the
Southern theatre of the conflict as a “vendetta war” between loyalists and Whigs, with
cycles of outrages and reprisals, fueled by pre-existing “family and local hostilities”.27
Likewise, John Shy could admit that “there was little difference between Loyalists and
rebels in terms of organization, tactics, or the use of terror.” Even so, in the same work
Shy writes that loyalist militia units “regarded retribution as their principle function” and
later referred to loyalists as “bitter, angry people bent on vengeance”.28 It seems that even
while attempting to explain the deeper complexities of a civil war, some historians still
presented the loyalists’ goals and motivations as localized, near-criminal expressions of
revenge as opposed to the strategic objectives of their patriot adversaries. This argument
persisted in the twenty first century, as Harry M. Ward’s examination of the “banditti” in
the American Revolution describes them as being composed of loyalists who were, again,
motivated primarily by “revenge and greed”.29
There is another recurring portrait of loyalists in the historiography which is more
indolent and indecisive than violent. As shown in chapter three, charges of cowardice and
unmanly weakness were commonly hurled at loyalists, and this stereotype lingers in the
historiography as well. In his study of British military policy in the American Revolution,
Paul H. Smith notes that when Crown forces finally began to see the logic of arming
loyalists in late 1777, they were underwhelmed by the number of volunteers they
received. Smith suggests that part of the reason for such a disappointing turnout was that
many loyalists had already become disillusioned by the failure of British forces to protect
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loyal subjects. Perhaps more importantly, Smith argues that the “typical American
Loyalist” was “conservative, cautious, abhorring violence” and was therefore
“disinclined to commit himself boldly”. Rather, he was content to leave the fighting to
the British army.30 Wallace Brown also sees “timidity and equivocation” as particular
loyalist traits. He points out that in the early years of the conflict, Crown spokesmen
advised loyal subjects to remain passive and take no part in the struggle, but later British
officials bemoaned the lack of loyalist spirit.31 As will be shown later in this chapter, the
loyalists saw things quite differently and blamed the British commanders’ idleness and
poor decisions for letting victory slip away. Nonetheless, the seemingly paradoxical
extremes of Tory ruthlessness and languor are found throughout the historiography of the
loyalists and they represent two different kinds of loyalist trope: what Nelson calls the
“Tory gentlefolk” and the “fearful outlaws”.32 This suggests a class-based dichotomy
where the low-born were considered the naturally violent loyalists, whereas the elite were
more cowardly until transformed by their quest for vengeance. More recently, Jim
Piecuch noticed that this simultaneous description of loyalists as both unreliable and
dangerously violent mirrors the traits ascribed to Native warriors in contemporary
sources, though he argues that neither group deserves this infamy.33 Native American
men were thought to possess a set of qualities which stood in stark juxtaposition to
colonial American men. They did not work the land or meet their enemies openly; they
were thought unable to control their passions, disdained Christian civilization, and could
be swept up in animalistic and indiscriminate waves of deadly fury.34 As will be shown in
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this chapter, the revolutionaries presented an image of frontier loyalists who resembled
their Native allies in appearance and behaviour. To patriots, these loyalists represented a
corruption of the white heroic patriot ideal. The similarity in the depiction of loyalists and
Native warriors is another reminder of the way in which masculine ideals and opposites
were used to discredit the loyalists and all the patriots’ enemies.
The historiography of the American loyalists shows a shift away from the Tory
villains of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to an appreciation of the complexities
of an ugly civil war exacerbated by competing ethnic groups and long-standing
grievances. It seems clear that neither side can be charged with being more or less
violent, yet the idea that loyalists were the more vengeful party remains a consistent
element in their historical treatment. Yet loyalists, especially gentlemen, were conflicted
about the honour and morality of revenge. While thousands chose to take up arms, many
prominent loyalists felt it was more prudent to allow the Crown to restore order. Other
loyalist gentlemen embraced the cause of armed loyalism which they regarded as
honourable, manly resistance against oppression. The preponderant Whig press managed
to recast the loyalists’ efforts into savage and criminal Tory vengeance. As Thomas Paine
scathingly wrote in 1776, though a Tory “may be cruel, never can [he] be brave.”35 As
this chapter will show, patriots constructed an image of loyalists so degenerated by their
own greed and thirst for revenge that they were transformed into the very antithesis of an
honourable man.

Revenge is a constant in human affairs and appears in literature from Homer, to
the Bible, to modern cinema. Psychologists have puzzled over the thought processes and
impulses that direct humans to avenge perceived wrongs while anthropologists,
sociologists, and ethnographers work to understand the implications and manifestations
of this seemingly innate drive within cultures and societies. Wolfgang Schivelbusch
argues that the “instinct for revenge is as elementary as thirst or sexual desire” and yet is
“also part of a larger behavior complex of exchange” which can be seen in the same vein
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as gift giving or compliments, but is expressed in a darker “spiral of exchange.”36
Regulated by ideas of honour, religious cosmology, laws, and customs, vengeance can
take many forms and can be carried out by individuals, tribes, families, nations, and
empires. Depending on the circumstances, revenge may be considered a right or a
crime.37 Vengeance, when placed in its cultural context, can provide an explanatory
framework for individual murders and genocide alike.38 Societies often design ways to
deal with aggression and revenge in order to prevent the endless cycles of vendetta and
blood vengeance that plagued pre-modern communities and continue to beset the
substrata of modern societies.39 In Arab cultures, the idea of “blood money” was a way
that the perpetrator of a crime could satisfy and atone for his transgression to the victims
or their families.40 In seventeenth and eighteenth century Western Europe, the upper
classes engaged in duels. Duels were not acts of vengeance, but were rather thought,
ideally, to restore a sense of balance and settle accounts. In industrial or post-industrial
societies, citizens have turned over most rights to violent revenge or retaliation to the
state.41
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In the eighteenth century English Atlantic there was no accepted structure for
taking revenge as there was in other cultures. Inter-family vendettas or long-standing
feuds certainly existed, but a combination of litigation and moral condemnation
prevented the sort of open, trans-generational conflicts seen in some Mediterranean
cultures.42 Even though revenge and “primal honor” are inseparably linked and seem
inconsistent with Christian principles and the culture of civility, men and women found
ways to reconcile these two divergent ethical systems.43 Indeed some eighteenth century
thinkers saw vengeance as arising not from the savage impulse of wrath, but from
masculine traits like pride. This did not mean that prideful vengeance was excusable, but
was less blameable, perhaps, than its bloodthirsty cousin. Describing the cut and thrust
world of insult and response he witnessed, Dr. Samuel Johnson noted that many men
“who could have conquered their anger are unable to combat pride”. Social pressures
caused aggrieved men to “pursue offences to the extremity of vengeance, lest they should
be insulted by the triumph of an enemy." Bernard Mandeville would likely have agreed,
claiming in 1714 that while “Religion commands you to leave all Revenge to God,
Honour bids you trust your Revenge to no body but your self…” Christianity, he
asserted, was “built on Humility, and Honour Pride.”44 These men are describing what
Frank Henderson Stewart terms “reflexive honor.” Reflexive honour is, in many ways, an
aspect of rivalry between equals, a phenomenon of horizontal honour where men were
compelled to defend their claim-right of honour. In the context of eighteenth century elite
society, insults and injuries had to be addressed, (as they do in all honour groups, but
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with different conventions), in order to assert one’s right to respect and maintain one’s
place in the hierarchy.45 Yet, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3 (“Honour and Dishonour”
and “Insult”) loyalist gentlemen were so completely dishonoured in their societies
through the rejection of their right to respect and the denial of their role as householders
and landowners, that there was no way to satisfy their honour in any conventional sense.
Such a condition would cause despair and rage which, in eighteenth century thought,
might unhinge a man from his reason and rationality.
Rage, vengeance, and lust were thought to be connected and savage passions. In
the genteel culture of the eighteenth century, anger was an emotion that needed to be
stifled and suppressed. True gentlemen did not to lose their temper, regardless of the
situation. Men of standing felt “resentment” at a slight or insult which was, in the words
of Nicole Eustace, “a quintessentially masculine form of anger both because of its
association with reason…and because of its link to honor.” Blind rage was thought to
express the “animalistic, the criminal, the insane.”46 “The Instructor” who wrote to The
Pennsylvania Gazette in 1754, argued that “Anger and Revenge, when once enter’d, are
very powerful: And the rational Man must exert his whole Force of Reason in Combat
with them or be overthrown.”47 “The Speech of Logan” which appeared in newspapers
throughout the colonies in 1775 after Dunmore’s War against the Shawnee, is indicative
of these eighteenth century beliefs. Logan, “a Shawanese Chief” cries out at the harm
done to his people and how this “called on me for revenge.” “I have fought it” declared
Logan, “I have killed many – I have fully glutted my vengeance.”48 Revenge is clearly
viewed as a savage hunger, yet some thinkers believed it was not without its uses. While
declaring that revenge “must be condemned in a Christian Country,” Dr. John Perkins of
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New England reminded his readers that “[r]evenge seems to be the Rod of Justice in the
Hands of savage Nature to keep the People in Awe and afford the Subject some little
Degree of Security.”49 In a state of nature, without laws or government, people were only
prevented from harming one another out of fear of revenge. Most thinkers would agree,
however, that this primal threat of reprisal was unnecessary and unwelcome in civilized
society.
The drive for revenge and the rage that fuelled it were emotions that had the
potential to transform a decent gentleman into a ferocious beast. This idea can be seen in
the eighteenth century’s literary inheritance. Shakespeare’s plays are filled with tragic
scenes of brutal revenge that turn ostensibly moral people into their own antithesis.
Hamlet’s quest for vengeance spirals into madness; Coriolanus, the great Roman general,
joins his former enemies to wage war on his own city. The list of Elizabethan and
Jacobean revenge plays is long, and each one contains a warning of the transformative
effect of such a destructive craving.50 Although it was a topic considered by essayists and
moralists of the day, the genteel literary world of the eighteenth century did not focus on
exploring vengeance. One notable exception is Edward Young’s drama The Revenge
(1721) wherein an enslaved Moor exacts a terrible vengeance on his Spanish master.
Again this presents revenge as a savage impulse, where the vengeance-seeker is neither
European nor Christian.51 In the generation after the Revolution, revenge became a
popular subject among the Romantic authors as they explored the human passions. Lord
Byron’s Venetian aristocrat, Alp, in The Siege of Corinth (1816) is a “fiery convert” to
revenge, “a renegade” who forsakes his countrymen and joins the Ottoman Turks to
destroy his own people who slighted him. Magua, in Fenimore’s The Last of Mohicans
(1826), is a perfect example of savage vengeance taking aim at the innocent and young.
A later work, Wacousta (1832) by the Canadian author John Richardson follows the same
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theme and tells the tale of an English aristocrat so consumed with his lust for revenge that
he is actually transformed into a terrifying Native warrior.52 In eighteenth and early
nineteenth century literature, revenge was something ancient and primal, something
animalistic and savage. It was practiced by the low-born thug or the foreign-born alien,
and was deeply unchristian. This body of literature written in England, the United States,
and Upper Canada, agreed that revenge brought no honour to a Christian gentleman, but
rather transformed him into his bestial opposite.
These literary ideas and contradictions were reflected in the advice given to
refugees in the loyalist press and from the pulpit. In a sermon entitled A Discourse on
Brotherly Love (1777), the Anglican clergyman and loyalist chaplain Samuel Seabury
condemned the idea of revenge, and compared it to “the impetuosity of mighty waters
[which] will drive us headlong down its furious current; bearing away all the little
remains of principle, overwhelming the feeble restraints of reason.” Though the loyalists
had been badly used by their enemies, pursuing revenge would leave the loyalists
“unsatisfied with any thing but the destruction of its object.” He advised his listeners and
readers to reject the “inordinancy,” the “lust,” “the bitterness of malice and revenge” and
follow “gentle, benign and humane propensities…[to promote] peace, unity, and concord
among the brotherhood of men…”53 Charles Inglis, a fellow clergyman of the Church of
England, echoed these statements, admitting that although his flock had suffered dreadful
persecution and loss at the hands of their enemies, he did not want to “kindle
Resentment,” or “widen a Breach,” “but to recommend Earnestness, Fortitude and
Perseverance.” “For they were not Enemies” he explained, “who occasioned those direful
Scenes. They were Brethren and Fellow Subjects.” The restoration of a just peace, not
revenge was the object of war, and healing, not vengeance, was every Christian’s duty. 54
These men of the cloth were adhering to the Pauline instructions of Romans 12:19 to
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“avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath: for it is written, Vengeance is
mine; I will repay, Saith the Lord,” but not every loyalist preacher agreed with this idea.
While a prisoner in the dreaded copper mines of Newgate, Simeon Baxter, a
“Licentiate in Divinity” of the Church of England, wrote a sermon justifying murderous
revenge against the Continental Congress. Quoting from the Book of Judges, Baxter used
the story of Samson’s revenge on the Philistines to instruct his readers and listeners on
the necessity of the “law of retaliation” which was a “law of nature”. When asked why he
slew the Philistines, Samson replied: “What they have done unto me, so have I done unto
them.” According to Baxter, Samson, Moses, Samuel, and the other champions of Israel
“never alleged the command of God for what they did, but defended themselves upon the
plea of retaliation.” Therefore, Baxter contended, the loyalists were justified in taking
revenge on Congress because “the doctrine of killing tyrants and their adherents is not
murderous, but truly Christian…” The times called for drastic measures, yet the loyalists
lacked heroes to carry out God’s will. There was “no Moses, no Ehud, no Samuel…with
a patriotic dagger to do justice upon our tyrants.” This may have been a veiled slight
against many of the loyalist elite who fled the scene of battle for the safety of England or
New York, but the main reason, according to Baxter, was that men did not “truly
understand the laws of God, nature, and civil society,” nor did they realize the extent of
the societal collapse around them. When “social liberty ceases, and natural liberty
revives…every man is a soldier, a Moses, a Samson, and may, without incurring the guilt
of murder, kill those uncircumcised Philistines…” Not only did Baxter argue that revenge
aligned with Christian principles, he also absolved his listeners and readers from the
dishonour of acts that would be considered cowardly or criminal under normal
circumstances “since we live in evil times.” Citing Plato, Baxter argued that “When
tyrants cannot be expelled by the law, the citizens may use secret practices”, and the
vengeful preacher took issue with men who were unwilling “to kill their oppressor with a
dagger in the dark.” The cause of justice superseded all other concerns, including the idea
that an honourable man should meet his enemies openly. “We have rights of civil society
to restore; we have honour, virtue, and religion, to maintain,” he wrote, “let us therefore
take the first prudent opportunity to revenge our wrongs.”55 This was the transformation
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from polite gentleman to avenger, and though it might be considered savage, Baxter felt
the loyalists were not only fully justified, but had divine sanction as well.
The loyalist newspapers occasionally called for vengeance, but considering both
the small number of loyal presses and the moral ambivalence of openly calling for
revenge, there are only a few extant examples. As the conflict progressed, however, the
calls for manly action and revenge appear to have increased. The works of Jonathan
Odell, the loyalists’ most prolific poet, exhibit this change in the loyalists’ attitudes. His
“Song for St. George’s Day” published as a broadside in the spring of 1777, cheered on
loyal Britons and extolled them to let “Vengeance arm your Hands!” “Seize and
Destroy!” the poet cries. At this early stage in the conflict, with New York firmly in
British hands and with Crown forces mustering for an invasion of rebel territory from
Canada and from New York, his calls for vengeance appear to be mere rhetorical
flourish. In the following lines, Odell is much more conciliatory and reminds his readers
in the next stanza “Let Pity melt in British Eyes/Let Mercy still be shown.” Repeated
throughout the song are the lines “But let not Havoc reign!/ The Brave alone, in Triumph,
know/ Soft Pity’s tender Pain.”56 Odell distances himself from the idea of savage
vengeance, but seemingly admits to the necessity of some measure of revenge to
engender a martial spirit. Once again this shows the ambivalence of not only the loyalist
elite’s attitude towards vengeance, but the common understanding of the passion in the
eighteenth century. As Simon Luttrell declared in the House of Commons in 1775,
revenge was “unchristian…yet how rarely do we find the human soul possessed of a
sublime heroism, without this alloy!”57
By 1779, however, Odell was less mollifying. By this point Burgoyne’s army was
defeated and captured, Philadelphia had been abandoned, and the French had entered the
war, all while Parliament squabbled. The British war plan had also shifted from the North
to the South, a move which left many loyalists in New York questioning the wisdom of
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British commanders.58 In “The Congratulation,” a new bitterness and anger is clear as
Odell exults in rebel and French losses. Hoping that the loyalists might finally have their
moment, Odell writes: “Myriads of swords are ready for the field/ Myriads of lurking
daggers are conceal’d/ In injured bosoms, dark revenge is nurst [sic]/ Yet but a moment,
and the storm shall burst.”59 The call for restraint and pity from his previous writings is
replaced by visions of a storm of warriors and assassins seeking swift justice. The loyalist
frustration with the war can also be seen in a fanciful script for a “Prologue to the
Tragedy of the Revenge” printed in The Royal Pennsylvania Gazette in March 1778, just
prior to the British evacuation in June. After comparing the American rebellion to the
regenerative giant Antous, whom Hercules repeatedly defeated but could not kill, the
author describes the treacherous behaviour of the Continentals and their mistreatment of
British prisoners. “Away with Grief,” cries the narrator, “Our God shall be
REVENGE.”60 What happens next in the play is not printed, but it is clear that the call
for revenge was becoming more common.
Beginning in 1779, loyalist associations, irregular units, and privateers were
openly publishing their intentions to seek vengeance against the rebels. In February a
group “from the province of Massachusetts Bay, and other loyalists” responded to the
“many injuries and indignities” and the punitive laws passed by the “the usurped
government of that province” by formally declaring themselves the patriots’ “avowed
enemies” who would “from this time, commence and carry on hostility against the rebels
and their adherents…” The loyalists declared that they were “actuated by the eldest law
of nature, [and] we apprehend ourselves fully justified by the laws of God and man, in
making retaliations and reprisals.”61 The Association of Loyal Refugees of Rhode Island
circulated a broadside in March of the same year, listing very similar complaints against
the rebels, and declaring they were “warranted by the Laws of God and Man, to wage war
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against their inhuman Persecutors; and to use every Means in their Power to obtain
redress and Compensation for the indignities and Losses they have suffered.”62 By 1779
the loyalists were freely publishing their desire for revenge, and they, like Simeon Baxter,
believed this was natural, legal, and divinely ordained. Yet they also had to be conscious
of preserving their own integrity in the eyes of the British and their fellow loyalists.
When loyalist gentlemen openly spoke of their desire for revenge they framed
their sentiments in the language of justice and many refused to consider the prospect of
peace without first punishing the rebels for their crimes. James Simpson, a prominent
loyalist and former Attorney General of South Carolina, wrote to Sir Henry Clinton in
May 1780 that the loyalists in his region were “resentful of their past Injuries, they are
clamourous [sic] for retributive Justice, and affirm that the Province will never be settled
in Pease [sic] until those People whose persecuting spirit hath caused such calamities to
their fellow subjects shall receive the punishments their Iniquities deserve.”63 It is quite
likely that Simpson was expressing his own feelings in the report, and would have known
that he was not alone in seeing just retribution as a necessary requirement for peace.
The desire for righteous vengeance is also present in the correspondence of
gentlemen loyalists. A colleague of the beleaguered Joseph Galloway wrote that he
would “suffer much in my property but will bear it cheerfully, provided the day of
retribution is not passed.” Galloway agreed, writing that he wished “every rebell [would]
receive his deserts.” John Blackburn, reflecting on the treatment Sir John Johnson’s
family had met at the hands of the rebels, (see chapter 2), wrote knowingly that “It is my
opinion…that he will have his Revenge upon…his enemies.” The young Henry Nase,
who had almost been impressed into the Continental Army before escaping to join the
King’s American Legion, described how his desire to settle scores had divine
approbation. He wrote that he was “Looking forward to that hastening period when the
Law of Retaliation shall take place & God in his way Shall see fit to Restore a sistim [sic]
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of happiness In this Distracted land.”64 Nase’s personal yearning for revenge is seemingly
couched in the Biblical idea of Judgement Day. In 1780, the Reverend Jacob Bailey
wrote Rev. Samuel Peters, about his written attacks on the “fathers of rebellion.” “It is
true private revenge without any view to redress and reform discovers [i.e. reveals] a
faulty disposition,” he wrote, “but a proper resentment upon certain occasions may be
attended with public utility.”65 In the end, Bailey likely agreed with Nase that while
vengeance should be left to God, a restrained expression of the primal urge might help
restore justice to the land.
Even with these private and public expressions of “retributive justice,” it was
unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman to advocate bloody retaliation. Especially in
light of patriot accusations of Tory barbarity, which will be described later in this chapter,
loyalist gentlemen sought to present themselves as sensible, humane individuals, who had
been attacked by heartless rebels and mistreated for no reason but their steadfast loyalty.
The New Jersey loyalist Lt. James Moody took pains to disclaim the bogey-man
reputation he had garnered as a successful partisan leader.66 In his narrative, Moody
describes an oath that he supposedly required his men take before they embarked on their
missions. Renouncing malicious vengeance, they swore to respect property, to protect
fellow loyalists, and “in case of our taking any prisoners, I will endeavour to treat them as
well as our situation will admit of.”67 The Maryland loyalist Captain John Ferdinand
Dalziel Smyth of the Queen’s Rangers recounted the cruelties he suffered at the hands of
the rebels in his published narrative, but he avowed it “would be unworthy of the British
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arms to retaliate cruelty, and it is far from my disposition to wish it.”68 Yet retaliation had
a powerful effect on eighteenth century men at arms. Even George Washington admitted
that while the “Obligation arising from the Rights of Humanity, and claims of Rank are
universally binding”, that obligation dissolved if enemy cruelty demanded retaliation.69 In
any war, this idea of justifiable revenge can quickly degenerate into a cycle of atrocities.
As the Rev. Charles Inglis wrote in 1780, “Civil Wars are always more cruel and more
barbarous than foreign Wars, and more destructive to Morals…” In a war between
neighbours and kin, he wrote, “personal Revenge and Animosity mingle and kindle up
the soul to tenfold rage.”70
This “personal revenge” was precisely what British commanders wanted to avoid
and so they were wary of employing armed loyalists in the early stages of the war. As
General Burgoyne explained to the House of Commons before he departed for America
in 1775, his duty was to deliver the “correction of the state” not indulge in the
“impetuous impulse of passion and revenge.” He did not anticipate a problem with
achieving that goal since “there is a certain charm in the very wanderings and dreams of
liberty that disarms an Englishman’s anger.”71 Burgoyne’s tone of a “generous enemy”
may have appealed to a British audience eager to restore peace and commerce, but this
gentle spirit, while certainly en vogue among London’s elite, was not what many loyalists
in America hoped for in their British commanders. By 1778, loyalists in and around New
York City had split into two loose factions: one made up of moderates, who wanted to
see a reconciliation, and the hardliners who wanted the British to engage in harsher
measures to crush the revolution and punish the rebels.72 These two attitudes again
corresponded with the two general poles of thought on vengeance: one genteel and
restrained; the other violent and active. The prominent loyalist Andrew Elliot of New
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York was well aware of the refugees’ anger, and had deep misgivings about the potential
bloodshed revenge could produce. He advised British commanders that “It will be
dangerous to use Refugees but as the Commander in Chief directs and to him alone they
should look up”. In other words, it was essential that British officers always have control
of the loyalists. If they were allowed to operate under their own commanders it “will
produce disagreeable consequences in times when revenge and necessity go hand in hand
and England aims at conciliating more than conquering.”73Most British officers agreed
with Elliot, but hardline loyalists chafed at the perceived timidity, indolence, and inaction
of British commanders.
To many loyalists “revenge and necessity” truly were inseparable, and their
resentment towards British commanders was a constant refrain throughout the conflict. In
1778 the loyalist James Parker described William and Richard Howe as the “fatal
brothers” who, through their inaction, “brought many of the best [loyalists]…to
destruction & death.”74 Joseph Stansbury, a prolific loyalist penman, turned his attention
to attacking the lethargic response of General Henry Clinton to patriot forage expeditions
in loyalist territory in 1779. “For revenge let the loyalists bellow” declares Stansbury’s
fictionalized General, “I swear I’ll not do more/ To keep them in humour/ Than to play
on my violoncello.”75 William Franklin held a similar view and wrote that “many of the
Loyalists in America think they have Reason to complain not only of Slights and
Inattentions, but of Ill-usage, from those who ought to have favoured and encouraged”
the friends of lawful government. William Franklin became the leader of the hardline
loyalist faction in New York, and along with Governor William Tryon and others,
advocated violent and sustained attacks on rebel-held territory to force Congress to a
negotiated settlement. Sir Henry Clinton, the British forces’ overall commander from
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1778 to 1782, flatly refused to consider loyalist plans for intensifying the war, fearing
that the loyalists’ plans would lead to “a system of war horrid beyond conception.”76
Despite Clinton’s misgivings, the inconsistent British policy towards the loyalists
provided plenty of opportunities for the refugees to seek revenge against their enemies.
British employment of armed loyalists was, according to Paul H. Smith, made up
of “ad hoc responses to constantly changing conditions”, but after Saratoga and
especially after the French entered the conflict, the British realized they needed every
man they could get.77 By this point the hopeful, conciliatory attitude of British
commanders had worn off and was replaced with a greater willingness to use the loyalists
and engage in what British Major Patrick Ferguson described as a “degree of severity,
which would not have been justifyable[sic] at the beginning…”78 This shift in British
policy corresponds with the already described change in loyalist rhetoric towards
vengeance. Whether one caused the other, or they merely coincided is an open question,
but the emergence of a force of armed loyalist hardliners had a significant impact on both
the war effort and the loyalist portrayal in the patriot press.
From the patriot perspective, loyalist fighters were politically dead members of
their respective states who could not honourably bear arms for another country. Therefore
the Whig press interpreted every act of belligerent loyalism as criminal expressions of
Tory vengeance whether the loyalists were in uniform or not. Loyalist fighters were
considered spies, murderers, or bandits, not legitimate fighters. The patriot press never
used the terms “Tory soldier” or “loyalist soldier” to describe them as they did the British
regulars.79 Put simply, loyalists did not fight with honour. They were regarded as either
ineffective fighters who waited for British success to strike their helpless victims, or were
half-savages who incited slaves and Native warriors and directed their fury against the
innocent. These images of cowardly, dependent, greedy, and vengeful bandits in many
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ways reflect the more widely held tropes in the English Atlantic of highwaymen, pirates,
and other dishonourable sorts who, according to Erin Mackie, helped craft the parameters
of what it meant to be a polite, honourable gentleman. The Tory, like the pirate, became
the antithesis of the brave patriot and the honourable man.80

The civil war between loyalists and patriots produced some of the most infamous
events of the Revolution. These helped forge the image of the vengeful Tory monster in
the patriot imagination, while also providing the loyalists with tales of victory and
successful revenge. In the southern theatre, in the Neutral Ground surrounding New York
City, and on the western frontier, a vicious war of atrocity and revenge destroyed farms
and homes, and killed thousands. Though very few loyalist gentlemen were actually
involved in these conflicts, sensationalized reports from the front served to sculpt the
patriot opinion of the loyalists in general. Refugee gentlemen were far more likely to join
or financially invest in privateering expeditions which had the potential for violent
revenge, but perhaps more importantly, could refill much depleted coffers and help
restore independence and the approximation of an honourable and genteel lifestyle. The
patriot reports of loyalists in arms which appeared in newspapers were clearly intended to
show that the dishonoured Tories were not like the patriot soldiers. Loyalist fighters were
seen as weak and dependent on the British for support or were exceptionally brutal and
operated outside of the norms of civilized behaviour. The loyalist ranks were supposedly
filled with the dregs of the earth, Scottish convicts and Jacobites, slaves and paupers, or
ruthless Native warriors. These were the only creatures desperate or depraved enough to
follow white loyalist officers, who were themselves depicted as loathsome corruptions of
manhood.
In the first two years of the conflict the revolutionary press depicted loyalists as
laughably weak, ineffective, and poorly led. Far from being a military threat, the loyalists
who fled to the British in 1775 and 1776 were remarkable in the press for their
insignificance. The Connecticut Gazette revelled in the fact that “the Refugee Tories are
taken but little Notice of by either Party” while another publication described the loyalists
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“as sheep in the fold” who forced the British to “listen to their lamb-like bleatings…”81
Similarly, the loyalists who flocked to New York City after its capture were equally
derided and described as “poor Devils…wandering about the city like lost sheep…”82
While this phrase contains a rare tinge of sympathy for the loyalists, it is more or less
negated by equating the loyalists with sheep – blindly following, willingly corralled, and
too impotent to change their circumstances.
The loyalists who managed to take up arms in the early stages of the conflict were
similarly mocked by the rebel press. Patriot newspapers reported that the few armed
loyalists in Boston were treated as night watchmen and did little honourable service. The
Pennsylvania Packet jeeringly reported the formation of a Boston regiment of
“ragamuffin Tories” led by “four-eyed Morgan, the fiddler”.83 Other loyalist units were
similarly ridiculed. A Worcester, Massachusetts force styling itself the “Loyal Fencible
Americans” was dismissed as being comprised of “some head tories, a few negroes, and
some Scotch Rebels and Convicts”. Reports of Virginia’s loyalist forces were described
as “the poorest, miserable wretches” of the region and consisted of “black companies” led
by “Scotch Tories”.84 The recurring refrain that loyalists were all either of Scottish or
African descent was a way for the Anglo-Protestant majority to malign the Tories as a
mongrel or subhuman threat. The Scottish “rebels and convicts” reported in the
newspapers invoked visions of furious, yet primitive Highlanders who fought to restore a
hated Catholic king. In Virginia, the Scottish minority of Norfolk included a powerful
merchant elite which held the Tidewater planters in their debt. 85 The repeated references
to African American recruits in the loyalist ranks pointed to the lowly status of Crown
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supporters, but more importantly, highlighted the terrifying prospect of servile
insurrection. Virginia Governor Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation of November 1775
promised freedom to the slaves of patriot masters if they fought for the British.86 This
new British policy earned the Scottish Lord the moniker “Negro Thief of Virginia.” The
Pennsylvania Evening-Post expressed horror at Dunmore’s “cruel declaration” and
within a week reported that roving bands of escaped slaves were taking revenge, with
British blessing, on the families and property of white gentlemen. The home of Benjamin
Wells, for example, was attacked by a group of escaped slaves who “pillaged every thing
valuable, such as bedding, wearing apparel, liquors…and carried off two Negro girls.”87
Such scenes horrified white Americans, and as Woody Holton argues, Dunmore’s
willingness to employ escaped and supposedly vengeful slaves in Britain’s cause pushed
many moderate Virginians squarely into the rebel camp. That Dunmore organized the
slaves into his “Ethiopian regiment” with uniforms emblazoned with the phrase “Liberty
to Slaves” helped transform colonial resistance in Virginia into an open rebellion with the
underpinnings of a race war.88
As threatening as the prospect of a British-directed slave uprising was, early
patriot victories against the motley bands of Tories and their African American allies
provided further evidence in patriot newspapers of the essential ineptitude of their
domestic enemy and the prowess of their own fighting men. Printed reports from across
the colonies described patriot units rounding up scattered Tories, disarming them, or
forcing them to flee. Organized loyalist resistance suffered two widely publicized defeats
at Great Bridge in Virginia on December 9, 1775, and at Moore’s Creek Bridge in North
Carolina on February 27, 1776. Both of these encounters involved ill-advised charges
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across bridges against entrenched patriots. Colonel William Woodford informed the
Virginia Convention of the patriots’ lopsided victory at Great Bridge, and provided
details of the aftermath which included the fate of a captured Scottish-born loyalist. In
disgust, Woodford “ordered him coupled to one of his brother black soldiers, with a pair
of handcuffs”, he wrote, “which is the resolution I have taken shall be the fate of all these
cattle…”89 This was a symbolic and degrading punishment for crossing racial barriers
and inciting slaves, but the use of the term “cattle” was an insinuation that the loyalists
gave themselves up like mindless beasts of burden and cannon fodder for the British. The
Pennsylvania Ledger published similar details, and while “the worst of the tories” at
Great Bridge were reportedly shackled to slaves, many of the loyalists were considered
too weak to be threatening, and a patriot noted that the “most stupid kind we
discharge.”90
Patriot newspapers described the Scottish loyalists defeated at Moore’s Creek
Bridge in much the same way. The Highlanders revealed their dim-witted savagery by
charging across the bridge in “the most furious manner” and were easily shot down by
the patriots who “behaved with the spirit and intrepidity becoming freemen, contending
for their dearest privileges.”91 A letter in The Pennsylvania Evening Post reported the
Tory defeat in detail, counting the number of times the loyalist commander had been
shot, and the cowardly escape attempts of hundreds of others. The writer singled out a
man named Tom Rutherford, for instance, who “ran like a lusty fellow” but was captured
nonetheless.92 The loyalists at both Great Bridge and Moore’s Creek Bridge were not
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complimented for their brave charges, but were depicted as doltish, disorganized, and
cowardly. Next to the resourceful and skilled patriots, the loyalists looked dishonourable
indeed. In the early years of the war, the patriots were wary of the potential menace posed
by slaves, but were seemingly dismissive of loyalists’ military threat. The Tories, patriots
claimed, did not have the courage or competence to fight their own battles.
Throughout the war loyalists were often depicted as cruel toadies or scavengers,
tagging along behind the British to plunder the wounded and weak. When protected by
British arms, the loyalists were depicted as exceptionally cruel. The Marquis de
Chastellux described the British Army as a “hurricane which destroyed every thing in its
passage” but it “was followed by a scourge yet more terrible, a numerous rabble, under
the title of Refugees and Loyalists [who] followed the army, not to assist in the field, but
to partake of the plunder.”93 Ethan Allen recorded that during his captivity in New York
City, the loyalists were the most sadistic of the guards. Secure in their position of power
over the helpless revolutionaries, Allen recorded witnessing “the tories exulting over the
dead bodies of their murdered countrymen.” 94 Loyalists were also thought to be the evil
behind New York Governor William Tryon’s policy of “desolation warfare” and his
devastating raids on the Connecticut coast in July 1779.95 The raids on New Haven,
Fairfield, and Norwalk, were mostly carried out by British regulars, but the loyalists were
implicated nonetheless. The Connecticut Courant called Tryon “the Tories kind
protector”, and erroneously reported later in summer that the Governor was at the head of
“three thousand Refugees and Tories”. The prospect of an army of vengeful plunderers
led by “a detestable salamander” sent by “the vice regent Satan” was a terrifying prospect
for coastal communities.96 A letter from Priscilla Lothrop Burr to her sister describes the
carnage and terrorism inflicted on the town of Fairfield, and notes how even amid the
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directed chaos of the British raids, the loyalists were the cruelest raiders of them all. In
one instance, British soldiers burst into her sister’s bedroom and “damned her” while they
plundered the house of all the valuables they could find. In response, Governor Tryon
personally wrote a protection for Mrs. Burr and her home. Nonetheless, when a group of
loyalist militants arrived at her home, “they Damned her and tore [Tryon’s protection] to
pieces in her hand, and instantly set fire to the house & swore that if she offered to put it
out they would Stab her to the heart…” Interestingly, Burr notes that “our Tories were
treated with no more respect” by the loyalist raiders, who “abused old Mrs. Rowland very
much, Draged her about by the hair of her head, tore her cloaths of[f], and swore they
would kill her…” To Priscilla Burr, Tory vengeance was indiscriminate rage. Burr
concludes her letter by describing the “heaps of naked Chimneys seemingly left for
monuments to bewail the Loss of those Pleasent habbitations.”97 Though it was the
British who descended upon Fairfield, according to Burr it was the Tories who carried
out the most barbarous acts. Tryon’s raiders burned over 180 structures with only a
fraction of those being public buildings. Official reaction to the raids was sharp in
America and Britain. The British commander-in-chief Sir Henry Clinton worried about
gaining a reputation as a “buccaneer” and relieved Tryon of his command the following
year.98
While the patriot press depicted Tories as little more than cruel outlaws,
thousands of loyalist refugees enlisted in uniformed provincial regiments. For the rank
and file, membership in loyalist units provided a steady income, and most received
generous enlistment bounties and promises of land at the conclusion of the war. Yet
loyalist units also faced considerable problems from what historian Paul H. Smith termed
a “catalogue of inconsistencies.” Loyalists in different regiments could have wildly
different signing bonuses, causing resentment and confusion, and loyalist officers chafed
at their junior status and lack of privileges compared with their British counterparts.99
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British officers always doubted the quality of loyalist troops and their officers, and yet
bemoaned the failure of more loyalists to enlist.100 In 1778, after the serious reversal at
Saratoga and the entrance of the French into the conflict, British commanders began to
take the loyalist regiments more seriously and offer more generous terms for enlistments
which included the same pensions and gratuity for wounded officers that the British
received. By the end of the conflict this change in policy produced a number of
respectable loyalist regiments with both loyalist and British officers, such as the Queen’s
Loyal Rangers under John Graves Simcoe and the British Legion under Banastre
Tarleton, but there never seemed to be enough recruits.101 These loyalist regiments
brought pride to the refugees and there was never a lack of loyalist officers since former
men of property routinely sought to regain their honour and status with military service.
In fact there were so many loyalists who, in the words of George Leonard, came from “a
rank in life superior to the class from which the common seaman and soldier is taken”
that many were unable to find suitable appointments and instead turned to privateering.102
The loyalist press hailed provincial regiments as the agents of justice and
retribution. In April 1778, the Royal Pennsylvania Gazette recorded with satisfaction that
“the loyal refugees, who had formerly felt the effects of [the patriots’] lawless
power…now rejoice to bring the culprits to justice.” The article describes the Queen’s
Rangers heroically destroying a party of rebel marauders for which the grateful
“inhabitants from all quarters flocked to them” to sell their goods to the loyalists at fair
prices.103 Likewise the New York Gazette reported that a combined loyalist force under
John Graves Simcoe, Banastre Tarleton, and Oliver DeLancey surprised a force of rebels
and “so briskly charged, that many of [the Continentals] forgot their Arms…and fled…”
Adding a comical nod to rebel cowardliness and bumbling, the newspaper recorded that
the patriot “Colonel…scamper[ed] off without his Breeches or Boots”.104 Such
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propaganda pieces were intended to show that the loyalists could take revenge with
honour, in an organized and directed fashion. As would be expected of any propaganda,
victories reported in loyalist newspapers were depicted as massacres in the patriot press,
and vice versa. Just as importantly, these brief descriptions of skirmishes actually
represent a cycle of violence and retaliation that characterized loyalist and patriot conflict
throughout the war.
This phenomenon of violence and retaliation can best be seen in one of the most
infamous battles between patriots and loyalists. The Battle of Waxhaws, which took place
in South Carolina on May 29, 1780, involved around 150 cavalry of the British Legion
under Lt. Col. Tarleton and an infantry force of over four hundred Continental regulars
under Colonel Abraham Buford. Caught in the open, Buford refused a command to
surrender and Tarleton’s force charged. At ten yards the Continentals fired a volley which
killed several officers and dozens of horses, but the loyalists broke the patriot line.
Banastre Tarleton recorded years later that his men then attacked the rebels with “a
vindictive asperity not easily restrained” killing 112 and badly wounding another 150.105
The loyalists lost only 5 men. Tarleton’s brief account of the clash was printed in the
loyalist New York Gazette which trumpeted his victory, declaring that he “had attacked
and cut them to Pieces.” According to Tarleton, this engagement, combined with the
British victory at Camden, convinced the backcountry militias to join the royal forces.106
In fact the effect was quite the opposite. When news of this incident spread it became a
story of Tories butchering surrendered patriots. Because of the consistent propaganda
image of vicious vengeful Tories, the story easily took root. Writing in 1785, David
Ramsay noted how this “barbarous massacre gave a more sanguinary turn to the war.”
More impassioned than ever, patriots were fired by a “spirit of revenge [which] gave a
keener edge to military resentments.”107 Even a loyalist historian writing after the war
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conceded that at the Battle of Waxhaws “the virtue of humanity was totally forgot.”108 To
the patriots, their righteous vengeance was fully justified because of the loyalists’ war
crimes. The clearest example of the patriots’ revenge was at the Battle of King’s
Mountain (described in chapter 4), where patriots fired on several white flags from the
surrounded loyalists, and executed numerous prisoners. This was but one example of the
revenge and reprisals of the civil war in the Southern theatre.109 The Battle of Waxhaws
was a shockingly lopsided loyalist victory but is a prime example of how the patriots
managed to turn a resounding defeat into a public relations coup. In this case loyalist
success was characterized as a dishonourable act of savage revenge and barbarity which
served to justify further acts of retaliation. Overall, this loyalist victory severely damaged
the British war effort and was fatal to many loyalists in the South. The “disagreeable
consequences” of employing loyalist troops predicted by the New York loyalist Andrew
Elliot had come to pass.
Some gentlemen loyalists deeply resented accusations that they revelled in
personal vengeance while carrying out their duties, and attempted to clear their names.
James DeLancey, a prominent member of the powerful DeLancey family of New York
and leader of the Corps of Loyalist Westchester Refugees, or “DeLancey’s Cowboys” as
they were more popularly known, chafed at the idea that he ordered or permitted his men
to loot and pillage the “Neutral Ground” between British and revolutionary occupied
New York. This area swarmed with foraging parties, guerilla fighters, and simple outlaws
who ravaged the farms and houses of the region. Both the British and Continental armies
employed private bands that specialized in raiding farms and stealing cattle from the
enemy. Though this was hardly honourable, it was considered a tactical necessity which
both wounded the enemy’s ability to wage war and supplied friendly troops.110
DeLancey, however, complained to Guy Carleton in 1783 that his troops were unfairly
blamed for these actions and that even some of his fellow loyalists “secretly endeavour to
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prejudice him” by blaming “every Irregularity committed…[on] the Refugees under his
Command tho’ most of [the crimes] have originated from other People who have no
Connection with that Corp.”111 Accounts of DeLancey’s actions were spun in markedly
different directions in loyalist and patriot newspapers. The loyalist New York Gazette
reported that a “successful incursion” by “Col. De Lancey” and “his loyal Band of
Refugees” had killed ten rebels and taken thirty seven prisoners along with “Trophies,
consisting…of over one hundred Head of Cattle.” The loyal band unfortunately lost “a
brave Office, Captain Fowler” who was shot from a nearby house which “occasioned a
severe Retribution – The House was immediately consumed to Ashes.”112 While this
event was recorded as a clean victory in the loyalist press, the same event was described
in the patriot Connecticut Gazette as a “descent” by the “enemy’s plunderers,
commanded by Col. Delancey” who “did their King, not their country service, by burning
two houses, in one of which was an old deaf woman who [sic] they let expire in the
flames, and murdering five of the militia.”113 Indeed, though later American historians
labelled DeLancey and his men “worthless and criminal” and claimed that they were
guilty of carrying out “terrible devastation and suffering”, interviews recorded with
surviving witnesses in the early nineteenth century paint a different picture. DeLancey
and his officers purportedly did their best to restrain their men, punish transgressions, and
conduct their missions within acceptable limits of wartime behaviour. 114 Historian
Catherine Crary judges that DeLancey’s Cowboys, acting under British orders to carry
out forage missions and other raids of military necessity, did not deserve the reputation
that history heaped upon them.115
Other loyalists in the Neutral Ground were not as concerned with their reputations
and engaged openly in the cycle of revenge and localized conflicts of the Revolutionary
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War. Newspaper coverage of the capture and execution of the “Tory villain” Claudius
Smith is a prime example of how these raiding expeditions led to intensely personal
vendettas. Local legends and lore described the Smiths of Orange County, New York as a
rough backwoods family who had always displayed a predilection for thievery. When
fighting broke out in New York, Smith, along with several of his sons and neighbours,
declared allegiance to the British and began their own private campaign against patriots
in the region, stealing cattle and other goods and selling their plunder in British occupied
New York.116
The Smith gang targeted the homes of prominent Whigs and according to a
nineteenth century historian, Claudius Smith was “foremost in daring wickedness” and
boldly promised to take the lives of several Continental officers in the region.117 In
October 1778, The Pennsylvania Evening Post reported that Smith and his men attacked
the home of “Captain [Jesse] Woodhull…whom…they intended to murder” and robbed
his family of “a silver tankard and spoons, a scarlet cloak, two horses, a saddle, a pair of
pistols, and all the clothes belonging to a young man who lodged in the house.” Unable to
find the captain, Smith allegedly locked “Mrs. Woodhull, her children and Negroes…in a
room and leaving them there.” He then rode to the nearby home of the Major Nathaniel
Strong, Woodhull’s cousin, and after a brief fire fight, Smith “called to [Strong] and told
him to deliver up his arms, and he should have quarter…” After Strong agreed to the
terms, Smith reportedly shot the surrendered patriot in the face and neck killing him
instantly.118 What prompted Smith to target and murder Strong is not discussed in the
newspaper article. This act of cold-blooded murder, made all the worse because of the
promise to spare Strong’s life, served as further proof of the dishonourable, half-crazed
Tory archetype bent on blind vengeance so often repeated in the Whig press.
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Reports of Smith’s crimes and treachery made their way to the state’s legislature.
The New York Senate described Smith as the “great Terror of the Inhabitants” and
offered a thousand dollar bounty for his capture and five hundred dollars each for his
sons Richard and James, and other members of their group. A day after news of Strong’s
murder appeared in The Pennsylvania Evening Post, the bounties were raised to twelve
hundred and six hundred dollars respectively.119 Bounty hunters tracked down Smith and
captured him on Long Island in November and he was hanged at Goshen, New York.120
Claudius Smith’s son Richard carried on the conflict, and evidently swore revenge
for his father’s execution. In 1779, patriot newspapers reported his attacks on
revolutionary fighters “who had shewn some activity and resolution in apprehending
these robbers and murderers, who infested the neighbourhood”. In March he shot and
killed John Clarke, a patriot militiaman who lived just long enough to identify his
murderer.121 The Royal Gazette printed the same report as the patriot papers, but included
the contents of a note Smith pinned to John Clark’s body, entitled “A Warning to the
Rebels.” “You are hereby warned at your peril to desist from hanging any more friends of
government as you did Claudius Smith…” the note began, “we are determined to hang
six for one, for the blood of the innocent cries aloud for vengeance.” The threats are made
all the more chilling when the author informs the rebels that many of the gang actually
belong to “Col. Butler’s army, Indians as well as white men…that are resolved to be
revenged on you for your cruelty and murder.” Smith placed the blame for all this
violence and mayhem on the patriots who were the “beginners and aggressors” whose
“cruel oppressions and bloody actions…drive us [loyalists] to it.” “This is the first,”
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concludes the note, “and we are determined to pursue it on your heads and leaders to the
last, till the whole of you are murdered.”122 For patriot readers this would have been
added evidence of the terrifying lengths that Tories would go in their quest for
vengeance, allying themselves with Native warriors and murdering innocent people. The
loyalist newspaper obviously thought this was worth including and did not provide any
editorial comment. Loyalists, as already shown, would have been divided on the justice
of Smith’s actions, but for Smith and hardline Tories, the grizzly act of pinning a note to
the victim was an attempt to restore a sense of primal, reflexive honour. Even primal
revenge could not be random. The victim needed to understand who was carrying out the
vengeance and why. With the breakdown of society in the Neutral Ground, this was an
example of men who believed they were employing revenge as a “Rod of Justice” which,
as Dr. John Perkins explained, was a way for “savage Nature to keep the People in Awe
and afford the Subject some little Degree of Security.” The threats were intended to
protect other loyalists, and affixing the note to a corpse provided terrifying proof of the
refugees’ sincerity. What some loyalists might regard as a cruel necessity the patriots saw
as savage criminality, and the cycle of violence continued. Indeed, this was not even a
unique case.
A similar act of vengeance, which became one of the most notorious of the entire
war, was carried out by members of the Associated Board of Loyalists. The Associated
Loyalists were a force of several hundred refugees who pooled their resources and
operated as privateers answerable to a board of directors led by William Franklin.123 The
main focus of the “Associators” was self-support through raids, but, just as the British
commanders feared, the activities of the Associated Loyalists were often directed towards
revenge. In early 1782, an Associated Loyalist named Philip White, a close friend of
William Franklin, was killed by patriot forces. The loyalists claimed this was an
extralegal execution, while the patriots reported he had been killed attempting to escape.
Frustrated at the British forces’ refusal to act, and reeling from the surrender at Yorktown
months earlier, Richard Lippincott, a loyalist Captain, sailed to patriot-held New Jersey
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with a rebel prisoner named Joshua Huddy, made a landing, and hanged him. Like
Richard Smith, Lippincott affixed a note to the hanging corpse which declared that the
loyalists would not “suffer without taking vengeance for the numerous cruelties” and
“further determine to hang man for man as long as a refugee is left existing.” The note
concluded with the terse yet chilling declaration: “Up goes HUDDY for PHILIP
WHITE.”124 When news of this reached General Clinton and the rest of the British
command, they were furious, and ordered an investigation. Washington personally
demanded Clinton turn over the loyalists responsible, or “a British Officer of equal Rank
must atone for the Death of the unfortunate Huddy.”125 The loyalists defended their
actions as just retaliation and even self-defence against the atrocities committed against
them. Lippincott was eventually cleared of the murder charge by a British court martial,
but William Franklin, as head of the Associated Loyalists, was unofficially recognized as
the architect of the whole affair and his character was tarnished. The debate over the
honour and justice of this act of revenge caused an irreparable rift between the loyalists
struggling to keep Britain in the fight, and Sir Guy Carleton who was anxious to defuse
the situation with the Americans as he prepared to extricate Britain from her former
colonies. To end the cycle of revenge, Carleton refused to consent to any further raids by
the now notorious privateers. The Associated Loyalists, to the British commanders’
relief, disbanded out of frustration in August 1782.126 The Marquis de Chastellux
recorded his thoughts on the “shame and indignation” of the Huddy case, writing that the
“English General” was “unable to enforce discipline in his own army” out of fear of
“irritating Governor Franklin and his envenomed board of loyalists.”127 Like the popular
depiction of Britain’s Native allies, the vengeful loyalists had become savage and
uncontrollable.

124

The New Jersey Gazette, April 24, 1782.

125

George Washington to Continental Congress, April 20, 1782. Series 3a, Varick Transcripts. Letterbook
6, 221. George Washington Papers, Library of Congress.
126

Skemp, 256-266. Henry Clinton to William Franklin, April 20, 1782, Series 4, General Correspondence,
Image 390. George Washington Papers, Library of Congress. Tebbenhoff, “The Associated Loyalists,” 143.
127

Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North America, Vol. 1, 337.

231
The Board of Associated Loyalists was the largest and most widely-known group
of loyalist privateers, but thousands of other refugees engaged in the same practice.
Formed in 1781, the Associated Loyalists cited two main goals of their group. The first
was to provide some sort of “comfort to those now suffering under the iron [rod] of rebel
oppression,” and the second, and perhaps more important reason, was to find “the means
of procuring a comfortable support, instead of becoming a useless burthen to
government.”128 Thousands of other loyalists shared these sentiments and with so few
government positions available, patrician and plebeian alike saw privateering as the only
way to earn a living and restore their personal honour.
Privateering was fully within the accepted rules of warfare, and was not
considered dishonourable. The patriots engaged enthusiastically in privateering, and
private ships constituted the bulk of Continental naval power.129 Yet as with any actions
undertaken by armed loyalists, the patriot newspapers branded Tory privateers cutthroats
and thieves. Baltimore’s American Journal described loyalist privateers as “piratical
villains, called refugees” while another Whig publication despaired over the weakness of
Continental sea power, wondering how a “small piratical fleet… a force which ought to
be despised, [could] harass and perplex our Eastern seas.”130 As a whole, loyalist
privateers were numerous and effective. Taking revenge against the patriots was no doubt
satisfying, but that was not the chief concern for the privateers’ financial backers who
were watching their fortunes wither away. Money was needed to maintain an honourable,
genteel lifestyle, and many loyalists found the only way to acquire funds was through
predatory expeditions. Successful privateering benefitted the Crown, the war effort,
individual loyalists, and hurt the rebels. As the loyalist captain George Leonard
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advertised, privateering was “an undertaking where profit and honour are inseparably
blended.”131
Refugees did not expect to become rich from privateering, merely to support
themselves and their families with dignity. Loyalist enclaves like New York City were
crowded with thousands of refugees and British soldiers. Everything from housing to
firewood was in short supply and could be ruinously expensive. Adding to the hardships
was Parliament’s Prohibitory Act which, until October 1778, barred all trade with the
rebellious colonies, and this included New York and its loyalist merchants. The
experience of one loyalist gentleman, Evert Bancker Jr., exhibits the strain that even the
wealthy and well-connected endured. The head of one of the most prominent merchant
families in the city and a former government contractor, Bancker lost much of his estate
to the rebels, while British soldiers pilfered what he had left.132 Because of “the
disappointments and Treatment I have received” Bancker felt compelled to raise the rent
for one of his genteel tenants to the astronomical sum of £250 a year. Bancker was sure,
he wrote, that “I could obtain [the rent from someone else] by only mentioning the house
was to be rented.”133 His correspondence serves as testimony to stacks of unpaid bills,
outstanding loans, and the inability of the Banckers to collect their debts. When Bancker
pressed one debtor, Matthias Nicoll, for payment, Nicoll meekly replied that “from the
dullness of business here, God knows where I shall get [the money.]”134 When a member
of his own family implored Bancker to help him out of his dire financial situation, the
loyalist merchant was notably slow in complying.135
Once British authorities lifted the prohibitions against shipping from the city in
October 1778, elite loyalists like Bancker began to fit out and bankroll privateering
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vessels, while the rank and file risked their lives in the crew.136 Investing in privateering
ventures was open to anyone with money, including loyalist gentlewomen. Ann Bancker
secured a “1 ½ share in the Hammond, Warren Leslie Nicol Commander”, while the
fittingly named The Fair American, was advertised in the Royal Gazette as being
bankrolled “by a number of the principle Loyal Ladies” of New York. It was, reported
the newspaper, an example of how the “insolence and obstinacy” of the rebels served to
“excite the indignation of the Fair Sex”.137 Privateering could be lucrative but it also
provided a way for genteel ladies to get a taste of revenge.
Loyalist men without money to invest could sign up for actual duty on board the
ships. Some were lured by the potential prizes, but many volunteers were also dissatisfied
and disappointed at the British failure to find a more active role for the loyalists in the
armed forces. George Leonard, a prominent loyalist ship owner and captain, maintained
that his fellow loyalists became privateers because they “were unwilling to enter as
common seamen on board his Majesty’s ships or as soldiers in the army, as most of us
were by birth and education, gentlemen.”138 As previously noted, Leonard had already
publicly announced his independent party of loyalists’ quest for vengeance. For such a
man, privateering was an opportunity to make a living, retaliate against the patriots, and
yet remain free from the humiliation of taking lowly positions in the British service.
There was an allure to privateering which could not be matched by other
occupations, yet it was also a gamble. When a privateer arrived laden with prize goods,
the wharfs overflowed with eager consumers, and the newly enriched crewmen must
have thought themselves celebrities.139 Advertisements for the auction of captured goods
became a common appearance in the loyal newspapers of New York. One advertisement
listed a succession of auctions for the cargos of the French and rebel ships Rosiere
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D’Artois, John Wilkes, Le Noir, Lydia, and the Le Viscomte De Veaux which included
everything from tobacco and tea, to luxury goods like brandy and silk, to dear necessities
like glass and soap.140 Other advertisements announced the auction of entire ships taken
as prizes such as the French ship Le Amity or the outfitted privateer, Norfolk Revenge
“with all her warlike stores”.141 A captured prize could restore a gentleman’s finances and
status, but the risky venture could and did sink others deeper into destitution. Loyalist
ships might be captured or destroyed or could come home empty-handed with no return
on investment. “[R]eturning without a prize”, wrote one privateering agent, “was almost
equivalent to a total loss of the Vessel.”142 But if the risk was great, so was the potential
reward. As James Simpson wrote “the profits upon a single voyage sometimes enabled
the Adventurers, not only to emerge from Indigence and obscurity, but to rise to a great
degree of opulence…”143 Perhaps a few fortunate loyalists could embrace George
Herbert’s famous maxim that “living well is the best revenge”, especially if they did so at
the expense of their enemies.144
The Connecticut refugee Joel Stone provides a good example of what could come
from a successful expedition. He recorded that having “expended all his money
[and]…run considerable in the debt of my friends…determined me to venture on the
hazardous practice of privateering…” Stone served aboard at least two ships as a “captain
of marines” beginning in January 1779. Although shipwrecked once, by the end of his
brief seven-month career as a privateer he had acquired “a sum not only sufficient to
discharge the chief of my accumulated debt but also to enable me by the aid of my
friends to resume my former employ in the merchantile [sic] business and hire a
convenient store for the purpose in the city of New York…” Not only did his privateering
activities provide him with the means to earn a less hazardous living, but also to gain
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respect and marry “a young woman of a good family”.145 Stone had regained his former
occupation and a semblance of his former status, or perhaps even elevated his rank in
society. The money he gained from his enterprise also represented an act of successful
revenge against the patriots. The shop he now tended and the success he displayed were
marks of honour and even a measured victory. No longer destitute, he became a captain
in the New York militia and the head of a household and a business. Privateering was his
path to credit and honour. As a result of such success stories, privateering became one of
the chief pursuits of New York’s loyalists.
Other loyalist privateers were less fortunate. John Porteous, a loyalist merchant,
converted his firm’s trading ship Elegante into the fittingly rechristened privateer
Vengeance. Porteous did not go to sea with his craft, but sent a representative named
John Richardson to monitor the voyage and perhaps keep watch on George Dean, the
ship’s captain. The correspondence between owner, factor, and captain reveals the
crowded nature of the business, the incessant quarrels over prize money, and suspicions
of the underhanded duplicity of prize commissioners who were responsible for fairly
dividing the loot.146 When the Vengeance succeeded in capturing enemy shipping,
Captain Dean and Richardson reported that the crew’s spirits were high.147 When
adversity struck, the crew of the Vengeance became uncontrollable. A disastrous case of
mistaken identity caused a British 50-gun warship to fire several broadsides at the
Vengeance, severely damaging the ship and wounding many in the crew.148 After the ship
limped back to New York for repairs, four of the crewmen stole a pinnace equipped with
several small cannon and deserted. Porteous placed an advertisement in the Royal Gazette

145

Joel Stone, “The Narrative of Joel Stone” in J.J. Talman, Loyalist Narratives from Upper Canada (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 331-332.
146

John Richardson to John Porteous, March 15, 1779. Richardson mentions of the names of some New
York loyalists who were “guilty of wronging us in a very ungenerous manner…” as the Vengeance was
present when prizes were taken and therefore “fully entitled to a share” yet were not included upon their
return.
147

Advertisements appeared in the Royal Gazette announcing the capture of such choice prizes as the
George Washington. Royal Gazette, September 1, 1779. Also John Richardson to John Porteous, February
15 1779, discusses high spirits after taking the George Washington. Porteous Papers UNBLC.
148

John Richardson to John Porteous, May 22, 1779. Porteous Papers, UNBLC.

236
offering seventeen guineas for their apprehension.149 The subsequent voyage was also
marked by open desertions as the loyalist sailors sought brighter prospects elsewhere. In
December 1779, while cruising off the Southern coast, Captain Dean reported that twelve
of the crew had stolen one of the Vengeance’s longboats on Christmas day and fled.
Believing they were headed for British occupied Savannah, Dean gave pursuit and
captured all of them. Yet even with the deserters in irons, three more members of his
crew, “on whose Fidelity I thought I cou’d depend, have deserted and left me in the
Lurch.”150 For the common sailor it seemed that loyalty lasted as long as the profit. After
its many uneven voyages, the ship disappeared towards the end of the conflict and was
never heard from again. There is no record of what happened to the ship.151 In this case
Vengeance brought neither profit nor honour to its crew and owners.
The loyalist privateering expeditions often involved more than raids on rebel
shipping. Patriot newspapers reported large and coordinated attacks on island
communities in the Long Island Sound and on the Massachusetts coast. In 1779, George
Leonard’s “invincible tory armada” attacked Nonamasset Island, Nantucket, and
Martha’s Vineyard off Massachusetts. Terrorizing the communities, breaking into
warehouses and barns, the “Royal Sheep-stealers…pretended to act under commission
from the Commander in Chief of the British forces” but the article alleges that the
marauders acted without authority and sought only revenge and plunder. According to the
report, the force consisted of dozens of small ships which landed two hundred loyalist
raiders at a farm on Nonamesset and “threatened to kill the family that lived there,
because the d ---d rebels had been killing them”. The loyalists stole everything they could
find, even “some chalk and old grindstones” and killed the cattle they could not take
away. To highlight the depth of the betrayal committed by these men, the lengthy article
included the names of different loyalists spotted in the band and their local origins: “a
Foster, belonging to Plymouth; one Uphan…of Brookfield…a Slocum, and two Sissons
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of Newport” and so on.152 Such attacks continued, with The Providence Gazette reporting
a similar scene of “between 50 and 60 Refugees” who plundered the isolated community
on Fisher’s Island in the Long Island Sound.153 Such attacks continued until the very end
of the conflict, with the last refugee privateers reported in March 1783, long after the
provisional peace of November 1782.154 To the readers of the Whig newspapers, the
vengeful loyalists would simply not give up.
The alleged crimes and persistence of Tory bandits and privateers was widely
covered in the patriot press, but the loyalist alliance with Native warriors on the frontier
provided the most potent fuel for the patriot charge that loyalists had been transformed
into vengeful monsters. “Tories and Indians” was a common pairing in patriot letters and
in the press. Obadiah Gore, a settler from Connecticut on the Susquehanna River, wrote
to his family back east of “some difficulty with Tories and Indians” who attacked a
settlement thirty miles from his home and took about twenty settlers “to Fort Niagary.”
To him and other settlers it seemed as though the enemy was everywhere. In the same
letter he explained that some of his acquaintances were paddling on the Susquehanna
River when they were surprised by “Indians and Tories” who “shot at them a great
number of guns…” The men were badly wounded but managed to escape.155 A few
weeks later, the local militia marched out to meet a contingent of loyalist rangers under
Colonel John Butler and several hundred Seneca warriors under Chief Cornplanter. In the
ensuing firefight the untrained patriot militia panicked and became easy targets for their
enemies. The patriot force of over three hundred men was annihilated. A letter from
Gore’s son, Obadiah Jr., who was away serving in the Continental army during the
devastating loss, described the effect of the raid on his family. “I lost three [of my] own
brothers…and two brothers in law…our families were all driven out from this
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settlement... Our buildings all burnt and our household furniture and clothing all carried
away or destroyed…”156
Colonel Butler claimed that only combatants were killed, but the lopsided Battle
of Wyoming Valley became known as “The Wyoming Valley Massacre” to patriots, who
contended that Tories and Indians slaughtered surrendered militiamen and civilians. A
generation later, the romantic poet Thomas Campbell penned a fictional account of the
event in Gertrude of Wyoming (1809), in which he implicated “Monster Brandt” in the
war crime.157 Joseph Brant was nowhere near the Wyoming Valley when this occurred,
but he nonetheless received much of the blame in the poem. In published accounts
immediately after the battle, Colonel Butler was clearly named as the commander, and it
was even reported that the group which carried out the outrages “is supposed to consist of
Tories chiefly.” If the savagery of “these inhuman allies of Britain” was terrifying, the
Tories’ own cruelty was indistinguishable.158 A longer article in the Connecticut Courant
described how Tories had “concealed themselves among our different settlements…” and
“fired up the Indians” and enkindled “a spirit of hostility against us.” Tories were found
roaming the backcountry in small groups with the Indians, or were working as a fifth
column ready to open settler forts to besieging enemies. As for the defeat at Wyoming
Valley, The Connecticut Courant reported that the patriot militia under Colonel Zebulon
Butler (John Butler’s cousin) was walking with a flag of truce when they were ambushed.
Like the British Legion at Waxhaws and Claudius Smith in the Neutral Ground, the
frontier loyalists treacherously violated the conventions of civilized warfare. The same
article reported that the vast majority of the raiders were actually “Tories, painted like
[Indians]” and only the officers were dressed like regulars. To add to the horrible
savagery of the Tories and Indians, the article claimed they took what captives they could
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“and shutting up the rest in the houses, set fire to them and they were all consumed
together.” This was a complete fabrication, but helped encourage readers to search for
some “speedy and effectual measures…to punish and extirpate these monsters in human
shape…” who betrayed their own families and their race out of vengeance.159
The allegations that the loyalists and Native warriors murdered civilians in cold
blood had profoundly violent consequences. In October, patriot forces attacked and
burned the settlement of Oquaga, a mixed community of Iroquois in northern New York.
Some supported the Revolution and others the British, but little distinction was made in
the patriot attack. Rumours circulated that in their own quest for vengeance the patriot
soldiers had discovered Iroquois children in the corn field and murdered them.160 This, of
course, was never reported in the newspapers. In retaliation, John Butler’s son Walter and
Joseph Brant descended on Cherry Valley, New York in November of the same year. In
the attack around thirty-two civilians were killed by Seneca and Mohawk warriors in
what both British and American authorities considered an atrocity.161 Reports in The
Connecticut Journal gave macabre details of the “inhuman barbarities” – scalping,
decapitation, and dismemberment – committed against defenseless civilians.162 The
Independent Chronicle published a letter sent to General Philip Schuyler by Walter
Butler concerning the events at Cherry Valley. Butler claimed that “I have done every
thing in my power to restrain the Indians in their fury, from hurting women and children,
or killing the prisoners who fell into our hands, and would have more effectually
prevented them, but they were much enraged by the late destruction of their village
Onohoghguago [Oquaga] by your people…” For Butler, the atrocities were explained by
a longer history of outrages committed by the patriots. Nevertheless, Butler assured the
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patriot general that he would continue to try and restrain his allies as it was “beneath the
character of a soldier, to wage war on women and children.” Yet, immediately following
that statement, Butler invoked the threat of savage retaliation himself. “[B]e assured,”
concluded Butler, “that if you persevere in detaining my father’s family with you, that we
shall no longer take the same pains, in restraining the Indians from making prisoners of
women and children.”163 The loyalist officer’s assertion that he had attempted to restrain
their Native allies must have seemed hollow when combined with the concluding threat.
The Butler family, once wealthy New York merchants, appeared complicit in the
outrages and were apparently willing to use the same methods to achieve their own
vengeance. To the Whig readers it must have seemed as though the Butlers had been
transformed into something savage themselves.
The perception of loyalist involvement in frontier atrocities deeply worried
gentlemen loyalists and their British commanders. News of the outrages had reached
Britain, and both Edmund Burke and William Pitt delivered scathing speeches in
Parliament deploring the use of Native allies against the rebels.164 The Swiss-born
Governor of Quebec, Sir Frederick Haldimand, knew the importance of the Native
alliances and the effectiveness of their raids, but reproached Colonel Butler after the
incident at Cherry Valley for “such indiscriminate vengeance” which was “useless and
disreputable…as it is contrary to the dispositions and maxims of the King…”165 On
previous missions Haldimand had stressed the need to restrain the Native warriors.
Writing to Captain John Peters in 1778, Haldimand advised keeping the number of
warriors to a minimum and “to take special care that proper persons of your
appointing…shall accompany them upon all occasions in order to prevent entirely all acts
of cruelty of Inhumanity…”166 Captain Walter Butler, who Guy Carleton described as a
“pretty genteel man,” remorsefully described the events of Cherry Valley to the elegant
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Hannah Lawrence Schieffelin during her travels through Canada in 1780. As in his letter
to General Schuyler, Butler blamed patriot atrocities for firing the zeal of the Native
warriors. In particular, he noted that a patriot “Captain H----” had “threatened to
exterminate” the whole race of Indians if they did not return to their villages. He also
suggested that it was Joseph Brant who “was infected with the contagious spirit of cruelty
and guilty of actions that redound to his dishonour.” Schieffelin seemed to accept Walter
Butler’s version of events but was aghast at the tragic cycle of revenge and reprisal on the
frontier. Brought up in the comfort of a wealthy New York household, Schieffelin was
appalled at how the frontier war sapped the decency and humanity from the people
caught up in its violence. On one occasion she encountered a raiding party returning from
an expedition with around one hundred prisoners “whom the Indians had stripped of
almost all of their cloathing[sic]” and to her shocked amazement “about thirty of their
number were inspired by their necessity to enlist in the British service.” The frontier
people, it seemed to Schieffelin, were devoid of “manners and morals” and were “fit
instruments of the devastation that attends these…sanguinary incursions.” She imagined
that the men who joined the British sought to “stifle the reproofs of conscience in
dissipation, and lose every sentiment of duty, honour, and humanity, in vice and
intemperance.” The war on the frontier, according to the gentlewoman, was a
dehumanizing and transformative affair for all parties. Watching as another raiding party
prepared to set out for the German Flats in New York, Schieffelin noted that “this
expedition seems destined to dishonour the British cause by the most barbarous violations
of faith and humanity.”167 Schieffelin’s romantic notions of honour and virtue seemingly
had little place on the frontier.
Despite the repeated charges of atrocities in the patriot newspapers, loyalists
continued to support the employment of Native warriors against the rebels and, like
Walter Butler, defended their reputations and actions. For many loyalists, patriot
propaganda was not only filled with lies but also smacked of hypocrisy since the patriots
167
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were just as guilty of war crimes. Newspaper accounts of atrocities like the Connecticut
Courant’s coverage of the Battle of Wyoming Valley were often exaggerated and
included blatantly false information. Reports of genuine war crimes like the murders at
Cherry Valley leave out the context of cyclical violence committed by both sides. Indeed,
the Virginia loyalist James Parker, incensed at the inactivity of British generals in New
York, applauded “the example of Butler and Brant” and suggested that the regular British
Army would do well to “try a little irregularity.”168 Simply put, the raids were effective;
they damaged patriot morale and deprived the enemy of valuable materiel.169 The
correspondence between officers in the field and Daniel Claus, the deputy Indian agent
for the Six Nations, testify to this fact. Just one raid in 1778 on German Flats destroyed
the rebel granary and the winter’s supply of beef for the entire garrison. Such raids, wrote
the loyalist agents, “must be severely felt by the Rebel Army.”170
Hit and run tactics were sometimes deplored as dishonourable and unmanly forms
of combat. Peter Oliver, the affluent Massachusetts loyalist, defended the Native style of
warfare in his Origins and Progress of the American Rebellion, (1781). “It is true,” he
wrote, “he [a Native warrior] doth not discover what is called english [sic] Courage, of
standing undaunted in the open field to be shot at…” Rather, “An Indian prefers the
Mode of fighting behind a Tree, or skulking in Bushes.” Yet, according to Oliver, the
Indian “can undergo the most excruciating Torture, without a Groan…” As for scalping,
Oliver wryly observed that “taking the scalp off a dead Man…will not give any great
Pain…” and reminded his readers that the New England militia scalped fallen redcoats at
Lexington, another insinuation that the patriots, not the loyalists or their allies, began the
cycle of violence. Oliver dismissed the criticisms poured out against the Native warriors
by asserting that “Every Nation has something peculiar in its Mode of War” and
furthermore, “The Definition of Courage is Arbitrary.”171Oliver’s ideas of courage
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actually correspond quite well to the modern anthropological studies of honour, but it is
unlikely his patriot contemporaries would have been impressed with Oliver’s open mind.
The revolutionaries, it must be noted, also did their best to court alliances with the
Native peoples on the frontier, and they were occasionally successful. The Oneida, one of
the nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, put their support behind Congress which in turn
initiated a civil war within the Six Nations.172 In what must have seemed to some like
fitting vengeance, Walter Butler was killed in a skirmish with patriot forces and Oneida
allies in November 1781. The New Jersey Gazette reported with satisfaction that “Captain
Walter Butler and eight others were killed and scalped” by the Revolution’s own Native
allies.173 Though the patriot press portrayed loyalists and their Native allies as savages
bent on vengeance, both sides employed similar tactics. In many respects the
Revolutionary War was grafted on to the genocidal conflict between settlers and Natives
that began at first contact. Nevertheless, the Whig propaganda machine was able to frame
the conflict as a product of loyalist and British treachery, which was, in the words of
George Washington “Sharpened by [loyalist] revenge.”174 Like the Tory bandits,
privateers, and ruthless uniformed troops in other theatres, the patriot press formed a
consistent image of a loyalist stained with war paint directing the murder of innocents or
committing the deeds himself. There could be no greater dishonour.

The loyalists of the American Revolution faced a unique moral quandary. To
restore their honour they needed to retaliate against the patriots, but in the process they
risked deepening their dishonour by openly declaring their desire for vengeance.
Eighteenth century genteel culture considered revenge a savage passion which could
transform an otherwise good man into a ruthless beast, yet at the same time reflexive,
masculine honour demanded that insults be repaid. Though all loyalists shared in the pain
of loss and deprivation, they were divided on the issue of retaliation. Some loyalists like
Simeon Baxter and William Franklin obviously felt justified in violent retribution, while
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others like Samuel Seabury and Charles Inglis wanted to prevent further bloodshed in
hopes of reconciliation. Those refugees who took up arms were viewed with suspicion by
British commanders, fearful that vengeful loyalists would deepen and prolong the
conflict. In the end the loyalists not only lost the military conflict, they also lost the
propaganda war. The patriot press created a consistent image of the Tory as a greedy
bandit, a ruthless butcher, and a heartless traitor to his country and his race. While
patriots could retaliate against their former countrymen out of a spirit of righteous
indignation, the loyalists, it was argued, fought out of base, criminal vengeance. Tories
were animated by dark passions which transformed them into corruptions of manhood.
These findings add to the knowledge of the American Revolution in several ways.
Historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth century accepted the idea that because
loyalist had been abused and driven from their homes, they were more vengeful and cruel
than their patriot counterparts. By the 1960s and 1970s, scholars such as Robert Calhoon
and William H. Nelson took a more sceptical approach to tales of Tory brutality. Military
historians like Charles Royster and John Shy pointed out the cyclical nature of the
vendettas between loyalists and patriots in which both sides engaged in violent acts of
retaliation. Yet the trope of the vengeful Tory persisted even in these academic works.
The reason, as this chapter has shown, was the systematic way that a dominant Whig
press delegitimized or dishonoured armed loyalists by claiming that bloody revenge
motivated Tory combatants. These men were transformed by their dark passions into the
antithesis of the honourable and righteous patriot. This dichotomy reflects the wider
cultural attitudes towards revenge and honour prevalent in the eighteenth century English
Atlantic, which coloured contemporary reports of loyalist military action and influenced
generations of histories. Armed with these insights, historians can better cut though the
propagandistic nature of contemporary patriot or Tory sources.
These same cultural ideas also help explain why the British failed to make better
use of the loyalists in the military conflict and why many loyalist gentlemen were content
to remain on the sidelines of the conflict. Paul H. Smith argues that the British did not
employ large numbers of loyalists in the early years of the war because of their
overconfidence in the ability of the British army to crush the rebellion, but came to rely
on armed loyalists as the conflict persisted and intensified. British authorities were never

245
satisfied with the quantity or quality of American loyalists who enlisted in Crown
forces.175 Though Smith provides an excellent political and military history, he leaves out
these important cultural aspects which illuminate the dysfunctional relationship between
loyalists and redcoats. Throughout the conflict, and especially after 1779, British
commanders were concerned about the loyalists’ vengeful outrages deepening the
conflict further and staining the honour of individual commanders. Even while the British
sought to employ more loyalists to fill their dwindling ranks, they tried to rein in their
activities. This led to deep frustrations among loyalists who believed that they were fully
justified in defending themselves against patriot insults. Loyalist gentlemen were also
deeply divided. William Franklin argued the loyalists’ quest for “retaliatory justice” was
honourable, while others like Andrew Elliot were deeply troubled by the bloodshed.
Loyalist gentlemen and British commanders were never united in their goals, nor did they
have a consistent outlook on the honour or morality of their tactics. These divisions,
caused in part by the cultural ambivalence towards revenge, and their concerns for
personal dishonour, contributed to the ineffectiveness of armed loyalism.
By placing the Whig propaganda, the British fears, and the loyalists’ own debate
on the justice of revenge within the wider cultural context of the eighteenth century
English Atlantic, it becomes clear why the loyalists suffered such a resounding and longlasting public relations disaster in the United States. Events like the massacres in the
Wyoming and Cherry Valleys, the continuous guerilla campaigns and looting in the
Neutral Ground and elsewhere, and the macabre notes infamously pinned to the victims
of loyalist vengeance, all fuelled the patriot image of uncontrollable Tory monsters. Any
war or violent conflict will enkindle the darker aspects of the human psyche, and
historians can now admit to abuses and outrages committed by all sides in the conflict.
Nevertheless, the success of the Whig propaganda campaign can be seen in the
generations of fictional and historical accounts of Tory barbarity. Once-esteemed
gentlemen such as William Franklin, James DeLancey and Thomas Browne had garnered
reputations as murderers and plunderers. Walter Butler, once “pretty genteel,” was
implicated in some of the most brutal outrages of the war. Deserved or not, the
reputation of the loyalists in the American Revolution was forever stained and all
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loyalists shared the dishonour. With the Treaty of Paris and the British capitulation in
1783, loyalist gentlemen had to face the reality that there would be no satisfaction on the
battlefield. The loyalists had no choice but to begin the search for honour in defeat.
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6. Political Rebirth
In 1819, George Ramsay, the ninth Earl of Dalhousie, and new Governor General
of British North America, toured Upper and Lower Canada. At four o’clock in the
afternoon of July 10th he stopped at a little village along the St. Lawrence River called
Gananoque, governed by a Connecticut exile named Joel Stone. Dalhousie described
Stone as “an Old Gentleman…seemingly a sensible, well-bred, and intelligent man, a
refugee Loyalist…”1 Though Stone was born a middling farmer’s son, and listed as a
“shopkeeper” by the Royal Claims Commission,2 Dalhousie noted in his journal that in
1819 Stone was “wealthy, tho’ not rich, occupied sufficiently to be busy, comfortable and
content.” The Earl wrote that he was “very much pleased with Mr. Stone’s manner and
sentiments…” and accordingly “…I have put down the conversation in his own words as
nearly as I recollect them.” Stone would certainly have been satisfied by Dalhousie’s
appraisal and compliments. During the Revolution Stone was but one of thousands of
struggling loyalist refugees in New York City, a man of little consequence who teetered
on the edge of destitution, and who bitterly resented Britain’s final capitulation and his
own paltry compensation for losses. Decades later he was an established landowner,
merchant, and the representative of British authority at this little river port, a man worthy
of being called upon by the Viceroy himself.
Dalhousie’s journal entry centred on Stone’s loyalist narrative, a tale no doubt
perfected through repeated recitations since 1783. Stone told his story with the manners
and speech of a gentleman, yet he also presented himself as a rugged trailblazer who “cut
the first tree at Gananoque.” His persistent loyalism was evident after thirty-five years of
exile from his homeland, and he explained to the Earl that he could not “reconcile to his
ideas the separation of the colonies from England.” Stone served as a militia colonel in
the second conflict with the United States in 1812-14, yet Dalhousie noted that even in
1819 Stone “fancies that he sees yet in the conduct of the British Govt. to the United
1
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States, in Peace and War, a feeling that the Colonies are still the children of the Mother
Country.” To round out his tale, Stone added the pathos of his own familial separation,
and described five sisters left to fend for themselves in rebel territory when he embarked
in the King’s service, and the fact he had “not seen one of them since 1783.” Stone
deeply lamented the family breakup. “That is wrong,” he said, “very wrong. I know it is,
but yet I cannot bring myself to go there, and I read & dwell upon the history &
discussion in Parliament from 1765 to the present day with a mixture of sincere sorrow &
astonishment at the Events.”3 The painful cleavages in his own family reflected the
political disintegration of the British Empire in America. For Stone and thousands of
loyalists like him, the domestic repercussions of the American Revolution were
impossible to separate from the imperial schism.
This chance encounter, decades after the American Revolution, is a window on to
one particular loyalist’s life after political death. In many ways Stone represents the
archetype of the Canadian loyalist tradition. He is prosperous and hardworking; genteel
and sensible.4 The encounter recorded in Dalhousie’s journal in 1819 reveals that Stone
was still crafting his narrative, his image, and his identity decades after the Revolution.
To make an impression on the visiting notable, Stone exaggerated the permanence of his
familial separation. He had in fact been to the United States on several occasions since
the Treaty of Paris to visit his family, and there is considerable extant correspondence to
prove that he remained in close contact with relatives in his homeland until his death in
1833. Details aside, this vignette shows that a man declared politically deceased in
Connecticut had risen to a social and economic status he was unlikely to have attained as
a non-college educated farmer’s son in colonial New England. In Upper Canada, a land
with few established institutions during the early years of settlement, Stone and men like
him were the faces of British authority in their small communities. He was the Justice of
the Peace, roads commissioner, customs official, as well as being the highest ranking
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military officer, largest landholder, and the wealthiest merchant in the area.5 Though
Stone’s political rebirth was exceptional, his experiences in the years after the American
Revolution were far from unique.
Political rebirth was a complex and multi-generational process that restored status
and privilege to dishonoured American gentlemen and secured them new positions of
domestic and political authority. The steps that Stone and other men like him took to
achieve the restoration of their honour and manhood between 1783 and the late 1790s is
the subject of this final chapter. The loyalists had to come to terms with Britain’s
crushing defeat in the conflict, and explain their role in the catastrophe. In general, the
refugee loyalists argued that they had sacrificed all they could for the British Empire, and
blamed incompetent generals and Parliamentarians for the loss of the colonies. The
loyalists then had to rebuild their lives and restore their positions as household masters.
This could only be accomplished with help from the British government, a fact which led
to deep confusion about the nature of citizenship and the stigma of dependence among
the loyalists.
The central argument of this chapter is that the loyalists, individually and
collectively, were not just making claims for lost property and income from the British
Parliament, they were reclaiming manhood. This concern permeated every facet of their
defeat, exile, claims process, and resettlement. The refugees’ submissions to the Loyalist
Claims Commission, their individual narratives and collective histories of the conflict, as
well as the strains in resettlement, reveal this consistent anxiety. The loyalist exiles faced
the immediate post-war years as men adrift, dependent on others for their support. This
condition was the antithesis of honourable manhood. In many ways loyalist gentlemen
were reduced to a stage of adolescence, and had to begin the long climb back to full
manhood. The loyalists never articulated the struggle in quite these terms, perhaps
because to do so would be too emotionally painful. Instead, loyalism itself became a
badge of honour and masculinity among the refugees, which allowed them to regard the
5
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compensation and assistance they received not as charity from a benevolent Parliament,
but as theirs by right. Though loyalists smarted at further insults, the British government
recognized its obligations and helped ensure that many loyalist gentlemen could build
new households and establish the patriarchal foundations of a new British Empire in
North America.
Throughout the claims and resettlement process the loyalists invoked honour’s
function as a claim-right, “a right that something be done by another”.6 In other words,
the loyalists’ identity as white, accomplished, and refined heads of households, combined
with the suffering and sacrifices they had endured, granted them the right to be treated
with honour by the state and other members of society. The loyalists discussed in this
dissertation felt they had a moral right to have their former privileges, respect, and
property restored by the British Empire. The assertion of honour as a masculine claimright is the common link between the stages of political rebirth from the initial experience
of defeat, to the search for monetary compensation, to the final ordeal of resettlement.
The loyalists claimed this right from everyone within the British Empire, from the King
to members of their own households, not simply as a reward for their sacrifices, but as the
right of gentlemen subjects. Their allegiance to Britain caused the loyalists’ political
death in their colonial homelands and stripped them of their property and status as
householders. Political rebirth would restore those privileges and transform loyalism, and
all the suffered indignities that came with it, into marks of honour and manhood. Loyalist
manhood was not a meek and subservient expression of duty, but was in fact as
demanding and assertive as the competitive ideals formed in the new republic.
Appreciating the central place of masculinity and honour in the post-war
experiences of the loyalists provides a new way of understanding their behaviour and
writings in exile, and it also provides new insights into how the American Revolution
affected concepts of manhood in the wider English Atlantic, and the relationship of male
honour and privilege to the state. British Parliamentarians were not bound by any legal
requirement to compensate the loyalists for their losses, but did so out of a sense of moral
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obligation engendered partly by the loyalists’ assertions of their rights as men. The
loyalist claims and narratives describe the loss of key benchmarks of manhood –
households, occupations, accumulated property, and influence over others – and reveal,
in negative, the essential value placed on well-ordered, loyal households in a properly
functioning state. Restoring the manhood and patriarchal authority of individual loyalists
was therefore made into an imperial concern.

The fate of loyalist manhood in the post-Revolutionary Atlantic has not yet been
explored by historians. Scholars have shown how the American Revolution disrupted
notions of family governance and patriarchal authority within the new republic, but the
same attention has not been paid to the loyalists, who, because of the physical dislocation
from their households and homelands faced far deeper and more immediate challenges.
Jay Fliegelman’s Prodigals and Pilgrims (1982) and Melvin Yazawa’s From Colonies to
Commonwealth (1985) both argue that the idea of patriarchal political governance,
constructed through “bonds of affection,” suffered a devastating blow in the
Revolutionary era. These ideas were replaced by republican notions of voluntary
association and contractual relationships between all free members of society. Fliegelman
argues this revolution in thought occurred throughout the English Atlantic, and
transformed culture and politics with concepts of individual freedom and autonomy, and
the desire to escape “protracted adolescence” both in the structure of families and
government.7 At first glance, then, the loyalists, with their professed affection for the
King and Parliament, and their dependence on British support would place them out of
step with the transforming culture of the English Atlantic. Indeed, they do appear to be
what Bernard Bailyn described as “ancient, honorable, and moribund”, clinging to
political ideas which had run out of time.8
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Yet other historians have convincingly argued that patriarchal authority in
domestic and public relationships remained a potent force. Even as state legislatures
worked to enshrine republican notions into law by abolishing ancient rights like
primogeniture and entail, Carole Shammas argues that this actually enhanced the power
of the householder since he was no longer obliged by law, but could decide inheritance
issues on his own. This provided powerful economic clout to back up the moral authority
of a father as he directed his adult children.9 Likewise, Nancy Rhoden’s work on the
families of Richard Henry Lee and Landon Carter during the Revolution reveals that
these wealthy planters were deeply anxious patriarchs who felt their authority slipping
within their households. Yet, their sons, in spite of the Revolution’s influence, were quite
dedicated to traditional ideals of patriarchal rule and built their own families on the same
foundations.10 While republican ideology may have altered the powers of the heads of
households and planted the seeds that later extended the rights of citizenship to women
and non-whites, the American Revolution did not attack the patriarchal power of
husbands and fathers at the time. Indeed, Linda Kerber’s theory of “republican
motherhood”, which argues that women became the inculcators of civic virtue within the
household in the early republic, does not negate the fact that men still needed to project
the appearance of domestic mastery in order to have a place in public life, just as they had
done in the colonial period.11 Anne Lombard, in her study of manhood in colonial New
England agrees and notes that patriarchal notions of family life “displayed remarkable
persistence” from the seventeenth century to the Revolutionary period.12
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While family life remained mostly unaltered, notions of manhood and honour in
public life underwent more significant changes. As Anthony Rotundo has observed of
masculinity in New England, the American Revolution marked a clear break between the
colonial attitudes which castigated “assertive individualism” as a corrosive influence on
the community, and the celebration of manly independence following the conflict. The
American citizen, a “self-made man”, was regarded as the source of the republic’s power
and virtue by the early decades of the nineteenth century. These men were expected to
resist arbitrary rank and power, and support the limited authority of men who displayed
the merit and worthiness to govern by consent. The ideal American citizen rejected
luxury, but pursued wealth and advancement for the good of his family and the good of
the nation.13
Mark Kann has argued that a “grammar of manhood” infused these ideas into the
very language of the early republic. Yet once again, the household is of central
importance to the construction of male identity and honour. Bachelors were regarded as
transient, reckless, and selfish, while the “better sort” of republican men derived their
“personal dignity, social respect, and public influence” first and foremost from an orderly
family life. Though Kann agrees that the Revolutionary period did diminish the power of
patriarchal authority in some respects, larger than life characters like Washington and
Jefferson stood as archetypes of virtuous republican men for others to emulate. Therefore
the deference due to the most worthy and heroic men meant politics remained dominated
by hierarchy and patriarchy.14 This was a republican version of manhood that allowed
deference only to those who could prove they deserved their standing.
For many middling and upper class men in the early republic, the options for
participation in public life increased and, as Lisa Wilson suggests, those public roles and
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competition with other men increasingly became as central to male identity as the
household.15 Lori Glover’s study of southern youth in the early republic reveals how elite
families raised their sons to participate in the political life of the new nation. Young
southerners were encouraged to “extend the sphere” of their influence and public renown,
and Southern patriarchs advised their sons to make themselves “useful within a larger
circle than your immediate neighbourhood” and gain “some celebrity”. Whatever genteel
profession a young man might choose, it was often but a gateway to politics.16 State and
national politics became the ultimate proving ground for gentlemen in the early republic,
and political disputes were inextricable from questions of honour. As Joanne B. Freeman
argues in her examination of the political cockpit of the first decades of the republic,
“Honor was the core of a man’s identity…a man of honor was defined by the respect that
he received in public.” The men who engaged in early republican politics entered into an
unstable world of shifting hierarchies, where men of established, powerful families
contended against a rising and ambitious new set of republican men who eschewed the
old culture of deference and demanded respect. Performance and bravado were often the
keys to success, and duels, relatively rare in colonial America (see chapter 2) became
increasingly common. Even men who held high political rank felt compelled to put their
lives on the line over public insults.17 In summary, gentlemanly manhood in the new
republic was characterized by independence and sometimes violent assertiveness, and, for
many gentlemen at least, a successful political career which brought honour and renown.
Old forms of genteel honour did not entirely fade away with the American Revolution,
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but spread throughout the middle ranks of men who saw personal honour as sacred and
felt compelled to defend it. Undergirding all of this remained the ordered household and
patriarchal authority. Whether in colonial or republican American, household governance
was an essential requirement for any man of consequence.
How then did the already wounded masculinity and honour of loyalist exiles fare
in the post-Revolutionary English Atlantic? It is an intriguing question which historians
have yet to address, and this chapter can only offer some tentative answers. Bereft of
their households and livings, by the standards of the period the loyalists were seemingly
dependent and emasculated. Loyalist gentlemen knew that their situation in 1783 fell far
short of what was expected of them as patriarchs and providers, yet far from considering
their claims and petitions for British assistance as emblems of that dishonour, the
loyalists instead attempted to present themselves as worthy men who had given up their
estates as advanced payment for a privileged place in the imperial hierarchy. In their
claims, the loyalists described themselves as ideal, masculine British subjects who
adhered to their duty and followed the King into bitter defeat. Though individual claims
were written with customary, even formulaic, expressions of deference and respect, the
loyalist gentlemen were actually quite assertive, and some even aggressively pursued
their perceived rights in the face of powerful opposition from British officials.
Both Mary Beth Norton and Maya Jasanoff have explored the claims process in
detail, but neither examines the work of the commission from the perspective of
manhood. They do note the important role of the rhetoric of national honour in the
Parliamentary debates and deliberations on the loyalist question, but this is only part of
the equation. Jasanoff argues that the Claims Commission represented an early example
of government taking on the role of a welfare provider, and that is certainly worth noting.
But she also argues that the loyalists, in making their claims on the British government,
were actually making a demand that was similar to the one their rebel neighbours had
made at the beginning of the conflict – to be treated as full citizens of the British Empire
and enjoy the same rights as Englishmen. In the end, Parliament never declared that the
loyalists were indeed entitled to compensation by their rights as British subjects and
citizens. Rather the claims were addressed more as expressions of state paternalism and
because “the honor of the nation” was at stake. As Edmund Burke explained, the loyalists
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“had no claim upon [the British government] founded in strict right” but rather
Parliament would consider the claims for the sake of “honor and justice” and to exhibit “a
new and noble instance of national bounty and generosity.”18 The loyalists insisted,
however, that their claims were centred on their rights, if not as British citizens, then as
loyal male subjects who had sacrificed their property for the British Empire. Their
affective attachment to the King, and their willingness to fight and suffer for him, created
a contractual obligation. As Joseph Galloway succinctly stated in his 1783 pamphlet,
Britain was bound by the “essential obligations established by the social compact”.19
Though loyalist began requesting restitution or financial assistance from the British
government from the outset of the conflict, it was not until the final peace that the
majority of loyalists realized that they could never hope to reclaim their property in
America. The loyalist claims collectively and individually present an image of loyal and
worthy manhood that had earned the right to both compensation and a privileged place in
the British Empire.
The loyalist concept of their own manhood and their place in the empire can be
perceived in the narratives they produced for the claims commission in the 1780s.
Gregory T. Knouff compared these narratives to similar petitions written by patriots after
the war and sees a sharp distinction between the patriot’s “identity as politically
empowered white men” and the loyalist “image of suffering, emasculated subjects.”
While both sets of narratives were penned with an eye to government compensation or
pensions for services during the war, Knouff argues that the loyalist depictions of their
losses and abuse created a picture of emasculation and dependence which intentionally
placed them in a subordinate position within an “increasingly hierarchical empire.”20 On
the surface this seems like a clear distinction between two divergent concepts of
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masculinity in the post-Revolutionary Atlantic – the republican’s manly assertion of his
honour and the loyalist’s willing submission to authority. Proper respect for the
established hierarchy was certainly a loyalist trait, but the emasculating images found in
the claims and the narratives represent more than feeble victimhood. Rather, as the
loyalist John Peters argued, it took great courage to suffer such unmanning catastrophes
as leaving one’s family unprotected in the middle of winter.21 The seemingly unbearable
indignities and insults could have ended with a public recantation and apology, but by
highlighting the fact that the loyalists endured this suffering for their King, the narratives
transformed what men might construe as failures into expressions of honour and undying
fidelity. The claims were not the plaintive requests of emasculated, defeated men, but
were claims based on rights which derived from honour culture. The loyalists had earned
the moral right to be compensated.
Along with explorations of the claims process, evidence for the state of loyalist
masculinity can also be found in studies of loyalist resettlement in what remained of
British North America. The restoration of loyalist patriarchal authority in the colony of
Upper Canada has been examined by Janice Potter-MacKinnon, who argues that loyalist
women were denied the same sort of moral role as the “republican mothers” in patriot
households. Loyalist settlements in Upper Canada replicated the strict British laws which
supported patriarchy, and Potter-MacKinnon points to the lack of women in the court
records to argue that all state power was mediated through the householder to his
dependants, just as it had been in the colonial period. Indeed, Potter-MacKinnon argues
that the overwhelmingly patriarchal nature of Upper Canadian society led subsequent
generations to forget the particular role of loyalist women in the Revolution in favour of a
more heroic, masculine narrative wherein “the women only wept.”22 It is entirely
plausible that this strict adherence to traditional patriarchy was a conscious effort on the
part of wounded men who were anxious to restore their power, but it was also a part of
British policy to replicate the laws of England in Upper Canada to prevent any further
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rebellions. Laws which supported patriarchal power in the households would ensure that
both domestic and public authorities contributed to the stability and loyalty of the
province. Yet as Jane Errington argues, the society that developed in Upper Canada in the
years after the American Revolution was a cultural and political hybrid of the American
republic and the British Empire. Loyalist exile did not represent a clean and final break
from the United States; rather lines of cultural and economic exchange and
communication remained open, even during the War of 1812.23 As will be shown in part
three of this chapter, struggling loyalist householders in exile often received help from
their former homelands which served to bolster their waning patriarchy. Loyalist
gentlemen could therefore employ both the legal authority entrusted in them by the
Crown as well as their residual connections to the United States to support their efforts to
rebuild their household patriarchy.
Ann Gorman Condon’s exploration of New Brunswick also shows how the
loyalists attempted to create a society built on elite patriarchal norms. With a much larger
number of refugees settling along the St. John River, and with a substantially larger
population of gentlemen than were present in Upper Canada, Condon shows how elite
exiles dominated the early evolution of the politics and society of the new province.
These loyalist gentlemen were also deeply concerned with re-establishing links with their
homelands and ensuring decent prospects for their sons and daughters. Condon explains
that loyalist men were engrossed with their families because that was “the one area of life
they could control and also the one area capable of positive response.”24 This was also an
indication that families were in fact political institutions, and as will be shown, the
outward appearance of domestic order could be a sign of patriarchal power or a
significant source of anxiety for the troubled loyalist gentlemen.
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Though Janice Potter-MacKinnon argues that loyalist women saw few of the
benefits that their patriot cousins experienced, the work of Katherine McKenna suggests
that loyalist women did in fact play an essential role in inculcating the virtues of loyalism
and citizenship. McKenna’s A Life of Propriety: Anne Murray Powell and Her Family
(1994), explores the experiences of the loyalist gentlewoman and her family who settled
in York, Upper Canada. Though ostensibly a middling sort of family, the Powells, much
like Joel Stone, were elevated to a much higher social status because of the paucity of
ladies and gentlemen in the remote and scattered settlements. Powell’s husband, William
Dummer Powell, who was not a promising candidate for advancement in his early years,
eventually embarked on a long career as a lawyer and a member of the Executive Council
of Upper Canada from 1808 to 1825. McKenna shows that loyalists like the Powells
grasped onto the ideas of gentility and refinement, as impractical as they may have been
on the frontier, as markers of class and distinction. Anne Murray Powell and other
women of the family passed on their refined culture and notions of respectability from
one generation to the next. The family’s anxiety over their sons’ education and moral
upbringing may be a timeless concern for families everywhere, but the particular
challenges faced by the Powells, of trying to foster genteel and honourable manhood on
the frontier, resemble the experiences of other loyalists and will be explored later.25
Anne Murray Powell was performing an important political function in her
domestic role. David Mills argues that ideas of loyalism in Upper Canada evolved to
embrace Victorian ideals of propriety, and households like the Powell’s were the primary
engines for inculcating notions of refinement and respect for hierarchy. Even with the
widespread cultural exchange with the United States, Mills observes that expressions of
loyalty became essential in the political culture of Upper Canada, especially after the War
of 1812. In essence, loyalty meant the open commitment to the imperial connection and
accepting the idea that without British ties the province and the superior manners and
morals of its people would be swallowed by vulgar American democracy. Reformers
therefore had to tread a careful, moderate path lest they be labelled “disloyal” and
politically illegitimate. The loyalist experience in the American Revolution, especially
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when transformed into more general Anglophilia, was employed for generations as a
foundational myth that allowed people with no real connection to the historical loyalists
to maintain political and economic power.26
The politics of Upper Canada, and the disputes between competing political
ideologies, became bound up in the concepts of masculinity. Cecilia Morgan’s Public
Men and Virtuous Women: The Gendered Languages of Religion and Politics in Upper
Canada, 1791-1850 (1996), shows how ideas of loyalism and masculinity became almost
synonymous in the generations after the Revolution. While true manliness was at times
claimed by both Upper Canadian republicans and conservatives alike, loyalism was
consistently portrayed in the colony’s print media as a manly virtue. American style
democracy was a beguiling, seductive vice compared to the tried and true British mode of
governance. After the War of 1812, tales of women’s contributions to the war effort
centred on the continuation of domestic activities, while manly loyalism was displayed in
public and on the battlefield. As Morgan writes, there was no Upper Canadian equivalent
of the “Marianne of the French Revolution or the republican mother of the American.”27
Much as Janice Potter-MacKinnon observed about the legacy of the Revolution, there
seemed little room for a civic celebration of womanly virtues in such a patriarchal
society.
This masculine, patriarchal culture found in the Canadian provinces was not
solely the result of loyalist attempts to overcompensate for emasculating failures. As will
be shown in the third section of this chapter, loyalist patriarchy was comparably weak, as
householders often lacked the ability to maintain order in their own homes and protect
and provide for their dependants amid the privations of frontier life. Rather, loyalist
gentlemen found their waning positions as patriarchs propped up by British preferment.
As Kathleen Wilson and Nancy Christie have recently argued, state power in distant,
multi-ethnic colonies with few functional institutions relied on households and their
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patriarchs to order society and replicate the values and manners of the metropolis.28
British law buttressed the power of householders and upheld hierarchical rule in the
attempt to create a counterrevolutionary society.29 Some loyalist gentlemen became the
representatives of British authority without themselves having achieved an orderly and
obedient household. In the early years of exile and resettlement, the masculinity and
honour of gentlemen refugees centred on loyalism. In this sense, expressions of fidelity
and sacrifice, for a time, substituted for traditional sources of honour, and helped loyalists
reconcile defeat, make honourable claims on the British government, and endure further
strains on their household authority during resettlement. Loyalism brought British
preferment and assistance, but rather than be seen as dependence, loyalist gentlemen
regarded this as a reciprocal relationship with the British imperial state. Their manhood
and patriarchal authority were inextricably linked with the future of the British Empire in
North America.

The process of political rebirth presented in this chapter consisted of three stages:
accepting defeat, the claims process, and the reestablishment of household patriarchy.
These were not the only concerns of exiles, nor do the stages reflect a perfectly linear
process, but they were the three most pressing and overlapping goals for loyalists.
Accepting defeat and the reestablishment of households proceeded unevenly,
simultaneously, and often took more than a generation. At what point a loyalist could be
said to have accepted defeat or restored his household patriarchy is subjective, but these
were nonetheless goals shared by all exiled loyalist gentlemen. In contrast, the loyalist
claims followed a bureaucratic procedure which demanded specific documents from the
loyalists and deadlines to be met. Issues of honour and manhood are clearly at work in all
three aspects of political rebirth, even in the cumbersome government commission. This
chapter is designed around these three interlocking stages of political rebirth, and
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examines how the refugee gentlemen navigated through the chaos of the postRevolutionary Atlantic, from their initial exile to their resettlement.
The first section explores how the loyalists coped with defeat, and how they
struggled to come to terms with their role in the catastrophe. For many loyalists, the
revolution disrupted not just the political composition of the Empire, but also its divinely
ordained social hierarchy and their privileged place within it.30 The refugees accepted a
variety of explanations for Britain’s failure in America. They blamed imperial decadence,
incompetent British generals, and treasonous elements within Parliament and English
society. A few loyalist gentlemen published their interpretations of the complex factors
that led to American independence, while individuals such as Joseph Galloway and John
Peters became locked in drawn-out and very public quarrels with British generals over
who was to blame for the American disaster. Explaining and accounting for defeat were
not merely the arguments and finger-pointing of old soldiers reliving past battles; these
were matters of official inquiry and public debate. At stake was the honour of loyalist
arms and manhood, and in many cases the accepted version of events could have a
significant impact on the ability of individual loyalists to make claims upon the British
government for their losses and services. Loyalists did not, therefore, defer to their
superiors, but often bitterly defended their contributions and directly challenged the
honour of the British generals who failed to quell the rebellion. The loyalists’ own
honour and rights superseded their obligations to respect all imperial officers.
The second section explores the role of honour and manhood in the claims
process itself. Even though the loyalists chafed at the interrogations and burden of proof
laid upon them by the Royal Commission on the Losses and Services of the American
Loyalists, the structure of the commission was designed to benefit gentlemen. Literate
men with the connections, resources, and manners had a tremendous advantage over
other claimants, and were able to make their cases in ways which appealed to the
gentlemen commissioners. In this way the British government ensured that most of the
compensation was paid to white gentlemen to restore their place as British colonial
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patriarchs.31 The claims process also provided the loyalists a venue, through their
depositions and published narratives, to craft an idealized image of a suffering, yet
valiant loyalist man who remained morally undefeated. The image of the loyalist man is
strikingly consistent throughout the narratives. These were hardworking yet genteel men,
with fortunes and bright futures ahead of them. Nonetheless, when faced with the
decision to rebel or remain loyal, they sacrificed all they had out of devotion to the King
and the British constitution. Yet after all they endured, the loyalists argued that they had
been betrayed in the peace treaty by the very authorities they had fought to defend. In
essence the refugee gentlemen were creating a sense of moral obligation between men,
which once again shows honour’s function as a claim-right. The loyalists portrayed
themselves as worthy, faithful, and suffering men who needed to be treated with respect
and gratitude to preserve British honour. They were making personal and collective
claims on the government, and on other individuals, not just for a monetary reward, but
for the restoration of their power and privilege. To experience anything less was an insult
and violation of their rights. Though the imperial government was unable to restore the
loyalists’ fortunes pound for pound, and in spite of the competing claims of some British
generals, Parliament did recognize the debt it owed to their loyal American subjects.
The final section of this chapter explores the loyalists’ fixation on their power as
household and community patriarchs during their resettlement in British North America.
Though a father’s power was enshrined in custom, religion, and law, in a practical sense
his authority over dependents was usually fixed to the amount of property and money he
was able to provide.32 The loyalists, like their counterparts in the new republic, were
deeply anxious about their place in the reordered world, and as they sometimes teetered
on the brink of insolvency and ruin, or contended with the privations of frontier life, they
fretted about losing patriarchal control over their wives, children, and other dependents.
The experiences of three loyalist gentlemen of very different circumstances living in
three different colonies reveal consistent concerns over strained and even collapsing
marriages, financial stress, and their anxiety over the honour and future of their sons.
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Using a comparative biographical approach, the correspondence of Joel Stone in Upper
Canada, Amos Botsford in Saint John, New Brunswick, and Mather Byles Jr. of Halifax,
Nova Scotia reveal that even though challenges to patriarchy were common in the new
settlements, these men were not isolated patriarchs in the wilderness. The combined
support of the British government and the extended, cross-border social networks
maintained the privileged place of loyalist gentlemen in their new communities. Sons
were sent for their education to the new republic, and people, goods, and ideas
continually passed between loyalist settlements and the American states, regardless of the
political divisions. British preferment and the loyalists’ continued attachment to families
and friends in their homelands ensured the survival of their patriarchal authority and
ability to pass their privileges and their values on to a new generation of loyalists.
Before continuing, it must be noted that while the majority of scholarly and
popular attention has been paid to the loyalist exiles, and the term “loyalist” is often used
interchangeably with exile or refugee in the study of the American Revolution, they were
actually a minority of the total number of Americans who sided with the British Crown.
If Paul H. Smith’s estimate of loyalist numbers is accurate, perhaps as many as 500 000
colonists were connected in some manner with the loyalists. According to Maya
Jasanoff’s recent study, the number of loyalist exiles is considerably less than originally
thought, perhaps numbering around 60 000 people who left the former colonies for a
variety of destinations within the British Empire. Most loyalists, therefore, found a place
within the new republic of the United States. Yet following the loyalists who remained or
returned to the United States is difficult and there have only been a handful of studies
which examine the question. Most work has focussed either on prominent individuals
such as Samuel Seabury or William Samuel Johnson, or on specific regions or states.33
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The wartime allegiance of the returning loyalists was a continued source of dishonour
and needed to be hidden or downplayed, not celebrated or commemorated. Reintegrated
loyalists did not speak out against negative depictions of them in the press or popular
literature or social memory. They did achieve a political rebirth, but not one based on
their wartime experiences. These loyalists worked to cover their past, and their political
rebirth followed a different trajectory and must therefore be treated elsewhere.

The loyalist exiles described in this dissertation believed their authority and
privileges were theirs by right. Their political death in Revolutionary America unjustly
stripped them of that right in the former colonies, but this was a sacrifice, they argued,
endured on behalf of the British Empire. Historians have long studied the claims process
and the history of resettlement, but when this same history is examined from the
perspective of honour and manhood, it is evident that the loyalist claim on the British
government for restitution was inextricable from the claims they made on their families
and others, to be treated as patriarchs and gentlemen. Far from being suffering,
deferential imperial subjects, the loyalists were assertive, demanding compensation and
preferment by right of their superior manhood and honour. Not all loyalists were
successful in their attempts. Some dishonoured themselves by falling into debt and
bankruptcy, while others, in their attempts to defend their reputations, offended the
honour of powerful men and lost potential patrons. Collectively, the loyalists in the
remaining colonies of British North America successfully achieved political rebirth.
Subsequent generations of Canadians remembered the loyalists not as dishonoured
Americans, but as heroic founders of a new nation.
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Defeat
The first stage of political rebirth was coming to terms with defeat. The shock and
bewilderment of the catastrophe pervaded all aspects of the loyalist experience. From
their own personal losses to the shared disasters of Boston, Saratoga, the abandonment of
Philadelphia, the surrender at Yorktown, and the final evacuation in 1783, the loyalists
had to find some way to rationalize these events and explain their role in them. If they
were to blame for Britain’s defeat, their incompetence would make them unfit for
political rebirth, but if they had done all they could and were failed by British arms, then
they were in a far better position to justify making claims on the government. Their
individual and collective honour and manhood, as well as their fortunes and families’
well-being, were at stake.
Wolfgang Schivelbusch argues that all defeated nations display “a recognizable
set of patterns or archetypes that recur across time and national boundaries.”34 The
loyalists exhibited some of these archetypes, but exiles suffered the imperial collapse
very differently from Britons. National defeat is experienced through stages of collective
mourning and renewal. In the first stage, which Schivelbusch borrows from the German
thinker Ernst Troeltsch, a defeated people fall into a “dreamland…in which all blame is
transferred” to the failed leadership. The incompetent leaders are then deposed “and the
losing nation feels cathartically cleansed, freed of any responsibility or guilt.” Germany
in 1918 and France in 1871 serve as examples of nations who dethroned their monarchs
in popular post-war revolutions. As seen in the preceding chapter, loyalists were clearly
frustrated with British commanders in America and saw them as vain, corrupt, and lazy,
just as the Germans and French chose to remember their former monarchs who led them
into disaster. Yet the loyalists never considered any sort of post-war rebellion of their
own, nor did they blame their King, even if they did feel that defeat in America was
entirely the fault of certain British generals and politicians. Joseph Galloway argued that
the loyalists’ virtues “taught them to look up to Government to take the lead in
suppressing [the rebellion]” but found that the British authorities in the colonies “were
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daily giving way to new usurpations, without any exertion to prevent it.” Furthermore,
individual loyalists could do little since they “were disarmed, [and] the most obnoxious
of them imprisoned.” To make matters worse, they could not fully participate in the
ideological struggle since the “loyal presses were restrained, some of them seized and
destroyed… [and] Publications in favour of Government were publicly burned…” To add
to Britain’s culpability, “republican presses teemed with speeches of their friends and
allies in parliament, and letters wrote from their colleagues in faction in England…all
tend[ed] to lead the people into a rebellious opposition to Government.”35 Any hope of
subduing the rebellion was dashed by sending ill-timed peace commissions to North
America with “terms of accommodation” after the siege of Boston and the invasion of
Canada. Galloway charged that this measure only emboldened the American rebels and
set them directly on the path to declaring independence.36
British bungling did not end with their diplomatic failures, but was joined by
equally disastrous military policies. If, as Schivelbusch argues, “the deployment of
armies on the battlefield is the classic manifestation of collective self-confidence”, then
the loyalists were deprived of this from the earliest stages of the war. According to
Galloway, the rebels “were arrayed in arms by voluntary associations, and there was
moreover a regular armed force under the Congress to support them…” In stark contrast,
“the loyalists…were without a head, and without weapons.” Throughout the conflict,
loyalists were not effectively utilized as soldiers, and those that were often felt insulted at
the arrogant high-handedness of British commanders. British political ineptitude and
military incompetence was to blame for the defeat, but did not lessen the loyalists’ virtues
of duty and fidelity, according to men like Galloway.37 The loyalists had done all they
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could to uphold their personal honour and remain faithful to the King. The loss was not
due to any deficiency in loyalist manhood, but the impotence of British leadership.
If the ignominy of defeat was hard enough for the loyalists to bear, the trauma
was exacerbated by the loyalists’ own stab-in-the-back moment: the articles of the Treaty
of Paris signed in 1783. Many loyalists had hoped to fight on after the Yorktown disaster
in 1781, but the British government and treasury were exhausted. Facing a global conflict
against France, Spain, and the Dutch Republic, the British Parliament, and eventually the
King, accepted the American victory.38 The Treaty of Paris recognized American
independence, secured fishing rights of American sailors on the Grand Banks, and
established generous borders for the new American nation. The independent United
States was difficult for loyalists to accept, but article five of the treaty seemed like a
blatant betrayal. Rather than demand the return of loyalists’ confiscated estates as a
condition of peace, the treaty simply stated that “Congress shall earnestly recommend it
to the Legislatures of the respective States to provide for the Restitution of all Estates,
Rights, and Properties, which have been confiscated…” Furthermore the loyalists “shall
have free Liberty to go to any Part or Parts of any of the thirteen United States and
therein remain twelve Months unmolested in their Endeavours to obtain the Restitution of
their Estates…”39 The loyalists considered this article to be a grave injustice. It seemed to
ignore their suffering and their losses while permitting the states to keep the loyalists’
illegally seized property. The proviso suggesting that the exiles could return to the scene
of their persecution and dishonour would have struck most refugees as ridiculous and
insulting.
Popular sentiment and local authorities actively worked against any sort of
loyalist reintegration or reconciliation in the months surrounding the peace treaty. Many
of Connecticut’s coastal towns, for example, suffered heavily from British raids during
the conflict and forbade the return of any loyalists on pain of imprisonment and
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deportation.40 The townspeople of Stratford formed a committee to determine how to deal
with “whole shoals of Tories…flocking over from Long Island, and other parts within the
enemy’s lines...” The committee’s resolves, published in The Connecticut Journal were
unequivocal, stating that until there was some direction from the State authorities to do
otherwise, “we do pledge our honor, to each other, that we will exert ourselves, in the
most proper and strenuous manner, to drive off and expel all such persons who shall
make the attempt to regain that settlement; in this town, which they have utterly and
forever forfeited.” The announcement then went on to list the names of individuals who
had boldly returned “to walk the streets of Freedom.”41 No matter what the negotiators
accomplished in Paris, there was little they could do to lessen the fierce, local animosity
toward the defeated loyalists.
Nevertheless, some men were willing the take the risk of returning to their former
communities in order to restore lost elements of their masculinity and satisfy personal
honour. In May 1783, Stephen Jarvis, a young cavalry lieutenant in the Queen’s Rangers,
returned to his home of Danbury, Connecticut eager to marry his fiancée, Amelia Glover,
after a seven-year delay. Jarvis’ memoir, written decades after the events, illustrates the
confusion of the immediate post-war period, as local rancour vied with treaty stipulations.
Jarvis received the proper passes from both his commanding officer and the Connecticut
authorities, but even with those official assurances of safe passage, his father’s home was
repeatedly besieged by a vengeful local militia. He was able to talk his way out of one
encounter through a combination of bravado and genteel manners, both appealing to
former acquaintances and daring the militia to act against official orders from their
government. A few old friends in the group shook his hand, while others cursed him “for
a dam’d Tory…charging me with Cutting out Prisoners[’] tongues.” Eventually, a small
body of American troops arrived to protect the premises and Jarvis consented to an
impromptu wedding ceremony to hurry his departure, and this temporarily placated the
mob. The following morning, after the guard departed, the local sheriff arrived to arrest
Jarvis despite his official passes and the deal brokered earlier with the militia. Barricaded
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in his bedroom with his new wife, Jarvis managed to assuage the crowd to let the
newlyweds leave by tossing a dollar for the men to drink the health of the bride, and
sharing a “bottle of bitters” lowered from his window in a bucket. With the mood
lightened, the mob reportedly declared the local Tory “a dam’d honest fellow” and Jarvis
and his wife eventually went on their way.42 In Jarvis’ narrative his masculinity is doubly
vindicated. He marries a woman of good character and becomes the head of a new,
though transient, family, all while he fends off his enemies. The details of the vignette,
however, bear some striking similarities to the custom of the charivari, where locals
might express their displeasure at a marital mismatch or some other form of nuptial
dishonour.43 Indeed, the marriage of a Tory to a local young woman may have been
exactly what the mob was protesting. In this case Jarvis’ obliging, yet manly, behaviour,
and perhaps more importantly Amelia Glover’s obvious desire to marry a man she had
waited seven years for, and quite likely her own family’s consent, ensured that no harm
came to the loyalist newlyweds.
Joel Stone’s return to his former home in Litchfield County, Connecticut was also
met with protest. As early as 1782, Stone’s brother had urged him to return. “You write
to me that the people…wish me to return” Stone replied. “Am much obliged to them for
there [sic] good opinion of me, and wish as sincerely there was an end to malice, & I
could happily spend my days with them.”44 But it was not to be. In August of 1783, Stone
returned not to visit or rekindle past affections, but to collect “a considerable property
due upon notes and book debts…” Even though he had been declared politically
deceased, and had his estate confiscated according to Connecticut law in 1777, he wrote
that he “had secreted my writings and could produce my books” and therefore
“determined to try what I could do among my original debtors.” Debt repayment was
considered a matter of personal honour and Stone obviously hoped that his neighbours
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would live up to their pre-war obligations. He recorded that his “former friends” treated
him “with respect [,] but from those of the populace who deemed me criminal to their
principles I met a quite different treatment.” Stone does not specify whether or not the
resentful patriots were the same people who owed him the money, but the local Justice of
the Peace warned Stone not to collect “such book debts as the populace being still
enraged against me the consequences might be dreadful.” When the locals learned of
Stone’s presence and intentions he “received solemn warning from the mob to leave the
province within forty-eight hours.” He then went into hiding to finish making copies of
his account books, before hastily returning to British lines.45 To Stone, the collection of
debts was both practical and a matter of honour that personally bound debtor and
creditor. The cancellation of loyalist debts was a particularly bitter issue for refugees. Not
only was the erasure of debts owed to loyalists another mark of their political death, it
was also a set-back in their quest to restore their finances. As Mather Byles Jr. wryly
noted in 1786, the people of the new republic had “a rooted Antipathy to paying their just
Debts” since “it is certainly inconsistent with the Liberties of a free People to be obliged
to pay them at all.”46 The loyalist impotence in collecting their pre-war American debts
was a stinging wound to their honour, but this was exacerbated by the fact that the British
disallowed any claims for lost debts in the final compensation process.47 To make matters
even worse for the loyalists, American creditors followed the refugees to England
seeking debt repayment. British courts and Parliament failed to protect loyalists in these
cases.48 The loyalists felt personally insulted and betrayed both by men who had made
honourable agreements before the war, separate from any political matter, and by their
supposed British protectors.
In the confusing months surrounding the announcement of the peace treaty, the
patriot press gleefully reported on grief-stricken Tories and their apparent abandonment
by the British. An article in the Connecticut Journal recounted that “Many of the
Loyalists affect not to believe our accounts of [the Treaty of Paris]: However, their faith
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of the important truth, is to be read distinctly in the countenance of the tories.”
Furthermore, “The offers of land in Nova Scotia, the promise of six months provisions,
and other tokens of royal favours, have no influence in dispersing the melancholy gloom
which has taken deep impression on their faces.”49 The South Carolina Gazette and
General Advertiser carried a notification from the loyalist official Oliver De Lancey that
all occupied homes in New York City had to be returned to their former patriot owners.
The announcement was followed by an editorial which described the loyalists fleeing “in
precipitation and disgust.” Patriots must have been gratified to read that the “Loyalists, it
is said, boldly d--n their King for ‘a Turn-coat.’”50 The Connecticut Courant reported that
“the vile miscreants of tories were so exasperated that they trampled their most gracious
King’s proclamation under their feet, with the utmost scorn and contempt…” “Finding
themselves duped by a government on whom they reposed the highest confidence in,”
continued the article, “they are become desperate even to madness….The just reward of
their demerits.”51 The South Carolina Weekly Gazette carried a supposed anecdote from
the English Civil War which underscored the historical recurrence of the English
monarch’s betrayal and abandonment of ruined loyalists. Upon the restoration of King
Charles II of England in 1660, he caught sight of “a very genteel figure, but meanly
habited” and was “told he was an old Cavalier, who had ruined his fortune by espousing
his father’s [King Charles I] cause against the rebels.” When the King learned his name
was Sir Thomas Pool, Charles II joked “shocking and cruel as it was; ‘should he
not…spell his name with an F?’ Thus was the invaluable spirit of loyalty ridiculed in the
last century; and how it fares in the present, is lamentably notorious from some late
transactions.”52 A more sympathetic reading of the loyalist plight appeared in the same
paper, which described the exiles in East Florida who suddenly found their refuge ceded
to Spain. “A Planter” writing from the St. Johns River in Florida, implored his former
countrymen to feel pity rather than malice towards the “unfortunate Loyalists in
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America”. “The man that is steeled against such forceable [sic] impressions, is a monster,
that should be drove from the circle of cultivated society.” The loyalists had been
“sacrificed to the ambition of their enemies, expelled [from] their native country, and
thrown upon the wide world, friendless and unsupported.” British promises, the planter
writes, “have been violated in every instance; and that national faith, which we had been
accustomed to look upon as sacred, basely bartered for an inglorious peace.” After being
so “betrayed and deserted” it was time, argued “A Planter,” “that the Loyalists should
think for themselves, and not trust to a people who have so repeatedly deceived them, and
whose national honour is sunk beneath contempt.” Rather than go to the British for
assistance, the Planter suggests that since the “brave and the virtuous will ever find
patrons and protectors”, it would be better to bring their case to the new states “and to set
forth in decent and manly terms the nature of their sufferings.”53 Valiant manhood, he
hoped, would always be respected regardless of politics.
To patriot readers, these accounts of friendless loyalists served to highlight once
again the perfidiousness of the British government, and the gullibility of the loyalists. In
many ways the patriot observations of the British betrayal mirrored the sentiments of
some loyalist gentlemen. In his official narrative to the commissioners, Joel Stone called
the treaty “unjust” while a loyalist from Georgia delivered his sentiment more strongly,
declaring that he “shall ever…remember with satisfaction that it was not I [who] deserted
my King, but my King who deserted me.”54 Mather Byles Jr., the exiled Boston
clergyman, struck a more sardonic and resigned tone. In a letter to his sister he describes
watching the ceremonial disbanding of some provincial regiments in Halifax,
“immediately upon which I bought a cheese & a Frying-Pan; the latter, because I
concluded all Broils would be at an End; & the former, because after cheese comes
Nothing.” After his attempt at humour, Byles concludes with an expression of Christian
stoicism. He endured his suffering, he wrote, knowing that “in Heaven [he would] have a
53
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better & enduring Substance, where the Sons of Violence can afflict no more…& where
those faithful Ministers who have steadily adhered…to their solemn ordination-vows of
Loyalty to the King, will meet their Reward.”55 Byles put his faith in God, not the British
government.
While Byles could take consolation in a clear conscience and the promise of
heavenly rewards, other loyalists expressed their bitterness by looking to lay blame for
the disaster. The Connecticut exile Joshua Chandler, an aging Yale graduate and former
assemblyman, knew exactly who was at fault. During his temporary residence in London,
Chandler wrote to a friend in Massachusetts of his astonishment at the decadent manners
and customs he encountered. He referred to England as “this Great Sink of Pollution,
Corruption and Venality…” “This Kingdom,” he despaired, “without a miracle in its
favor must soon be Lost; you can have no idea of their Corruption, of their Debauchery
and Luxury; their Pride; their Riches; their Luxury has Ruined them; it is not in the
Power of Human Nature to Save them.” To that excoriating assessment of the English, he
added that even men whom he assumed were the loyalists’ allies, such as former Prime
Minister Lord North, were “in Favor of the Democratical Part of the Constitution to the
Ruin of the Monarchical…” To Chandler, like many others, it was clear that the British
were the architects of their own defeat and the ruin of the loyalists. The letter must have
seemed like the admission of a terrible error to its patriot recipient.56
Even with the loyalists’ recognition of the British government’s mishandling of
the war and perceived mistreatment of the loyalists, many refugees still argued that their
choice to remain faithful to the King was the honourable and moral decision. Colonel
John Peters wrote in his narrative that “I cannot say that I look back with regret at the part
I took from the motives of Loyalty and from a foresight of the horrors and miseries of
Independency”. Indeed, “I thought the part I took right & I certainly think so still from
love to my Country as well as Duty to my Sovereign & notwithstanding my sufferings,
and Services and Scandalous treatment [at the hands of British officers]…I wou’d do it
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again if there was occasion.” If Peters refused to question the righteousness of his cause,
he still had to contend with the success of his enemies. “With the consciousness of having
done right,” he wrote, “I can look with disdain at the triumph of successful Villainy.”57
Nevertheless, Peters still blamed the British for the defeat and felt badly used. This raised
one of the fundamental problems loyalists faced: they could blame the British for the
defeat all they pleased, but they still relied on the same government to rebuild their
estates and influence. This must have been a bitter truth for the loyalists as they
floundered in the post-Revolutionary years without a home or even a solid sense of
identity, caught between America and Britain without being part of either.58
Loyalists were therefore caught in a paradox. They were certain of the honour,
justice, and righteousness of their decision, but torn by resentment towards British
authorities who either did not appreciate the extent of their suffering or were perhaps
unworthy of the loyalists’ sacrifices. To work out these issues some of the most literaryminded loyalists like Joseph Galloway, Alexander Hewatt, Peter Oliver, Samuel Peters,
and Jonathan Boucher wrote extended histories which attempted to explain Britain’s
defeat and defend the part the loyalists played. 59 Without exception, each of the writers
agreed that the rebellion had been incited by a small group of demagogues who whipped
a gullible people into an emotional frenzy, even though the colonists should have been
perfectly happy in their rich country.60 Samuel Peters, (along with most of the loyalist
pamphleteers explored in chapter 3), saw the Revolution as a war of religion, contending
that the spirit of rebellion from the English Civil Wars had persisted in the “darkness of
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superstition” among the bigoted Congregationalists of New England. The Connecticutborn Peters recorded outrageous tales of his homeland’s religious fanaticism, such as
fining an Anglican clergyman who ran to escape the rain on the Sabbath.61 Along with,
(or perhaps because of), his former countrymen’s peculiar religious devotion, Peters
noted that these seemingly godly people made it their business to “conscientiously study
to cheat the King of those duties, which they say, God and nature never intended should
be paid. From the governor down to the tithing-man,” Peters charged, “they will aid
smugglers, resist collectors, and mob informers.”62 Regardless of their advantages and
comforts, Peters asserted that the New Englanders were religiously and culturally
disposed to rebellion and republicanism.
The former Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, Joseph
Galloway, also saw the connection between the Roundheads and 1776. “If the pulpits of
the sectaries in England in the year 1641, resounded with sedition,” he wrote, “the pulpits
of the Congregational Independents and Presbyterians, from Nova Scotia to Georgia,
rung with the same flagitious doctrines.”63 Jonathan Boucher, writing almost two decades
later, agreed with Peters and Galloway that the dissenters of New England played a major
role in the rebellion, but what united all of the colonies into conflict with Britain was
much more complicated. Indeed Boucher writes that it was a “marvellous, romantic, and
incredible” fact that the people of Virginia and Maryland would follow the New
Englanders, “for whom they entertained an hereditary national disesteem,” into civil war.
The true cause, argued Boucher, was that the colonies were “planted in imperfection.” “A
possibility of their future defection” he wrote, “was not foreseen; nor of course, guarded
against.” Whatever the individual acts of Parliament, the imperial authorities “either saw
not, or heeded not, the latent mischief, till at length it broke out with a force that was
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irresistible.” The loyalist chroniclers generally agreed that although the revolution had
deep cultural roots, it was, in the end, completely unjustifiable.64
Since the loyalists contended that the Revolution was not ignited by actual
oppression, the writers looked to the revolutionary leaders as the true sparks of the war.
Each of these works presents the leading patriots as the dark inversions of decent
gentlemen. Hardly the champions of individual liberty and rights, the loyalists depicted
the patriot leadership as either fanatical dissenters, or, just as often, cabals of selfinterested and ambitious men. Through their demagoguery and charisma, this small group
managed to delude the people of America. Peter Oliver devoted lengthy portions of his
manuscript dissecting and lambasting the character of some of the most prominent
revolutionaries. Samuel Adams “was so thorough a Machiavellian, that he divested
himself of every worthy Principle, & would stick at no Crime to accomplish his ends.”
These crimes included deluding John Hancock, whose “Mind was a meer [sic] tabula
rasa,” and hijacking his fortune to support the rebellion. Benjamin Franklin “was a Man
of Genius, but of so unprincipled an [sic] Heart, that the Merit of all his political &
philosophical Disquisitions can never atone for the Mischiefs which he plunged Society
into…” John Adams was characterized as a petty tyrant, possessing “an Acrimony of
Temper” which “settled into Rancor & Malignancy – by having an absolute Authority
over Children” when a schoolmaster. James Otis had ruined his law practice “by drinking
& by Passion”.65 These invectives painted the patriot leadership as a sort of rogue’s
gallery of men guided by the worst defects gentlemen could possess.66 Indeed, both
Joseph Galloway and John Peters wrote that the deceitful rebel faction had intentionally
thwarted any attempt at reconciliation, and in spite of Congress’ protestations of loyalty,
“the Bankrupts, dissenting Teachers and Smugglers [in Congress] meant to have a
Serious Rebellion, and a Civil and Religious separation from the Mother Country.”67
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To the loyalists the causes of the American Revolution – the deep-seated religious
and political distemper, the structural weakness of authority in the colonies, and the
demagoguery of the rebel leaders - went a considerable distance in explaining the British
defeat. In the face of such systemic dysfunction and conspiracy there was little the good
gentlemen in the loyalist ranks could do. Yet the loyalists also blamed Britain’s military
leaders in America. Two bitter feuds between high-ranking loyalists and British
commanders display the stakes and rancour involved in determining the blame for defeat.
Joseph Galloway and John Peters took on William Howe and John Burgoyne respectively
in Parliamentary inquiries, in the back channels of political influence, and in the court of
public opinion, in their attempts both to vindicate the conduct and manhood of the
loyalists and to show how the defects in the generals’ characters and their failed policies
led to the disaster at Saratoga in 1777 and the failure of the Pennsylvania Campaign in
1777-78. In both cases, the loyalist writers boldly present the generals as intemperate,
vain, foolish, and even cowardly. These concerted attacks on British authority figures by
loyalist gentlemen underscore just how assertive the leading refugees became in defeat.
To Galloway and Peters, and doubtlessly many other loyalists, America was lost because
of the deficient martial prowess and deep character flaws of Burgoyne and Howe.
As a refugee in London in 1779, Joseph Galloway anonymously published a
pamphlet entitled Letters to a Nobleman on the Conduct of the War in the Middle
Colonies, which, he wrote, was intended to reveal “the shameful misconduct of the
American war” and refute General William Howe’s claims that his reversals were the
fault of the administration’s lack of support and the strength of the “almost universally
disaffected” colonists. Though Galloway rarely mentions General Howe by name, his
attacks are clear and sharp.68 Publishing the pamphlets anonymously was a standard
custom, but as will be seen in this case, Galloway’s identity as the author was well known
and the anonymity was dropped in later printings.
Galloway begins by describing the easy terrain of New Jersey and Pennsylvania
which “cannot, with the least propriety, in the military sense of the words, be called
uncommonly strong, and much less impracticable.” The British army moved freely
68
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through the territory “with ease and little loss” putting the rebels to flight at every
encounter. The loyalist author then goes one step further and compares the fighting in the
Middle Colonies, with “the scene of action in the last American war” which “was in a
country of thick woods, - full of vast mountains, high precipices, and strong defiles”
defended by “French veterans.” And yet it was conquered by “an Amherst and a Wolfe”
who, Galloway sniped, “unconnected with party, prized their own honour, and devoted
their lives to the interest of their country and the glory of their Sovereign.” Howe’s
assertion that the Middle Colonies were in fact “strong and impracticable” was a feeble
excuse “for the military indolence and misconduct of men, who have sacrificed to party
and faction their own honour, the glory of their Sovereign, and the dignity of the
nation.”69 This was a stinging rebuke for a general whose reputation had already been
skewered by tawdry gossip of his affair with the married Elizabeth Loring (see chapter
2).
After assuring the reader that the majority of colonists were loyal subjects,
Galloway dissects Howe’s leadership during the military campaign. The overwhelming
might of British arms should have ensured victory. According to Galloway, over forty
thousand British soldiers, “commanded by able and experienced officers” were pitted
against a force of eighteen thousand rebels “seduced into arms” and led “by men destitute
of military skill or experience; and, for the most part, taken from mechanic arts or the
plough.”70 British soldiers were trained and led by gentlemen, yet succumbed to lesser
men. The eventual failure of the British in the northern colonies, save for the occupation
of New York City and Long Island, was entirely the fault of the “British General
[Howe]” who “was left to his own judgement in forming and executing his plans in every
instance [except in assisting Burgoyne] and by that neglect sacrificed a British army, and
involved his country in a degree of disgrace it never before had experienced.” In the end,
Galloway asserted, the seeds of defeat were found in Howe’s “want of wisdom in plans,
and of vigour and exertion in the execution.”71
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Galloway provided a litany of examples of bungling: instances when Howe
pointlessly delayed his army, overestimated rebel strength, and underestimated the
number of loyalists while failing to arm American volunteers. Furthermore Howe took
the army on needlessly circuitous routes in the summer heat and exhausted his men.72 To
make matters worse, after “thousands” of loyalists “took the oath”, “the Royal faith,
pledged for their safety, was shamefully violated. The unhappy people, instead of
receiving the protection promised, were plundered by the soldiery. Their wives and
daughters polluted by the lustful brutality of the lowest of mankind…” Throughout all of
the outrages Howe “was indolent and neglectful in putting a stop to these cruelties”,
which disheartened the loyalists and gave the patriot press an unmatched propaganda
tool.73 Galloway presents example after example of poor planning, abysmal leadership,
and moments of “unparalleled absurdity” where Howe turned overwhelming advantage
into failure.74 In a final rebuke, Galloway declares that neither Howe’s superiority in
arms, men, and equipment, nor “the distress of the loyal inhabitants, the millions he was
wasting, the prospect of glory, nor the duty he owed to his Sovereign and the nation,
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could prevail on the general to desert the delusive pleasures of the long room and the
Faro table.”75
Galloway’s sharp tone was a product of his own frustrations. Howe, for his part,
gave Galloway a number of important offices including superintendent of the police and
customs in occupied Philadelphia. The loyalist reported on the Continental Army’s
movements, strength, and morale to Howe, but was astonished at the General’s failure to
crush Washington while the patriot army languished at Valley Forge in early 1778. 76 By
the late 1780s, Galloway and another loyalist pamphleteer, Israel Mauduit, had together
written and published twenty-five separate pamphlets attacking the general’s conduct.77
Howe defended himself vigorously against Galloway and others who blamed him
for Britain’s failure, and published his own pamphlet addressing Galloway’s claims and
“invidious assertions” page by page.78 In his defence, Howe attacked Galloway and the
honour of the loyalists in general. The British commander rejected the alleged similarities
between the French and Indian War and the American War of Independence, and
provided the testimony of other British officers to refute Galloway’s claim that the terrain
was easy to traverse and conquer.79 In reference to loyalist support, Howe denied that
“thousands” of loyalists flocked to British-occupied Philadelphia. Those Americans who
did come through the British lines, he argued, came not out of loyalty but “to get
possession of their houses and effects…[others] to do us all the mischief they could, by
sending out intelligence to the enemy, and inveighing the troops to desert, and
smuggling… supplies for Washington’s army…” Local farmers only supplied the British
to get “hard money” instead of the Continental Army’s “paper money”, charged Howe.
The Pennsylvanians fed the redcoats out of greed and not from their zealous attachment
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to the King.80 Far from describing his enemies as undisciplined rabble, Howe
complimented Washington’s troops as being surprisingly well disciplined, provisioned,
and having “as good use of fire-arms, in general, as the King’s troops...”81 The British
general also denied the plundering and rapine alleged by Galloway, and insisted that the
few cases which did occur were dealt with justly.82
Howe never claims to know the author of Letters to a Nobleman, but his frequent
mention of Joseph Galloway, always emphasized in italics, indicates he was fully aware
of the author’s identity. In an extended discussion of Galloway, Howe portrays him as a
puffed-up provincial, whose declarations of status and ability fell far short of his
promises. Howe claims that he put great confidence in certain loyalists, but writes, “I
confess that I sometimes found myself the dupe of such distinctions.” He then spends a
page and a half castigating the former Pennsylvania representative in particular. For
example, Howe charges that Galloway only came into British lines after the resounding
victory in New York and the subsequent “Proclamation of indemnity,” which implies that
Galloway had in fact been numbered among the rebels, and deserted his countrymen out
of fear of a British victory. Howe writes that he “expected much assistance from a
gentleman of [Galloway’s] abilities and reputed influence” and entrusted him with a
variety of posts and an annual salary of £770. “[B]ut I afterwards found that my
confidence was misplaced”. “His ideas,” Howe continues, “were visionary, [i.e.
delusional] and his intelligence was too frequently either ill-founded, or so much
exaggerated, that it would have been unsafe to act upon.”83 William Howe goes on to
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allege that Galloway “applied…for permission to raise a provincial corps of
dragoons…chiefly from the county of Bucks in Pennsylvania, where he pretended to
have (for he certainly had not) great influence” and failed in his task. On another
occasion, the loyalist gentleman promised to find 500 loyal workers to erect fortifications
around Philadelphia, but could only produce “seventy or eighty.” Galloway was
constantly assuring the General of his “intimate knowledge” of the land and its people,
and insisted on their loyalty. When it did not materialize, Galloway simply stated that the
loyalists “were farther on.”84 In Howe’s narrative he was impeded, not helped, by the
loyal gentleman and the loyalists in general. It was the loyalists who did not come to the
assistance of the British, and who undermined the war effort with their unmanly greed
and bad advice. Galloway, in particular, was little more than a fawning huckster.
To Galloway, Howe’s printed aspersions must have seemed like astonishingly
open attacks on the loyalists’ honour, but Howe was not alone in his opinions. Edmund
Burke, the famous orator and Parliamentarian, criticized Galloway’s demands for sending
more troops and dealing harshly with the rebels, arguing that his advice would lead to
perpetual war in America.85 Nonetheless, Galloway set his pen again to refuting Howe’s
refutation of the original pamphlet. In a tedious 160 page document, Galloway, again
anonymously, set out to answer Howe’s page-by-page challenges, page by page.86
Enough people evidently took interest in the dispute for there to have been several
editions of the pamphlets and the body of Galloway’s work was eventually repackaged
and printed under his name in Philadelphia in 1788 as A Short History of the War in
America.87 In the first appendix, Galloway includes an open letter to General Howe,
castigating him for his personal insults. Citing the conventions of civility, Galloway
scolds Howe for not following “the example I had set you in my Letters; in which…I
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had confined my strictures to your ‘professional conduct,’ without suffering one syllable
of personal abuse, or one hint at the defects in your private moral character…to escape
my pen.” This was entirely false. Galloway had clearly blamed Howe’s defeat on his
character as a bumbler and as an indolent gambler. Nonetheless, Galloway accuses Howe
of deserting “the field of decent and manly argument, and [taking] a mean refuge under
the abuse of [Galloway’s] private reputation. A conduct of this kind” added Galloway, “is
the usual practice of the guilty, and the common weapon made use of to wound the
innocent.”88 If Galloway felt better for defending himself in print, his nemesis Howe,
even with the cloud of controversy hanging over him, remained a powerful figure in the
British establishment for the rest of his life.89 Galloway continued as an influential
advocate and spokesman for his fellow refugees, printing several pamphlets in defence of
the loyalists’ claims on the government. He was never able to return Pennsylvania, and
by the 1790s he had retreated from public life. He died in England in 1803.90 The dispute
between Howe and Galloway faded, but was never resolved.
An equally acrimonious argument took place between the Connecticut-born
loyalist Colonel John Peters of the Queen’s Loyal Rangers (nephew of the Rev. Samuel
Peters) and his one-time commanding officer Lieutenant General John Burgoyne over
their competing versions of the British disaster at Saratoga in 1777. Like the GallowayHowe quarrel, this controversy called loyalist manhood and honour into question, but it
also had a profound impact upon John Peters’ claims on the British government.
Powerful and well-connected British officers were eager to protect their own reputations
and dismissed Peters and his fellow loyalists as grasping, cowardly, opportunistic
provincials who even lacked the moral fiber of their rebel adversaries. In the end, Peters’
attempts to vindicate his actions and those of his fellow loyalists at Saratoga failed, and
his hopes of political rebirth were entirely dashed.
Though he has long been characterized as a foppish and incompetent dandy in the
historical and popular imagination, John Burgoyne was a respected commander and was
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considered by many to be the epitome of the genteel officer. In spite of his military defeat
and his political allegiance with the short-lived Whig government that collapsed in 1783,
Burgoyne continued to enjoy fame as an accomplished playwright and was respected as
an influential gentleman until his death.91 John Peters, by comparison, was an unknown
provincial exile who provoked the ire of both Burgoyne and Frederick Haldimand, the
military governor of Quebec from 1778 to 1786. Peters did not have the resources to
publish a response to Burgoyne’s printed version of the Saratoga campaign, but his
handwritten narrative provides an intriguing testimony of the deep insult a formerly
prominent loyalist felt at the dismissive and disparaging treatment he experienced at the
hands of commanders whom he blamed for Britain’s defeat.
In 1779, John Peters learned of Burgoyne’s attempts to defend himself and blame
his crushing defeat, in part, on “the ill Conduct of the Indians & Provincials on whom he
found too late was no Dependence.” In a letter to an unnamed recipient, Peters attempted
to defend “the Provincials” and “Indians” and show how Burgoyne blundered his way to
defeat by alienating his provincial irregulars and Native allies, neglecting to properly
compensate them, and ignoring their advice. Burgoyne’s first mistake was telling his
Native allies that they “should be hanged if they carried on the War in their own Way.”
Peters neglects to mention that Burgoyne was responding to the murder of Jane McRae,
the wife of one of the loyalist officers, but nonetheless, the warriors were incensed and
left the camp. While Burgoyne’s high-handedness lost the army invaluable Native allies,
he also thoughtlessly sacrificed loyal American lives. According to Peters, when the
loyalists first refused an order to march out on the “Connecticut Road through
Bennington” to secure supplies, knowing “the certain Danger & the Mountains between
which they must pass”, Burgoyne refused to listen. Ignoring his subordinate officers’
suggestion that Peters may have had a point, the General instead declared that the
“Americans were Cowards and disobedient. [A]t this Colonel Peters told the General
that…he was ready to obey his Orders but we shall not return.” The resulting Battle of
Bennington on August 16, 1777 found the British, Hessian, and loyalist forces exposed to
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fire from “Rebels, secreted behind Rocks & Trees” who “killed in half an Hour above
one thousand Men.”92 As the letter continues, Peters’ sense of insult becomes more and
more palpable. “The Provincials further say, that if Genl Burgoine [sic] had
condescended to the Advice of those who knew the Country…” he writes, “all America
could not have tarnished his Glory, nor hurt or starv’d his Army.” Furthermore, “the
Provincials think themselves ill treated, as their Characters are wounded by the General
for whom they went to die…” In the same way that Galloway bristled at Howe’s
compliments of rebel prowess, Peters wished “that Gen’ Burgoine [sic] would consider
these Questions as he calls the rebel Americans bold & brave...” and the “loyal
Americans…cowards…” This was too much for Peters, and was evidence that the whole
moral universe had been upended. After all, the loyalists “had Courage to leave their
Wives & Children, their Friends & Property and turn Soldiers and go in the forefront of
all his Army to receive the first Blows of the Enimy [sic] and be Guardians to Each Wing
& Rear…when…the loyal Provincials…were killed ten to one of the royal Army.” The
final line of the letter is an ominous, if impotent, threat at Burgoyne’s failure to
acknowledge and reward the loyalists: “Neglect is a Percecution [sic] that may be
attended with equal bad Consequences to Insult or reproach.”93
John Burgoyne published his version of events in 1780 as The State of the
Expedition from Canada. It is a well-written and thorough defence of his conduct,
supported by transcribed examinations of his fellow officers and witnesses. Burgoyne’s
version of events does not blame the loyalists for the defeat; rather the Provincials are
shown as having little impact on events. There are several discussions of the loyalists in
the work, none of which are flattering. And the fact that the testimonies come from
several different sources make the aspersions all the more cutting and seemingly
credible.94
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John Peters records in his hand-written defence that “the General gave Leave to
Peters & others to return to Canada…” the night before Burgoyne’s surrender, and “700
went off to Canada with out Loss…” because it was believed the loyalists would be
arrested as traitors and not treated as prisoners of war (see Chapter 4). Yet in the
examination of Lt. Col. Kingston, Burgoyne asked a particularly leading question: “If any
party did make its way to Canada, do you not suppose it must be that party of provincials
that ran away while they were employed to repair roads, and that were never heard of
afterwards?” Kingston answered that any who escaped were “likely to have been that
party.” Since Peters had explicitly stated that he returned to Canada, this would likely
have been considered a direct stab at his character, placing him in the ranks of deserters,
not of wily servants to the Crown. Since no action was ever taken against Peters as a
deserter these statements are puzzling, and may have been included simply to cast doubt
on the loyalist character. Kingston further denigrates the loyalists as being “not
disciplined” and comments that “A very great part of them were such as I should have
placed very little dependence upon.”95
In Burgoyne’s lengthy “Review of the Evidence” he shares his own opinions of
the “professed loyalists” in his army. In his estimation they were entirely unfit for
military duty because the “various interests which influenced their actions rendered all
arrangement of them impracticable.” His evaluation of the provincials under his
command would undoubtedly enrage any American loyalist:
One man’s views went to the profit which he was to enjoy
when his corps should be complete; another’s, to the
protection of the district in which he resided; a third was
wholly intent upon revenge against his personal enemies;
and all of them were repugnant even to an idea of
subordination. Hence the settlement [of] who should act as
a private man, and who as an officer, or in whose corps
either should be, was seldom satisfactorily made among
themselves; and as surely as it failed, succeeded a reference
to the Commander in Chief, which could not be put by, or
delegated to another hand, without dissatisfaction, encrease
or confusion, and generally a loss of such services as they
were really fit for, viz. searching for cattle, ascertaining the
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practicability of routes, clearing roads, and guiding
detachments of columns upon the march.96
To Burgoyne the loyalists were tedious provincials who spent more time
squabbling over the dubious honours of their junior ranks than they did fighting their
common enemy. Even some of the best loyalists under his command were incapable of
behaving like gentlemen soldiers, and suffered from the same ungovernable spirit as their
rebel counterparts. He concludes his thoughts on the loyalists by undermining their
avowed core principles and the entire basis for their claims on the British government. “I
only maintain that the interests and the passions of the revolted Americans concenter in
the cause of the Congress”, he writes, “and those of the Loyalists break and subdivide
into various pursuits, with which the cause of the King has little or nothing to do.” 97 In
other words, though the patriots might be rebels, they at least fought for a cause, while
the loyalists fought for themselves. John Peters obviously had a particularly obstinate
opponent in John Burgoyne.
Peters’ personal quarrel with Burgoyne continued for years, and while they both
attacked one another for their roles in the defeat, Peters actually depended on Burgoyne’s
attestation of his services to submit a formal claim to the British government. Peters was
continually incensed at what he regarded as Burgoyne’s brusque treatment of him. The
general had dishonoured Peters, but because of the gaping chasm of rank and culture that
separated the two men, Peters could not take Burgoyne on alone. Nine years after
Saratoga, Peters composed a letter asking for help from his “only Patron” Sir Guy
Carleton.98
Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester, had been the military governor of Quebec until
Burgoyne’s promotion to command of the Saratoga campaign. Incensed at being passed
over in favour of a subordinate officer, Carleton demanded to be recalled to Britain and
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was replaced by Sir Frederick Haldimand in 1778. Carleton was a great favourite among
the loyalists, and though in and out of favour with the administration, he was one of the
few British commanders who actively stood up for the refugees. Jonathan Odell lauded
his “mild command” and many loyalists wrote to him upon his return to America in 1782
and afterwards, in the hopes of special consideration and assistance in redressing wrongs
committed by other officers.99
The rough copy of Peters’ letter, stored in the archives of the New York Historical
Society, is an emotionally charged document, full of redactions and rephrasing as Peters
struggled to find the balance between assertiveness and impudence, deference and selfdefeating timidity. Peters’ central claim was that he had “inlisted 643 Men” and yet
“General Burgoyne did not deliver to me my Commission and I believe it was owing to
the various disasters under which the royal Army laboured.”100 Years after these events,
however, Burgoyne still had not issued a certificate testifying to Peters’ rank and
services. A signed commission from Burgoyne was essential proof of Peters’ activities in
the war, without which he could not apply for an officer’s pension. Perhaps just as
importantly, without the commission Peters could not receive public acknowledgement of
his loyalty to the Crown. The lack of a commission was very likely an intentional insult,
calculated to prevent any preferment of the former loyalist colonel. Burgoyne’s sin of
omission in this case prevented Peters from even beginning his quest for political rebirth.
“I know myself under greater obligation to you than to all Mankind besides; this
truth I have owned Since 1776 and will continue to own as long as I live” writes Peters,
before arriving at his more bitter point. “I had full faith in the Promises of British
Ministers and British Generals. Upon that faith I acted without expecting to meet with
deception, neglect & contempt from those I served with my Mind, my Person &
Property.” Here his tone changes sharply: “but, Sir, I have at last discovered that I was
once blinded by the Dazle [sic] of British Honor vested in the hands of certain British
Officers, whose maxim has been to make no Difference between evil Servants & good.”
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With a classical flourish meant to remind Carleton that Peters, though a provincial, was
still a well-educated man, he alludes to the Catilinarian Conspiracy of ancient Rome,
when “Cataline made use of Lentulus and of Cethagus, but it was to ruin his Country and
not to save it…Why any Person should adopt the policy of Cataline to Support…British
Honor cannot be Accounted for…” In this new conspiracy, Peters saw the loyalists in the
role of Cataline’s unfortunate dupes, left behind in Rome to be executed by a vengeful
Senate. It was a muddled analogy.101 The lengthy letter continues with praise for Carleton
and scorn for Burgoyne who despite several entreaties never signed the commission.
Peters could only conclude these slights were “designed while in America…”
“[Burgoyne] was fond of my services while he was to receive the Glory of it”, and now
without Carleton’s help, Peters reported that he “shall despair and die in wretchedness
with my numerous family.” Rather than simply end on such a pathetic or sympathetic
note, Peters also drew on Carleton’s own potential piques and rivalries by including the
Swiss-born General Frederick Haldimand, who replaced Carleton as Governor of Quebec
in 1778, as another conspirator in the scheme to undo the loyalist. Peters charged that
“while in Canada [Haldimand] said that he would take care & prevent me having half pay
or any other favour from the King for no other Reason known, than that because he
Supposed me to be the Author of the inclosed [sic] Petition to himself to be Signed by the
Loyalists in Canada” writes Peters, “but I have reason to Suspect my greatest crime
consisted in my being born in New England & not in a Hut in the Mountains of
Switzerland…”102 In 1786 Haldimand’s threat appeared to be coming to fruition, and
serves again to show how personal honour and politics were inextricably linked in the
loyalist refugee crisis.
Peters explained his feud with Haldimand in more detail in his narrative. After his
escape from Saratoga, Peters returned to Quebec penniless, yet he and his men were
owed a considerable sum of unpaid wages. When Haldimand refused to settle accounts
101

Both Sallust’s The Conspiracy of Catiline and Ben Johnson’s Catiline, His Conspiracy (1611) would
have been available to Peters, and both agree that Catiline, Letulus, and Cethegus were immoral bankrupts
and desperate criminals. The reference may also be an allusion to Joseph Galloway’s Letters from Cicero to
Catiline the Second. With corrections and explanatory notes, (London, 1781), which was directed at the
radical Charles Fox and used the same trope.
102

John Peters to Sir Guy Carleton, July 10, 1786. John Peters Papers, 1770-1786. NYHS.

291
with Peters, the loyalist wrote to his uncle Rev. Samuel Peters in England for advice. The
elder Peters managed to gain the ear of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord
George Germain, who ordered Haldimand to address the issue. To Haldimand it must
have seemed like a politicking breach of the chain of command, and Peters noted that
“General Haldimand seemed to be offended, and accused me of complaining home
against him.” Things got worse for Peters in 1781, when Haldimand reorganized the
loyalists under his command at Quebec into “the Loyal Rangers.” John Peters writes in
his narrative that while he was away exchanging prisoners, Haldimand placed Major
Edward Jessup in command, and demoted Lt. Col. Peters to the rank of “Captain of
Invalids.” He complained of “this cruel degrading change” but was never given a
satisfactory answer. Later, when Peters was accused of writing the petition for the
loyalists to settle at Cape Breton, rather than Haldimand’s choice of Bay Chaleurs in
Quebec, the Swiss-born General “treated me with great indignity: I told him no man but
the Commander in Chief should treat me so.” In the end, “General Haldimand refused a
certificate of my Loyalty & Services, tho’ they had been so conspicuous for Ten Years
past.” Peters also regarded the fact that his sons were overlooked for promotion as part of
the same campaign against him.103
All of these disputes weighed heavily on Peters. As a gentleman he could not
silently abide such treatment, especially considering what he had sacrificed for the British
government. Yet his opponents were too powerful and his resources too limited to carry
on a campaign like Joseph Galloway attempted. With both of his former commanding
officers refusing to provide certificates on his behalf, Peters could not begin his political
rebirth. His disfavour was also felt by his loyalist sons and his entire family. For as much
as Peters cried out in defence of his own honour and that of the loyalists in general, he
failed entirely. Peters died in 1788, never achieving the satisfaction he so desperately
sought.104
The exiled loyalists experienced the trauma of defeat as a people adrift, as
refugees caught between the nation that exiled them and a government that had, for some,
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seemingly betrayed them. The patriot press regarded the loyalists as gullible dupes who
had been completely unmanned by their fear and greed. Some loyalists began to feel that
the British were unworthy of their sacrifices, but many others did their best to defend
their honour, uphold the justice of their cause, and assert their rights as worthy men
within the empire. Most loyalist refugees agreed that a combination of wicked and
ambitious colonists, raised in a republican, dissenting culture, had been victorious
because of a weak and dysfunctional colonial administration and the defective manhood
of the generals sent to quell the rebellion. The loyalists had done all they could in support
of British arms, despite the charges of Burgoyne and Howe. To the refugees, the British
government was responsible for losing America and the loyalists’ estates. The King and
Parliament had sacrificed the property and livelihoods of their loyal American subjects
for peace, and the loyalists were determined to make the government understand its
obligation and provide compensation. At the heart of this claim was the loyalists’ appeal
to their honour and manhood.

Claims
In order to receive any kind of compensation from the British government, the
loyalists first needed to make Parliament and the British people aware of the injustice of
their situation. The refugees again found their champion spokesman in the former
Pennsylvania Assemblyman Joseph Galloway, who while fighting his own battles with
General William Howe, also published pamphlets which articulated the loyalist cause and
presented solutions for restoring faith and honour between Britain and her American
loyalists. His 1783 pamphlet, Observations on the Fifth Article of the Treaty with
America, called on the British government to compensate the loyalists for their material
losses. His argument hinged on the impossibilities of the fifth article of the Treaty of
Paris which “recommended” that the American states return confiscated estates.
Galloway argued that since the property had already been sold under the seals of the
individual states, which were now recognized as legal by Britain through the treaty itself,
it would be impossible to restore the actual estates. In any event, the “Loyalists, who are
subject to those attainders and confiscations, can therefore of right, and in justice, look up
only to Great Britain for a compensation.” Any idea of returning to the United States to
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purchase back their property was also delusional, because the loyalists would face the
“implacable resentment” of their former adversaries, and would be subjected to “every
insult, and even death itself. Besides,” Galloway asked, “where are men, who have
forfeited all they possessed on earth, to find money to repurchase their property [?]”
Galloway succinctly stated what most loyalists surely thought: that Britain had
“purchased peace with the property of the attained Loyalists…”105 Mary Beth Norton and
Maya Jasanoff agree that the work of Galloway and others had a significant impact on
British Parliamentarians who passed the “Compensation Act” in July 1783, which
established the Loyalist Claims Commission.106
The Royal Commission on the Losses and Services of the American Loyalists is
often seen as a remarkable moment in British imperial history. The sheer scale of
compensating the loyalists for their losses, as well as providing free transportation, land
grants, and provisions in the early years of settlement was unprecedented.107 While the
loyalists pointed to the British government’s compensation of those who suffered losses
in the Jacobite rebellions as precedent, the situation of the American loyalists was unique
in British history. The loyalists were not British citizens, but subjects. Even the wealthiest
loyalist in the colonies could not vote for a Member of Parliament, and his rights within
the empire were not entirely clear.108 Nonetheless, most Parliamentarians understood that
some restitution was necessary to maintain, as Galloway put it, “the social compact.”
The structure of the claims process, and the requirements demanded of individual
claimants, favoured the formerly wealthy and connected loyalists. Literacy was a basic
requirement, since claims had to be submitted in writing. Witness testimony was a vital
component in the claims process and those loyalists with more extensive personal
connections could produce prominent witnesses, like governors and generals, who were
obviously taken seriously by the commissioners. In the first round of claims
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investigations, loyalists had to personally attend a hearing in London. This disqualified
thousands of people who lacked the means to travel and support themselves in England.
In the end, both the commission in London and the later commission sent to Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick, were dominated by middling and wealthy white loyalist men.109 Of
the 3 225 claims fully examined by the commission, the vast majority were submitted by
formerly landholding men, and of the 468 white women who submitted claims, most did
so on behalf of deceased or absent husbands or fathers. Because of the nature of
eighteenth century domestic roles, these women were often unable to provide accurate
valuations for the lost property and received little restitution.110 The compensation of the
loyalists was not a recognition of their citizenship, but an acknowledgement by the
commission of the important place of gentlemen patriarchs within the empire.
In the patriarchal world of the eighteenth century it is not surprising that the
claims commission would favour landholding men, but even with their advantage,
loyalist gentlemen chafed at the burden of proof placed on claimants by the
commissioners’ interrogations. For their part, the five men placed in charge of the
commission were tasked with the unenviable chore of determining appropriate
compensation for the loyalists while representing a deeply indebted imperial state reeling
from the loss of vast territorial holdings. The initial Compensation Act included a
deadline of March 24, 1784 for the loyalists to submit their claims. Because of the vast
distances involved and the inability of many loyalists to travel to England to submit their
testimony in person, the government enacted another claims commission to be held in
British North America, with a deadline of May, 1786. 111 The sheer number of claims and
the extensive supporting material created massive backlogs, but it also required a degree
of bureaucratic due diligence on the part of the commissioners which some loyalists
109
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found insulting. A loyalist agent advised the commissioners that “Every mans [sic] claim
be his Rank or Character what it will, ought to be enquired into as strictly as the
lowest.”112 This sort of egalitarian investigation was certainly prudent, but its disregard
for the respect of rank and station disturbed some loyalist gentlemen. In keeping with
their policy of due diligence, the commission sent a barrister named John Anstey as an
envoy to the United States to investigate the situation loyalists faced during the conflict,
and just as importantly, determine what things actually cost in the colonies at the outset
of the war. Initially suspicious of the loyalist claims and narratives, Anstey’s findings
confirmed their version of events.113 Although the loyalists as a group tended to
exaggerate the monetary value of their losses, there was actually very little outright
fraud.114
Even with careful documentation and Anstey’s findings, the eventual
compensation fell far below what the loyalist gentlemen had expected and hoped for, and
some felt betrayed once again. To the horror of many loyalists, only losses suffered
directly on account of their loyalty, and not due to the depredations of British soldiers, or
from fire or other disasters, would be considered.115 Merchants and professionals
received a smaller percentage of their claims than landowners, likely because it was
simply easier to determine the exact value of real estate as opposed to professional losses
documented in inventories and account books. Regardless of occupation, the Pitt
government determined that the British treasury could simply not afford to compensate
the loyalists pound for pound. Instead, loyalists who bore arms would receive 40% of
their accepted claims and everyone else was to receive 30%. In spite of Joseph
Galloway’s passionate invocation of Britain’s “sacred obligations” and the sad reality he
described of destitute loyalists dying “of broken hearts” while others were “driven by
their extreme distress, into insanity, and from insanity, SUICIDE…” the average loyalist
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gentleman received 37% of what he claimed.116 This led even arch-loyalists like Peter
Oliver to lament bitterly on the fact that they were “obliged to put up with every insult
from this ungrateful people the English…” “Blessed are ye, who expecteth…nothing” he
fumed, “for ye then will not be disappointed.”117
Because loyalists might only receive a third or less of the value of their lost
estates, refugees had to look elsewhere for financial resuscitation. Most middling and
elite exiles found the best chances for financial recovery in the new colonies of British
North America where they received generous land grants, military pensions, and where
they could vie for government offices, and practice their former professions as lawyers,
physicians, or merchants.118 While most loyalists could not rely on the claims for their
economic salvation, there was a moral weight embedded in the claims process that went
beyond simple financial restitution and reward. In many ways the claims provided a
public forum for individual loyalists to have a direct conversation with their government
through the submission of narratives, wherein they could also account for the more
intangible losses suffered in consequence of their loyalty.
The composition of narratives was a chance for loyalists to rebuild their own
sense of honourable manhood by presenting their suffering and other experiences as
marks of distinction. Collectively, the claims formed a macro-narrative that all white
loyalists could share. As Keith Mason argues, even with the repetitive “banality” of the
language found in the claims, they indicate a common loyalist identity which was
particularly strong among the elites.119 And while most narratives and depositions dwell
on the trauma of insults, displacement, and suffering families, these stories were offered
up not as expressions of helpless emasculation, but as proof of a manly willingness to
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undergo any trial for the sake of loyalty.120 These personal narratives and the macronarrative also helped loyalists accept and account for their role in the defeat.
Most narratives submitted to the claims commission were very short, amounting
to little over a page, summarizing the claimants’ experiences, services, and losses. These
were accompanied by witness statements and supporting documentation such as
certificates from British officers, deeds, records of confiscation from the American states,
and other types of documentation.121 Some loyalists, such as Joel Stone, John Peters,
James Moody, and John Connolly, penned much longer memoirs to add to their case.122
Moody and Connolly even went so far as to publish their narratives for the London print
market in the hopes of garnering popular support for their own claim and the loyalist
cause in general.123
Memorials submitted to the claims commissioners tended to follow a standard
template found in a helpful pamphlet published in 1783. The anonymously authored
pamphlet was meant to guide the refugee claimants through the process, and provided
instructions for the memorial format, items to include in inventories and accounts of
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losses, along with stipulations for acquiring written witness testimonials. Included in the
suggested language for the memorials are basic expressions of humility which followed
eighteenth century conventions. Most gentlemen would have been aware of the expected
displays of deference, so it is interesting that these instructions were included. Perhaps
the loyalist agents feared that many refugees might let their provincial manners or their
sense of outrage and assertiveness seep through and embarrass the loyalists’ cause. In any
event, nearly all of the claimants followed the pamphlet’s rubric and began their
memorials by stating that they “Humbly Sheweth…”124 The longer narratives penned by
loyalists expanded on this customary expression of humility. John Connolly, in perhaps
the lengthiest loyalist narrative published in the 1780s, apologized for any appearance of
“unavoidable egotism” and hoped it “may be overlooked in mercy to the misfortunes of
one who is at least conscious of having acted with good intentions, and from principles
which he believed were descriptive of a loyal subject, an honest man, and a man of
honour.” James Moody likewise averred that though he was once “a plain, contented
farmer” it was only through “the importunity of his friends” that compelled him to
compose his narrative. He at least would keep his tale brief, rather “than to make a
pompous display of any supposed merit of his own.” John Peters characterized his
narrative as a response to another gentleman’s queries, thus he did not intend “to boast of
my Exploits by complying with your request: but, to relate my Story in Simplicity.”
Juxtaposed to the professions of humility, these gentlemen loyalists portrayed themselves
as remarkable men who were sharper, wittier, and more honourable than their ragged
adversaries.125
One of the most striking aspects of loyalist narratives is the consistent elements
that appear regardless of the various forms they took, whether terse official claims or the
longer narratives penned by some gentlemen, or even personal memoirs written years or
decades after events. In addition to the humility described above, the narratives outlined
an idyllic pre-war existence and glowing future prospects; they told of the loyalists’ grim
124

“A Loyalist,” Directions to the American Loyalists in order to Enable them to State their Cases…to the
Honourable Commissioners (London: 1783), 23.
125

Connolly, Narrative of the Transactions, 1-2; Moody, Lieut. James Moody’s Narrative, 1-2, 4; Peters’
narrative, 1, John Peters Papers, NYHS.

299
determination in the face of overwhelming odds; and they described episodes of
endurance, suffering, and loss. Some loyalists wrote about their heroic acts of bravery in
their battles with the rebels while others recounted their wit and wiles as they outsmarted
the ham-fisted agents of Congress.126 The narratives are doubtlessly biased towards the
loyalists’ version of events, and therefore the details need to be treated circumspectly. In
general, however, the narratives and memorials of loyalist men depict two tropes of the
suffering male. Some loyalists painted themselves as refined martyrs who had been set
upon by the unruly, unwashed mob. Other loyalists portrayed themselves as wily foxes
that outwitted their adversaries, and though they evacuated with the British, remained
morally undefeated. The most gripping loyalist narratives went beyond the templates, and
showcased adventurous men with the requisite blend of strength and sensibility thought
to be possessed by the first class of gentlemen. This display of valued masculine traits
exhibited the worthiness of individual loyalists and was intended to compel British
readers to consider their obligations to the authors and their cause. These narratives were
attempts by the loyalists to achieve the basic function of honour as a claim-right: the right
to be respected and appreciated by others.
Loyalist authors rarely missed an opportunity to display their own masculine
worthiness in their narratives. Their descriptions of an idealized pre-Revolutionary
colonial world include portraits of idealized men, diligently growing their fortunes and
providing for their families as honest and genteel patriarchs until everything is destroyed
by “the dreadful horrors of unnatural War.”127 James Moody was “a happy farmer,
without a wish or an idea of any other enjoyment, than that of making happy, and being
happy, with a beloved wife, and three promising children.” Furthermore, he was a moral
and independent family man “Clear of debt, and at ease in his professions.” Joel Stone,
from a more modest background, was on the make, rising from a farmer’s son to a
successful merchant, who, even at a young age entered a partnership with “a Merchant of
great trade”. His dignity and work ethic was visible in the “confidence and esteem of all
126

Mary Beth Norton, The British-Americans, 198. Norton describes the consistent format of submitted
claims, as well as a few common elements, as does Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles, 132-133. Also see Norton,
The British-Americans,130-154 (chapter 5), for a longer discussion of recurring tropes in loyalists writings,
which recur in the personal narratives as well.
127

Talman, “Joel Stone’s Narrative,”324.

300
my Neighbours and the public in general…” No retired gentleman, Stone was building
his fortune, and “by dint of an unwearied diligence and a close application to trade I
found the number of my Friends and customers daily increasing and a fair prospect of
long happiness arose to my sanguine mind…”128 Both John Connolly and John Peters
spoke of their advanced education – Peters attended Yale and Connolly “received as
perfect an education as that country could afford.” Wherever these two settled on the
frontier, civilization seemed to spring up around them. Connolly helped establish new
settlements in western Virginia and valiantly assisted Lord Dunmore in Virginia’s war
with the Shawnee in 1774. Peters left Connecticut for New Hampshire where he
established mills and farms, then moved west of the Connecticut River into New York
and was “appointed by Governor Tryon to be Colonel of the Militia, Justice of the Peace,
Judge of Probates, Register of the County, Clerk of the Courts; and Judge of the Court of
Common Pleas: Here I was in easy circumstances, and as Independent as my mind ever
wish’d.”129 The independence, respectability, and honour these men displayed marked
them as ideal colonial gentlemen and patriarchs.
Other gentlemen loyalists relied on witness testimonies to provide information on
their estates as well as to support their claims of worth, dignity, and advancing careers.
Nehomiah Marks testified on behalf of Amos Botsford of Connecticut that “he lived as
genteely as any Man in New Haven.” Moreover, “He seemed to be in full as much
Business as any young Man of the Profession and seemed arising very fast.” Another
witness, Daniel Lymans agreed, testifying that Botsford “was in considerable Practice
[and] Was amongst the first Lawyers…had the fairest Prospects, he lived very well and
seemed to be laying up Money.”130 These were subjective observations that described
appearances of wealth and gentility, but even then such witness testimonies were
important in determining not only what property the loyalists owned before the war, but
also their place within their former communities, and the power they broadcasted by their
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homes and finery. Simply having witnesses testify on a man’s behalf was evidence of his
connections, influence, and standing. Ideally witnesses were to attend and give their
statements in person, but written and notarized statements were also acceptable. Perhaps
one of the most interesting witness statements was submitted on behalf of Rev. Samuel
Peters of Hebron, Connecticut. Written by Charles Wattles, a former neighbour of Peters,
the letter contains details which attested to the character and property of the Anglican
clergyman. Wattles described “Priest Peters” as “a Gentleman greatly beloved by all his
Acquaintances” who “built a grand house on his Estate” and “lived in a genteel and
splendid Manner.” Though a former friend, Wattles, like the majority of Connecticut,
supported the Revolution, and therefore his assertions that Peters and his family were
“industrious and indefatigable to Subject America under the power of the King of Great
Britain” must have held significant weight. Indeed, a letter of support from a man who
signed off with “I shall live and die your political Enemy” underscores the fact that the
loyalists relied on former contacts in their homelands, be they friend or foe, for evidence
to secure their claims.131
Once the loyalist gentlemen had established that they were either men of property
or had been on the sure path to prosperity, they moved on to describe their stalwart
character as loyalists. Joel Stone declared that he “was fixed in my resolves rather to
forego all I could call my property in the world than flinch from my duty as a subject to
the best of Sovereigns [and] sooner to perish in the general Calamity than abet in the least
degree the enemies of the British Constitution.” Connolly “decided instantly, and
resolved to exert every faculty in defence of the royal cause;” while Moody “resolved to
do any thing, and to be any thing, not inconsistent with integrity – to fight, to bleed, to die
– rather than live to see the venerable Constitution of his country totally lost…” Amos
Botsford was less florid in his declaration of sentiments, merely stating that through his
loyalty he “rendered himself obnoxious to his Country” while most other claimants
simply listed the sufferings they experienced “on account of” or “in consequence” of
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their loyalty.132 Like their descriptions of property and the idyllic past, the refugees’
expressions of their undying loyalty fit a common pattern with few significant variations.
A picture of an archetypal loyalist gentleman was coming into focus.
At this point, most loyalist narratives turn to a discussion of the insults, losses,
and attacks they suffered. In another context, these would have been confessions of
masculine failure, but the wounded patriarchs were sharing their misfortunes to both
highlight the extent of the suffering they were willing to endure, and to make the claim
that this suffering was on behalf of the King. Munson Jarvis described his experience of
being unable “to supply his Family with meat, Drink or Clothes” and then being forced to
leave “his Family behind to the mercy of the Rebels who they stript of every necessary of
Life.” Timothy Hierlihy’s “Wife, and nine Children were left in a great Measure destitute
of the necessaries of Life” on account of his political choice, while Lt. Hugh Fraser’s
family was “stripp’d of every thing by Gen’l Gates’s Army”133 Edward Jessup’s career as
a loyalist officer left his “Large family…exceedingly distressed by means of the Loss of
his property…”134 Such examples fill page after page in the claims and narratives.
Though these men had followed their conscience and their King, they had ruined their
households and their status as providers and patriarchs. Applying the paternal analogy of
the King as the father of his people, the loyalists’ dishonour was the King’s as well, since
he and his government were unable to protect them.
In addition to losses and suffering, the loyalists also went to great lengths to
describe their services to the crown, though not all loyalists had to bear arms to be
considered a worthy servant of the King. Men like Amos Botsford, Evert Bancker, and
Joshua Lorring served as government agents in a variety of tasks from supplying soldiers
to surveying and allocating lands for refugees. In what must have been one of the more
eyebrow-raising narratives, Dr. Isaac Moseley described how he and his confederates
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spent the war disguised as patriots in Connecticut, all the while delivering shipments of
provisions into the hands of lurking British cruisers.135 For many of the wealthiest
gentlemen loyalists it was enough that they had forfeited their estates and became
refugees. Clergymen like Jonathan Boucher and grandees such as former Governor
Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts lived out the war in England, yet worked to
influence government policy as best they could.136 Other loyalist officers, who served
under arms but did not see much action, distinguished themselves by obeying orders and
keeping their men in line. Such officers found a written testimony from a General added
significant weight to their loyalist claims.137
Loyalist narratives occasionally include tales of gallantry and heroic resistance to
rebel mobs. These episodes added memorable drama to the narratives that could help a
loyalists’ claim, as well as display the refugee’s martial prowess and brave audacity. John
Peters describes his actions as a feeling gentleman warrior who, when he was run-through
with a bayonet, realized his opponent was an “Old School fellow & Playmate and a
Couzin of my Wife’s: Tho his Bayonet was in my Body, I felt regret at being obliged to
destroy him.” When a rebel interloper threatened John Connolly with a pistol to his head
in his own home, the veteran declared that “I had been so long learning to despise danger,
and acquire fortitude, that [I] was not easily to be intimidated.” In a scene worthy of a
modern action film, Connolly grapples with his armed opponent while briefly fending off
another twenty rebels who rush in.138 Such super-human feats are rare in the narratives,
and these British-American lions also presented themselves as wily foxes. Peters
describes how he tricked his enemies by leading them into “an Ambuscade whereby [the
135
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British] took and killed near 150 Rebels.” John Connolly explains how the local
revolutionaries prevailed on him to convince the Native tribes on the frontier to join the
rebellion. While he did indeed go speak to the various Native leaders at Fort Pitt, he
“secretly frustrated the machinations of the Republicans, while I received their thanks,
and procured assurances from the Indian chiefs to support his Majesty, at all events, as
his Majesty’s most faithful friends and auxiliaries...”139
Perhaps the most gripping tales of sly and stealthy loyalist heroics are found in
James Moody’s narrative. Indeed, Moody portrays himself as a loyalist avenger, slinking
behind the enemy lines to intercept Washington’s dispatches, capture cruel
committeemen, and rescue imprisoned loyalists – all while maintaining the moral
rectitude of a gentleman. Moody’s tales were so fantastic that the second edition of his
printed narrative included affidavits from a variety of respectable commanders and
gentlemen to assure the reader of the narrative’s truth. In a particularly dashing sequence
of events, Moody attempts to gain access to a jail in some unnamed “country town” to
free a captive loyalist. He first poses as a patriot soldier, delivering one of his own men as
a prisoner to the jail. When that fails because of a standing order to refuse entry to anyone
after dark, Moody tries to cow the jail-keeper by announcing who he really was, and
warning the guards that “I have a strong party with me, and if you do not this moment
deliver up your keys, I will instantly pull down your house about your ears.” His men
then make the “Indian war-whoop” and the jailor “obsequiously conducted Moody to the
dungeon.”140
It is unclear what impact these tales of heroics and suffering had on the wider
British public. The loyalists were a topic of parliamentary debate, and there were
charitable societies established for the relief of the poorest refugees, including black
loyalists.141 Perhaps the best evidence for the resonance of the loyalist macro-narrative of
stoic, honourable men, who endured the loss of their families and fortunes, can be
glimpsed in a poem composed by the English gentlewoman Mariana Starke, the author of
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some of the first travel guides to France and Italy.142 In The Poor Soldier; An American
Tale: Founded on a Recent Fact (1789), Starke tells the story of Charles Short, a
“Carolina loyalist.” Starke’s sentimental poem follows the standard loyalist narrative
pattern exactly, with the only real innovation being the introduction of a feeling young
gentlewoman named Felicia who sets out to save the loyalist from his misery. Felicia first
comes across Short begging in the street, who “A Soldier’s garb the mournful Object
wore/ A wooden-leg, stern Honour’s badge, he bore/ Dire Famine in his hollow cheek
was seen/ But placid Resignation mark’d his mien.”143 Short has lost everything, but
accepts his lot with a clear conscience, knowing that he has done right. Once Felicia
learns how this former gentleman came to such a pitiable condition, she cannot help but
echo the loyalists’ cry:
Ungrateful England! Shall the Man whose blood
Flow’d, at thy bidding, in a copious flood;
Who left his happy Cot, his fair domains,
To war for thee on Carolina’s Plains,
Shall he in vain solicit thy relief,
And die from meagre want and pining grief?144
Short’s career began in a golden land of plenty, where he minded his “fruitful
Farm”, and lived the patriarchal dream with his faithful “Tenants” and “pure Wedlock’s
hallow’d joys”. Then came the “deathful banner” of war at which “domestic Comfort
fled/ And dark suspicion came in Concord’s stead/ The Brother now against Brother rose/
And dearest Friends were turn’d to deadliest Foes.” Short chooses loyalty “to my Prince
and Albion’s interest true” and joins the British army, eventually evacuating his whole
family to New York. There he is met by unspeakable tragedy when his family is burned
alive in their home by marauding Hessians. Left “Unman’d, distracted, void of all relief,
Silent [Short] stood, a monument of grief.” After this trauma Short fights recklessly for
the British, until he mournfully comes across his rebel brother dying on the battlefield.
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With all of his family dead and his world destroyed, Short is finally wounded and
crippled on the battlefield. The shattered former gentleman travels to England but is
ignored by his former commanders, until Felicia uses her resources and influence to give
the poor soldier a comfortable place to die.145
The Poor Soldier is more than likely a well-designed piece of fiction, intended to
jerk tears from a feeling, genteel audience. Written after the conclusion of the Claims
Commission’s work, it would have been of little political use.146 Yet the narrative
described in the poem would have been recognizable to any loyalist. The fact that it was
penned by a young English gentlewoman indicates that the macro-narrative of the
loyalists was known and even had an impact on the wider public. The character is a good,
honourable man, who did everything that was expected of him as a gentleman, husband,
and as a loyal and brave soldier. For his virtues he is rewarded with nothing but tragedy
and abandonment. It was a perfect encapsulation of the loyalists’ self-perception. As late
as 1797 the exiled Reverend Jonathan Boucher brooded in his history of the Revolution
that “Loyalty and loyal men gained nothing but honour, either by their superior prowess,
or superior skill.”147
Enduring losses and suffering became marks of honour for loyalists, but the strain
of the privations meant that not all loyalist gentlemen could live up to the idealized
standard of Mariana Starke or the loyalists’ own narratives. The longing to rebuild lost
fortunes and provide for a family led some loyalists into deeply questionable behaviour.
As previously stated, there were very few cases of outright fraud, but they did happen. In
the most glaring example, Frederick Dalziel Smyth claimed to own an estate in
Maryland, until it was brought to the attention of the commissioners that he was a mere
renter. Caught in his lie before the commission he “confess’d that he had been very
disingenuous”, admitted his shame, and was denied any compensation.148 While loyalists
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worked to prevent individual frauds from tainting the claims process in general, some
refugees actively cast doubt on the testimonies and claims of others for their own
personal benefit. Just prior to the evacuation of Charleston in 1783, Robert Bayard and
some of his fellow New York merchants who had interests in the southern colonies,
petitioned the British commanders to return rebel property, including slaves who had fled
to the British for the promise of freedom, in the hopes of mollifying the victors and
restoring their own lost estates. They assured Lieutenant General Alexander Leslie that
the loyalists who were carrying property out of South Carolina did so on “the specious
pretense of retaliation for losses and injuries, which perhaps, on investigation, would be
found utterly destitute of existence.” Furthermore, returning the escaped slaves to their
former masters could hardly be considered unjust since it would in fact be an act of
“tender Sympathy to commiserate the condition of the Negroes, who, although reduced to
Slavery in this Country, are entitled to humanity, which forbids the separation of them
from their kindred.” The wealthy loyalists’ petition was rejected outright by Leslie who
wrote to Guy Carleton that he could never hand over “Negroes, who having claimed our
protection have borne arms in our service or otherwise rendered themselves obnoxious to
the resentment of their former masters, and the severity of Rebel Laws…”149 Though
Bayard and his fellow gentlemen saw no problem in abandoning the most vulnerable
refugees, it evidently struck the British commanders as a dishonourable proposition.
Throughout the peace negotiations Carleton stood by the British promises of freedom to
the Black Loyalists in spite of Congressional and white loyalist pressure.150
Of all the sources of dishonour that haunted loyalist refugees during the claims
process, the spectre of bankruptcy was the most omnipresent. The expense of exile and
the debts they incurred along the way led some gentlemen to take drastic measures to
avoid both the public shame of destitution and debtors’ prison. Some loyalists were
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confined for insolvency, while the claims show evidence of at least two loyalist women
who were abandoned by bankrupt husbands who fled rather than go to prison.151 The
loyalist gentlemen were in England seeking compensation so they could restore their
place as honourable patriarchs, and yet the drawn out nature of the claims process
brought more than one loyalist family to ruin.
The experiences of the formerly wealthy New England lawyer Joshua Chandler
provide an example of how compounded family misfortunes and tragedies could lead an
otherwise respectable loyalist gentleman into personal dishonour. Chandler was described
by the early twentieth-century historian Franklin Dexter as one of the most prominent
men of New Haven, from an ancient and established New England dynasty. Among his
many other duties, Chandler even sat as the chairman for the local Committee of
Correspondence in the early years of the imperial crisis, but because of “conscientious
motives” declared his loyalty to the King and willingly “accepted the consequent
suspicion and obloquy”.152 Chandler and his family left with General William Tryon’s
forces during their destructive raid in 1779, an infamous act of desertion reported as far
afield as Philadelphia.153 Indeed, Dexter writes that Chandler’s political death in the
community clung to his son, John Chandler, whose legal “career was blighted by the
opprobrium of the family record.”154
Joshua Chandler spent the rest of the American Revolution, like so many other
refugees, in New York, and with a “Final and Everlasting Farewell of my Native
Country”, he and his family evacuated in October 1783, bound for Nova Scotia. They
experienced a “Terrible Passage” where rough seas “swept off all our Stock” destroying
all the property they were able to salvage from New York. Meanwhile his wife “was
overcome with the Passage.” Upon arriving in Nova Scotia she “languished, mourned and
Died in about 3 weeks” as much from despair as her illness, Chandler suggested. Despite
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his loss, the wounded patriarch was determined to regain some of his former wealth, and
like many other loyalist gentlemen made the expensive and risky journey to England only
to be bitterly disappointed at the small compensation he received in the form of a
quarterly pension.155
When Chandler returned to his new home in Digby, Nova Scotia in 1787 he was
still in the process of arguing his claim, and therefore took passage with his family to St.
John, New Brunswick to meet with the visiting commissioners. The events of this illfated voyage were widely recorded in the American press: a late winter storm blew in and
“the vessel was cast upon a rocky shore…and soon beat to pieces”. Chandler’s son
“drowned in attempting to reach the shore…his father [Joshua] and sister perished with
fatigue and cold, after wandering several hours in the deep snow…” Perhaps out of
respect for the dead, or perhaps due to the common infamy of prominent men like
Chandler, the reports mentioned that he had been the Justice of the Peace for New Haven,
and had recently returned from England, but made no mention of his wartime
allegiance.156 The storm took the lives of Chandler and two of his children, but it also
destroyed the documents Chandler intended to present to the commissioners. A later
family biographer recorded that the shipwreck dashed the hopes of the remaining
Chandler heirs, who without proof of losses, could not make a proper claim.157 Chandler
had failed as patriarch and provider for his family.
If that was not enough woe to strike a refugee family, a year after the disaster
Chandler’s son-in-law, Amos Botsford, another prominent New Haven loyalist, received
a letter from the Reverend Samuel Peters which revealed a serious stain on the deceased
gentleman’s honour which, had he survived, could have jeopardized his attempts at
political rebirth. The loyalist clergyman opened with the customary ministerial duties and
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attempted to assuage Botsford’s sadness and make sense of the inexplicable misfortune
inflicted on a good and loyal family. Peters, alluding to a passage in the Gospel of Luke,
reminded Botsford that “those Men on Whom the tower of Siloam fell were not sinners
above all Men nor does the Catastrophe of Chandler & his Children prove them less
righteous for their Loyalty, than [Connecticut Governor] Trumbull for his Rebellion, tho’
he died in Bed, without feeling the Calamities rising from the Hail, Snow & Winds – The
Wiseman & fool die alike & turn to the Worms…” But this was not simply a letter of
condolence. Though the “Sad Story on the Shore of New Brunswick…compel the Tears
of Sorrow from those that feel human woes”, Peters alleged that Chandler had
dishonoured himself by neglecting to repay his lawful debts.158
The problem began in England when Chandler failed to repay his debt to a “Mr.
Bean.” Following the standard practice, “an attachment was obtained” but “Mr. Chandler
confined himself to his House to avoid a Prison.” The threat of being tossed in jail as a
bankrupt caused Chandler to become “almost delirious” and his son went to Peters for
help. A simple but telling example of how bankruptcy was understood in this period is
revealed in a letter from the loyalist agent Charles Cooke, who informed his client Joel
Stone that their close friend “Sandall was a Bankrupt.”159 Bankruptcy was not simply a
business matter, but a stain on a man’s character and even became a part of his public
identity.
Peters went on to explain that “I went three miles in a night of snow & rain &
paid the Debt to Mr. Bean”. The good reverend then “pacified the mind of Mr. Chandler
& recommended him to Mr. Isaac Scott, a Marchant [sic] for Goods on Credit.” Peters,
Scott, and Chandler worked out a deal for the repayment to come from Chandler’s
loyalist pension. Peters would remain Chandler’s agent in the dealings, but for some
reason, Chandler then appointed another man, a Mr. Cook, as his agent under a similar
deal, without informing Peters. To add another layer of duplicity to these transactions,
Peters alleged that Chandler received an advance on his pension to the amount of £240
158

Samuel Peters to Amos Botsford, Feb. 10, 1788. Botsford Family Papers, UNBLC. The story of the
Tower of Siloam can be found in Luke 13: 1-5 King James Bible.
159

Charles Cooke to Joel Stone, April 4th 1789. Joel Stone Papers, Toronto Public Library Collection,
UNBLC.

311
which he kept, leaving Cook, Peters, and Scott saddled with a substantial loss. Chandler
“suddenly went off” to Halifax and it was only then that “Cook, Scott & I found out the
Secret of all these Manoeuvers.”160 It was a revelation of shameful proportions.
Eighteenth century law and popular opinion tended to weigh whether bankruptcy was due
to an unfortunate and unforeseeable sequence of events beyond the power of an
individual, or whether it was due to a man’s incompetence, or worse still, his
malfeasance. Both varieties of bankruptcy brought shame, but the behaviour of Chandler,
though distressed by his losses, was in keeping with the dishonourable bankrupt who
would hide or flee rather than face the consequences of his actions. The writings of the
seventeenth-century dramatist and pamphleteer Thomas Dekker neatly summed up the
distinction in British law. The fraudulent or “politick bankrupt,” “after he hath gotten into
his hands so much of other mens goods or money, as will fill him to the upper deck, away
he sayles with it, and politickly runnes himself on ground, to make the world believe he
had suffered a shipwreck.” In the eighteenth century, sympathy for unfortunate debtors
was common, but Chandler’s behaviour revealed him to be a schemer and a cheat.161
Peters concludes by calling on Botsford, as Chandler’s “Heir and Son in Law”, to
settle the debt. “I might have complained of this to the commissioners & perhaps caused
them to neglect the surviving children of Joshua Chandler” continues Peters, “but Mr.
Cook & I thought best to let matters rest as they were & he engaged to inform you…”
This must have been a blow to Botsford. He could ill afford to part with the money, but
that was not the main problem. It was the charge of impropriety, of a dishonourable fraud
known among his fellow loyalists, and the subtle threat that this case could be taken to
the commissioners, that would have distressed Botsford. Such duplicity would cast a long
shadow of doubt across his own claim since Chandler acted as Botsford’s agent to the
Claims Commission in London.162 There is no record of whether or not Botsford paid the
debt, but it would have been in the loyalists’ interests to do so. This tragic episode is just
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one of many found in the confusion and chaos of the 1780s and 90s. A once proud and
prominent gentleman, borne under by the circumstances he found himself in, commits a
dishonourable act in the hopes of restoring a modicum of his past status. The shipwreck
was a common metaphor for failure in the eighteenth century, but in the case of Chandler,
a literal shipwreck saved him from the ignominy and public dishonour of the bankrupt.163
Chandler’s case reveals the essential role of financial destruction as a contributing
cause and consequence of political death. A man’s honour was inextricably linked to his
economic power, and the loss of that power was felt throughout his entire network of
friends, dependants, patrons, and clients. Refugee or not, a man’s failure to meet his
financial obligations to creditors and dependants signified dishonour, and this needed to
be overcome for a gentleman loyalist to be restored to prominence. An example of the
reverberating consequences of a gentleman loyalist’s financial collapse can be seen in a
brief, but emotionally charged letter received by the former New York scion William
Bayard in 1785. Bayard had served as an executor for the estate of Barnaby Byrne who
passed away in 1771. After liquidating the Byrne estate at auction, Bayard was entrusted
with providing the widow, Jane Byrne, a yearly stipend of £70. The war and Bayard’s
exile had ended these payments. Dispensing with the customs of civility, the widow
Byrne began her letter directly, stating that the “want of money and many demands for
the Same, oblige me to charge you with being the sole cause of my Distress and
suffering…” She castigates the loyalist exile for withholding her stipend “for many
years” and for what she regarded as the misuse of her husband’s property, which “to a
Considerable amount you Converted to your own use…” Unable to get any compensation
from New York State’s confiscation of Bayard’s property, Byrne concludes by
demanding Bayard send her £775, “Otherwise I will be under the Disagreeable Necessity
of sending my papers to England, to procure redress…”164 Byrne was using the same
tactic as Samuel Peters. The threat of public embarrassment in front of the claims
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commissioners seems to have been a recurring practice to encourage loyalists to pay their
debts. Bayard’s papers do not record whether or not he paid Mrs. Byrne, but the
accusation of dishonourable conduct and the menace of embarrassment was surely meant
to prey on Bayard’s mind. Bayard’s political death upset a wide network of dependents
that extended beyond his household, and each dependant like Jane Byrne represented
Bayard’s failure to live up to his patriarchal or paternalistic duties. He would likely have
argued that since his estate, which including Byrne’s pension, was confiscated, her case
should be brought to the New York legislature. Yet the fact that prominent gentlemen
loyalists like Bayard would never be able to fulfill all of their previous responsibilities or
repay all their debts was something they had to acknowledge and accept. Even in the best
of circumstances, political rebirth was not the restoration of all that was lost, but the
beginning of something new.

The Claims Commission dominated the hopes and fears of loyalist gentlemen
eager to reclaim their status as honourable patriarchs. Though the refugees tended to be
disappointed by the compensation they received, the Parliamentarians held up the
commission as a shining example of British faithfulness and compassion. The British
government did not compensate the loyalists based on their rights as citizens, but out of
concerns for the honour of the British state. The loyalists regarded themselves as
important members of the empire, who were owed compensation for their losses by right,
if not as citizens, then as gentlemen and patriarchs. The structure of the claims
commission favoured gentlemen claimants who had the education and connections to
prove their claims, thus preserving their privileges and advantages among the wider
population of refugees. Loyalist honour was never fully satisfied with the compensation,
but it was nonetheless a step on the road to political rebirth. In addition to the monetary
compensation, the claims commission provided loyalists with the opportunity to compose
narratives which together created a consistent image and ideal of the loyal man as a
person of honour, integrity, and a martyr for the British Constitution and its notions of
liberty. The loyalists had restored, as best as they could, the function of honour as a
claim-right within the imperial hierarchy. Though their role in the war was never fully
acknowledged, and they were even attacked and denigrated by prominent British officers
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like John Burgoyne and William Howe, and despite the continued risks of bankruptcy
and dishonour that haunted loyalist petitioners, the claims process was a key stage in their
political rebirth. The last and longest stage of political rebirth was the recreation of
loyalist households and financial security. The final section of this chapter highlights a
few key observations of this process in British North America from 1784 to the 1790s.

Patriarchs
A colonial gentleman’s identity was born in the household. Only when a man had
married, maintained an orderly home, and had secured a stable living could he be
considered of any consequence. Transient males like sailors and soldiers were considered
to be locked in a state of adolescence. The men explored in this dissertation had, by and
large, achieved all the necessary benchmarks of honourable manhood prior to the
outbreak of war in 1775. Those benchmarks were systematically stripped from the
loyalists. They were insulted with impunity, their homes were vandalized, their
businesses ruined, and their very right to own property was taken from them. The
privileges and honour their manhood had provided were nullified in the revolutionary
upheavals. Their exile and attainder marked the final realization of their political death.
Though exiles often maintained ties of affection and connections among friends and
relatives in their former homelands, they no longer held the status of men or citizens in
the United States. As shown in the preceding sections, the loyalists worked to restore
their own sense of honour by defending their role in Britain’s defeat and asserting their
moral right to be compensated for their losses, sacrifices, and services. Few loyalists felt
that these endeavours had fully restored their honour. There was public recognition of
their plight and of the Crown’s obligation to them, but the loyalists felt interrogated and
questioned by the commissioners, and believed their compensation fell far below what
was just. Only when they had resumed the role of a household patriarch, on land they
owned, could loyalists be truly reborn as men. While the wealthiest loyalist gentlemen
remained in Britain, the vast majority of exiles began their new lives in the British
colonies of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Upper Canada.
This final section is not intended as a retelling of the history of the loyalist
settlement in Canada, but is rather a brief examination of how concerns over manhood,

315
patriarchy, and the function of honour as a claim-right continued into loyalist
resettlement.165 Applying a comparative biographical approach to Amos Botsford,
Mather Byles, Jr., and Joel Stone, all New England exiles who became prominent in the
loyalist colonies, reveals the consistent challenges they faced in their attempts to assert
their honour and compel superiors and inferiors alike to treat them as gentlemen.166 The
history of loyalist settlement is vast, and therefore this examination can only highlight
some recurring themes and areas of study that would benefit from further research.
Whether in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, or Upper Canada, gentlemen loyalists found
their finances strained again to the breaking point, they competed with other loyalists for
government positions and lands, and their assumed authority was challenged. Even some
of their marriages buckled under the stress of frontier privations. They also worked to
instil their political values in their children but, ironically, they also relied on contacts in
the United States to provide a suitable education for their sons to secure their place as the
next generation of loyalist leaders.
Though historians have long noted the patriarchal nature of early Canadian
societies,167 the genteel “loyalist founders”, whose children and grandchildren later
formed the ruling cliques of these new societies, began with comparatively weak
patriarchal power in their households and in public. They had little money, and remained
165

For detailed histories on loyalist settlement and culture, see: Neil MacKinnon, This Unfriendly Soil: The
Loyalist Experience in Nova Scotia, 1783-1791. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988);
Condon, The Envy of the American States.; Errington, The Lion, the Eagle and Upper Canada. Other books
add greatly to our knowledge about the period of loyalist settlement in this region including: J.K Johnson,
Becoming Prominent: Regional Leadership in Upper Canada, 1791-1841 (Montreal/Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 1989); Douglas McCalla, Planting the Province: The Economic History of
Upper Canada, 1784-1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); Jeffrey L. McNairn, The
capacity to judge: public opinion and deliberative democracy in Upper Canada, 1791-1854 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2000); Mills, The Idea of Loyalty in Upper Canada; Françoise Noel, Family
Life and Sociability in Upper and Lower Canada, 1780-1870: A View from Diaries and Family
Correspondence (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003); S.J.R Noel, Patrons, Clients,
Brokers: Ontario Society and Politics, 1791-1896 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); Bruce W.
Antliff, Loyalist Settlements, 1783-1789: New Evidence of Canadian Loyalist Claims (Toronto: Archives of
Ontario, 1985).
166

This method is based in part on the example of Nancy Rhoden’s exploration of patriarchy during the
American Revolution among Virginia’s planter elite using the cases of Richard Henry Lee and Landon
Carter. See Rhoden, “Patriarchal Authority in Revolutionary Virginia,” 417-418.
167

Potter-MacKinnon, While the Women Only Wept; Morgan, Public Men and Virtuous Women; Constance
Backhouse, Petticoats and Prejudice: Women and Law in Nineteenth Century Canada (Toronto: Osgoode
Society by Women’s Press, 1991).

316
dependent on government preferment and the assistance of friends well into the 1790s.
Nevertheless, British interests and the loyalists’ personal goals aligned in the imperial
project. The empire needed households and loyal patriarchs as functional units of state
power in the sparsely settled colonies bordering an unfriendly rival state. As with so
many frontier experiences, even ruined and disgraced men could find a new start on the
fringes of civilization, but the loyalist gentlemen explored in this section had the
advantage of British preferment and the continuation of pre-war connections with their
homelands to prop-up their waning patriarchy, ensure proper educations for their sons,
and preserve their positions until the new settler communities matured. Once again, this
assistance was not seen as dependence, but as the rightful compensation for their loyalty.
With the benchmarks of successful masculinity in disarray, with divided families,
strained affections, and precarious levels of debt, loyalism – professed attachment to
Britain and a history of sacrifice and continued service to the Crown – became the mark
of honour and the source of restored public and domestic power in British North
America. This process sometimes took generations to complete, but it was the final stage
of political rebirth.

Amos Botsford was a Yale-educated lawyer with a flourishing practice in New
Haven before the war. He fled Connecticut in 1779 and as a well-connected gentleman he
quickly found government preferment in New York as a refugee agent during the conflict
and as a settlement director in New Brunswick after the peace. He eventually held a
number of important posts, including Speaker of the House in the provincial assembly.168
Like so many gentlemen loyalists, even a grandee such as Botsford ran deeply into debt
as he attempted to resurrect his genteel standards of living and risked following his
father-in-law, Joshua Chandler, into bankruptcy and disrepute. Almost a decade after
resettlement, Amos Botsford bemoaned his debts and ever-increasing expenses he had
incurred in New Brunswick and in supporting his scattered family. In a lengthy and
candid letter to his son William, Bostford admitted to being “embarrased [sic]” and “very
apprehensive respecting my Affairs and have felt so this long time…” He chided his son
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that “My children run me too hard, they think Pa is worth a great deal, whereas they are
mistaken.” The elder Botsford wrote that he had gone to great expense and effort for his
children, “but the greater my exertions the louder their demands against me…” He did
not begrudge his obligations as a patriarch and genteel provider, but wanted his son to be
aware of the strains on the family fortune. When Botsford arrived in New Brunswick to
“get some little spot to begin the world anew and which might be in a way of
accumulating”, his entire estate amounted to about £1000. By the standards of other
loyalist refugees, this was an incredible sum, but to Botsford it was hardly sufficient.
“My purchases here amount to about that Sum or near it and Building has been very
expensive” he recalled, and added that he was also responsible for the “support of the
Family abroad” as his dependants spread throughout the Atlantic. Knowing perhaps that
his taste for luxury and genteel living was also to blame for his precarious financial
condition, Botsford concedes that “you may say I went upon to[o] large a scale, perhaps I
did, for my own Comfort I know I did…”, yet “I have not made a foolish Bargain in any
of my Purchases, nor an injudicious one that I know of…” He simply needed to “exercise
every Oeconomy to extricate my Affairs.”169 All of these thoughts depict the conflicting
emotions of a man caught between many competing obligations. His sons and daughters
were a reflection of his status, and they needed to be properly attired and refined; his
home needed to reflect his status and prestige to project his power; and he was obviously
loathe to sacrifice his own creature comforts. To ignore any of these pursuits would
lessen his public image, and yet these same obligations imperilled his whole project.
Botsford’s admissions were meant to educate William in the family affairs and groom
him as a future heir and responsible patriarch. The letter was also meant to highlight the
significance of Botsford’s support of his son’s lifestyle and advancement by pointing out
the burden and strain it placed on the greater household. No petulance or ingratitude
would be countenanced in light of such generosity. The Botsford patriarch was
attempting to ensure continued respect and obedience from his son by taking him into his
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confidence and by intimating that his financial support was more precarious than the
father’s public image may have suggested.
Similar worries over financial matters and their connection to domestic authority
were shared by Joel Stone in Upper Canada. Though of middling status, Stone had
married Leah Moore, a member of a prosperous New York merchant family during his
time in the British-occupied city. Separated from her husband for almost three years
while he pursued his claims in England, Leah Moore Stone and their infant son were
shuffled around from family home to family home, deeply straining their new marriage
and the good graces of relatives. The couple was finally reunited in 1787 and settled
initially in the rough loyalist camp of New Johnstown along the St. Lawrence River. 170
Disappointed in his attempts to procure a government position, which were doled out to
more prominent gentlemen, Stone instead went into the distillery business, working from
a building constructed “from the forests standing.”171 By 1790, however, Stone was in
great difficulty. His distillery languished “owing to the singular Scarcity of grain” and he
fell into debt. He despaired that “my expenses call loud for more cash than I can
command, (owing to Domestick troubles, which has embarrassed my mind & finances,
both to a Digree [sic] of ruin).” Without a doubt his “domestick troubles” were Stone’s
biggest concern. Though details of the specific causes are lost, the Stone marriage
disintegrated in 1789. It was a very public humiliation, a “calamity” as he put it, for a
man striving to build a household and a career in a new land.172 No letters survive
between Joel and Leah during their break-up, but others commented on the issue. Stone’s
brother referred to Leah Moore Stone as “that Rib of the Devil, who had so long
devoured your interest and happiness,” and his sister, Dothe, referred to her sister-in-law
in her diary as the “evil ----”.173 The public embarrassment continued to mount for Stone,
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when he learned from a friend in Montreal that “your quondam wife…is endeavoring to
place you in debt wherever she can find that you have any credit.”174 Stone’s honour and
finances were being deeply tarnished by the affair. Sometime in 1790 Stone effectively
banished his wife to New York City to live with her family while he took full custody of
their two children. Turning over his military pension to her, he also placed
advertisements in New York newspapers which give some hint to his understanding of
the failed marriage. In a draft he declares that the separation was caused by his wife’s
“ungrateful conduct, and repeated demands” which “obliged me to enter into Articles of
Final Separation.”175 In other words, his patriarchal authority was questioned or denied
by his wife, who refused to live with what could be provided. His notice in the Daily
Advertiser further blames his wife for the separation, stating that she “has impetuously
requested and demanded a final separation from me” which was signed on May 25, 1789.
“I therefore forbid every person trusting her…on my account” he continues “as I will not
pay any debts contracted by her.”176 It is plausible that Leah Moore Stone was simply
exasperated with her husband’s constant schemes and failures. The couple’s dispute had
been growing since he travelled to London in 1783, and there is ample evidence in their
letters that she bitterly resented his absence. For his part, he likely viewed his journey as
a necessary sacrifice for the future prospects of their family. The duties of patriarch, like
honour itself, were open to interpretation. The break-up of their marriage was certainly a
public disgrace for the Stones, yet even with these very public humiliations, Joel Stone
eventually became a prosperous and respected householder and prominent local
gentleman. In a more settled region, such a failure could have been Stone’s undoing, as
his inability to maintain an orderly household would announce a deeper level of
incompetence that would make creditors or patrons leery about attaching their fortunes to
the man. But in the unsettled frontier of Upper Canada the domestic catastrophe was but a
limited setback on his road to political rebirth. Leah died in 1793, so no divorce petition
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was ever sent to the Upper Canada legislature. Stone continued to pursue government
posts and was soon rewarded with several important positions including Justice of the
Peace and militia colonel. He finally restored his position as the head of a complete
household when he remarried in 1798.177
It would be reasonable to assume that marital strain would accompany the trauma
of war, dislocation, and exile. Yet there is no evidence of any endemic trend towards
marital break-up among the loyalists in exile. As Janice Potter-MacKinnon and Anne
Gorman Condon have shown, it was quite the contrary. The correspondence of other
genteel loyalist couples like Edward and Mary Winslow, Jonathan and Mary Bliss, and
Beverly and Nancy Robinson, all show abiding concern, respect, and mutual love in the
face of the material privation and the emotional depression of exile.178 The appearance of
stable marriages among genteel loyalist families may perhaps point to the persistent fact
that marriage, according to Kathleen M. Brown’s study of the Virginia elite, “was vital to
class formation and gentry identity.”179 There was much more to gain in eighteenth
century culture, both socially and morally, within wedlock than without. But there were
also few options open for individuals to divorce their spouses anywhere in British North
America. Upper Canada’s divorce laws followed the British Common Law tradition, and
anyone seeking to dissolve their marriage needed a special act of the Legislature. The
first successful petition did not occur until 1839, and in the whole legal history of Upper
Canada, only seven divorce proceedings ever made it to the Legislature. The other
provinces had equally or even more restrictive laws, and in nearly all cases divorce laws
in British North America upheld patriarchal power and favoured the husband.180 In
contrast, many American states liberalized their divorce laws after the Revolution,
permitting the legal dissolution of marriage in the case of abuse or abandonment. Nancy
Cott noted a significant rise in the number of divorce cases in Massachusetts during the
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Revolutionary period, and both she and Jay Fliegelman have argued for a causal link
between revolutionary ideology and the increase in divorce. Men and women had the
right to pursue independence if their spouse was a tyrant or did not fulfill their end of the
marriage contract. Yet marriage remained one of the primary benchmarks for manhood in
the early republic, showing the continued importance of traditional expressions of
patriarchal authority in what Cott sees as a modernizing state, led by men who were eager
to show that it was different from the restrictive and authoritarian Old World.181 The laws
in the remaining British possessions of North America made divorce nearly impossible.
More often than not, this situation favoured the man in dysfunctional relationships, again
showing how British government and law buttressed even seemingly corrupt or impotent
patriarchal power.
Despite not having a legal recourse to divorce, other loyalist marriages also
dissolved in practice, though not law. Joseph Galloway, the loyalist spokesman from
Pennsylvania, famously went into exile without his wife, Grace, who remained in
Philadelphia. Already suffering through a mismatched and unhappy marriage,
Galloway’s loyalism destroyed the family fortune and caused the confiscation of their
estate, most of which was inherited from Grace Galloway’s father. In 1779, she recorded
in her diary that she was “truly set against him [her husband]” for causing so much pain
and loss to their family, and for taking their daughter Elizabeth with him into exile. Grace
Galloway never made any attempt to join her exiled husband and daughter in England,
and she died in 1789, never having seen her family again. Though they never formally
divorced, the permanent separation was a very clear and obvious sign of the failure of
Galloway’s patriarchal authority, and yet his continued custody of this daughter was a
sign of the state’s power to prop-up a man’s waning domestic command.182
The Botsford family also experienced the break-up of the nuclear family. Sarah
Botsford, the wife of Amos Botsford and the daughter of Joshua Chandler, followed her
181

Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2009), 47-50; and “Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth-Century
Massachusetts,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4, (Oct., 1976): 592-595. Fliegelman,
Prodigals and Pilgrims, 123-127.
182

Ferling, The Loyalist Mind, 44. Raymond C. Werner, introduction to The Diary of Grace Growden
Galloway, by Grace Growden Galloway (New York: Arno Press, 1971 [reprint]), 33-34.

322
husband into exile in New Brunswick, but the two had a dreadful falling out. The cause
of the troubles is not revealed in the Botsford correspondence, but Mrs. Botsford either
felt she was to blame, or accepted the blame in an attempt to restore the family. Either out
of contrition or calculation, her letters express the “learned helplessness” and deference
towards patriarchal authority that was expected of married women.183 She wrote to her
husband in 1788 “that I hartily repent of my past Folly and Often wish I could recall my
past Life again but alas too Late.” In her letter she apologizes for “the abuse & troble that
I have given” and writes about the “unhappy day when we parted.” There is no reply
from Amos Botsford in the papers, but the following year he wrote his son that “Your
Ma…boards out at Sackville about a Dozen miles from this [place]” and though
inconvenient in many ways, “it is however less troublesome to board her out than to keep
her in the Family.”184 His continuing rebuke of his wife, in spite of her pleas, was
obviously an expression of his power over her, and he seemed to feel fully justified in his
actions. Perhaps because of Botsford’s rank and influence, he kept the domestic strife as
quiet as possible, yet it certainly must have been a topic of gossip in the refugee
communities. Nevertheless, he continued to receive government posts and remained a
powerful figure in the community regardless of the unofficial separation and frayed
appearance of domestic authority and tranquility.
Mather Byles also did his best to project the appearance of domestic order, but
was deeply anxious about how his marriage was seen in the community. In 1783, the
exiled Anglican reverend was living with his family in Halifax. He wrote to his sister that
his wife, Sarah Lyde, “made a great Racket about Nothing, roused the Family at three
oclock in the Morning, & alarmed the whole Neighborhood.” Though he attempted to be
tender to his suffering wife, “I was convinced of the Necessity of her being confined to
her chamber & she was so, strictly, for three weeks; since which Time she has, for the
most Part, behaved very quietly & decently.” While concerned for his wife, the very
public scene caused Byles to reflect that “this memorable crisis…had such direct
Tendency to lessen the Family in the Eye of the World, & indeed to make the poor
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Woman herself look little.” What caused the outburst is unclear, but it is likely that the
stress of exile and loss, of moving from the genteel environment of Boston and its social
scene to the rustic surroundings of Halifax, had taken an emotional toll and contributed to
her apparent mental breakdown. Byles admitted as much in the same letter, noting that “I
have slips enough of my own to answer for.” 185 Sarah died in 1787 from a “mysterious &
extraordinary” ailment, which Byles and his doctor reasoned “was totally owing to a
pernicious Practice of lacing & girding herself too tight.” Byles was at least somewhat
cheered that “Her funeral was long & very respectable; a large Number of the American
Refugees being dressed in Black & walking as Relations” which he interpreted as a
testament to the esteem the community held for his family. As no household was
complete without a wife and mother, Byles, now in his fifties, remarried a year later.186
What the cases of Stone, Botsford, and Byles suggest, is that while marriage was
considered a vital institution for gentlemen leaders, and though these loyalists might have
suffered emotional anguish and embarrassment over the appearance of domestic strife,
their political positions in their communities and their relationship with government were
not unduly affected. Indeed, they retained their role as the face of government authority,
or in the case of Byles, spiritual authority. They could count on continued advancement,
in spite of their perceived personal failures, because of their status as loyalist gentlemen.
Even without money and an orderly domestic life, the British authorities continued to
treat them as leaders and as potential recipients of government posts.
Holding a government office was one of the very few ways a gentleman could
earn a living in the rough and unsettled colonies. Opportunities existed for merchants and
surveyors, but the majority of loyalist gentlemen who settled in New Brunswick, for
instance, were trained as lawyers. There would never be enough work for these men to all
practice their genteel vocation. Government positions were therefore the only reliable
source of employment for gentlemen in the early years of settlement. Men vied with one
another for positions and often held far more offices than they could effectively
administer in an effort to maximize earnings and prestige. Whether they acquired offices
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through nepotism or merit, loyalist leaders routinely found their authority questioned or
challenged.187
As an Anglican clergyman, the Reverend Mather Byles Jr. found a secure living
tending to a refugee congregation, but the popular veneration for him and the Church of
England fell far below his hopes. During the American Revolution Byles served as
chaplain to troops stationed in Halifax, and continued there after the peace, even though
he loathed the ramshackle city and its uncouth people. While he mentions the occasional
genteel soirée and periodic bouts of excitement, such as a visit from Prince William
Henry in the autumn of 1787, Byles was either bored or annoyed for his entire time in
Halifax. He found the society tedious and the politics of the province caustic and factious.
As a public man, he lamented bitterly that he had been drawn into vulgar elections and
politics which were dominated by “the dispute between the old Inhabitants of this
Province & the American Loyalists.” He felt his honour and dignity impugned as he
spent his days marked with “the Rage of Electioneering, & the Violence of Party”
coupled with “many drunken Mobs… & much other Mischief done.” The environment
didn’t appeal to him either, as he jokingly explained to his sister that far from being a
“howling wilderness”, Nova Scotia was rather a “hissing Wilderness” due to the
“Abundance of Rattle-Snakes.” In another letter to his sister, Byles despaired of the
people among whom he was forced to live. The people ignored Byles and his teachings,
did not attend his services, and in essence, disregarded his claim to privilege and
authority in favour of other denominations or, seemingly, embraced no religion at all.
After leaving Halifax he wrote that he had “been imprisoned” in the city, and “upon cool
Reflexion,” he continued, Halifax was “in every Respect, the most contemptible my Eyes
ever beheld & I desire never to forget that the most irreligious People I ever knew were at
the same Time the [most] ignorant, the most stupid, & the most unhappy.”188 This is a
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considerable rebuke for his refugee neighbours considering Byles was forced to flee the
mobs of Revolutionary Massachusetts. Byles was therefore overjoyed when he received
an appointment to the rectory in Saint John, New Brunswick, a colony settled and
governed by loyalists like him.
The Church of England, even in loyalist New Brunswick, was but one of many
denominations competing for parishioners, and its rigid and conservative customs and
hierarchy did not appeal to the vast majority of settlers. While the locals raised Baptist
and Presbyterian churches and supported their ministers, and itinerant Methodist
preachers travelled healthy circuits, Byles and his fellow Anglican clergymen were
supported by government subsidies and by The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
in Foreign Parts. Led by Charles Inglis, who was consecrated as the first Bishop of Nova
Scotia in 1787, the Anglican Churches of New Brunswick were directed to maintain strict
hierarchy and order by replicating traditional customs such as assigning and renting pews
to individual families based on rank and respectability. While the Church of England
failed to fill their services or find enough local support to build new churches, Inglis
fussed over the fact that some clergy allowed church-goers to sit where they pleased, a
practice destined, he wrote, to “produce disorder and confusion…” The Church of
England, though the established church of both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, was
not able to sustain itself on local support for another generation. Mather Byles could not
have based his domestic and public authority on his role as a minister of the Church of
England, which the majority of the population seemingly rejected, without direct support
from government. His transfer to the comparatively more genteel surroundings of St.
John was doubtlessly made possible through the intercession of other gentlemen loyalists
on his behalf.189 Byles achieved his political rebirth because the British government
believed orderly religious instruction from the established church would help create a
peaceful, loyal, and deferential population. The success or failure of the clergyman’s
personal quest to restore his household patriarchy and his public honour as a spiritual
authority figure depended entirely on Britain’s imperial policies.
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Amos Botsford was also a beneficiary of British preferment, but his own sense of
entitlement to respect and positions, described as his “dictatorial style”, brought him into
conflict with both the common loyalist settlers and his superiors. He was accused of
lording over inferiors and being impertinently demanding with British officials, including
Nova Scotia’s military governor John Parr. His lack of deference earned him a sharp
rebuke, with one official reminding the exile that he was no longer in Connecticut where
people “may reject and chuse another [Governor] when they please.”190 Yet British
authorities still entrusted Botsford with directing refugee settlement along the St. John
River in New Brunswick. Perhaps again because of his brusque manners, several
disgruntled refugees, provincial captains and other middling loyalists, drew up a petition
charging Botsford with gross neglect of duty, conflict of interest, and peremptorily
reassigning lands, presumably to his friends. The British passed over Botsford in the
initial allocation of government offices in 1784, though he attributed this to the influence
of more powerful loyalist gentlemen petitioning in England, and not to his own imperious
behaviour. Nonetheless, this was only a temporary setback, and Botsford went on to hold
a number of prominent government posts.191 Botsford was not the only New Brunswick
loyalist to be accused of haughtiness and pomposity. An American visitor described the
mayor of Saint John, Gabriel Ludlow, as “aping the hauteur of the British” while
Jonathan Bliss shuddered at the manners of fellow gentleman loyalist Jonathan Odell
whose “hauteur” was “so disgusting that he has become completely obnoxious…”192 The
new powers entrusted to these men combined with the memory of the insults and losses
they had suffered during the war, and their desire to repair their wounded masculinity,
might have produced such overweening behaviour. These instances could also be
expressions of mental strain or of gentlemen overcompensating for their own
psychological wounds. Yet the pompous displays of imperious manners could also be
consistent with the loyalist gentlemen’s beliefs that they possessed a level of honour
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which required significant displays of deference from other men. That other loyalists
seemingly rolled their eyes at such pretenses indicates people understood both the
offensive idiosyncrasies of some gentlemen, and the precarious and spurious foundations
of authority that could be transferred at the whim of British officials.
While men like Botsford seemed to succeed in spite of themselves, less wellconnected loyalists had to struggle against more powerful gentlemen for land grants and
government posts. While Joel Stone’s marriage collapsed and he was passed over for a
government office, he was also involved in a drawn-out dispute with Sir John Johnson,
formerly one of the greatest landholders in colonial America, and a Brigadier General of
provincial forces. Stone had been instructed by the Surveyor General Samuel Holland,
that if he paid to have lands on the Gananoque River surveyed he could then take legal
possession.193 Unfortunately, Johnson was the supervisor of loyalist land settlement in
what became Upper Canada and also claimed the land. The Gananoque River, with rapids
flowing into the St. Lawrence, was an ideal place to construct both grist and saw mills to
serve the growing region. Neither man was willing to back down. The correspondence
between the men reveals that far from being cowed by the unequal contest, Stone,
perhaps still smarting from his continued personal failures, was determined not to lose
what he saw as his last chance at political rebirth. With the requisite combination of
assertiveness and deference, Stone argued that while he “never presumed to doubt your
[Johnson’s] Rights” he was eager to “explain and defend my own rights…particularly in
point of right to [my] just proportion of the King’s Bounty in Lands.” Stone refused
Johnson’s offer of 1000 acres further up the river and continued to argue his point. The
lands, Stone said, were his by right – by law, since he had paid for the survey and
Johnson had not, and from the justice of his previous sacrifices. The baronet seemingly
acknowledged the legality of Stone’s claim, and agreed to a compromise wherein they
would each take a bank of the river. This moment marked the beginnings not only of
Stone’s successful political rebirth, but a period of social, economic, and political
advancement. He had asserted himself against a much more powerful adversary and
secured his right to respect and his rightful reward. His honour was at least partially
restored. Johnson served as an absentee landlord of the east bank of the river, while Stone
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began operating a saw mill and a general store, which eventually grew into a set of mills,
shops, and homes with Stone as the undisputed leader of the settlement. Yet Stone’s case
also highlights the fluid and subjective nature of the term “gentleman” on the frontier.
When John Graves and Elizabeth Simcoe stopped at Stone’s settlement in 1791, Mrs.
Simcoe had to be told by another loyalist that “Stone was too much a gentleman to offer”
payment for his hospitality.194 While Stone’s status was understood by the other refugees
on the St. Lawrence, Elizabeth Simcoe did not recognize him as a gentleman in the
English sense. Less than a decade after the Simcoe’s visit, Stone’s enterprise was
prospering, and because of his economic centrality in the region, he was rewarded with
government offices and married Abigail Dayton, the widow of another prospering
Connecticut loyalist. By 1804 he held the positions of Justice of the Peace, roads
commissioner, and militia colonel.195 Stone lacked the connections, education, and
previous wealth of Amos Botsford and Mather Byles, and his loyalist losses and service
as a militia captain were unremarkable among the thousands of other claimants. Yet
because of his staunch loyalism, expressed in his claims narrative and no doubt repeated
to every British officer who would listen, he established a flourishing settlement at a
strategic location on the St. Lawrence River, a main highway of British communications.
In spite of domestic failures, he became the face of the British government in the
settlement. His new found prosperity and the honours brought by rank helped him to
restore his patriarchal power and granted him a level of political authority he had never
before achieved. An early twentieth century historian described him as “a little
autocrat…in his little kingdom.”196 If his status as a gentleman was in doubt in 1791, by
the early nineteenth century he was a secure member of the provincial elite.
Government preferment was essential for Stone’s political rebirth, but he also
relied heavily on his continued connections with his homeland to build his new
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settlement. The task of clearing thickly wooded land and erecting a mill in a remote area
was not something a single man could undertake. Because the rank and file loyalists were
busy with their own lands, Stone enlisted men from his hometown of Litchfield,
Connecticut, who though not loyalists, came to settle on the Gananoque River in Upper
Canada. A blacksmith and a number of labourers all eventually relocated. Welcomed as
“late loyalists” these workers built the settlement and Stone became their patron. Joel
Stone’s political rebirth in Upper Canada signalled at least a partial rebirth in his former
homeland as well. He ceased to be regarded as a traitorous exile and became a contact for
men looking for a brighter future in the depressed economy of the early republic.197
None of the loyalists examined in this chapter lost contact with family and friends
in their former homelands. The Stone, Botsford, and Byles correspondences all show an
abiding emotional and practical attachment to their family and friends that was
maintained for the rest of their lives through letters and the occasional visit. The
correspondence served as a conduit for local and family news, as a route for the exchange
of political ideas, and serves as evidence for the continued economic ties. As Jane
Errington has shown, these connections facilitated cultural exchange and became part of
a loose political alliance between the elite settlers of Upper Canada and the Federalists of
the northern states.198 The situation was similar in the Maritime Provinces where family
ties continued in spite of political death. Perhaps the most significant element of the
continued attachment of loyalists to their former homelands was in raising and educating
loyalist sons. Ann Gorman Condon refers to the next generation of loyalists as “redeemer
children,” who “were expected to carry the torch” of genteel loyalism and “bring honour”
to their families. 199 On the children’s shoulders rested their father’s hopes for the lineal
fulfillment of their political rebirth. From childhood this generation was raised on stories
of the Revolution, and there is even evidence of a uniquely loyalist vernacular. When at
age six Belcher Byles made “his first Appearance in Jacket & Trowsers” his father
197

Luther Bishop and Dan Throop to Joel Stone, Feb. 9, 1789. Gananoque Museum Collection (Copied
from McDonald, Stone, Baker Family Fonds, LAC). Luther Bishop to Joel Stone, undated, Sheldon Family
Papers. Helga J. Ingraham Memorial Library, Litchfield Historical Society.
198

Errington, The Lion, The Eagle and Upper Canada, 35-54, 39, 46.

199

Condon, “The Family in Exile,” 49-50.

330
Mather Byles described how “he struts, & swells, & puffs, & looks as important as a
Boston Committee-Man.”200 When his daughter Betsey turned twenty-one and left the
family home, Byles mused on his shrinking household, writing that “my Subjects are
reduced to four. I expect the Example will spread, & that they will all, one after another,
declare their Independence.”201 Before the next generation of loyalists “declared their
independence”, refugee parents worked to instill genteel manners and replicate their
loyalist political ideology in their children. This proved to be a complex task.
For many genteel loyalists, the need to provide their children, especially sons,
with a proper education, reveals one of the most significant advantages of maintaining
ties to their homelands. To persist as a respectable family, sons needed to be crafted into
gentlemen, but this could not be completed in the rough wilderness settlements. A proper
education was not simply a matter of academics, although that was certainly an important
element. Rather, a gentleman’s education consisted of the inculcation of tastes, customs,
and mores which served to set men apart and distinguish them as leaders. Loyalist elites
and British governors like John Graves Simcoe acknowledged that the opportunities for a
genteel education in any of the provinces were sorely lacking. While loyalist parents did
their best to impress their culture and political ideology upon their sons, only through a
proper education, which included seeing more of the world, could loyalist sons be fit to
take the reins of government.202
The options open to loyalists depended heavily on their connections in the United
States. Joel Stone’s son William had first been sent to a boarding school in Montreal in
the 1780s, but after the Stones’ marriage fell apart, William and his younger sister Mary
were sent to live with their aunt in Woodbury, Connecticut until, Stone wrote, “I can rid
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myself of bad examples in my own family.”203 The Stone family was not wealthy or
connected enough to provide the next generation of sons with a college education, but
local schools in Connecticut, and the households of the extended family were more
promising environments than the frontier of the St. Lawrence River. The children stayed
in Connecticut for several years, attending school and living with several different family
members. In many ways this was a continuation of the old New England custom of
“sending out,” where children were sent to live in a related household to attend school or
apprentice, refine their manners, and build character in a less familiar environment.204
Indeed, the Stone children were split up with Mary staying with her Aunt Dothe Cutler in
Watertown, Connecticut and William with his Aunt Rene Hopkins in Hartford where he
could attend a “French school.”205 Yet Stone’s sister Rene eventually came to the
conclusion that, while a promising boy, William needed the direction and example of his
father. This was perhaps an encoded admission that she could not control her nephew.
Rene Stone Hopkins wrote that she could not bear to become a “tyrant” in the typical
joust of care-giver and teenager, and felt it would be better for William to begin working
in Upper Canada rather than consorting with “bad company or…trifling away his
time…in a town like this…that would unman him forever.”206 Mrs. Hopkins may also
have been suggesting that it was time for Stone to act a patriarch and guide his own son
into adulthood. William returned to live with his father in Gananoque and became his
business partner. The younger Stone routinely travelled to Connecticut to conduct
business and kept his father informed of family news and early republican politics.
Though moulded in New England, he was obviously the son of a Tory, noting on one
occasion that the “people now begin to open their eyes, and see that Thomas Jefferson
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and Tom Paine…will not always lead the people as they wish…” He observed for his
father, with satisfaction, that many of their relatives in Connecticut “are wishing that their
property was under the King’s Dominion.”207 Stone was doubtlessly proud of his son and
was grooming him to lead the next generation of loyalists along the St. Lawrence. He
secured William a position as customs collector at Gananoque and was giving the young
man more responsibilities when tragedy struck, and William Stone died in 1809. His
hopes shifted to his daughter and a sound marriage with a capable and enterprising
Scottish merchant-adventurer who eventually took over affairs in the little community.208
With far more financial resources and connections, Amos Botsford sent his son,
also named William, for an elite education in Connecticut, first at a grammar school, then
at Yale College. William Botsford was being groomed to be a fine gentleman, and his
father monitored his progress in as minute detail as he could from a distance. The
correspondence contains a great deal of advice and instruction, and is typical of genteel
patriarchs of the time who used rewards of fine clothes and money as both incentives to
encourage study and proper behaviour, and as a way to maintain control over their
sons.209 William began his instruction at a private boarding school under a Mr. Goodrich.
From the detailed information Amos Botsford seemed to have about his son, it is likely
he and Mr. Goodrich were in regular contact. For example, Botsford warned his son that
he had “heard you are rather too much inclined to go abroad Evenings” and he urged his
son to stay home to study and “get well fitted for College…” Other letters focus on
William’s poor spelling and grammar. Botsford instructs his son that “a young
Gentlemen should always wr[ite] and spell properly otherwise the handsomest writing
does not look well…” The patriarch then adds that his son has also “not learnt to fold a
letter handsomely” and provides some instruction and continued incentives to improve,
promising “I shall grudge you nothing if you are studious and behave well.”210
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When William entered Yale in 1789, Amos became even more interested in his
son’s progress, a situation that may have been resented by the young scholar who
responded to his father less frequently. Nonetheless, the elder Botsford continued to be a
helpful but stern advisor to his son, half-mocking William when he was passed-over for
some extracurricular distinction. “[I]t seems your Sophimorical Honour and Dignity has
been wounded, a great affair indeed!” he chided. Concerned that his son had taken this
perceived slight too seriously, he upbraided William, “I clearly discover too much
Obstinacy in your temper, from your own Account of the business_ if you cannot bear
little disappointments it shews a great want of Philosophical Coolness.” Worried about
the family name at Yale, Amos Botsford shared a tale of his own disappointment adding
that “I bred no Rumpus or Riot, nor flounced, nor made a pother.” The letter continues
with an ongoing argument between William and Amos over ideas of politeness and
deference, which William believed “were injurious” to his advancement at the college.
William was likely caught up in a new spirit of assertiveness and resistance to authority
which was becoming common in the elite colleges of the new republic. 211 Such a cultural
shift seemed alien, uncouth, and alarmingly republican to the loyalist patriarch. Amos
Botsford was determined to put an end to what he certainly saw as corrosive democratic
influences, and concludes his letter by explaining that a “youth should not be…proud,
obstinate, haughty, foppish, nor ill-tempered; nor give to Noise, Riot, drinking or
debauchery…” Instead, a young gentleman should be “complaisant, submissive to rule
and good order, quiet…studious, respectful to superiors and obedient to the Laws of the
Society which he is a member.” Fathers had given such advice for generations, but the
Revolutionary age, which witnessed the collapse of divinely ordained hierarchy
throughout the Atlantic world, seemed to heighten the importance of such basic wisdom
for Botsford. Again, detecting the spirit of aggression and competition that so
characterized ambitious young men in the early national period, Botsford adds that
“Ambition tho not properly to be classed among the Rules of Politeness is however useful
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when properly managed.” Employing a nautical metaphor, Botsford advised that
ambition “should not be top-heavy, more sail than Ballast, but well trimmed and
balanced, and if you have a good store of useful knowledge you will have a good cargo
on board and arrive at a good market.”212 While the faculty of Yale trained his son in the
liberal arts and the law, Botsford tried to mould his son’s character and by extension, his
political ideology. When William sent his father a letter full of histrionics about a debt he
had incurred, Amos chides him once again that “You are really too desponding at
times… it does no good, you have a want of Philosophy”. By embracing the sort of
stoicism displayed by the loyalist patriarchs “you will find convenience to carry you
easily along in Life.”213 These were words that Amos Botsford, and many loyalists, lived
by, and he expected his dutiful son to follow his advice. William Botsford completed his
studies in 1796 and settled in St. John where he practiced law and rose to follow in his
father’s footsteps, becoming Speaker of the New Brunswick House of Assembly and
holding a number of other offices until his death in 1864. It was William Botsford and
other loyalist children who completed their parent’s political rebirth.
The loyalists examined in this chapter relied on the assistance of the British
government, their connections, and even their children to achieve political rebirth. The
loyalist gentlemen did not see this assistance as dependence, but theirs by right. They
demanded the respect due to them by virtue of their personal honour and sacrifices. Amos
Botsford, Mather Byles, and Joel Stone each faced their own domestic troubles, financial
difficulties, public controversies, and the task of raising the next generation of gentlemen
loyalists on the frontier, and throughout all of this their patriarchal authority was
supported and preserved by British preferment. At times the loyalists inflated their sense
of importance and took their rights far too seriously, engaging in pompous and imperious
displays like Amos Botsford, or in the case of Mather Byles, cursing the people for not
paying due deference to a gentleman and his office. In other cases, such as Joel Stone’s
dispute with Sir John Johnson, a loyalist’s demand for respect and the assertion of his
loyalist rights resulted in recognition and wealth. In each of these cases, the loyalist
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gentlemen endeavoured to surround themselves, both in their home and in public, with
people who paid them the sort of deference they thought they deserved. When Mrs.
Botsford or Mrs. Stone proved unwilling to abide by their husbands’ wishes, they were
sent away. When the people failed to show the proper respect to Rev. Byles, he
endeavoured to find a more appreciative flock to manage. Only by establishing an
obedient household in a respectful community could a loyalist be politically reborn.

The political rebirth of the loyalists could never fully erase the sting of political
death. The ignominy of insult, defeat, and exile remained a central part of the loyalists’
narrative and identity, but through the process of political rebirth these injuries came to
be regarded as badges of honour and hallmarks of a superior form of masculinity. The
loyalists were reliant on British assistance throughout the 1780s and 1790s, but they
refused to see this as emasculating dependence. Rather, the assistance was the just
remuneration for their manly services and sacrifices. They had a right to compensation,
just as they had a right to be treated with respect, and loyalists asserted these perceived
rights throughout the process of political rebirth. When John Peters and Joseph Galloway
condemned the foppish incompetence of Burgoyne and Howe they were defending the
honour of all loyalists and asserted their right to respect. When Peter Oliver, Samuel
Peters, or Jonathan Boucher wrote their histories of the Revolution, they were defending
the honour of the loyalists by explaining how the machinations of wicked Americans and
the folly of negligent Britons combined to destroy the empire. When individuals wrote
their narratives and claims describing the loyalists’ manly virtues, they created a moral
obligation wherein the British government was bound by honour to assist its faithful,
wounded subjects. And when the loyalists demanded obedience and respect from their
wives and children and their fellow loyalists, they were drawing on the same claim to be
treated with the honour and deference due to patriarchs. In their minds, their special
status among men entitled them to privileges that had to be restored in order for the
national honour of Britain to be upheld. In large measure, the British government agreed.
Though the loyalists were never recognized as citizens, they were compensated and
assisted in their resettlement because they were white, male British subjects who would
form the basis of imperial rule through the establishment of orderly, loyal households.
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Amid the privations and challenges of frontier life, loyalist patriarchy struggled to assert
itself, but was buttressed by British support. Gentlemen loyalists experienced their
political rebirth because others accepted and supported their special status and privileges,
from the British Parliament to individual household members. For many women, for the
poor, for the First Peoples and for the descendants of African slaves, life in the new
provinces in Canada was still marked by legal subjugation and few social privileges. But
for loyalist gentlemen, this was honour restored.
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Conclusion
“I am afraid we are apt to forget that the Loyalists, to a considerable extent, were
the very cream of the population of the Thirteen Colonies. They represented in very large
measure the learning, the piety, the gentle birth, the wealth and good citizenship of the
British race in America...”1 So wrote J.H. Coyne, a Canadian lawyer and historian in
1898. His ideas are a neat encapsulation of what has since become known as the Loyalist
Myth. As Norman Knowles explains in his study of the social memory of loyalists in
Ontario, supporters of the continued connection between Canada and the British Empire,
from the mid-nineteenth century to the First World War, embraced the loyalist myth as a
“usable past.” The loyalists were the harbingers of Victorian decency, honour, and the
prosperity that came from the unity of the British Empire and a rejection of all things
American.2 According to Coyne, because of the moral and institutional foundations laid
down by the loyalists, Canada enjoyed a profoundly different culture than its American
neighbour. The loyalists’ “native instinct of British respect for law and order” could still
be felt in 1898, Coyne argued, and he praised the peace and order of Canada against the
“annual harvest of 10 000 murders and 200 lynchings” that plagued the United States.
Canada may not have been as prosperous as the republic, but “Our churches are well
filled. Our legislation keeps pace with the requirements of advancing civilization. Our
Legislatures and Municipal Councils are fairly representative, and largely free from
corruption.”3 Coyne’s Canada was a shining monument to the loyalists’ lasting morality
and honour, which stood in stark contrast to the excesses and violence of Gilded-Age
America and its westward expansion.
The myth of the honourable and genteel loyalist fathers that Coyne and other
Canadian nationalists attempted to fashion was a response to the vibrant American
mythos of 1776,4 which contained its own Tory myth of aristocratic and dishonourable
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placemen, selling liberty for preferment and plunder. More than a century after the
American Revolution, nationalists from both sides of the border still held up their
respective ancestors as the truly honourable party. Twentieth century historians
demolished both of these loyalist myths, and revealed the diversity of Crown supporters
and the contributions of women, the poor, freed slaves, and Native allies in the struggle.
The elite or middling sorts comprised only a small, but powerful minority of the loyalists
and exiles.
Yet studying this elite minority is useful for several important reasons. Historians
often rely on extant sources that were overwhelmingly produced by, or pertain to, the
loyalist elite. By drawing on the insights and methodology of cultural history and the
anthropological study of honour, as well as gender history and its exploration of
masculinity, this dissertation has worked to contextualize these records within their
original culture. Understanding the class and gender-based concerns embedded in the
written records should caution against extrapolating general notions of loyalist ideology
and applying them to the wider loyalist population. Of broader significance is the way
these records display deeply held cultural beliefs about honour and manhood that might
not have been articulated had it not been for the political and social upheavals of the
American Revolution. In their cultural and political arguments, loyalists and patriots
employed insults and arguments permeated with gendered archetypes that cast light on
their shared mentalities. Furthermore, the methods of cultural history provide ways of
reading recorded social interactions, physical descriptions of bodies, clothing, rituals, and
other symbols for their deeper power and meaning. As Robert Darnton argues, people
“think with things”, and interpreting the interactions of patriots and loyalists for these
often unwritten, yet essential beliefs reveal aspects of culture shared by men throughout
the eighteenth century English Atlantic.5 It has not been the intent of this dissertation to
applaud the contributions of white, wealthy, landowning men at the expense of others,
nor to deny the agency of other participants in the American Revolution, but to dissect
the cultural sources of power and better understand the loyalists’ behaviour as gendered
and class-based subjects.
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This dissertation adds to the historiography of the loyalists in the American
Revolution, and to the wider study of eighteenth century masculinity and honour, in
several ways. First, it reveals that loyalists and patriots shared a common culture despite
differences of political ideology. Second, the persecution of loyalist gentlemen was
enacted through deeply gendered insults and symbols of dishonour. Punitive legal actions
and confiscations also fit into this schema as the loyalists’ patriarchal authority was
stripped along with their property. Though the conflict was often deadly, at a local level
patriots usually destroyed a loyalist gentleman’s public existence and honour, rather than
kill him outright. This is referred to in this dissertation as political death. Finally, the
loyalists clung to ideas of honour to justify and rationalize their political choices and their
claims on Britain. The indignities they suffered were transformed into expressions of
honour and martyrdom for the British constitution. As loyal men, they lived up to their
obligations to the King and Parliament who had sacrificed their subjects’ property in the
peace treaty with the United States. Thus the loyalists argued that Britain owed them
monetary restitution for their losses, as well as moral recognition for their services and
fidelity. Parliament agreed both from the need to uphold the honour of the British
government, and because the loyalists’ quest for political rebirth coincided with Britain’s
continued imperial project in North America. The Empire needed patriarchs as
representatives of the state as much as the loyalist gentlemen needed to be restored to
honour.
The gentlemanly fixation on honour is central to this thesis. Bertram WyattBrown argued that “the missing element in the historians’ grasp of [Revolutionary]
events was an appreciation for the ethic of honor.”6 This dissertation has shown that
integrating honour into the loyalist history is pivotal for uncovering the mentalities of
both gentlemen loyalists and their opponents alike. Despite regional, professional, and
class-based variations, men throughout the eighteenth century Atlantic were deeply
conscious of honour as a public measure of their morality and standing in their
communities. It encompassed some of the most important aspects of manhood – domestic
patriarchy, public reputation, and financial credit. To be bankrupt, a cuckold, or a kinless
wanderer was to be a man with very little honour by the standards of the day. All men
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needed to belong to hierarchies regulated by expressions of respect and deference. Men
of all ranks and status had some notion of honour or masculine capital, but men who
claimed the status of gentlemen needed to meet exacting standards of behaviour and
cultivation. Gentlemanly honour was reserved for men with the economic clout or leisure
time to form the culturally legitimate nexus of tastes, manners, and knowledge,
collectively described as gentility. These elements served as emblems that announced a
man’s honour and manly virtues. A true gentleman was a household patriarch: the master
of a tight group of obedient dependants who lived in a well-kept structure that projected a
man’s status and position within a community. To some extent these ideals of deference
and respect resided more in the minds of gentlemen than in practice, but they provided
powerful cultural aspirations nonetheless.7 Indeed, honour was a source of male privilege
that legitimized and even sacralised patriarchal dominance over women, non-whites, and
less powerful men. Gentlemanly honour classed certain men morally above others with
assumptions of inherent honesty and openness. As seen time and again, this cultural
assumption was often used as a convenient disguise to cover any number of underhanded
or abusive behaviours. Despite claims of higher morality and ancient traditions, honour
was functionally a far more pliable concept than men cared to admit, and it was used by
loyalists, patriots, the British, indeed by men from all European nations, to rationalize
and justify their actions and claim power over each other.
This reading of eighteenth century honour as a cultural virtue and code of conduct
which encompassed aspects of manhood, patriarchy, and gentility, fits precisely into
ethnographic studies of honour culture. Cultural values of masculine honour predicated
on familial obedience, manly achievements, and mutual respect within a group of peers
regulated by ritualized forms of insult and retribution, recur across human cultures and
throughout recorded history. Though the details and customs may vary, there are many
commonalities. Chief among them is what honour does. Frank Henderson Stewart’s
theory of honour as claim-right, a “right that something be done by another,” is a crucial
element for understanding why honour was such a powerful concept: it was a man’s right
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to respect.8 When that right is violated, a man in an honour-conscious society must
respond or be diminished in the eyes of his peers. This anthropological function of
honour can be seen at work throughout the Revolutionary period, as patriots, loyalists,
and the British all made and denied competing claims for respect.
Culture and political ideology can seem to be hopelessly confused and
intermeshed in the apparent mentalities of historical actors. Bertram Wyatt-Brown
thought that loyalist honour was guided foremost by ideas of “submission to established
authority,” while Bernard Bailyn argued that the loyalist mentality was decidedly premodern, being “ancient, honorable, and moribund.”9 What this study has shown is that
though their political ideology differed, loyalists and patriots shared a common culture of
masculinity and honour. Loyalists and patriots defended their respective positions with
notions of individual liberty, freedom of conscience, rights of private property, and
resistance against tyranny – be that Congress or the King. What is fascinating about the
conflict between the loyalists and patriots is how these shared cultural virtues which
formed ideals of honourable masculinity can often be best discerned in negative –
through insults, shaming, and dishonour. As the patriots stripped away the constituent
elements of loyalists’ genteel manhood, they also revealed hegemonic masculine ideals.
This shared culture made gendered and honour-based attacks all the more devastating for
loyalists. By exploring the systematic denial of loyalists’ gentlemanly privileges and
honour, the destruction of the benchmarks of manhood, as well as attempts by loyalists to
restore themselves to honour and prominence after the war, the anatomy of eighteenth
century honour culture and masculinity comes more clearly into focus.
The patriot attempts to dishonour the loyalists do not represent attacks on
patriarchy or male privilege in general, but rather testify to the continued power of these
concepts. Republicanism and democracy drastically expanded the number of men who
could claim honour and citizenship in the decades following the American Revolution,
but during the conflict, on a cultural level, patriots and loyalists were speaking with the
same symbolic language of honour and manhood. Though popular American memory
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depicts Tories as aristocrats, very few loyalists, if any, could come close to that level of
distinction. The loyalist gentlemen examined in this dissertation, with the notable
exceptions of royal governors or the highest-ranking colonial officials, were
indistinguishable from their patriot counterparts, save for their political choices. Patriots
argued that loyalism was an unmanning political position which revealed corruption and
dishonour; therefore loyalists were no longer worthy of the rights and privileges of
gentlemen.
This dissertation presented the theory of “political death” to explain the
experience of elite and aspiring elite loyalists in the American Revolution and their legal
and cultural excision from American society. Unlike a slave’s social death, as described
by Orlando Patterson, loyalist gentlemen were never permanently stripped of their
freedom or identity.10 Their race and gender often protected white loyalists from severe
corporal punishments, close confinement, and execution, and permitted them far more
privileges in disgrace than slaves ever had even while fulfilling their expected roles.
Rather, political death was a systematic rejection of a man’s right to respect, as well as
the legal, social, financial, and cultural extinction of a man’s public place in society. He
was disgraced, dishonoured, and emasculated. The term political death was occasionally
used by contemporaries to describe loyalists who fled to the British for protection, and it
was also a phrase utilized in the wider eighteenth century world of letters. As a
contributor to a Revolutionary-era newspaper explained, “A Man’s honour is his political
life; and the moment he sacrifices it, he dies a political death – he is no longer a useful
member of the community, but is truly a burden to society.”11 Loyalism was an active
choice, and whether men chose their allegiance out of love for the King or because they
were opposed to the unruly methods of the revolution did not matter to the Whigs. From
the patriot perspective, their insults and punishments did not cause political death; rather
those actions merely recognized the dishonourable choices made by the loyalists
themselves.
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Political death is a term which encompasses the patriot treatment of loyalists,
from the shaming rituals and other forms of dishonour, to civil and financial death, but it
also recognizes the limits of loyalist dishonour. The American Revolution did not witness
bloody massacres of loyalist gentlemen, and this is likely because the consequences of
political death were considered harsh and effective enough to end Tory influence in
American society. And yet, former friends and acquaintances sometimes stressed that
their enmity towards individual loyalists was political, and there are numerous examples
of patriots interceding on loyalists’ behalf, even assisting loyalist prisoners or exiles.
Though individual loyalists could eventually find friendly receptions in the United States
in the decades following the Treaty of Paris, the memory of dishonoured Tories lived on
for generations in American folklore, literature, and history.
These limits did not seem to dull the pain of political death for gentlemen, nor did
they assuage the suffering of loyalist dependants. Loyalist gentlemen were usually
household heads and patriarchs, and their political death was felt throughout their
families and wider connections. With a patriarch’s citizenship stripped, his wife, children,
servants, and slaves no longer had a clear relationship to the state and shared in the
privations caused by his apparent dishonour. The political death of a loyalist gentleman
also left a gaping hole in his patron-client networks. A man’s financial situation in the
eighteenth century was inextricable from his moral character, and erased debts, lost
fortunes, and bankruptcies surrounded the politically dead. Unlike a natural death, where
family members would inherit property and the estate might continue, the wealth of a
loyalist was seized and liquidated by the state through acts of confiscation and attainder.
In many respects this resembled the medieval punishment of “corruption of blood”
wherein a man’s criminal dishonour and treason prevented any inheritance. He ceased to
have any legal existence, alive or dead, and his property was forfeit. Without having
much say in the matter, loyalist dependants were forced into poverty and exile with their
dishonoured patriarchs.
Confiscation and banishment represented the culmination of political death, but
the process of dishonouring loyalists began in campaigns of insults and harassment that
were infused with cultural meaning and symbolic power. This included a myriad of small
insults that to modern eyes may seem like almost juvenile pranks, such as snatching a wig
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from a gentleman’s head or donning a rich man’s hat, but these were deeply emasculating
acts. More seriously still, patriot mobs exposed loyalist impotence by invading and
vandalizing homes and property, and attacking their genteel bodies and clothing with
humiliating rituals like tarring and feathering, all with the tacit or open support of local
authorities. Rank and file revolutionaries could be creative in their insults. Chaining
loyalist gentlemen to African-American slaves or rolling them in pig manure and forcing
them to beg forgiveness from assembled patriot women, articulated the new categories of
deficient manhood patriots created for hated Tories. The insults and humiliations
demarcated the true men and citizens from “apostate[s] from the order of manhood”.12
The creation of such binary categories served as a warning to the undecided or to hidden
loyalists. Even informal attacks on loyalist honour in the form of insults delivered in
person, in the press, and on the streets, were powerful because loyalists were unable to
respond effectively. Most loyalist gentlemen, when faced with public insults, felt
compelled to flee to the British for protection, even before receiving any official demand
or ultimatum from revolutionary authorities.
Loyalists and patriots saw the Revolution as a morally asymmetrical conflict.
Loyalists viewed themselves as the righteous few who stood against the storm of
rebellion, while the patriots saw the Tories as selfish, greedy, and cowardly men who
stood in defiance of the will of a free people. Both sides clung to masculine tropes and
hurled gendered insults in the press war between supporters and opponents of colonial
resistance. The loyalists saw their position as the rational, reasonable, and prudent course
of action. Any illegal tax or imposition by Britain should be petitioned and questioned
with restraint and respect for authority, and they castigated supporters of more radical
resistance as impetuous youths, who were leading the colonies into destruction because
they were unable to control their passions. The press war was a decidedly lopsided patriot
victory because they had access to far more friendly printers, and they embraced a
populist and active approach in their attacks on the loyalists. At best Tories were depicted
as fretful old men who had outlived their usefulness; at worst they were impotent
cowards, slaves, lapdogs, amphibians, and worms. The loyalists’ wealth was not earned
by any special prowess or virtue, patriots argued, but flowed from their obsequious
12
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dependence on the Crown. The loyalists were not free and independent men, but parasites
who lived off their fellow colonists. After two and half centuries the gendered nature of
the patriot attacks remains powerful and cutting. The printed war of words between
loyalists and patriots reveals their shared mentalities, as both sides operated within the
same cultural context, but employed different gendered binaries of boys and men, men
and women, brave and cowardly, competent and incompetent, freeborn and slave, human
and animal.
One would expect the loyalists’ generalized dishonour and their bitterness
towards the rebels to exacerbate the violence of the armed conflict, and at times it did.
Civil wars, as Charles Inglis wrote, “are always more cruel… than foreign Wars,”
wherein “personal Revenge and Animosity mingle and kindle up the soul to tenfold
rage.”13 Indeed, loyalists struggled with the cultural conventions of honour in their war
with the patriots: their primal honour called for manly revenge, while genteel and
Christian values saw honour in manly restraint. There are numerous examples of patriots
and loyalists denying one another the martial honours expected of gentlemen in combat.
The summary executions of loyalists in the aftermath of the Battle of King’s Mountain
and the carnage at the Battle of Waxhaws in 1780 stand out as particularly bloody
examples. Yet notions of personal honour often prevented bloodshed and encouraged the
belligerent parties to extend at least grudging respect to one another. Captured loyalist
gentlemen were not extended the automatic rights enjoyed by British officers. Rather, the
treatment of individual loyalists depended on patriot evaluations of loyalist prisoners’
personal honour and willingness to pay courtesies and show respect to their captors. The
seriousness of a loyalist’s alleged crimes often seemed less important than the respect he
showed his captors or a loyalist’s pre-war renown. While some loyalists were held under
armed guard or punished merely for claiming neutrality, others, such as the loyalist
mayor of New York who was suspected of plotting to kill George Washington, was
lodged as a genteel guest. The greatest dishonour, for which loyalists were shown little
compassion by patriots, was to collude or fight alongside escaped slaves or Native
warriors on the frontier. Even gentlemen like Lt. Gov. Henry Hamilton could be shackled
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and held in a tiny cell like a condemned prisoner. In a culture built on notions of divinely
sanctioned racial hierarchy, patriots argued that the loyalists had compounded their
treason and dishonour by betraying their race. Ideas of savage revenge and dishonour
became deeply associated with the loyalists in the Whig press, and this propaganda
campaign engendered an image of brutal, vengeful Tories that survived for generations in
popular writing and professional histories.
The loyalists suffered a crushing blow to their public honour and patriarchal
power in the American Revolution which coincided with Britain’s own humiliating
defeat and the loss of her prized colonies. Loyalist exiles used the language of honour to
defend their role in the catastrophe, and explain how, why, and who was responsible for
losing Britain’s New World empire. Incompetent British generals and short-sighted peace
commissioners had betrayed the loyalists. The refugees collectively and individually
called on the British government to acknowledge their services and provide restitution for
their losses. Parliament compensated the loyalists not based on their rights as citizens, for
as colonials they had none, but to preserve the honour of the British state. The loyalists
believed they had a sacred claim on the British government by virtue of their rights as
male, property-owning subjects, who had sacrificed their personal happiness and wealth
out of duty to the imperial hierarchy. The King and Parliament were bound by the same
obligations to compensate the loyalists, or be dishonoured.
Though the loyalists did not receive the level of monetary compensation they
believed they were owed, the British government helped restore their patriarchal power
and honoured positions in new societies. The empire needed gentlemen patriarchs to act
as extensions of the state, to instill morals, manners, and loyalty to the Crown. The
political rebirth of exiled loyalist gentlemen to prominence in the new Canadian
provinces was an imperial concern. Exiles like Mather Byles Jr., Amos Botsford, and Joel
Stone built their households and re-established their patriarchal power and influence with
British assistance. They did not look upon this aid as dependence, but as theirs by right.
They employed honour as a claim-right, demanding that others, from their own
dependants to British officials, treat them with the respect owed to gentlemen. The
written claims of loyalist exiles may look humble and banally obsequious, but these
gentlemen, animated by the belief in their own honour, were fastidious, and even
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obnoxiously assertive in their demands for respect and reward. Political rebirth, like
political life, relied on the willingness of others to accept and support a gentleman’s
claim to power, and though it did not set all things to right, it created a functioning
hierarchy that allowed them to “begin the world anew”.

This dissertation has endeavoured to show that for all their political differences,
loyalists and patriots operated within the same cultural framework of symbols, rituals,
and virtues that led them to justify and rationalize their allegiances. Whatever truly
motivated patriots and loyalists, they defended their political choices and attacked their
enemies in the gendered language of honour and manhood. The power of these cultural
ideas can be seen both in their ubiquity and their pliancy. The loyalists were routinely
humiliated, emasculated, and dishonoured by their more numerous enemies, and yet they
continued to cling to ideas of honour, transforming failure and indignity into sacrifice and
martyrdom. Generations of mythmaking and nationalistic interpretations clouded the
history of the loyalists in the American Revolution, and this study accounts for the
emergence of those Tory archetypes in the print culture of the War of Independence.
Some of the gentlemen loyalists described in this dissertation went on to become the
leaders of new societies and for a time even gained the status of legendary founding
fathers of Canada. The same men were reviled as traitors and bloodthirsty villains in the
popular memory and history of the United States. This dissertation has helped explain
why, well into the twentieth century, the loyalists were regarded as both the moral
bedrock of Canada, and as the epitome of dishonoured Americans.
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Grand,” University of Waterloo School of Architecture, Cambridge,
Ontario.

June 3/09

“A Captivity So Much to be Dreaded:” Loyalism, Honour, and
Imprisonment in Revolutionary Connecticut,” Presented at
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“Loyalism in the Revolutionary Atlantic World,” University of
Maine, Orono.
January 18/08

“Saving Local History in Gananoque, Ontario,” Bruce McCaffrey
Memorial Lecture, UWO Department of History.

Nov. 17/06

“Forgotten Villains and Invented Saints: The Social Memory of
Loyalists in Ontario and Connecticut.” Presented at: “Inventing Our
Past: What, Why and How we Remember” Litchfield Historical
Society, Litchfield, Connecticut. (Invited)
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